The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY November 6, 2025
2025COA86
No. 24CA1786, People in Interest of H.L.B. — Juvenile Court — Dependency and Neglect — Termination of the Parent-Child Legal Relationship — Criteria for Termination — Less Dramatic Alternatives — Allocation of Parental Responsibilities
In this dependency and neglect case, a department of human
services appeals a juvenile court’s order denying its motion to
terminate the parent-child legal relationship, arguing that the
juvenile court erred because the court was precluded from finding
that an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) was an available
less drastic alternative to termination and in the child’s best
interests when the child’s placement provider at the time of the
termination hearing was not willing to be a party to an APR.
Applying People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 37,
the division observes that whether a less drastic alternative is
available and in the best interests of the child is a fact-intensive, case-specific inquiry to which an appellate court must accord
deference.
Applying this standard, the division concludes that, based on
the circumstances of this case, the juvenile court’s finding that
there was a less drastic alternative to termination in the form of an
APR is supported by the record. In reaching this conclusion, the
division rejects the proposition that the current availability of a
specific less drastic alternative (i.e., an APR to specific individuals)
is a necessary prerequisite for a court to conclude that a less
drastic alternative is available; instead, the division concludes that
current availability is among the multitude of factors that a juvenile
court may consider in assessing whether the less drastic alternative
is in the child’s best interests.
The division further concludes that the record supports the
court’s finding that an APR was in the child’s best interests —
meaning it was the best option for this child. Accordingly, the
division affirms the juvenile court’s order denying the motion to
terminate parental rights. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2025COA86
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1786 Mesa County District Court No. 23JV8 Honorable Valerie J. Robison, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellant,
In the Interest of H.L.B., Child-Appellant,
and Concerning A.S.,
Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON Grove, J., concurs Welling, J., specially concurs
Announced November 6, 2025
Todd M. Starr, County Attorney, Brad Junge, Assistant County Attorney, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellant The People of the State of Colorado
Josie L. Burt, Guardian Ad Litem
Just Law Group LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, the Mesa County
Department of Human Services (the Department) appeals the
juvenile court’s order denying its motion to terminate the parent-
child legal relationship between A.S. (mother) and H.L.B. (the child).
¶2 The Department contends that the juvenile court erred by
denying its motion because the court was precluded from finding
that an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) was an available
less drastic alternative to termination and in the child’s best
interests when the child’s placement provider at the time of the
termination hearing was not willing to be a party to an APR. In
other words, the Department asserts that, because there was not a
less drastic alternative to termination currently available, the
juvenile court erred as a matter of law by denying its request to
terminate mother’s parental rights.
¶3 In People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 37, the
supreme court held that a juvenile court should deny a
department’s motion to terminate the parent-child relationship if,
“in connection with its overall consideration of the statutory criteria
for termination, [the court] finds that a less drastic alternative is
available and is in the child’s best interests.” Whether a less drastic
1 alternative is available and in the best interests of the child is a
fact-intensive, case-specific inquiry to which we must accord
¶4 Based on the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the
juvenile court’s finding that there was a less drastic alternative to
termination in the form of an APR is supported by the record. In
reaching this conclusion, we reject the proposition that the current
availability of a specific less drastic alternative (i.e., an APR to
specific individuals) is a necessary prerequisite for a court to
conclude that a less drastic alternative is available; instead, current
availability is among the multitude of factors that a juvenile court
may consider in assessing whether the less drastic alternative is in
the child’s best interests.
¶5 We further conclude that the record supports the court’s
determination that an APR was in the child’s best interests —
meaning it was the best option for this child. Therefore, the
juvenile court did not err by rejecting the Department’s motion
seeking termination, and we affirm the court’s order requiring the
dependency and neglect action to remain open.
2 I. Background
¶6 The Department filed a petition in dependency or neglect
raising concerns about mother’s substance dependence. The
juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected and
adopted a treatment plan for mother requiring her to address her
mental health and substance dependence and maintain a
relationship with the child by participating in family time. One year
after the treatment plan was adopted, the Department moved to
¶7 After a contested hearing, the juvenile court found that mother
had not fully complied with her treatment plan and that the
Department had proved by clear and convincing evidence that the
statutory criteria for termination had been satisfied. But the court
nonetheless denied the Department’s motion for termination
because it found that an APR was a less drastic alternative to
termination and that an APR — not a termination of parental
rights — was in the best interests of the child.1
1 The juvenile court found that father had abandoned the child and
terminated his parental rights; father is not part of this appeal.
3 ¶8 The Department and guardian ad litem (GAL) appeal the
juvenile court’s denial of the termination motion.
II. Standard of Review
¶9 We review a juvenile court’s application of the termination
statute to evidentiary questions as a mixed question of law and fact.
See A.M., ¶ 15. “Thus, a trial court’s factual findings and
conclusions will be set aside only where they are ‘so clearly
erroneous as to find no support in the record.’” Id. (quoting People
in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 250 (Colo. 2010)).
¶ 10 As part of our review of a juvenile court’s decision to deny a
motion to terminate the parent-child relationship, we review a
juvenile court’s less drastic alternative findings, including whether
the less drastic alternative is in the child’s best interests, for clear
error. See id. at ¶¶ 15, 44, 49; see also People in Interest of M.B., 70
P.3d 618, 627 (Colo. App. 2003) (holding that if the record supports
the juvenile court’s findings and conclusions regarding whether a
less drastic alternative is in the child’s best interests, we may not
disturb the court’s determination).
¶ 11 It is for the juvenile court as the trier of fact to determine the
sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence and to
4 assess witness credibility. A.M., ¶ 15; People in Interest of C.A.K.,
652 P.2d 603, 613 (Colo. 1982). When the evidence conflicts, a
reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its
judgment for that of the juvenile court merely because there might
be evidence supporting a different result. See A.J.L., 243 P.3d at
256.
III. Applicable Law on Less Drastic Alternatives
¶ 12 A court may terminate parental rights only if it finds, by clear
and convincing evidence, that “(1) the child was adjudicated
dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an
appropriate, court-approved treatment plan, or the plan has not
been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct
or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time.” A.M., ¶ 19.
We will refer to these as the “statutory criteria.”
¶ 13 A juvenile court must also consider and eliminate less drastic
alternatives to termination before entering an order terminating the
parent-child legal relationship under section 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S.
2025. The supreme court has characterized the consideration of a
less drastic alternative as an “implicit” criterion under the statutory
5 scheme. A.M., ¶ 19; see People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530,
531 (Colo. App. 2004).
¶ 14 In determining whether to terminate the parent-child
relationship, the court must give primary consideration to the
child’s physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs. § 19-
3-604(3); People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 29.
¶ 15 The parties disagree as to whether a juvenile court must grant
a motion to terminate once it determines that all of the statutory
and implicit criteria have been established by the requisite burden
of proof. The Department and the GAL contend that the granting of
the motion is mandatory under such circumstances, while mother
contends that the court retains discretion to deny the motion even if
the court finds that all of the statutory and implicit criteria have
been established.
¶ 16 It appears that A.M. resolves this dispute in favor of the
Department and GAL. In A.M., the supreme court held that if the
juvenile court determines that the statutory criteria are satisfied
and that termination is in the best interests of the child, then it
“must” grant the motion to terminate. A.M., ¶¶ 32, 37. The court’s
direction in this regard begins by telling us that “if a trial court
6 considers a less drastic alternative in connection with its overall
evaluation of the statutory criteria for termination and finds that it
is in the child’s best interests, it should deny the termination
request.” Id. at ¶¶ 32, 37. The court goes on to hold that “if a trial
court considers a less drastic alternative in connection with its
overall consideration of the statutory criteria for termination and
finds that termination is in the child’s best interests, it must reject
the alternative and order termination.” Id. at ¶ 32 (emphasis added).
Thus, because the juvenile court here found that the statutory
criteria were satisfied — and those findings are not challenged on
appeal — the propriety of the juvenile court’s denial of the motion
turns on whether its determination that the less drastic alternative
was in the child’s best interests is supported by the record.
Accordingly, that is where we focus our analysis.
IV. Analysis
¶ 17 As noted above, the juvenile court determined that a less
drastic alternative was in the child’s best interests and that “the
best interests of [the child] would not be termination of parental
rights.” The juvenile court found that an APR was a less drastic
alternative to termination because it met the child’s primary need of
7 maintaining a relationship with mother. The court further found
that this primary need outweighed other factors, including mother’s
failure to demonstrate sobriety and the placement provider’s
concerns about becoming a permanent placement under an APR.
Based on this finding, the court concluded that an APR was an
available less drastic alternative that was in the child’s best
interests, and, therefore, it denied the termination motion. We
conclude that the juvenile court’s ruling is consistent with A.M. and
enjoys record support.
8 A. The Availability of a Less Drastic Alternative Finding
¶ 18 The Department contends that “an APR was not available
because the placement would not accept one.”2 Specifically, the
placement provider testified that she was not open to an APR
because “dealing with [mother] is difficult . . . and we don’t want to
have to deal with it anymore.” Based on this testimony, the
Department contends that, because the less drastic alternative was
not currently available, the juvenile court necessarily erred in its
assessment of the less drastic alternative criterion for termination.
We disagree.
2 Mischaracterizing the juvenile court’s order denying the motion to
terminate as one also ordering an APR to the current placement, the Department initially asserted a claim that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the order being appealed. But once it was clarified at oral argument that the juvenile court did not enter an APR order but instead solely denied the termination motion because it found that an APR was in the child’s best interests, the Department abandoned its subject matter jurisdiction challenge. And because we are convinced that the juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction to enter the order being appealed, we do not address this issue further. See People in Interest of J.W. v. C.O., 2017 CO 105, ¶ 24 (where a “court has already obtained subject matter jurisdiction, a later failure to follow statutory requirements does not divest the court of subject matter jurisdiction” (quoting People in Interest of Clinton, 762 P.2d 1381, 1387 (Colo. 1988))).
9 ¶ 19 A less drastic alternative analysis requires a juvenile court to
determine which permanency outcome for a child serves the child’s
best interests. In the termination context, if a return to home is not
possible, the comparison is often between termination and
adoption, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, an alternate
path to permanency that leaves a respondent’s parental rights
intact, such as a permanent placement through legal guardianship
or an APR, or other planned permanent living arrangements. § 19-
3-702(4)(a)(I)-(V), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 20 The Department seems to suggest that when assessing
whether an APR is an available less drastic alternative, the court
must constrain its consideration of an APR to specific, identified
individuals. But the Department does not cite, nor are we aware of,
any authority that so constrains the framing of the issue of less
drastic alternatives. Indeed, when a court concludes that
termination is in a child’s best interests because that child’s needs
are best met by the permanency that only termination and adoption
can provide, for that finding to survive appellate scrutiny, the child
does not need to be in a potentially adoptive home, nor do we
require that a specific adoptive placement be identified or known to
10 the court at the time of termination. See People in Interest of T.E.M.,
124 P.3d 905, 910-11 (Colo. App. 2005) (declining to disturb a
juvenile court’s rejection of placement with a relative as a less
drastic alternative and its finding that termination and adoption
were in the children’s best interests “whether or not they were
ultimately adopted” and notwithstanding that the children were not
placed in a potentially adoptive home at the time of the termination
hearing).
¶ 21 We are not persuaded that the requirement is any different
when it comes to assessing whether an APR is in a child’s best
interests. In other words, in assessing the less drastic alternative
criterion, a juvenile court may consider whether the alternative legal
disposition — e.g., an APR — is available and in a child’s best
interests, even when a specific person has not been identified or the
specific terms of a proposed APR are not before the court.
¶ 22 Even though a less drastic alternative to termination is not
dependent on a particular out-of-home placement provider,
divisions of this court have viewed approvingly a juvenile court’s
consideration of factors related to the child’s current or potential
placement provider, including (1) attempts already made by the
11 court or a department to cultivate alternative dispositions to
termination, C.S. v. People in Interest of I.S., 83 P.3d 627, 640-41
(Colo. 2004); (2) the identification of persons who could be
permanent placement providers under an APR or guardianship,
D.B-J., 89 P.3d at 532; (3) a proposed placement provider’s
understanding of the child’s needs and conditions, id.; (4) a
proposed placement provider’s preference for a certain permanency
disposition, People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 920 (Colo.
App. 2011); and (5) the parent’s fitness to care for the child, People
in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 38.
¶ 23 In other words, whether a less drastic alternative is available
is a distinct consideration from a court’s later finding of whether
that alternative is in the child’s best interests. And here, the only
barrier to an APR identified by the Department and GAL is the
child’s current placement provider’s expressed hesitation or
unwillingness to be a party to an APR. But as mother correctly
points out, the current placement provider’s expressed preference
for adoption does not make an APR unavailable. Instead, a
particular placement provider’s willingness to enter into an APR is
only one consideration for the juvenile court to weigh to determine
12 whether an APR would be in the best interests of the child. See id.
Likewise, the present availability of a specific APR proposal is yet
another consideration; indeed, even when a placement provider is
willing to enter into an APR with a parent, the court may properly
determine that such an arrangement is not the best option for the
child and, therefore, not in the child’s best interests. See D.B-J., 89
P.3d at 532 (upholding a juvenile court’s determination that a
proposed placement was not a less drastic alternative to
termination based on a finding that the placement provider lacked
appreciation of the child’s needs and conditions).
¶ 24 Based on the record that was before the juvenile court, we
conclude that it was not error for the court to determine in this case
that an APR was an available less drastic alternative to termination.
See People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1124 (Colo. 1986)
(determining that the juvenile court’s crediting of testimony that a
child’s need to maintain contact with his parent was secondary to
his primary needs of consistent and reliable parenting supported its
no less drastic alternative finding); see also In re Marriage of Kann,
2017 COA 94, ¶ 36 (“[O]ur supreme court has . . . expressed
unbridled confidence in trial courts to weigh conflicting evidence.”).
13 B. The Child’s Best Interests Finding
¶ 25 We now turn to whether the record supports that an APR was
in the child’s best interests. We conclude it does.
¶ 26 In A.M., the supreme court stated that, for a less drastic
alternative to be viable, “it must not only be adequate, it must be in
the child’s best interests.” A.M., ¶ 27. In other words, whether a
less drastic alternative is available is likely easy to ascertain, but
whether it is in the child’s best interests involves a complex
analysis, often requiring the court to weigh and resolve conflicting
evidence and make credibility determinations. See A.R., ¶ 38.
¶ 27 To highlight the complexity and range of what a juvenile court
considers when determining whether a less drastic alternative is in
the child’s best interests, we note that divisions of this court have
looked favorably upon juvenile courts resting their best interest
determinations on the following findings: (1) it was important for
the child to maintain an ongoing relationship with a parent, see id.;
(2) the child was bonded to the parent or interested in maintaining
a relationship, see People in Interest of E.W., 2022 COA 12, ¶ 36,
aff’d sub nom., R.W. v. People In Interest of E.W., 2022 CO 51;
(3) the child needed permanency, see People in Interest of Z.M., 2020
14 COA 3M, ¶ 30; (4) it was important for the child to maintain
relationships with siblings and other biological family members, see
People in Interest of J.L.M., 143 P.3d 1125, 1127 (Colo. App. 2006);
and (5) the child’s developmental needs might preclude a long-term
placement with siblings, see People in Interest of Z.P., 167 P.3d 211,
215 (Colo. App. 2007). With this in mind, we turn to the facts of
this case as found by the juvenile court.
¶ 28 At the time of the termination hearing, the child in this case
was ten years old.
¶ 29 The child’s placement provider testified that mother and the
child had maintained a strong relationship throughout the
dependency case. The placement provider testified that the child
and mother “need to have a relationship with each other” and that
her “ultimate goal” would be for mother to take care of the child
again one day, even if the case ended in a termination.
¶ 30 The family time facilitator described a robust relationship
between the child and mother. The facilitator testified that mother
was appropriate in her engagement and redirection of the child
when necessary. The facilitator also described mother’s unique
insight into the child’s feelings and experiences. The facilitator
15 further testified that mother was able to engage the child to express
his feelings and put “her own needs last and direct[] her efforts
towards comforting [the child],” particularly when he was upset
after overhearing comments about the case direction and about
mother. The family time facilitator advocated for an expansion of
family time and the addition of family therapy.
¶ 31 The caseworker testified that the child advocated for more and
less restrictive time with mother, a request approved by the
Department. The caseworker testified that the child was asking to
return to mother’s care at least part-time and had consistently
reported feeling safe with mother.
¶ 32 Mother’s expert in the mental and emotional impact of
permanency outcomes, childhood trauma, and child development
testified that a termination outcome for a ten-year-old child bonded
to their mother would be “catastrophic.” The expert opined that the
child’s age was a significant factor in the potential harm caused by
a termination because he “has the knowledge, experience, and
opinions and feelings and memories associated with” mother. The
expert opined that a child may have dysregulated or extreme
behaviors after being told that adoption is a possible outcome, in
16 part because a child’s “psychological wellbeing hinges on his
opportunity to maintain that . . . connected bond with his mother.”
Finally, the expert explained that there was “no reasonable
certainty” that such a connected bond would be maintained
through termination and adoption, but “there is that guarantee
through a well-constructed and appropriate APR.”
¶ 33 The Department responds by pointing to evidence presented at
the hearing supporting a conclusion that the child needs
permanency. Specifically, the Department notes the caseworker’s
opinion that the child felt “in limbo and [wa]s confused about where
he is going to be.” As we have said, the need for permanency is but
one consideration of many for the court to weigh when determining
whether a less drastic alternative is available and is in the child’s
best interests. It is for the juvenile court, however, to weigh the
evidence, and we cannot substitute our judgment for the juvenile
court’s determination. See A.J.L., 243 P.3d at 256; People in
Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 29; M.B., 70 P.3d at 627.
¶ 34 We acknowledge that this record could support a contrary
outcome, but we must defer to the juvenile court’s weighing of the
conflicting evidence, as we would if the court had found that the
17 less drastic alternative, while available, was not in the child’s best
interests and, thus, had granted the Department’s motion to
terminate. Indeed, even a similar record with the passage of time or
subsequent motions for termination may compel the same fact
finder to reach a different outcome.
¶ 35 But when, as was the case here, the juvenile court finds that a
less drastic alternative “is in the child’s best interests, it should
deny the termination request.” A.M., ¶¶ 32, 37. And because there
is record evidence supporting the juvenile court’s finding that an
APR was a less drastic alternative to termination and was in the
child’s best interests, we won’t disturb the juvenile court’s
judgment.
V. Conclusion
¶ 36 The juvenile court’s order denying the Department’s motion to
terminate and requiring the dependency and neglect action to
remain open is therefore affirmed.
JUDGE GROVE concurs.
JUDGE WELLING specially concurs.
18 JUDGE WELLING, specially concurring.
¶ 37 I am fully on board with the majority opinion in its rationale
and conclusion. I write separately to raise a concern regarding the
proper standard of review that appellate courts should apply when
reviewing a juvenile court’s less drastic alternative findings,
particularly the question of whether the less drastic alternative is in
the child’s best interests. As we noted in Part II of the majority
opinion, People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶¶ 15, 44,
provides that we review a juvenile court’s less drastic alternative
findings, including whether the less drastic alternative is in the
child’s best interests, for clear error. Supra ¶¶ 9-10.
¶ 38 We are of course bound by supreme court precedent, see In re
Estate of Ramstetter, 2016 COA 81, ¶ 40, and, therefore, we must
review the juvenile court’s less drastic alternative finding for clear
error as A.M., ¶¶ 15, 44, requires. While the supreme court
reaffirmed the clear error standard for a juvenile court’s less drastic
alternative ruling in People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80, it
also summed up its ruling in that case by stating, “we see no abuse
of discretion by the district court when it concluded that there were
no less drastic alternatives to termination,” id. at ¶ 4 (emphasis
19 added), leaving some room for questioning whether the court
applied a clear error or abuse of discretion standard in that case.
¶ 39 I think there is a strong case to be made that an abuse of
discretion standard should apply to a juvenile court’s less drastic
alternative finding. After all, the clear error standard is so
deferential that appellate courts will only reverse ‘“if there is no
evidence in the record’ to support the . . . court’s factual findings.”
Galiant Homes, LLC v. Herlik, 2025 COA 3, ¶ 22 (quoting Byerly v.
Bank of Colo., 2013 COA 35, ¶ 32). I am concerned that this
standard may render a juvenile court’s less drastic alternative
findings virtually unreviewable, particularly when a court may
reject some or all of a witness’s testimony, see In re Marriage of
Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 50 (a court can believe all, part, or none
of a witness’s testimony, even if uncontroverted).
¶ 40 At the very least, I wonder whether the availability of the less
drastic alternative should be treated as a factual finding reviewed
for clear error, while the less drastic alternative being in the child’s
best interests should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. While
A.M., ¶¶ 15, 44, treated best interests of the child as a factual
finding reviewed for clear error, the supreme court and divisions of
20 this court have routinely reviewed best interests of the child
findings in the domestic relations context for an abuse of discretion.
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 148 (Colo. 2005)
(reviewing “[a] best interests determination under subsection 14–
10–129(2)(c),” C.R.S. 2004, “for an abuse of discretion”); In re
Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶ 52 (Where the trial court
ruled that the child could move with the father out of state, the
appellate court reviewing the order stated, “[W]e perceive no abuse
of discretion in the court’s consideration and resolution of the best
interests factors.”).
¶ 41 All of this said, although in the majority we reviewed the
juvenile court’s order for clear error, I would also conclude that the
court’s finding that there was a less drastic alternative to
termination available that was in the child’s best interests was not
an abuse of discretion. A court abuses its discretion when its
decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it
misapplies or misconstrues the law. See People in Interest of E.B.,
2022 CO 55, ¶ 14. The juvenile court here provided a well-reasoned
analysis that, despite the current placement provider not being
amenable to an APR, an APR was in the child’s best interests. It
21 based this conclusion on appropriate best interest factors, including
placing great weight on this child’s need to maintain a relationship
with mother and the benefits to him of doing so. Thus, I don’t
discern an abuse of discretion, much less clear error, by the
juvenile court.