Peo in Interest of PS

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 12, 2026
• Docket: 25CA1448
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA1448 Peo in Interest of PS 02-12-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1448 Delta County District Court No. 23JV30014 Honorable Michael A. O’Hara III, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of P.S. and F.H., Children,

and Concerning C.H. and T.D.H.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED

Division V Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY Tow and Taubman*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 12, 2026

John Baier, County Attorney, Adriana Hartley, Assistant County Attorney, Delta, Colorado, for Appellee

Robert G. Tweedell, Counsel for Youth, Delta, Colorado, for P.S.

Robert G. Tweedell, Guardian Ad Litem, for F.H.

Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant C.H.

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Justin Twardowski, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant T.D.H.

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 C.H. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent-

child legal relationships with P.S. and F.H. (the children), and

T.D.H. (father) appeals the judgment terminating his parent-child

legal relationship with F.H. We affirm the judgments.

I. Background

¶2 The Delta County Department of Human Services filed a

petition in dependency and neglect that documented concerns

about educational neglect for then-ten-year-old P.S., medical

neglect for then-sixteen-month-old F.H., and the conditions in the

camper where the family was living.

¶3 Both parents entered admissions, and the juvenile court

adjudicated the children dependent and neglected and adopted

treatment plans for the parents. The Department placed the

children separately for most of the case; it placed P.S. in the Denver

area about a month after filing the petition.

¶4 The Department later moved to terminate the parents’ parental

rights. Almost two years after the Department filed the petition, the

juvenile court terminated mother’s parental rights to the children

and father’s parental rights to F.H. following a contested hearing.

1 II. Reasonable Efforts

¶5 Both parents contend that the Department failed to make

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate them and reunite the family. We

disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶6 A human services department must make such reasonable

efforts before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights under

section 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025. §§ 19-1-103(114),

19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025. “Reasonable

efforts” means the “exercise of diligence and care” for a child who is

in out-of-home placement. The reasonable efforts standard is

satisfied when the department provides services to the family in

accordance with section 19-3-208. § 19-1-103(114).

¶7 “We review the juvenile court’s findings of evidentiary fact —

the raw, historical data underlying the controversy — for clear error

and accept them if they have record support.” People in Interest of

S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10, 486 P.3d 1201, 1204. But the

ultimate determination of whether the Department provided

reasonable efforts is a legal conclusion that we review de novo.

People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8, 527 P.3d 404, 407.

2 ¶8 The Children’s Code specifies that services provided in

accordance with section 19-3-208 satisfy the reasonable efforts

standard. See § 19-1-103(114). Among the services required under

section 19-3-208 are screening, assessments, and individual case

plans for the provision of services; home-based family and crisis

counseling; information and referral services to available public and

private assistance resources; family time services for parents with

children in out-of-home placement; and placement services

including foster care and emergency shelter. § 19-3-208(2)(b).

¶9 The juvenile court did not make findings regarding the

Department’s reasonable efforts. However, a juvenile court’s failure

to make express findings on this issue does not, standing alone,

establish a failure by the court to ensure that the Department made

reasonable efforts. People in Interest of A.S.L., ¶ 15, 527 P.3d at

408.

B. Mother’s Contentions

¶ 10 Reviewing de novo the ultimate question of whether the

Department satisfied its statutory reasonable efforts obligation, we

conclude that the record demonstrates that the Department met the

reasonable efforts standard. The Department devised a treatment

3 plan for mother and, according to the caseworker’s uncontroverted

testimony, it provided mother with life skills services, parenting

classes, substance monitoring, and mental health evaluations.

Furthermore, the Division facilitated individual therapy,

occupational therapy, speech language therapy, and physical

therapy for the children.

¶ 11 Mother contends that the Department failed to make

“reasonable efforts to rehabilitate [her] and reunite the family”

because the Department placed P.S. “too far away for the [p]arents

and P.S. to have a meaningful amount of in-person family time.”

We conclude that the Department met its reasonable efforts

obligation to provide mother with meaningful opportunities for

family time. The Department initially placed P.S. with a series of

kinship placement providers in Delta County. When P.S. required

specialized care, however, the Department could not locate a

placement for him in Delta County. The Department initially placed

him in Brighton and later at a therapeutic foster home in Denver.

The Department offered mother opportunities to participate in

family time with P.S., both virtually and in-person. When mother

logged into virtual family time, she was often distracted by shopping

4 or other tasks instead of interacting with the child. Even though

the Department offered mother financial and logistical support to

help her attend in-person family time with P.S., mother “would

often say that [she] couldn’t” attend. In addition, Mother declined

the Department’s offers to cover the cost of lodging, bus passes, and

train tickets to facilitate her visits with P.S.

C. Father’s Contentions

¶ 12 Father contends that the Department failed to make

reasonable efforts because it did not refer him for substance testing

after his probation was revoked. But we discern no error. The

caseworker testified that further substance testing services for

father were not necessary because the Department was not

concerned about his substance use. See People in Interest of S.L.,

2017 COA 160, ¶ 31, 421 P.3d 1207, 1215 (holding that to satisfy

the reasonable efforts requirement, the department of human

services should “provide the parents with necessary and needed

services”).

¶ 13 Father also contends that the Department failed to provide

reasonable efforts because it offered father family time with P.S.,

but that father was unable to meaningfully participate in it because

5 the Department had placed P.S. at a distant location. But father is

not P.S.’s parent. Father therefore lacked standing to raise issues

concerning P.S. People in Interest of E.S., 49 P.3d 1221, 1222-23

(Colo. App. 2002). We therefore do not address this claim.

III. Appropriate Treatment Plan

¶ 14 Father next contends that his treatment plan was not

appropriate. We disagree.

¶ 15 The purpose of a treatment plan is to preserve the parent-child

legal relationship by helping the parent overcome the problems that

required the intervention into the family. People in Interest of L.M.,

2018 COA 57M, ¶ 25, 433 P.3d 114, 119-20. Therefore, an

appropriate treatment plan is one that the juvenile court approves,

relates to the child’s needs, and provides treatment objectives that

are reasonably calculated to render the parent fit to provide

adequate parenting to the child within a reasonable time.

§ 19-1-103(12); People in Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶ 13, 369

P.3d 822, 826.

¶ 16 We measure the appropriateness of a treatment plan by its

likelihood of success in reuniting the family, which we assess in

light of the facts existing when the juvenile court approved the plan.

6 People in Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1071 (Colo. App. 2005). In

determining whether a treatment plan is appropriate, the court

must consider whether the plan’s objectives adequately address the

safety concerns identified during the assessment of the family.

People in Interest of K.B., ¶ 14, 369 P.3d at 826. A treatment plan’s

ultimate lack of success does not mean it was inappropriate when

the court approved it. Id.

¶ 17 Father claims that his treatment plan became inappropriate

when the juvenile court did not modify it to (1) address substance

testing after father’s probation was revoked or (2) require a

neuropsychological evaluation. We disagree.

¶ 18 When the juvenile court approved father’s treatment plan, it

also granted his request to limit his substance testing requirements

to sharing with the caseworker the testing results he was required

to submit to his probation officer. The revocation of father’s

probation ended his obligation to provide substance testing under

the terms of his treatment plan. In other words, the juvenile court

did not need to amend father’s treatment plan to reflect this change

in his circumstances. (Although the juvenile court noted father’s

failure to submit substance testing while he was on probation, the

7 record does not indicate that the juvenile court erroneously

imposed an expectation that father would submit substance testing

results after his probation was revoked.)

¶ 19 Father also claims that the treatment plan was inappropriate

because the Department wanted to add a requirement that father

complete a neuropsychological evaluation but did not formally do

so. But this is not what father argued at trial. Instead, father

objected to the caseworker’s testimony about the possible need for a

neuropsychological evaluation and urged the juvenile court to find

that father “should not be punished for not participating in an

evaluation he was not required or ordered to complete.” Therefore,

we will not consider this issue. People in Interest of N.A.T., 134 P.3d

535, 537 (Colo. App. 2006) (noting that an appellate court will not

consider an issue when a parent took the opposite position in the

juvenile court).

IV. Fitness

¶ 20 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

she was not fit and not likely to become fit within a reasonable

period of time. We discern no error.

8 ¶ 21 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders the

parent “unable or unwilling to give the child reasonable parental

care to include, at a minimum, nurturing and safe parenting

sufficiently adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional, and

mental health needs and conditions.” § 19-3-604(2).

¶ 22 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of fact and law because it involves

application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15, 480 P.3d 682, 686. As

noted above, we review the juvenile court’s findings of evidentiary

fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo, including a

conclusion that a parent is unfit. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S.,

¶¶ 10-11, 486 P.3d at 1204-05.

¶ 23 Mother contends, with record support, that she substantially

complied with her treatment plan because she completed a

psychological evaluation and complied with the recommendation for

mental health treatment, signed the requested releases of

information, completed a parenting class, obtained an appropriate

apartment, prepared a budget, remained in contact with the

Department, and rarely missed virtual or in-person family time with

9 the children. However, partial or even substantial compliance with

a treatment plan may not render a parent fit. People in Interest of

S.L., ¶ 11, 421 P.3d at 1212.

¶ 24 The juvenile court found that mother was unfit and unlikely to

become fit within a reasonable period of time because she did not

comply with key portions of the treatment plan and did not

adequately address the concerns that brought the case to the

juvenile court’s attention. The juvenile court found that, although

mother regularly attended family time, she “failed to engage

sufficiently” with the children during those sessions. The juvenile

court also expressed significant concern about mother’s inability to

provide a safe and stable environment for the children. And the

juvenile court noted that, although “[b]oth children need significant

services based on their prior experiences with” mother, she was

“unwilling or unable to make accommodations to meet the needs of

these children.” The juvenile court found that mother “still fail[ed]

to recognize appropriate behaviors” with P.S. and struggled with

“even the most basic parenting skills despite participation in

education.”

10 ¶ 25 The record supports these findings. The caseworker provided

uncontroverted testimony that mother often shopped or engaged in

other activities during virtual family time rather than talking with

the children. According to the caseworker, mother did not respond

to coaching about engaging with the children in an age-appropriate

manner. The caseworker testified that both children had “complex

needs,” meaning “there are several different areas in their lives that

would need constant or long-term specialized care.” The

caseworker, an expert in child welfare and child protection, opined

that mother did not understand the children’s needs and was not

able to follow through with services for them.

¶ 26 While the caseworker acknowledged that mother “has

attempted to engage in some services and has been consistent in

some services,” the caseworker also testified that mother only

consistently engaged after the Department filed the termination

motion, demonstrating that mother was unable to show stability

over time. The caseworker said it was “huge” that mother had

obtained an appropriate apartment, but that “it [was] only a little

part . . . of the case.” The caseworker further testified that mother

demonstrated minimal progress in mitigating concerns regarding

11 her financial stability and budgeting, personal hygiene, and

maintaining a safe home environment.

¶ 27 In sum, while some evidence supported mother’s position that

she had complied with certain of the elements of her treatment

plan, there was also evidence that she remained unable to meet the

children’s complex needs. It is within the juvenile court’s purview

to weigh evidence and determine witness credibility. See In re

Marriage of Kann, 2017 COA 94, ¶ 36, 488 P.3d 245, 252 (“[O]ur

supreme court has . . . expressed unbridled confidence in trial

courts to weigh conflicting evidence.”); see also Carrillo v. People,

974 P.2d 478, 486 (Colo. 1999) (recognizing “the trial court’s unique

role and perspective in evaluating the demeanor and body language

of live witnesses” and “discourag[ing] an appellate court from

second-guessing those judgments based on a cold record”).

¶ 28 Mother also contends that “[t]o the extent poverty remained an

issue for this family, the [juvenile] court erred [by] terminating the

[p]arents’ parental rights because of the downstream effects of the

family’s socioeconomic circumstances.” Mother presented this

argument at the termination hearing, and the juvenile court

explicitly addressed and rejected it.

12 ¶ 29 The juvenile court acknowledged the truth of mother’s

argument that the “children should not be removed from [mother

and father’s] case [sic] because they are poor.” The juvenile court

found, however, that “nearly two years after removal, the parents

are unwilling to seek out or accept assistance from others or

government agencies to improve their situation or the lives of their

children.” It further found that the parents had “militated against

complying with the [t]reatment [p]lan” and “will not engage in

services that are designed to assist them and their children.”

¶ 30 These findings make clear that the juvenile court found

mother to be unfit not because of her socioeconomic circumstances

but because she was “unable or unwilling to give the child[ren]

reasonable parental care to include, at a minimum, nurturing and

safe parenting sufficiently adequate to meet the child[ren]’s

physical, emotional, and mental health needs and conditions.”

§ 19-3-604(2).

¶ 31 Mother also contends that, even if she was unfit, the juvenile

court erred by terminating her parental rights because termination

was not in the children’s best interests. This argument fails for two

reasons. First, mother claims that termination was not in P.S.’s

13 best interests because he was not in a potentially permanent home

at the time of the termination hearing. But “the child does not need

to be in a potentially adoptive home, nor do we require that a

specific adoptive placement be identified or known to the court at

the time of termination.” People in Interest of H.L.B., 2025 COA 86,

¶ 20, ___ P.3d ___, ___. Second, and more importantly, the

Children’s Code does not support the conclusion that “a parent-

child relationship should be continued when it has been shown by

clear and convincing evidence that . . . the parent is unfit, an

appropriate treatment plan has been tried without success, and the

conduct or condition of the parent is unlikely to change within a

reasonable time.” People in Interest of A.M., ¶ 36, 480 P.3d at 689

(quoting People in Interest of A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625, 637-38 (Colo.

1982)). In other words, the Children’s Code does not support a

conclusion that termination is not in the child’s best interests if the

other statutory criteria for termination have been met.

V. Disposition

¶ 32 The judgments are affirmed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.