25CA0861 Peo in Interest of KE 12-24-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0861 Mesa County District Court No. 22JV5 Honorable Craig P. Henderson, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of K.E., G.E., and E.E., Children,
and Concerning K.S. and J.E.,
Appellants.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE Pawar and Yun, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 24, 2025
Todd M. Starr, County Attorney, Brad Junge, Assistant County Attorney, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellee
Robert G. Tweedell, Guardian Ad Litem
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant K.S.
Beth Padilla, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Durango, Colorado, for Appellant J.E. ¶1 J.E. (father) and K.S. (mother) appeal the judgment
terminating their parent-child legal relationships with K.E., G.E.,
and E.E. (the children). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In January 2022, the Mesa County Department of Human
Services received a report about a law enforcement investigation
into an allegation that father had punched S.E. — the couple’s
fifteen-year-old daughter — and threatened to kill her. During the
investigation, law enforcement learned of other allegations of
physical abuse by father, including incidents in which he reportedly
shot S.E. with an “airsoft gun” and wrapped duct tape around her
head. Based on these reports, law enforcement arrested the
parents, removed the children from the home, and placed them into
the Department’s custody.
¶3 The Department then filed a petition in dependency or neglect,
alleging physical abuse by father, failure to prevent that abuse by
mother, domestic violence between the parents, and concerns about
the condition of the home. The parents accepted a deferred
adjudication under section 19-3-505(5), C.R.S. 2025, and they
agreed to comply with treatment plans adopted by the court. Before
1 the deferred period expired, the parents resolved their criminal
cases: (1) a jury found father not guilty after a trial, and (2) the
criminal court dismissed mother’s case at the district attorney’s
request. After resolving their criminal cases, the parents believed
that the children should be returned to them, but they nevertheless
agreed to admit to the petition so that the court could enter a
formal adjudication. However, the parents requested a return home
hearing, which occurred over multiple days between May 2023 and
January 2024. After the hearing, a magistrate entered a written
order denying the parents’ request.
¶4 In March 2024, the Department moved to terminate the
parents’ parental rights. Before the termination hearing occurred,
S.E. turned eighteen, and the court dismissed her from the case.
The juvenile court held a hearing on whether to terminate the
parents’ parental rights to the other three children over five days in
January and March 2025, and it heard testimony from three
caseworkers, a life skills worker, a foster parent, individuals
involved with the criminal cases, father’s therapist, a family time
coordinator, father’s expert witnesses, and both parents. After
hearing the evidence, the court determined that, although the
2 criminal cases were resolved in the parent’s favor, “there were
numerous issues arising” from those incidents that the parents
needed to address to become fit, as well as other issues not related
to the criminal cases. But the court found that the parents had not
addressed any of those issues because they did not comply with
their treatment plans and were therefore unfit. The court
terminated the parent-child legal relationships between the parents
and the children.
II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review
¶5 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been
adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not
reasonably complied with an appropriate treatment plan or the plan
has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s
conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.
¶6 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves
application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in
Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the court’s
3 factual findings for clear error, but we review de novo its legal
conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S.,
2020 COA 12, ¶ 10. The credibility of the witnesses; sufficiency,
probative value, and weight of the evidence; and the inferences and
conclusions drawn therefrom are within the juvenile court’s
discretion. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo.
2010).
III. Treatment Plan
¶7 Father asserts that his treatment plan was inappropriate
because the components requiring him to complete a capacity to
parent evaluation and neuropsychological evaluation were
unnecessary. We discern no reversible error.
A. Additional Background
¶8 Father’s original treatment plan under the deferred
adjudication agreement required him to (1) participate in family
time; (2) address his mental health and/or substance abuse issues;
(3) complete a psychological evaluation; (4) maintain stable housing
and income; (5) engage in life skills training and parenting
education; (6) cooperate with the caseworker and other
4 professionals; and (7) comply with the conditions of his criminal
case.
¶9 In March 2023, the Department moved to amend father’s
treatment plan as follows: (1) substitute the psychological
evaluation for a neuropsychological evaluation (component three)
and (2) add a capacity to parent evaluation (component eight).
Father objected to these modifications. At the adjudication and
dispositional hearings in April 2023, the magistrate noted the
objection to the new components and stated that the parties would
“probably have to set [a] hearing[] on the motion[] to modify the
treatment plan.” The court then adopted the original treatment
plan.
¶ 10 In August 2023, the Department filed a motion for permanent
plan review, in which it requested that the magistrate amend the
treatment plan to remove the objective related to father’s criminal
case. However, the form order submitted alongside the motion
included an amended treatment plan that not only removed the
criminal case objective but also included amended component three
and component eight. Although the magistrate did not address the
amended treatment plan at the permanency planning hearing, it
5 signed the form order and therefore effectively adopted the amended
treatment plan.
¶ 11 In December 2023, the Department filed another motion for
permanent plan review; that motion did not request any
amendments to the treatment plan, and the form order submitted
alongside the motion still included the new components. On the
final day of the return home hearing in January 2024, father’s
counsel asked the magistrate to allow her to present testimony from
her expert witness on the appropriateness of components three and
eight. In response, the magistrate stated that counsel never filed a
written response to the motion filed in December (even though that
motion did not request amendments to the treatment plan). The
magistrate did not permit father’s counsel to question the witness
about the amended treatment plan, but the magistrate gave counsel
seven days to respond to the December motion.
¶ 12 Father’s counsel responded, arguing that the amended
treatment plan was inappropriate. But at the next permanency
review hearing, the magistrate told counsel that she could not
object to the components at that point because he had already
ordered them in August 2023. Counsel then said that she would
6 “change [her] pleading to a motion to amend to delete th[ose]
portion[s]” of the treatment plan, and she requested an evidentiary
hearing on removing components three and eight from the plan.
The court held a hearing over four days in July 2024. After hearing
the evidence, the magistrate denied father’s request to amend the
treatment plan, finding that the amended treatment plan was
“reasonable and appropriate.”
¶ 13 At the termination hearing, the juvenile court found that
father’s treatment plan was appropriate, and it noted that
components three and eight were “clearly necessary for
reunification.”
B. Analysis
¶ 14 On appeal, father first asserts that he was deprived of due
process when the magistrate denied him an opportunity to be heard
on the amended components. But as father acknowledges, he never
challenged any of the magistrate’s rulings. A petition for review of
the magistrate’s order is a prerequisite before an appeal may be
filed with this court. See § 19-1-108(5.5), C.R.S. 2025. Therefore,
we lack jurisdiction to consider father’s challenges to the
magistrate’s rulings. See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning
7 J.H., 2021 COA 94, ¶ 14 (dismissing an appeal of a parentage
adjudication because the appealing party did not file a petition for
review with the district court).
¶ 15 Father also asserts that his attorney was ineffective for failing
to challenge the magistrate’s rulings. In evaluating a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel in a dependency or neglect
proceeding, the parent must show that (1) counsel’s performance
was outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance
and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the parent —
that is, a reasonable probability exists that but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the proceeding’s outcome would have been
different. A.R. v. D.R., 2020 CO 10, ¶ 60. “If the parent fails to
establish either prong of this test, the claim fails.” People in Interest
of C.B., 2019 COA 168, ¶ 26.
¶ 16 Even assuming, without deciding, that counsel provided
deficient performance, father’s allegations are not sufficient to prove
prejudice. See A.R., ¶ 63 (when a parent’s allegations lack
sufficient specificity, the appellate court may summarily deny the
ineffective assistance claim). In his brief, father alleges that he was
prejudiced because, but for counsel’s deficient performance, “there
8 would have been clarity as to what was included in the court-
ordered treatment plan and there would have been appellate
review.” But father has not explained how the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different if counsel had filed a petition
for magistrate review. What’s more, father does not allege that, had
counsel filed a petition for magistrate review, he would have
succeeded, the components would have been removed, and his
parental rights would not have been terminated. We therefore
reject father’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
¶ 17 Finally, father asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding
that the amended treatment plan was appropriate. We disagree.
¶ 18 The purpose of a treatment plan is to preserve the parent-child
legal relationship by assisting the parent in overcoming the
problems that required the government’s intervention. K.D. v.
People, 139 P.3d 695, 699 (Colo. 2006). A treatment plan is
appropriate if it is reasonably calculated to render the parent fit to
provide adequate parenting to the child within a reasonable time
and relates to the child’s needs. § 19-1-103(12), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 19 As for component three, father asserts that he did not need a
neuropsychological evaluation because the purpose of the
9 evaluation was to discover if he had any disabilities, but he had
already told the Department that he had disabilities and needed
accommodations. Although the record indicates that father told the
Department about his disabilities and made some requests for
accommodations, the evidence also shows that a
neuropsychological evaluation was necessary to help accommodate
father. For example, father said that he had a brain injury and
“borderline autism,” but he did not offer the Department any
information about a formal diagnosis or specific accommodations.
The second caseworker testified that the neuropsychological
evaluation (which father’s attorney originally requested) could have
provided clear diagnoses and made recommendations on the
services that the Department could have offered father. Therefore,
the record supports the juvenile court’s finding that component
three was appropriate.
¶ 20 As for component eight, father asserts that he did not need a
capacity to parent evaluation because “there was no identified
problem during the parents’ parenting time that would necessitate a
parent capacity evaluation.” In support of this argument, father
relies on the opinion of his own expert witness. But the juvenile
10 court did not rely on this expert’s opinion when it made its decision.
In other words, the court did not find father’s expert persuasive,
and we must defer to that decision when the evidence supports the
court’s judgment. See A.J.L., 243 P.3d at 249-50. In this case, two
caseworkers, who were designated as experts in child protection,
testified that the treatment plan was appropriate with components
three and eight. Therefore, because the record supports the court’s
finding, we cannot disturb its decision.
IV. Reasonable Efforts
¶ 21 Both parents contend that the juvenile court erred by finding
that the Department made reasonable efforts. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law
¶ 22 In determining fitness under section 19-3-604(1)(c), the
juvenile court must consider whether the county department of
human services made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent
and reunite the family. §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h),
C.R.S. 2025. “Reasonable efforts” is defined as the “exercise of
diligence and care” to reunify parents with their children, and the
department’s reasonable efforts obligation is satisfied if it provides
services in accordance with section 19-3-208. § 19-1-103(114).
11 ¶ 23 When determined “necessary and appropriate,” the
department must provide (1) screening, assessments, and
individual case plans; (2) home-based family and crisis counseling;
(3) information and referral services; (4) family time; and
(5) placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). The juvenile court should
consider whether the services provided were appropriate to support
the parent’s treatment plan, People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d
911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011), by “considering the totality of the
circumstances and accounting for all services and resources
provided to a parent to ensure the completion of the entire
treatment plan,” People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35,
¶ 33.
¶ 24 The parent is ultimately responsible for using the services to
comply with the plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279,
1285 (Colo. App. 2011). And the juvenile court may consider a
parent’s unwillingness to participate in treatment in determining
whether the department made reasonable efforts. See People in
Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.
12 B. Analysis
¶ 25 The juvenile court determined that the Department made
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parents and reunite them with
the children, but the parents did not use the resources the
Department provided to become fit. The court found that the
caseworkers “authorized services, attempted to facilitate the
completion of every aspect of the treatment plans, [provided]
financial assistance, and . . . tried to ascertain appropriate
accommodations for the parent’s needs.” The court noted that, in
response to these efforts, the caseworkers “were met with
resistance, stonewalling, and hostility.”
¶ 26 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. As noted
above, father’s treatment plan included components addressing
family time, mental health and/or substance abuse, a psychological
or neuropsychological evaluation, housing and employment, life
skills and parenting education, and a capacity to parent evaluation.
Mother had a similar treatment plan, except that she was required
to complete a danger/risk assessment instead of a
psychological/neuropsychological evaluation.
13 ¶ 27 Neither parent contends that the Department generally failed
to offer the services necessary to complete the objectives in the
treatment plan. Indeed, the record shows that the Department
provided supervised family time services, co-occurring assessments
for the parents’ mental health and substance abuse issues, a
danger/risk assessment for mother, a psychological and a
neuropsychological evaluation for father, life skills training,
parenting classes, and capacity to parent evaluations.
¶ 28 But the record shows that, other than family time, the parents
minimally engaged in the services. To be sure, the parents
completed co-occurring assessments, and mother completed the
danger/risk assessment, but neither parent followed the
recommendations from those assessments. Father never complied
with the psychological or neuropsychological evaluation and neither
parent participated in the capacity to parent evaluation. The
parents met with a life skills worker for a short time, but essentially
“fired” the worker and never engaged with another one. The
Department also made referrals for parenting classes, but the
parents did not sign releases, so those classes were never set up.
14 ¶ 29 Nevertheless, the parents assert, for the five reasons below,
that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts. We address
and reject all five arguments.
¶ 30 First, father contends that the Department failed to make
appropriate and timely referrals to services. We discern no
reversible error.
• Father asserts that the Department did not provide a
parenting class because the identified class was canceled
for lack of participants. Not so. Although the caseworker
said that one class was canceled because of a lack of
participants, she could have referred father to the next
class if he had signed the release of information. And
even if the class lacked participants, the caseworker
testified that the provider was willing to work with father
on an individual basis.
• Father argues that he requested a life skills worker who
had experience working with parents with disabilities,
but the Department never referred him to one. Father
had a life skills worker that he refused to work with after
a few months. The Department attempted to refer father
15 to another life skills worker, but he decline to participate.
And father told the caseworkers that he did not need life
skills. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that
the Department failed to provide the requested worker.
• We are not persuaded by father’s contention that the
Department failed to make timely referrals to the
neuropsychological evaluation and capacity to parent
evaluations. Although the record shows that the second
caseworker did not make referrals when the magistrate
amended the treatment plan in August 2023, she made
referrals in early 2024. Father therefore had close to a
year to complete these evaluations but did not do so.
• Nor are we convinced by father’s assertion that the
Department should have referred him to a different
provider to complete the evaluations because the
Department’s provider had a conflict of interest.
Contrary to father’s argument, he did not ask for a
different provider because of a conflict of interest; rather,
he told the caseworker that the Department’s provider
had refused him services, which was not accurate.
16 ¶ 31 Second, father argues that the Department withheld gas cards
from him as a punishment. If a department has additional funds,
section 19-3-208(2)(d) requires it to provide transportation to
services when other appropriate transportation is not available.
The record shows that the Department provided father with gas
cards in the amount of forty dollars for most of the case. However,
the second caseworker testified that the Department reduced the
amount to twenty dollars for two or three months because father
was not attending services, except for parenting time. The
caseworker said that, after talking to her supervisors, she managed
to reinstate the full amount. Father does not direct us to anything
in the record indicating that he missed any services or
appointments because of the short-term reduction in gas cards. We
therefore discern no reversible error.
¶ 32 Third, the parents assert that the Department failed to make
reasonable efforts because it never expanded or liberalized their
family time. Section 19-3-208(2)(b) only requires that the
Department provide family time services “as determined necessary
and appropriate by individual case plans.” Stated another way, to
satisfy the reasonable efforts requirement, the Department must
17 provide family time as ordered by the court. It is undisputed that
the Department provided the court-ordered family time. The record
therefore shows that the Department satisfied its burden under
section 19-3-208, and we are not convinced that it had any duty to
exercise its discretion to expand or liberalize family time, especially
considering that the parents were not addressing the concerns in
the case.
¶ 33 Fourth, the parents assert that the Department failed to make
reasonable efforts because it did not make reasonable
accommodations for them as required by the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). We are not persuaded.
¶ 34 Services provided under section 19-3-208 must comply with
the ADA. See § 19-3-208(2)(g). The ADA mandates that public
entities — such as a county department of human services — make
reasonable modifications to existing policies and services to
reasonably accommodate qualified individuals with disabilities. 42
U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5). A parent may be a qualified individual with a
disability if the parent has a “physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(1)(A).
18 ¶ 35 A parent is responsible for disclosing information about a
disability and any accommodations that are needed to address the
disability. See People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 21.
Whether a parent is a qualified individual with a disability under
the ADA requires a fact-specific determination that, if disputed, the
juvenile court should resolve. See id. at ¶ 21 n.2. And if the court
determines that a parent is a qualified individual with a disability, it
must consider if reasonable accommodations were made for the
parent’s disability when determining whether the department made
reasonable efforts. Id. at ¶ 34.
¶ 36 The record shows that father never provided the Department
with any information about his disabilities, except for a letter
indicating that he received Social Security Disability Insurance
(SSDI). Father said that he had a shoulder injury, a brain injury,
and autism spectrum disorder. But the record is unclear if he was
receiving SSDI for one or all of these disabilities. Because father
did not provide a formal diagnosis for his disabilities, the
Department asked him to complete a neuropsychological
evaluation. As discussed, father never completed the evaluation.
19 ¶ 37 In any event, assuming that father was a person with a
qualifying disability, he testified that he never asked for
accommodations. Nevertheless, he now argues that the
Department did not make reasonable accommodations because it
did not (1) provide him with a life skills worker experienced in
working with disabled parents or (2) refer him to an online
parenting class. We reject these arguments for the same reasons
described above.
¶ 38 Father also asserts that his attorney provided ineffective
assistance of counsel by failing to file a petition for magistrate
review after the magistrate denied his motion for accommodations.
But he does not develop this argument, and we therefore conclude
that his allegations are insufficient. See A.R., ¶ 63.
¶ 39 As for mother, the record shows that she had epilepsy,
cerebral palsy, and scoliosis. Like father, mother provided the
Department with her SSDI paperwork, but the Department could
not ascertain the nature of mother’s disabilities or what
accommodations she needed. And mother does not direct us to
anything in the record indicating that she ever formally requested
ADA accommodations from the Department during the case. At the
20 termination hearing, she testified that her disabilities never
“prevented [her] from being a parent or doing things that needed to
be done for this case.”
¶ 40 That said, the record shows that mother sometimes had
problems with physical labor because of her disabilities, and she
told the first caseworker that she wanted a more “hands-on” life
skills worker to help her with the condition of the home. The
second caseworker said that she contacted a provider to see if it
had someone who could engage in “physical labor,” but they did not
provide that service or know of anyone in the area who did. In any
event, even if the Department could have done more to provide a
“hands-on” life skills worker, we discern no reversible error because
(1) the record shows that the parents improved the condition of the
home without additional assistance and (2) the juvenile court did
not base its termination judgment on the condition of the home.
¶ 41 Finally, mother contends that the Department did not provide
her with an appropriate danger/risk assessment. The Department’s
original proposed treatment plan for mother required her to
complete a domestic violence evaluation. Mother objected to this
component, and the parties compromised by changing the
21 component to require a danger/risk assessment. The Department
referred mother to the assessment, but she took issue with the
assessment’s focus on domestic violence. The second caseworker
testified that the danger/risk assessment had to consider domestic
violence if that was one of the risk factors for the parent. Therefore,
we are not convinced by mother’s assertion that the Department
failed to provide her with the necessary assessment to become a fit
parent.
¶ 42 In sum, we conclude that the record supports the juvenile
court’s findings that the Department provided the necessary
resources for the parents to comply with their treatment plans, but
they did not use those resources to become fit parents. See A.V., ¶
12; J.C.R., 259 P.3d at 1285. We therefore decline to disturb the
court’s judgment.
V. Fitness
¶ 43 The parents next argue that the juvenile court erred by finding
that they were unfit. We are not persuaded.
¶ 44 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders the
parent unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care.
People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007).
22 Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent
provide nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently adequate to meet
the child’s physical, emotional, and mental needs and conditions.
People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006). A
parent’s noncompliance with a treatment plan generally
“demonstrates a lack of commitment to meeting the child’s needs
and, therefore, may also be considered in determining unfitness.”
People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008).
¶ 45 The juvenile court found that the parents were unfit. The
court noted that “neither parent meaningfully engaged in their
respective treatment plans, and, in fact, actively resisted them.” It
further found that the parents’ “pattern of resistance, mistrust, and
hostility . . . ultimately culminated in the overall failure of the
parents in complying with the treatment plans.” As a result, the
court determined that “neither parent had made sufficient progress
towards becoming fit parents.”
¶ 46 The record supports the court’s findings. As described in Part
IV.B., above, the parents participated in family time and some of
the evaluations but did not otherwise participate in any services
necessary to rehabilitate them. The second and third caseworkers
23 said that the parents resisted working on their treatment plans,
noting that they would say that they did not need the services or
that they simply would not do them. The caseworkers also opined
that the parents were unfit because they did not understand the
children’s needs, address the concerns about abuse and violence in
the home, comply with their treatment plans, show that they could
be protective parents, and make any behavioral changes.
¶ 47 Father asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding him
unfit because he “complied with the majority of his treatment plan
and was appropriate in parenting time,” while mother contends that
she was fit because she “maintained a loving relationship with the
children and ensured that the family home was a safe and stable
environment in which they could return.” Although the record
supports aspects of the parents’ assertions, the court considered
that evidence, weighed it against the evidence to the contrary (as
described above), and concluded that the parents were unfit. We
must reject the parents’ assertions because it would require us to
reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the
juvenile court, which we cannot do. See People in Interest of S.Z.S.,
2022 COA 133, ¶ 29.
24 VI. Children’s Best Interests
¶ 48 Finally, the parents maintain that the juvenile court erred by
terminating their parental rights because termination was not in
the children’s best interests. We disagree.
¶ 49 In addition to the statutory criteria in section 19-3-604(1)(c),
the court must also consider and eliminate less drastic alternatives
to termination. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1122
(Colo. 1986). “These criteria require the [juvenile] court to give
primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional
needs.” A.M., ¶ 20. Therefore, the “primary and controlling issue in
termination proceedings, even though parental rights are at stake,
is the determination of what will best serve the interests and welfare
of the child.” Id. (quoting K.D., 139 P.3d at 701).
¶ 50 In this case, the juvenile court determined that the parents
had not complied with their treatment plans, were unfit, and were
unlikely to change in a reasonable time. The court also found that
there were no less drastic alternatives to termination and that
termination was in the children’s best interests. In doing so, the
court noted that the children needed “stability, permanency, and a
safe environment,” which they could receive in an adoptive home
25 but not from the parents. The court concluded that it could not
return the children home because doing so “would be detrimental to
the children’s needs and unnecessarily damage what progress ha[d]
been made.”
¶ 51 The record supports the court’s findings. The second
caseworker testified that termination was in the children’s best
interests because (1) the parents had not engaged in their treatment
plans to address the safety concerns and (2) the children needed
permanency after “three years in limbo.” She also said that there
were no less drastic alternatives available because there were no
kin options willing to take the children; nor would more time serve
the children’s best interests because the parents refused to work on
their treatment plans. The third caseworker agreed that
termination was in the children’s best interests, noting that they
needed a safe and stable environment and deserved to have a
permanent home that could meet all their needs. She further noted
that the children were in an adoptive home and the placements
were currently meeting all those needs. Finally, the third
caseworker confirmed that the Department had not located any
26 relatives willing to take placement or participate in an allocation of
parental responsibilities.
¶ 52 Despite this evidence, the parents assert that other evidence in
the record refutes the juvenile court’s finding that termination was
in the children’s best interests. For example, they note that the
evidence showed that one child was injured in foster care, another
child experienced inappropriate touching by a fellow foster child,
the children expressed a desire to return home to their parents, and
the children would be separated if not returned home because they
were in different placements. The parents also assert that, because
they attended family time regularly throughout the case, they
continued to have a strong bond with the children.
¶ 53 We recognize that these are some of the factors a court may
consider when determining whether termination is in a child’s best
interests. See People in Interest of H.L.B., 2025 COA 86, ¶ 27. But
as described above, the evidence supported the court’s finding that
returning the children home would not be in their best interests.
And the parents do not argue for a less drastic alternative other
than returning the children home. Because the record supports the
court’s findings, we cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute our
27 judgment to reach a different conclusion. See id. at ¶ 34
(acknowledging that the record “could support a contrary outcome”
but noting that an appellate court “must defer to the juvenile
court’s weighing of the conflicting evidence”). We therefore reject
the parents’ assertions.
VII. Disposition
¶ 54 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE YUN concur.