26CA0117 Peo in Interest of JL 07-30-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 26CA0117 Douglas County District Court No. 23JV30057 Honorable Ryan J. Stuart, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of Jac.L. and Jax.L., Children,
and Concerning B.B. a/k/a B.L.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ Lipinsky and Yun, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 30, 2026
Jeffrey A. Garcia, County Attorney, Erinn Walz, Assistant County Attorney, Castle Rock, Colorado, for Appellee
Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, B.B. a/k/a B.L.
(mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal
relationships with Jac.L. and Jax.L. (the children). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In May 2023, the Douglas County Department of Human
Services filed a petition in dependency and neglect based on
concerns about, among other things, mother’s substance use. The
juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent or neglected and
adopted a treatment plan for mother.
¶3 The children resided in several placements during the
pendency of this case. Shortly after the case was opened, the court
removed the children from the family home. Following two
consecutive, brief foster placements, the children were returned
home to mother on a trial basis. Ten months later, the Department
received a report alleging that mother drove under the influence
with the children’s half-sibling (who is not involved in this appeal).
The court then ordered that the children be placed in foster care.
Later, the court ordered an Interstate Compact on Placement of
Children (ICPC) home study of the children’s maternal
grandmother’s home in New York. The ICPC home study was
1 approved, and the court placed the children with maternal
grandmother, where they remained for the duration of the case.
¶4 After holding a hearing on the Department’s termination
motion in December 2025, the court terminated mother’s
parent-child legal relationships with the children.
II. Less Drastic Alternatives
¶5 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by determining
that there was no viable less drastic alternative to termination of
her parental rights. She asserts that the children’s best interests
would have been served through an allocation of parental
responsibilities (APR) to maternal grandmother instead. We are not
persuaded.
A. Legal Framework and Standard of Review
¶6 A juvenile court may terminate a parent’s parental rights if it
finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was
adjudicated dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not
reasonably complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment
plan or the plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit;
and (4) the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change in a
reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.
2 ¶7 Before terminating parental rights under section
19-3-604(1)(c), the court must also consider and eliminate less
drastic alternatives. People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 24.
In considering less drastic alternatives, a court must give primary
consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional
conditions and needs. People in Interest of Z.M., 2020 COA 3M,
¶ 29; see § 19-3-604(3). The court may also consider, among other
things, the parent’s fitness, see L.M., ¶ 27, and whether an APR
would adequately meet the child’s need for permanence and other
needs, see People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 910 (Colo.
App. 2005).
¶8 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than
adequately meet the child’s needs; rather, it must be in the child’s
best interests. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 27.
¶9 “We review a juvenile court’s less drastic alternatives findings
for clear error.” People in Interest of E.W., 2022 COA 12, ¶ 34.
Thus, when a court considers less drastic alternatives because it
finds that termination is in the child’s best interests, we are bound
3 to affirm the decision so long as the record supports its findings.1
People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.
B. Analysis
¶ 10 The juvenile court determined that an APR would not achieve
the permanency that the children “deserve[d]” and that there was
not a less drastic alternative that would serve their best interests.
See T.E.M., 124 P.3d at 910. In doing so, the court found that
mother had not seen the children in months, had not improved her
relationship with them, and was unlikely to achieve sobriety in
sufficient time to be able to parent them. See L.M., ¶ 27. The court
also found that the children’s needs were being met by maternal
grandmother, who wished to adopt them. See Z.M., ¶ 31
(recognizing that the juvenile court may consider whether the
placement favors adoption rather than an APR).
1 In People in Interest of H.L.B., 2025 COA 86, cert. granted,
25SC721, 2026 WL 353234 (Colo. Feb. 2, 2026), Judge Welling filed a special concurrence suggesting that the supreme court may wish to consider whether it is more appropriate to review a trial court’s factual findings regarding a less drastic alternative for clear error, but review the court’s ultimate conclusion of whether a less drastic alternative is in the children’s best interest under the abuse of discretion standard. See id. at ¶ 40 (Welling, J., specially concurring).
4 ¶ 11 The record supports the court’s findings and shows that
maintaining sobriety was a longstanding struggle for mother.
Mother’s drug and alcohol use was an issue in a prior dependency
and neglect case. The caseworker testified that mother had not
demonstrated sobriety during this case. She explained her concern
that mother was using substances based on mother’s behavior
throughout the case and various reports that the caseworker had
received.
¶ 12 The record also shows that mother did not have contact with
the children for extended periods during the pendency of the case.2
One of those stretches spanned over two months and directly
preceded the termination hearing. Mother did not consistently or
timely attend her therapeutic family time and sometimes returned
2 The caseworker testified that there were periods during the case in
which she was unable to reach mother or the children’s father, J.L. (father). With respect to father, the caseworker described, more precisely, that he communicated only “[v]ery sporadic[ally]” with the Department and “never engaged” in rehabilitative services during the case, outside of therapeutic family time. Domestic violence on father’s part was one of the reasons the Department opened the case, and father never completed a domestic violence offender evaluation or treatment. The juvenile court also terminated father’s parent-child legal relationships with the children. Father does not appeal that ruling.
5 to her car during sessions. The family time supervisor testified that
supervision remained at this level because, (1) “on the whole,”
mother did not mitigate the Department’s various concerns about
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26CA0117 Peo in Interest of JL 07-30-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 26CA0117 Douglas County District Court No. 23JV30057 Honorable Ryan J. Stuart, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of Jac.L. and Jax.L., Children,
and Concerning B.B. a/k/a B.L.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ Lipinsky and Yun, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 30, 2026
Jeffrey A. Garcia, County Attorney, Erinn Walz, Assistant County Attorney, Castle Rock, Colorado, for Appellee
Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, B.B. a/k/a B.L.
(mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal
relationships with Jac.L. and Jax.L. (the children). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In May 2023, the Douglas County Department of Human
Services filed a petition in dependency and neglect based on
concerns about, among other things, mother’s substance use. The
juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent or neglected and
adopted a treatment plan for mother.
¶3 The children resided in several placements during the
pendency of this case. Shortly after the case was opened, the court
removed the children from the family home. Following two
consecutive, brief foster placements, the children were returned
home to mother on a trial basis. Ten months later, the Department
received a report alleging that mother drove under the influence
with the children’s half-sibling (who is not involved in this appeal).
The court then ordered that the children be placed in foster care.
Later, the court ordered an Interstate Compact on Placement of
Children (ICPC) home study of the children’s maternal
grandmother’s home in New York. The ICPC home study was
1 approved, and the court placed the children with maternal
grandmother, where they remained for the duration of the case.
¶4 After holding a hearing on the Department’s termination
motion in December 2025, the court terminated mother’s
parent-child legal relationships with the children.
II. Less Drastic Alternatives
¶5 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by determining
that there was no viable less drastic alternative to termination of
her parental rights. She asserts that the children’s best interests
would have been served through an allocation of parental
responsibilities (APR) to maternal grandmother instead. We are not
persuaded.
A. Legal Framework and Standard of Review
¶6 A juvenile court may terminate a parent’s parental rights if it
finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was
adjudicated dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not
reasonably complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment
plan or the plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit;
and (4) the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change in a
reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.
2 ¶7 Before terminating parental rights under section
19-3-604(1)(c), the court must also consider and eliminate less
drastic alternatives. People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 24.
In considering less drastic alternatives, a court must give primary
consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional
conditions and needs. People in Interest of Z.M., 2020 COA 3M,
¶ 29; see § 19-3-604(3). The court may also consider, among other
things, the parent’s fitness, see L.M., ¶ 27, and whether an APR
would adequately meet the child’s need for permanence and other
needs, see People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 910 (Colo.
App. 2005).
¶8 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than
adequately meet the child’s needs; rather, it must be in the child’s
best interests. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 27.
¶9 “We review a juvenile court’s less drastic alternatives findings
for clear error.” People in Interest of E.W., 2022 COA 12, ¶ 34.
Thus, when a court considers less drastic alternatives because it
finds that termination is in the child’s best interests, we are bound
3 to affirm the decision so long as the record supports its findings.1
People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.
B. Analysis
¶ 10 The juvenile court determined that an APR would not achieve
the permanency that the children “deserve[d]” and that there was
not a less drastic alternative that would serve their best interests.
See T.E.M., 124 P.3d at 910. In doing so, the court found that
mother had not seen the children in months, had not improved her
relationship with them, and was unlikely to achieve sobriety in
sufficient time to be able to parent them. See L.M., ¶ 27. The court
also found that the children’s needs were being met by maternal
grandmother, who wished to adopt them. See Z.M., ¶ 31
(recognizing that the juvenile court may consider whether the
placement favors adoption rather than an APR).
1 In People in Interest of H.L.B., 2025 COA 86, cert. granted,
25SC721, 2026 WL 353234 (Colo. Feb. 2, 2026), Judge Welling filed a special concurrence suggesting that the supreme court may wish to consider whether it is more appropriate to review a trial court’s factual findings regarding a less drastic alternative for clear error, but review the court’s ultimate conclusion of whether a less drastic alternative is in the children’s best interest under the abuse of discretion standard. See id. at ¶ 40 (Welling, J., specially concurring).
4 ¶ 11 The record supports the court’s findings and shows that
maintaining sobriety was a longstanding struggle for mother.
Mother’s drug and alcohol use was an issue in a prior dependency
and neglect case. The caseworker testified that mother had not
demonstrated sobriety during this case. She explained her concern
that mother was using substances based on mother’s behavior
throughout the case and various reports that the caseworker had
received.
¶ 12 The record also shows that mother did not have contact with
the children for extended periods during the pendency of the case.2
One of those stretches spanned over two months and directly
preceded the termination hearing. Mother did not consistently or
timely attend her therapeutic family time and sometimes returned
2 The caseworker testified that there were periods during the case in
which she was unable to reach mother or the children’s father, J.L. (father). With respect to father, the caseworker described, more precisely, that he communicated only “[v]ery sporadic[ally]” with the Department and “never engaged” in rehabilitative services during the case, outside of therapeutic family time. Domestic violence on father’s part was one of the reasons the Department opened the case, and father never completed a domestic violence offender evaluation or treatment. The juvenile court also terminated father’s parent-child legal relationships with the children. Father does not appeal that ruling.
5 to her car during sessions. The family time supervisor testified that
supervision remained at this level because, (1) “on the whole,”
mother did not mitigate the Department’s various concerns about
her visits; and (2) the children remained stressed about her
attendance and behavior. The caseworker, who was qualified as an
expert in child protection casework, opined that mother had not
complied with the treatment plan requirement that she maintain a
positive bond with the children through consistent family time.
¶ 13 In addition, the caseworker opined that the children needed
permanency because (1) the “ups and downs” of the case had been
detrimental to them; and (2) they worried about mother when she
was nonresponsive, which impacted their behavior and “the way
that they emotionally adjust to things.” As noted, the children
moved between numerous placements during the two and a half
years the case was open. Maternal grandmother testified that she
wished to adopt the children because they deserved a stable,
nonviolent, safe, and loving home that provided them structure.
According to the caseworker, maternal grandmother was meeting
the children’s needs and providing them with structure and routine.
6 ¶ 14 Nonetheless, mother maintains that the court erred by
terminating her parental rights because (1) an APR would have
allowed the children to maintain their “bonded” relationship with
her; and (2) maternal grandmother was willing to allow contact if
mother was sober. To that end, mother points to evidence that may
have conceivably supported a different result, such as testimony
that the children were excited to see her during visits. But mother
does not challenge the court’s well-supported factual findings,
including that her relationship with the children had not improved
and that she had not seen them in months. Instead, she effectively
asks that we reweigh the evidence and find in her favor. However,
we cannot reweigh the evidence, nor do we substitute our judgment
for that of the juvenile court. See People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022
COA 133, ¶ 29; cf. In re Marriage of Kann, 2017 COA 94, ¶ 36
(“[O]ur supreme court has . . . expressed unbridled confidence in
trial courts to weigh conflicting evidence.”) And the court
specifically found that an APR would not provide the children with
adequate permanence.
¶ 15 The record amply supports the court’s determination that no
less drastic alternative was in the children’s best interests, given
7 their needs, “the circumstances, [and] the posture of this case.”
See Z.M., ¶ 29 (in considering less drastic alternatives, a juvenile
court must give primary consideration to the child’s needs); see also
L.M., ¶ 27 (a less drastic alternatives determination will be
influenced by a parent’s fitness to care for their child). Because the
court’s less drastic alternatives and related best interests findings
are amply supported by the record, we perceive no error in its
decision to terminate mother’s parental rights.3 See B.H., ¶ 80;
E.W., ¶ 34.
III. Disposition
¶ 16 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE YUN concur.
3 We reach this same conclusion under either the clear error or
abuse of discretion standard of review. See H.L.B., ¶ 40 (Welling, J., specially concurring).