Peo in Interest of JL

Opinion

25CA1074 Peo in Interest of JL 11-26-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1074 El Paso County District Court No. 24JV30660 Honorable Lin Billings Vela, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of J.L., a Child,

and Concerning J.G.,

Appellant,

and

G.L.,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V Opinion by JUDGE YUN Freyre and Pawar, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 26, 2025

Kenneth R. Hodges, County Attorney, Melanie E. Gavisk, Assistant County Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee the People of the State of Colorado

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Counsel for Youth, Salida, Colorado, for J.L.

Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Chelsea A. Carr, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee G.L. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect case, J.G. (mother) appeals the

judgment allocating parental responsibilities for J.L. (the youth) to

G.L. (father). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The El Paso Department of Human Services filed a petition in

dependency and neglect alleging a history of domestic violence

between mother and her partner, substance dependence by mother,

and mental health concerns. When the petition was filed, mother

was incarcerated following a domestic violence incident in the

presence of the youth. The juvenile court adjudicated the youth

dependent and neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother.

¶3 Father, who resides out of state, appeared at the shelter

hearing. Mother disputed parentage and the court ordered genetic

testing. After the juvenile court adjudicated father as the youth’s

legal parent and ordered the birth certificate to be amended, father

made a no-fault admission to the allegations in the petition.

¶4 Father then moved for an allocation of parental responsibilities

(APR) with a step-up parenting time plan for mother. The juvenile

court granted the motion after a contested hearing.

1 II. Standard of Review

¶5 Allocating parental responsibilities is a matter within the

sound discretion of the juvenile court. See In re B.R.D., 2012 COA

63, ¶ 15. When there is record support for the court’s findings, its

resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on review. Id.

However, whether a court has applied the correct legal standard

presents a question of law that we review de novo. Id.

III. Reasonable Efforts to Rehabilitate Mother

¶6 Mother first contends that the Department had an obligation

to make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her and reunite the

family. Our inquiry, however, is not whether the Department was

required to make reasonable efforts while the case was pending but

instead whether the juvenile court was required to make findings

about those efforts as part of its judgment allocating parental

responsibilities. See C.A.R. 1(a) (explaining that our jurisdiction is

limited to review of final, appealable judgments or orders). Mother

refers us to People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶16, 20, to

support her claim that reasonable efforts findings were required.

But mother misreads A.S.L.’s holding in this regard. In A.S.L., a

division of this court specifically limited its holding to

2 circumstances “when the juvenile court, in lieu of terminating a

parent’s rights, enters an APR to a nonparent.” Id. at ¶ 20. Here,

the court granted an APR to father after his parentage was

adjudicated.

¶7 Mother also contends that she “was entitled to a reasonable

period of time to demonstrate fitness with Department support and

assistance.” However, the court was not required to make findings

regarding mother’s parental fitness when it determined that father’s

proposed APR was in the youth’s best interests. People in Interest of

L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208 (Colo. App. 2011) (APR must be

determined in accordance with a youth’s best interests; finding of

parental unfitness not required for an APR for a youth adjudicated

dependent or neglected); see § 19-3-507(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025.

Therefore, mother’s contention that she was not given a reasonable

period of time to become fit must fail.

IV. Fitness Findings Regarding Father

¶8 Mother next contends that the court erred by granting an APR

to father “without first requiring the Department to demonstrate

that father was, indeed, a fit parent.” But mother provides no

3 authority for her claim that the Department had any obligation to

do so when father — and not the Department — moved for an APR.

¶9 To the extent mother contends that the juvenile court erred by

finding that father was a fit parent, we discern no error. The court

found that father was fit, was able to meet the youth’s needs, and

maintained significant psychological ties with the youth. The court

found that it was in the best interest of the youth to grant the APR

order proposed by father and supported by the youth.

¶ 10 The record supports the court’s findings. Father, who the

juvenile court found credible, testified about his employment,

housing situation, and specific plans to meet the youth’s

educational and medical needs. The youth, who the court also

found credible, expressed his desire to live with father and testified

that he felt safe with father during extended unsupervised family

time held during the case.

¶ 11 Furthermore, it was uncontested that father complied with his

treatment plan, which required him to cooperate with the

Department and strengthen his parental relationship with the

youth. See People in Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6, ¶¶ 18-19

(holding that a parent may be found to have regained fitness after

4 an adjudication when the parent complies with the treatment plan

and is able to safely parent). In addition, father addressed the

concerns that necessitated the Department’s intervention by

asserting parentage, being adjudicated the youth’s legal father, and

requesting formal custody orders that would allow him to protect

the youth.

¶ 12 Although mother objected to the APR and raised concerns

about father’s fitness, the court did not find her testimony credible.

It is within the juvenile court’s purview to weigh evidence, including

conflicting evidence, and determine witness credibility. See In re

Marriage of Kann, 2017 COA 94, ¶ 36 (“[O]ur supreme court has . . .

expressed unbridled confidence in trial courts to weigh conflicting

evidence.”); see also Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 486 (Colo.

1999) (recognizing “the trial court’s unique role and perspective in

evaluating the demeanor and body language of live witnesses” and

“discourag[ing] an appellate court from second-guessing those

judgments based on a cold record”).

V. Disposition

¶ 13 The judgment is therefore affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE PAWAR concur.