Parker v. County of Los Angeles

338 U.S. 327, 70 S. Ct. 161, 94 L. Ed. 2d 144, 94 L. Ed. 144, 1949 U.S. LEXIS 2974
Supreme Court of the United States·Decided December 5, 1949·No. NO. 49·Published·Cited by 76 cases

Opinion

Mr. Justice Frankfurter

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In No. 49, twenty-five classified civil servants of the County of Los Angeles brought an action in the Superior Court of that County, and in No. 50, suit was brought by one such employee. The respective plaintiffs sought relief against enforcement by the County and its officials of what is colloquially known as a loyalty test, and they did so for themselves and “in a representative capacity ... on behalf of 20,000 employees of Los Angeles County similarly situated.”

The plaintiffs, petitioners here, alleged that on August 26, 1947, the Board of Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles adopted as part of its “Loyalty Check” program the requirement that all County employees execute a prescribed affidavit. It consisted of four parts, fully set forth in the Appendix. By Part A, each employee is required to support the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution and laws of the State of California; by Part B, he forswears that since December 7, 1941, he has been a member of any organization advocating the *329 forcible overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State of California or of the County of Los Angeles, that he now advocates such overthrow, or that he will in the future so advocate directly or through an organization; by Part C, he is required to list his aliases; and by Part D, he is asked to indicate whether he has ever been “a member of, or directly or indirectly supported or followed” any of an enumerated list of 145 organizations. Asserting fear of penalizing consequences from the loyalty program, and claiming that the law of California and the Constitution of the United States barred coercive measures by the County to secure obedience to the alleged affidavit requirement, petitioners brought these actions. Demurrers to the complaints were sustained by the Superior Court and its judgments were affirmed by the District Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District. 88 Cal. App. 2d 481, 199 P. 2d 429. After the Supreme Court of California denied discretionary review we brought the case here because, on the showing then before us, serious questions seemed raised as to the scope of a State’s power to safeguard its security with due regard for the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 337 U. S. 929. In view, however, of the circumstances that became manifest after the cases came to argument, we are precluded from reaching these constitutional issues on their merits.

To begin with, the California decision under review does not tell us unambiguously what compulsion, if any, the loyalty order of August 26, 1947, carried. It is unequivocally clear that the lower court refused to decide whether an employee who discloses his so-called “subversive” activities or connections may for that reason be discharged. It is not clear, however, whether, as petitioners contend, the lower court meant to hold that the *330 Board of Supervisors may discharge an employee who refuses to file an affidavit. 1 This ambiguity renders so doubtful whether an issue under the United States Constitution is before us that at most we would exercise jurisdiction to obtain clarification by the State court. See Honeyman v. Hanan, 300 U. S. 14; Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U. S. 551; State Tax Comm’n v. Van Cott, 306 U. S. 511; Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117. But the circumstances which were called to our attention after the cases reached us leave no doubt that the issues which led us to bring them here are not ripe for constitutional adjudication. American Wood Paper *331 Co. v. Heft, 8 Wall. 333, 131 U. S. xcii; Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson, 250 U. S. 360.

As of July 20, 1948, nearly a year after the original loyalty order, all but 104 of the 22,000 officers and employees of the County had executed the prescribed affidavit. On that day, these noncomplying employees were advised that the Board of Supervisors had adopted an order providing (1) that unless they had executed Parts A, B and C of the affidavit by July 26 they would be discharged, and (2) that unless they had executed Part D by that time they would be discharged “if and when the loyalty test litigation now pending is finally concluded with a determination that the County was justified in requiring from its employees the information embodied in Paragraph 'D.’ ” 2

This order was the first explicit announcement of sanctions by the Board in furtherance of its loyalty program. By July 26 the entire affidavit had been executed by all but 45 employees. Of these, 29 had executed only Parts A, B and C. Sixteen stood their ground against any compliance. They invoked their administrative remedy of review before the Civil Service Commission which decided against them. On June 24 of this year these sixteen discharged employees sought a writ of mandate from the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles to review the decision of the Civil Service Commission, with a prayer for reinstatement and back pay. We are advised that this litigation is now pending in the Superior Court. The petitioners here, except one in No. 49, signed Parts A, B and C, and that petitioner is a party in the case before the Superior Court.

*332 From this it appears that the California courts have before them for the first time since the inception of the loyalty program an order which expressly threatens sanctions. These sanctions are being challenged under State law as well as under the United States Constitution. For all we know the California courts may sustain these claims under local law. 3 The present cases are here from an intermediate State appellate court because the State Supreme Court did not deem the records before it to present issues deserving of its discretionary review. The explicit sanctions of the modified order may lead the Supreme Court of California to pass on them should the litigation now pending in the lower courts go against the contentions of these petitioners. It is relevant to note that when claims not unrelated to those now urged before us, but based on State law, have come before the Supreme Court of California that tribunal has not been insensitive to them. See Communist Party v. Peek, 20 Cal. 2d 536, 127 P. 2d 889; James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P. 2d 329.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Parker v. County of Los Angeles, 338 U.S. 327, 70 S. Ct. 161, 94 L. Ed. 2d 144, 94 L. Ed. 144, 1949 U.S. LEXIS 2974 (1949).

338 U.S. 327 (Parker v. County of Los Angeles) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

State v. Dickson
141 A.3d 810 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 2016)
In re Danyellah S.-C.
143 A.3d 698 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 2016)
Johnson v. District of Columbia
71 F. Supp. 3d 155 (District of Columbia, 2014)
Rivera Schatz v. Estado Libre Asociado
191 P.R. 791 (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 2014)
W.B. v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health & Family Services
388 S.W.3d 108 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 2012)
Domínguez Castro v. Gobierno del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico
178 P.R. 1 (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 2010)
PLAINVIEW AREA ASS'N v. State
900 So. 2d 837 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2005)
Rumsfeld v. Hamdi
337 F.3d 335 (Fourth Circuit, 2003)
Sánchez v. Secretario de Justicia
157 P.R. Dec. 360 (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 2002)
Stepney v. Town of Fairfield, No. X05 Cv 00-0180732 S (May 24, 2002)
2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 6331 (Connecticut Superior Court, 2002)
Nisinzweig v. Kurien, No. Xo5 Cv 96 0150688 S (Aug. 21, 2001)
2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 11310 (Connecticut Superior Court, 2001)
Kish v. Cohn
756 A.2d 313 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 2000)
Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc. v. Department of Public Utility Control
754 A.2d 128 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 2000)
Dowling v. Slotnik
712 A.2d 396 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1998)
Rios v. Perez Valentin
4 T.C.A. 270 (Tribunal De Apelaciones De Puerto Rico/Court of Appeals of Puerto Rico, 1998)
Nielsen v. State
670 A.2d 1288 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1996)
National Rifle Ass'n of America v. Magaw
909 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Michigan, 1995)