Paola Gas Co. v. Paola Glass Co.

44 P. 621, 56 Kan. 614, 1896 Kan. LEXIS 69
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedApril 11, 1896
DocketNo. 8150
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 44 P. 621 (Paola Gas Co. v. Paola Glass Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Paola Gas Co. v. Paola Glass Co., 44 P. 621, 56 Kan. 614, 1896 Kan. LEXIS 69 (kan 1896).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Johnston, J.

[620]*620' books as [618]*618: The principal inducement for establishing a glass factory at Paola was the cheap fuel which it was supposed could be obtained there, and which the gas company agreed to furnish. The manufacture of glassware was an untried enterprise in the West. It was unsuccessful, and the cause of the failure is the main subject of dispute. On.one side, it is contended, that it was due to an insufficient supply of gas, which the gas company had agreed to furnish ; and on the other side, the contention is that the supply was ample, but that the factory was defective in plan and faulty in construction, so that the gas supplied was not utilized. The findings of the referee, based as they are upon conflicting testimony, [619]*619settle the contention in favor of the glass company. It must be assumed in this review that the sole cause of the failure was the violation of the contract by the gas company in refusing to furnish the quantity of gas that it had agreed and whs able to supply. The contract having been broken by the gas company, it must be held liable for all the direct and proximate damages which resulted from the breach. How shall the damages be measured? The allowance made by the referee was in two items: First, $9,000 for the expense incurred in the unsuccessful attempt to operate the factory; and, second, $10,000 for the anticipated profits of running the factory for a period of 10 months. As to the first item, there is no dispute except as to the amount of the allowance. It is conceded that the glass company is entitled to recover the actual loss incurred in the unsuccessful attempt to operate the factory. There is a controversy as to what constitutes actual expense of operation, and it is contended that the allowances made were not established by competent testimony. In an attempt to show that expense or loss, the president of the glass company was permitted to state the amount of the pay-rolls of the company and the contents of some of the books of account. He did not have the pay-rolls or books at hand, and it does not appear that he had prepared or kept them. It is clear from his testimony that he had not personally attended to the payments for labor, material, utensils, machinery, and repairs, and he did not pretend to have any definite knowledge as to either items or amounts, except as he obtained them from the books and accounts. In the absence of personal knowledge of the witness or other proof of actual payment, the expenses incurred could properly have been shown by the pay-rolls and books ; [620]*620but before they could have been offered it was necessary that they should have been identified, and to show that they were kept in such a manner as to make their contents receivable in evidence. There was no showing as to what the books were — whether they contained a pay-roll, and under whose direction or supervision they were kept; whether the entries therein were correct, or made at or near the time when payments were made. Without having transacted the business, or having any recollection of the facts independently of rhe books, he was allowed to testify of losses amounting to $9,000, which were necessarily made up from a great number of items. The information which he had, however correct it may have been, was derived from others and from books and accounts of which it is not shown that he had any knowledge at all. His testimony as to what was shown by the pay-rolls and books is obviously incompetent. This was substantially all the testimony upon which the greater part of the allowance for the net cost .of the unsuccessful operation of the plant rested. His testimony was that the pay-rolls showed that over $7,000 was paid ,to operatives, while in. another part of his testimony he stated that the. cost of the product.made during the time of operation was between $5,000. and $6,000 ; and upon this incompetent and inconsistent testimony the referee found that the amount paid to operatives was $5,650.. . The testimony, upon this matter was incompetent. and wholly. insufficient to sustain ’the finding that was made.

[621]*621workmen imported. [620]*620Objection.is made to the allowance of the expenses in bringing operatives to Paola.-. It appears, that men skilled in the manufacture of glass could not.be found in. Kansas, and therefore the company was obliged [621]*621to go to St. Louis and other points for skilled operatives. In order to manufacture glassware it was necessary to have men who were skilled in that business : and, if it was necessary to pay the cost of their transportation m order to induce them to come west, we think it may be treated as a part of the expenses of the actual operation of the factory.

officers— payment. The allowances made to the officers of the corporation are contested. The mere fact that they were officers of the corporation, or that they might have been entitled to salaries from the corporation, does not require that the salaries shall be treated as a part of the expenses of operation. If the services performed by them were necessary to the operation of the factory, the compensation which the ° company had agreed or was required to pay for such services should be treated as a part of the expense of operation for which the gas company is liable. The liability, however, should be confined to actual expenses, properly and necessarily incurred in the unsuccessful attempt to manufacture glass. Some of the testimony regarding the expenses of operation was incompetent, as we have seen, and some was weak in failing to show that the expenses allowed were reasonable and necessary, or necessarily and actually paid out; and the fact that the referee made an allowance of about $4,000 more than was claimed in the petition emphasizes the errors that were committed.

The main contention, however, in the case is over the allowance of prospective profits. The contract was doubtless made, and the enterprise undertaken, for the profits expected to be gained. The gas company must have been aware that that was the purpose of [622]*622the venture, and if the failure was due to the fault of that company it cannot escape liability for the actual loss sustained. It is urged that damages cannot be measured by the anticipated profits, as the calculation is necessarily based on conjecture, rather than upon facts. It is the aim of the law to give a party injured by the breach of a contract all the damages which he may suffer from such breach ; and where the contract is made with a view to future profits, and such profits are within the contemplation of the parties, they may, where they can be established with certainty, form a just measure of damage. It has been said that, as a general rule with a few exceptions, anticipated profits prevented are not recoverable in the way of damages for the breach of contract; but it is well settled in this state that damages based on prospective profits which would have been realized had the contract been performed may be allowed, providing they are fairly within the contemplation of the parties, are the direct and natural consequence of the breach of the contract, and are susceptible of being ascertained with reasonable certainty. (Hoge v. Norton, 22 Kan. 374; Brown v. Hadley, 43 id. 267; Town Co. v. Lincoln, ante, p. 145, 42 Pac. Rep. 706.)

[624]*624i.

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Bluebook (online)
44 P. 621, 56 Kan. 614, 1896 Kan. LEXIS 69, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/paola-gas-co-v-paola-glass-co-kan-1896.