OPINION
STRINE, Vice Chancellor.
In this action, the Midland Companies seek to recover damages and obtain other relief from their prior owner-operator, Ronald Saverin, and defendants affiliated with Saverin. The Midland Companies base all of their claims on Saverin’s actions while he was their owner and operator. Because the current owner of the Midland Companies was assigned its interest from corporations that acquired their shares directly from Saverin, after his alleged wrongdoing occurred, I find that the Mid
land Companies’ claims are barred by the doctrine articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co.,
417 U.S. 703, 94 S.Ct. 2578, 41 L.Ed.2d 418 (1974), which this court adopted as the law of Delaware in
Court-land, Manor, Inc. v. Leeds,
Del.Ch., 347 A.2d 144 (1975).
I.
The Parties
Plaintiffs Midland Food Services, LLC (“Midland I”), Midland Food Services II, LLC (“Midland II”), and Midland Food Services III, LLC (“Midland III”) are Delaware limited liability companies (“LLCs”). Each of the Midland Companies, as I will refer to the three Midland entities, has its principal place of business in Ohio. The Midland Companies operate 125 Pizza Hut restaurants in Ohio and West Virginia under franchise agreements with Pizza Hut, Inc. Proposed Third Am. Compl. (hereinafter “Compl.”) ¶ 17, 21-22.
Defendants Castle Hill Holdings V, LLC (“Castle Hill V”), Castle Hill Holdings VI, LLC (“Castle Hill VI”), and Castle Hill VII, LLC (“Castle Hill VII”) are Delaware limited liability companies (“LLCs”).
Id.
¶¶4-6. Each of the Castle Hill Companies, as I will refer to the three Castle Hill defendants, has its principal place of business in Missouri.
Id.
The Castle Hill Companies own many of the sites on which the Midland Companies’ Pizza Huts are located and lease those sites to the Midland Companies.
Id.
¶ 24.
The Midland Companies and Castle Hill Companies were each created by defendant Ronald Saverin, a resident of Missouri. Compl. ¶¶ 23-24. Before January 1998, Saverin owned a controlling interest in and served as the principal operating officer of both the Midland and Castle Hill Companies.
Id.
¶¶ 8, 23, 25. That month, Saverin resigned as Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of the Midland Companies and assigned his ownership interest in the Midland Companies to certain of those Companies’ creditors.
Id.
¶ 68. Saverin retained his ownership and management of the Castle Hill Companies.
Id.
¶ 69.
Defendants MAJESS, LLC (“MA-JESS”) and DAJUST, LLC (“DAJUST”) are Delaware LLCs whose principal places of business are in Missouri.
Id.
¶¶ 11-14. MAJESS and DAJUST were established to serve as trusts for the benefit of the children of Ronald Saverin. MAJESS and DAJUST are members in the Castle Hill Companies.
Id.
¶ 14.
Potential defendant CNL American Properties Fund, Inc. (“CNL”) is a Maryland corporation with its principal place of business in Florida.
Id.
¶ 15. Potential defendants APF I Properties, APF II Properties, and APF III Properties are either wholly-owned subsidiaries, divisions, or affiliates of, or are otherwise controlled by CNL.
Id.
CNL provided financing to the Castle Hill Companies to enable them to purchase several of the properties which the Castle Hill Companies in turn lease to the Midland Companies.
Id.
¶¶ 28-38. Rather than referring to CNL and the APF entities separately, I frequently will refer solely to CNL.
Defendant Key Trust Company of Ohio, N.A. is a banking association with its principal place of business in Ohio.
Id.
¶9.
II.
Procedural Posture of the Case
A group of defendants
consisting of Saverin, his wife, MAJESS, DAJUST, and the Castle Hill Companies seek to dismiss the complaint for, among other reasons, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In addressing the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion, I must initially address what complaint to consider. After the defendants filed their motion to dismiss, the Midland Companies sought leave to file a Third Amended Complaint. Although it would have been preferable had the Midland Companies taken a more fo-cussed approach to their earlier attempts at amending their initial complaint — thus not burdening the defendants with a series of modestly evolving pleadings — it is more efficient and in keeping with Chancery Court Rule 15(a) to examine the Third Amended Complaint in deciding defendants’ motion to dismiss. If the Third Amended Complaint fails to state a claim, so does the First Amended Complaint. To the extent the Third Amended Complaint fails to state a claim, I will therefore deny the motion to amend as futile,
Smith v. Smitty McGee’s, Inc.,
Del.Ch., C.A. No. 15668, mem op. at 22, 1998 WL 246681, Steele, V.C., (May 8, 1998), and grant the moving defendants’ motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. To avoid any unfairness to the defendants, I gave them the opportunity to brief the differences between the First Amended Complaint and the proposed Third Amended Complaint.
In considering a motion to dismiss under Chancery Court Rule 12(b)(6), this court must assume the truth of all well-pleaded allegations, giving the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the complaint.
Grimes v. Donald,
Del.Supr., 673 A.2d 1207, 1213-1214 (1996). The court may dismiss the complaint if there are no facts in the pleadings from which the court could infer that the plaintiff could prevail.
In re USACafes, L.P. Litig.,
Del.Ch., 600 A.2d 43, 47 (1991).
III.
Factual Background
A.
Saverin Forms The Midland and Castle Hill Companies
In 1995, Saverin entered the pizza business by obtaining the rights to operate 125 Pizza Huts in Ohio and West Virginia.
Saverin created the various Midland and Castle Hill Companies and used them to acquire, operate, and finance these Pizza Huts. The dispute before me now turns largely on the arrangements Saverin made to finance the business. In particular, this case turns on certain leases between the Midland and Castle Hill Companies. Therefore, a brief description of the leases is in order.
According to the complaint, a typical deal between a Midland Company and a Castle Hill Company involved the following:
• Saverin would identify an existing restaurant or restaurant location.
• Saverin would then negotiate with the owner to purchase the property on behalf of a Castle Hill Company.
• The Castle Hill Company would not purchase the land directly. Rather, CNL, through an APF entity, would buy and pay for the land.
• CNL would then lease the land to the Castle Hill Company at a rate sufficient to support the purchase price paid by CNL.
• The Castle Hill Company would then sublease the land to one of the Midland Companies (a “Ground Lease”).
• The Castle Hill Company would receive financing from CNL to purchase or build the restaurant building. CNL would receive a note and mortgage in exchange. The Castle Hill Company would take title to the restaurant building.
• The Castle Hill Company would then lease the building to the Midland Company (a “Building Lease”). In addition to the rent required to be paid to the Midland Company under the Building Lease, the Building Lease also required the Midland Company to pay the rents due to CNL from the Castle Hill Company under the Ground Lease.
Id.
¶¶ 28-38. Approximately forty-five of the Pizza Hut restaurants operated by the Midland Companies were subject to Ground and Building Leases (collectively referred to as the “Leases”) from the Castle Hill Companies arranged in this manner.
Simultaneous with his negotiation of these transactions, Saverin negotiated arrangements between the Midland Companies and CS First Boston Mortgage Capital (“CSFB”) and other lenders, to finance certain construction and enterprise costs of the Midland Companies (the “Enterprise Loans”).
Id.
¶¶ 40-43. Pursuant to the Enterprise Loans, CSFB and other lenders hold liens on the non-real estate assets of a Midland Company.
Id.
¶44. Integral, apparently, to this financing was $71,400,000 worth of financing provided by CSFB’s assignee, Franchise Mortgage Acceptance Company (“FMAC”), to Midland in the form of a note (the “FMAC Senior Note”).
As part of the Ground and Building Lease transactions, Saverin also obligated the Midland Companies to enter into- a series of Subordination, Payment, and Security Agreements (the “Direct Pay Agreements”).
Id.
¶ 51. The Direct Pay Agreements obligated the Midland Companies to make their Ground and Building Lease payments directly to CNL, rather than to the Castle Hill Companies.
For the further protection of the creditors of Midland I, a concentration account agreement originally dated February 1, 1996 (the “Concentration Account Agreement”) was entered into between Midland I and Key Trust of Ohio. The Concentration Account Agreement was formally agreed to and accepted by, among others, CNL, CSFB, and FMAC. Pursuant to that Agreement, all revenues from Midland I are funneled into the concentration accounts, from which they are paid out by Key Trust, as trustee, to CNL and other creditors in accordance with the Agreement’s terms.
Id.
¶ 55.
Midland I received only what remained after the creditors were paid in accordance with the Concentration Account Agreement.
Id.
Even though CNL was not a direct creditor of Midland I, but of the Castle Hill Companies, it received Lease payments directly from Midland I pursuant to the Direct Pay and Concentration Account Agreements. Midland I allegedly received
no benefit from the transactions requiring it to make such payments.
Id.
¶¶ 58, 59.
B.
Saverin’s Role And Alleged Self-Interest
Saverin negotiated the transactions on behalf of both the Midland Companies and the Castle Hill Companies. This is unsurprising given that Saverin (directly or in concert with entities his family controlled) at that time allegedly owned all of the equity of the Midland and Castle Hill Companies.
Id.
¶¶ 28-25. The Midland Companies allege that he structured the transactions to be advantageous to himself and detrimental to them. Specifically, the Midland Companies contend that Saverin: i) borrowed more money from CNL than was necessary to purchase the Grounds and Buildings; ii) retained some of the excess loan funds personally and for his family; and iii) set the Ground and Building Lease rents at rates substantially in excess of market value so as to enable the Castle Hill Companies to repay CNL and to realize “excess” profits from the rents.
Id.
¶¶ 46-48. The rents are alleged to be commercially unreasonable and to include “annual rent increases that are fixed and not correlated to inflation, the cost of living index, or any other financial index.”
Id.
¶ 49.
C.
The Midland Companies Flounder And The Enterprise Lenders Assume Ownership Of The Companies
The Midland Companies allege that they quickly found themselves unable to sell enough pizzas to pay their bills and turn a profit. They further allege that part of the reason for this lack of profitability was the Ground and Building Leases, which are “between 50 and 150 percent higher than market rate.”
Id.
¶ 61.
As a consequence of failing to pay their debts, the Midland Companies fell into default with their Enterprise Lenders and Pizza Hut shortly after they began doing business.
Id.
¶ 64. In December 1997, Pizza Hut sent Midland I a notice of default under its franchise agreement, because Midland I had failed to pay required royalties.
Id.
¶ 65.
Saverin then commenced negotiations with Midland’s primary creditors: CSFB, FMAC, and Pizza Hut.
Id.
¶ 67. During the negotiations, Saverin told the creditors that the Midland Companies would file bankruptcy proceedings unless the creditors worked out an arrangement with him.
Id.
The negotiations produced an agreement (the “Resolution Agreement”) in which CSFB and FMAC received all of Saverin’s equity interest in the Midland Companies and in which Saverin resigned as CEO of the Midland Companies. Under the Resolution Agreement, CSFB and FMAC had the right to assign their ownership interests to another party, subject to approval by Pizza Hut.
Id.
¶ 68.
As a matter of fact told the court by the Midland Companies’ counsel at a hearing, but not pled in the proposed Third Amended Complaint even though the proposed Complaint was prepared after that hearing, CSFB and FMAC assigned their ownership interests to counterclaim defendant Al Hut, LLC, a Delaware LLC. 1/14/99 Tr. at 8 (Hereinafter, “Tr.
at_”);
D.U.R.E. 201;
In re Wheelabrator Technologies Inc. Shareholders Litig.,
Del.Ch., C.A. No. 11495, slip op. at 21-22, 1992 WL 212595, Jacobs, V.C. (Sept. 1, 1992) (taking judicial notice of certificate of incorporation and relying upon its clear terms in granting motion to dismiss). A1 Hut is owned by A1 DiMarco, a “work out” specialist with “extensive experience with troubled fast food chains.” Tr. at 8.
The Resolution Agreement also contained a § 9.K, which states as follows:
Reciprocal Releases. Ronald Saverin,
Michael Monahan, James Kerr, Christopher Flocken, Brian Rezach,
Midland Management of Ohio, LLC,
Sacor Investors II, Inc., Sacor Investors III, Inc.,
Dajust, LLC
and
Majess, LLC,
and
each of Midland [I, II, and III], Pizza Hut, CSFB, and FMAC,
as servicer of the Senior Loan,
will execute a reciprocal release of claims,
other than ongoing contractual obligations (including loan documents) or, except with respect to individuals, claims for indemnity, reimbursement, exoneration, or contribution arising as a result of any claims by third parties. The release shall specifically release Ronald Saverin and Pizza Hut from their respective obligations concerning negotiations to acquire or acquisitions of any other Pizza Hut System restaurants.
(emphasis added).
The Resolution Agreement did not divest Saverin of his ownership or management positions in the Castle Hill Companies. Nor did the Resolution Agreement alter the Ground or Budding Leases. Even though the Resolution Agreement modified the obligations of the Midland Companies to its creditors in certain material respects, the Resolution Agreement
expressly states that “regularly scheduled rent” will be the second priority — after payments on the FMAC Senior Note — for payments from the Concentration Accounts. Resolution Agreement § 9.E.(ii). Furthermore, the Resolution Agreement obligates the Castle Hill Companies to cooperate with the Midland Companies in assigning certain of the Leases.
Id.
¶ 9.P.
Despite the reference to certain of the Ground and Building Leases in the Concentration Account Agreement and the reference to lease payments in the Resolution Agreement, the Midland Companies plead that CSFB and FMAC only learned of the Ground and Building Leases after A1 Hut took control of the Midland Companies in 1998. Compl. ¶ 71.
Later in 1998, Midland II and III stopped payment on certain of the Ground and Building Leases with regard to certain poorly-performing Pizza Hut restaurants the Midland II and III Companies closed.
Id.
¶¶ 72-78. As a result, in August 1998, CNL and the Castle Hill Companies sent the Midland Companies default notices under the Direct Payment and Lease Agreements.
Id.
¶¶ 77-81. As to certain of the Pizza Huts Midland I operated, Midland I has continued to pay rent, not by choice, but because the Concentration Account Agreement requires that the Midland I revenues go directly into the Concentration Accounts and be paid out in accordance with the Concentration Account Agreement.
Id.
¶ 74.
IV.
The Counts Of The Complaint
On November 12, 1998, the Midland Companies filed this action. Nearly two months later, the Midland Companies moved for an expedited schedule for consideration of their motion for a preliminary injunction. After a hearing, this court denied that motion on January 14,1999.
The complaint contains nine counts. Counts I and II allege that Saverin breached his fiduciary duties of care and loyalty by causing the Midland Companies to enter the Ground and Building Leases on commercially unreasonable terms so as to advantage the Castle Hill Companies, himself, and his family.
Id.
¶¶ 84-93. Count III alleges that the Midland Companies were insolvent at the time they signed the Ground and Building Leases and that those Leases constituted a fraudulent conveyance to the Castle Hill Companies, CNL, MAJESS, and DAJUST.
Id.
¶¶ 94-98. Counts IV and V allege that the Leases and the Concentration Account Agreement were not negotiated at arms-length and in good faith, and should be reformed so as to bring the payments owed by the Midland Companies under those Agreements into line with market rates.
Id.
¶¶ 99-110. Count VI alleges that Ronald Saverin used the Castle Hill Companies to improperly benefit himself at the expense of the Midland Companies, and thus that Saverin’s “veil should be pierced” to enable the plaintiffs to recover from the Castle Hill Companies.
Id.
¶¶ 111-115.
Count VII alleges that Saverin, the Castle Hill Companies, MAJESS, and DA-JUST were unjustly enriched at the expense of the Midland Companies.
Id.
¶¶ 116-120. Count VIII alleges that Janet Saverin was unjustly enriched at the expense of the Midland Companies by a transaction in which she received $1.25 million of loan proceeds from the original Midland III financing transaction, which she then lent to Midland I in exchange for a promissory note.
Id.
¶¶ 121-127. Count IX seeks a declaratory judgment that the Leases and the Concentration Account Agreement are voidable or reformable and thus that the failure of the Midland Companies to make full payment under those contracts does not justify the eviction no
tices sent to the Midland Companies under those contracts.
Id.
¶¶ 128-136.
Although the counts plead different legal theories, each is grounded on an assertion that Saverin committed a breach of his legal obligations to the Midland Companies during his tenure as their owner-operator. The Midland Companies admit as much:
[t]he action arises out of a series of acquisition and construction financing transactions and related leases and sublease transaction undertaken by Save-rin — at a time when he was the CEO ... of the three Midland Companies.... The main purpose that Saverin accomplished in structuring the leases this way was to avoid having to make any commitment of personal funds as a capital investment.... In addition, Saverin used his control position to structure side deals that benefitted his wife Janet Saverin and the two trusts set up for the benefit of their children.
See
Pis.’ Br. at 5.
None of the moving defendants other than Saverin are alleged to have independently wronged the Midland Companies; rather, they are being sued for the most part because Saverin was their agent and owner (e.g., the Castle Hill Companies) and/or because they allegedly benefited from Saverin’s wrongdoing (e.g., MAJUSS and DAJUST).
V.
Legal Analysis: The Bangor Punta Doctrine Bars The Complaint
The defendants argue that the Midland Companies lack standing under the doctrine articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co.,
417 U.S. 703, 94 S.Ct. 2578, 41 L.Ed.2d 418 (1974) and embraced by this court in
Courtland Manor, Inc. v. Leeds,
Del.Ch., 347 A.2d 144 (1975). The
Bangor Punta
Doctrine (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the “Doctrine”) was well-summarized by then Vice-Chancellor Brown in
Court-land Manor
as follows:
[A] shareholder may not complain of acts of corporate mismanagement if he acquired his shares from those who participated or acquiesced in the wrongful transaction. The basis for this rule is that where shareholders have purchased all or substantially all of the shares of a corporation at a fair price, they have personally sustained no injury from wrongs which occurred prior to their purchase, and consequently, any recovery on their part for such prior wrongs would constitute a windfall and would enable such shareholders to obtain funds to which they had no just title or claim. In addition, to allow recovery to subsequent shareholders for prior
wrongs would permit them to recoup a large part of the price they agreed to pay for their shares even though they had received all they had bargained for. Finally, to allow recovery would be to permit after-acquiring shareholders to profit from wrongs done to others, and thus encourage speculative litigation.
347 A.2d at 147.
Courtland Manor
involved a situation very similar to that which exists in this case. In that case, the defendant Leeds owned and controlled a partnership, which was created to own and lease a building, as well as the plaintiff-corporation, which was formed to operate a nursing home in the building owned by the partnership.
Id.
at 145-147. After the partnership and the plaintiff-corporation executed a lease agreement for the building, the plaintiff-corporation began suffering severe cash shortages.
Id.
at 145-146. As a result, Mr. Leeds gave up his ownership interest in the plaintiff-corporation and sometime thereafter, three others purchased most of the stock of the plaintiff-corporation for “a fraction of its initial cost.”
Id.
at 146. Soon after purchasing this majority interest, the three new controlling stockholders of the plaintiff-corporation caused their company to commence suit against,
inter alia,
Mr. Leeds and the partnership.
Id.
The complaint asserted that Mr. Leeds breached his fiduciary duties to the plaintiff-corporation by causing it to enter into a lease agreement that included rental terms which were “unfair” to the plaintiff-corporation and “excessively favorable” to the partnership.
Id.
Relying on
Bangor Punta,
this court refused to permit the corporation to sue Mr. Leeds or the partnership, since most of the stockholders of the corporation at the time the suit was commenced acquired their shares after the alleged misconduct occurred.
Id.
at 147-148. Thus, the current stockholders would have obtained an unfair “windfall” if they were successful on their claims since they would be re-trading the bargain they made to become owners.
Id.
at 148.
In an important way, the
Bangor Punta
Doctrine implements the policy embodied in the continuous ownership requirement of 8
Del.C.
§ 327 and Chancery Court Rule 23.1 (and, of course, its federal counterpart). The continuous ownership requirement generally prevents a person who obtains an ownership interest in a corporation after a claim arose from suing derivatively on the claim on behalf of the corporation.
See generally
Donald J. Wolfe, Jr.
&
Michael A. Pittenger,
Corporate and Commercial Practice in the Delaware Court of Chancery
§ 9 — 2(b)(2) (1998). The
Bangor Punta
Doctrine ensures that a purchaser who obtains a controlling interest in a corporation after potential claims arose against those persons from whom the purchaser obtained his shares cannot use his control of the corporate machinery to cause the corporation to assert those claims directly.
The
Bangor Punta
Doctrine and the reasoning of
Courtland Manor
apply with full force in this case. A1 Hut obtained its ownership interest in the Midland Companies long after the Leases— which are the basis for virtually all of the counts in the complaint — were executed.
A1 Hut received its interest as an assignee of CSFB and FMAC, which had negotiated at arms-length to obtain that interest free
of charge from the alleged wrongdoer, Ronald Saverin, as part of the Resolution Agreement. The Resolution Agreement was executed by sophisticated parties with experience in negotiating work-out agreements.
CSFB and FMAC were on notice of the Leases because the Resolution Agreement itself reflects such knowledge and gave payments under the Leases second priority to payments on the FMAC Senior Note, Resolution Agreement ¶ 9.E.Ü;
see also Id.
¶ 2, ¶ 9.P, and because the Concentration Account Agreements discuss certain of the Leases.
See, e.g.,
May 28, 1996 Concentration Agreement at 1-3 (discussing Leases);
Id.
at 8-9 (defining Leases between Castle Hill V and VI and Midland I). In the Resolution Agreement, CSFB and FMAC specifically agreed to execute a reciprocal release absolving Saverin and the other investors in the Castle Hill Companies from liability. Resolution Agreement § 9.K.
To enable this suit to go forward would sanction the type of commercial unfairness the
Bangor Punta
Doctrine exists to prevent. Al Hut acquired its interest in the Midland Companies from parties, CSFB and FMAC, which obtained their “shares from those who participated or acquiesced in the [allegedly] wrongful transaction[s].”
Courtland Manor,
347 A.2d at 147. The
Bangor Punta
Doctrine binds Al Hut as CSFB’s and FMAC’s successors.
Court-land Manor,
347 A.2d at 148. The fact that Al Hut may now wish that CSFB and FMAC struck a different deal does not entitle it to an exception to a clear rule of law which bars its claim.
The Midland Companies seek to distinguish this case from
Bangor Punta
and
Courtland Manor
on four grounds. The first is that the
Bangor Punta
Doctrine, according to them, only applies to claims “such as for breach of fiduciary duty or corporate mismanagement, whether under state or federal law, that could have been brought as shareholder derivative actions.” Pis.’ Br. at 11 (emphasis omitted). But the
Bangor Punta
Doctrine is not limited to barring claims for “breach of fiduciary duty or corporate mismanagement.”
As a matter of logic, the nature of the claim is irrelevant to the purpose of the Doctrine, which is to prevent persons from being able to re-trade arms-length transactions by using the corporation to sue the parties from whom they obtained their shares. The fact that the claim asserted by the corporation after a change of control is one for breach of contract, rather than breach of fiduciary duty, against the person selling corporate control does not eliminate the unfairness of allowing such a claim to be asserted.
As a matter of fact, the United States Supreme Court applied the Doctrine to bar common law and statutory claims in the
Bangor Punta
case.
Bangor Punta,
417 U.S. at 706-707, 717-718, 94 S.Ct. 2578 (dismissing all counts of plaintiffs complaint, including Maine common law claims and claims under federal and state statutes). Other federal courts have so applied the Doctrine.
See In re REA Express, Inc., Private Treble Damage Antitrust Litig.
.
(“REA Express”),
412
F.Supp. 1239, 1253 (E.D.Pa.1976) (fact that claim was brought under Sherman Act did not render
Bangor Punta
Doctrine inapplicable since that doctrine “is not tied as closely to the nature of the cause of action then before the court as plaintiff would have us find”);
REA Express, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co. (“Travelers”),
406 F.Supp. 1389, 1394 (D.D.C.1976) (applying Delaware law and dismissing common law claims, including claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and wrongful interference with business relations, under the
Bangor Punta
Doctrine),
aff'd in part and modified in part,
554 F.2d 1200 (D.C.Cir.),
cert. denied,
434 U.H. 858, 98 S.Ct. 182, 54 L.Ed.2d 131 (1977). Likewise, in
Courtland Manor,
then Vice Chancellor Brown dismissed as barred by
Bangor Punta
a claim that one of the defendants had obtained rent payments from the corporate plaintiff in breach of a lease contract. 347 A.2d at 146-147.
In addition, the premise of the plaintiffs’ asserted exception — that claims based on theories such as reformation
and unjust enrichment may not be brought derivatively — is incorrect. A derivative suit is a “suit [brought] by the corporation, asserted by the shareholders on its behalf, against those hable to it.”
Aronson v. Lewis,
Del.Supr., 473 A.2d 805, 811 (1984). Any claim belonging to the corporation may, in appropriate circumstances, be asserted in a derivative action. Thus, the fact that several of the counts in the Midland Companies’ complaint do not involve corporate mismanagement or breach of fiduciary duty does not exempt those claims from the application of the
Bangor Punta
Doctrine.
The Midland Companies also try to distinguish
Bangor Punta
on the ground that the Resolution Agreement did not involve a “negotiated sale” of the Midland Companies to CSFB. Pis.’ Br. at 13-14. Yet, the complaint alleges that CSFB obtained its ownership of the Midland Companies as a result of the Resolution Agreement. Compl. ¶¶ 67-68.
The fact that the Resolution Agreement was worked out between Saverin and the Midland Companies’ creditors and that those creditors may have assented to the terms of the Resolution Agreement to avoid a bankruptcy filing by the Midland Companies is of no legal consequence.
Atlantis Plastics Corp. v. Sammons,
Del.Ch., C.A. No. 930, 1988 WL 32371, at *3, Hartnett, V.C. (Mar. 30, 1988) (where a creditor obtained a controlling block of shares pursuant to an agreement executed prior to sale of that stock at a sheriffs sale, the creditor-purchaser was barred from using the corporation to sue the seller for breaches of fiduciary duty occurring prior to the sale);
see also Bank of Santa Fe v. Petty,
116 N.M. 761, 867 P.2d 431, 437 (.1993) (where noteholder foreclosed on bank shares and obtained control of bank, he could not thereafter cause the bank to sue its former directors for actions before he became a
stockholder),
cert. denied,
117 N.M. 10, 868 P.2d 655 (N.M.1994).
To the extent that A1 Hut now gets to operate the Midland Companies without paying the full rents owed under the Leases, it will be unjustly enriched at the expense of the defendants. Saverin’s agreement to turn over ownership of the Midland Companies was premised on the continuation of the Leases and on a reciprocal release. Enabling CSFB’s and FMAC’s assignee, A1 Hut, to use the Midland Companies to sue to change the Leases would vitiate the consideration Saverin received under the Resolution Agreement, resulting in precisely the type of commercial unfairness the
Bangor Pun-ta
Doctrine exists to prevent.
Cf. Council of S. Bethany v. Sandpiper Dev. Corp., Inc.,
Del.Ch., C.A. No. 935, mem. op. at 13, 1986 WL 10081, Jacobs, V.C. (Sept. 4, 1986) (where real party-in-interest attempted to use corporation to sue on his behalf when he was barred from doing so in his individual capacity, “the corporate fiction will be disregarded and the corporation will be precluded” from asserting the claim).
Next, the Midland Companies contend that
Bangor Punta
does not apply because the Leases have a “continuing effect” on the Midland Companies. Although
Bangor Punta
adverted to the possibility that the Doctrine might not apply where the effects of prior wrongdoing had a “continuing effect” on the corporation, 417 U.S. at 711, n. 6, 94 S.Ct. 2578, the logic of the Doctrine and its similarity to the contemporaneous ownership rule dictate that a “continuing effect” exception should not be recognized. Where sophisticated persons assume ownership, as did CSFB and FMAC, on clear notice of the very agreements, the Leases, alleged to be the source of the “continuing effects,” there is no justification for the Doctrine not to apply.
For that reason, courts have eschewed a “continuing effect” exception to the
Bangor Punta
Doctrine and have applied an approach similar to the “continuing wrong” exception to Rule 23.1’s contemporaneous ownership rule. Under the continuing wrong exception, the key fact is when the “specific acts of alleged wrongdoing occurred, and not when their effect is felt.”
Schreiber v. Bryan,
Del.Ch., 396 A.2d 512, 516 (1978). Hence, courts have refused to allow an exception to the
Bangor Punta
Doctrine in cases where plaintiffs complained that payments under contracts predating their ownership of the corporation constituted a “continuing wrong” to the corporation.
Finally, the Midland Companies claim that the Doctrine does not apply because they are, in reality, asserting their
claims not for the benefit of themselves or A1 Hut, but for the benefit of the creditors of the Midland Companies. This rather odd assertion does not avail the Midland Companies. For one thing, I have no reason to believe that the Midland Companies or Al Hut are anything other than profit-maximizing corporations. To the extent that they can reduce the rents due under the Leases, A1 Hut increases its chances to turn around the Midland Companies’ performance. Although this will have the instrumental effect of helping those Companies pay their creditors, the ultimate end sought is not health for the creditors; it is profits for the Midland Companies and their sole owner, A1 Hut. Affording A1 Hut this competitive advantage at the expense of the defendants results in the inequity the Doctrine is designed to prevent.
Such is also the case even if A1 Hut is genuinely trying to advance the interest of the Midland Companies’ creditors.
The Midland Companies assert that the “principal creditors” of the Midland Companies are CSFB, FMAC, and Pizza Hut. Pis.’ Br. at 14. Each of these creditors is a party to the Resolution Agreement. That Agreement incorporated provisions acknowledging the existence of the Leases and a provision in which CSFB, FMAC, among others, agreed to release any claims they had against Saverin, DAJUST, MAJESS, and the other owners of the Castle Hill Companies. It would therefore be inconsistent with the Doctrine to allow CSFB’s and FMAC’s assignee under that Agreement, A1 Hut, to recover on these creditors’ behalf through a suit nominally brought by the Midland Companies.
See Bangor Punta,
417 U.S. at 715, 94 S.Ct. 2578 (rejecting argument that plaintiff-corporation should be entitled to recovery since any recovery would benefit the public where the plaintiff-corporation “would be entitled to distribute the recovery in any lawful manner it may choose”);
REA Express,
406 F.Supp. at 1395 (rejecting argument that
Bangor Punta
Doctrine should not bar a claim because the plaintiff-corporation had filed for bankruptcy and therefore any recovery would benefit creditors);
cf. Council of S. Bethany,
Del.Ch., mem. op. at 13, 1986 WL 10081.
In concluding that the
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Doctrine bars plaintiffs’ complaint, I am not insensitive to the surface appearance of unfairness that results from the application of the Doctrine. I mean, can’t it be said that the Doctrine insulates wrongdoers from liability? When the question is closely considered, I think not. After all, the
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Doctrine does not prevent a party who obtained control of a corporation from a seller from asserting a claim that the sales agreement should be rescinded because the seller defrauded or otherwise wrongfully induced the purchaser to execute the agreement. A1 Hut’s predecessors, CSFB and FMAC, and A1 Hut, as their successor, certainly had that option if they believed that the defendants had misled or coerced CSFB and FMAC into signing the Resolution Agreement.
What the
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Doctrine does prohibit is purchasers like CSFB, FMAC,
and A1 Hut from accepting their end of the bargain — ownership and control of the corporation — and attempting to sweeten their end of the deal by suing the seller to recover damages to the corporation allegedly caused by the seller before the sale. The
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Doctrine properly prohibits as inequitable such attempts at re-trading commercial transactions through litigation.
The moving defendants advance several other arguments as to why the complaint should be dismissed. Although many of them are meritorious and would justify dismissal of several of the counts in the complaint,
1 need not address them since the
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Doctrine bars the counts in the Complaint in their entirety.
V.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I hereby grant the moving defendants’ motion to dismiss and dény plaintiffs’ motion to amend. Defendants shall, upon notice as to form, submit a conforming order.