Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HARRY T. EDWARDS.
Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge WALD.
HARRY T. EDWARDS, Circuit Judge:
In 1982, Michael Hubbard applied for but was denied a job with the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”). The District Court found that EPA acted unlawfully in failing to hire Hubbard because of his exercise of First Amendment rights. The District Court ruled that, as appropriate equitable relief, Hubbard was entitled to be instated as a criminal investigator at EPA, at a grade and pay scale equal to that of persons hired in 1982; however, the trial court ruled that Hubbard could not be awarded back pay pursuant to an equitable action under the First Amendment. The District Court also refused to consider Hubbard’s claim for attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1988). Hubbard here appeals from the denial of back pay and the trial court’s failure to rule on his request for fees; the Government cross-appeals on the question of liability.
We agree with the trial judge that EPA violated Hubbard’s First Amendment rights, so we affirm the judgment of the District Court on the question of liability. We reverse and remand, however, on the judgments with respect to back pay and fees.
I. BACKGROUND
This litigation has now consumed a decade; unfortunately, the disagreements be[455]*455tween the parties seem as great now as when this law suit was initiated. The history of the case is detailed in the District Court’s first judgment issued in 1984, a prior panel opinion of this court reviewing that judgment, a subsequent decision by this court sitting en banc, and two decisions of the District Court rendered following a remand of the case after en banc review. See Hubbard v. EPA, 809 F.2d 1 (D.C.Cir.1986), vacated in part and aff'd sub. nom. Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223 (D.C.Cir.1988) (en banc), on remand, Hubbard v. EPA, 735 F.Supp. 435 (D.D.C.1990), modified, 739 F.Supp. 654 (D.D.C.1990). To put the case in focus, we offer here a brief review of the principal facts.
In 1981, while a detective with the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”), Hubbard participated in the highly publicized Capitol Hill drug investigation, pursuing allegations of drug use and distribution by Members of Congress and their staffs. Hubbard’s involvement, and apparently the entire investigation, began when he received a tip from mémbers of columnist Jack Anderson’s staff, Jack Mitchell and Indy Badhwar. Following the tip, Hubbard arranged, with the help of Anderson’s staff, to use a phone in Representative Robert K. Dor-nan’s office as a cover to receive messages. The investigation eventually led to a number of arrests for alleged drug violations.
After the initial arrests in the case became public, Representative Dornan, who was a member of the Select Committee on Narcotics, requested an update on the investigation. Hubbard then met with the congressman, his assistant, Mitchell and Badhwar. Hubbard outlined the investigation and began to name suspects. Representative Dornan cut him off and requested a written memo, which Hubbard later provided; the memo named several suspects. The memo was later sent by Dornan’s office to Anderson’s office and to the Select Committee. Anderson published several columns about the investigation, although none of the suspects was named in any of the initial stories.
Sometime after publication of the story, officials at MPD removed Hubbard from the investigation; however, upon considering the situation, the MPD Chief of Police rejected a recommendation of disciplinary action against Hubbard. Accordingly, Hubbard was never sanctioned by MPD for any improper communications with Representative Dornan or the press. On this point, the trial court specifically found that “Hubbard’s communications regarding the investigation were not insubordinate.... Hubbard was removed from the case after the publicity broke, but ultimately, was neither reassigned nor demoted. It was the considered judgment of his superiors in the police department that Hubbard did not act inappropriately in his communications regarding the investigation.” 735 F.Supp. at 439.
In 1982, Hubbard applied for an investigator position with the newly formed Criminal Investigations Division at EPA. EPA’s personnel division rated Hubbard’s application “highly qualified.” He was invited for an interview with Peter Beeson, the hiring official and Division director, William Graff, the chief of investigations, and Gary Steakley, the deputy chief. Both Graff and Steakley recommended that Hubbard be hired. Beeson, however, acted to block Hubbard’s application.
Before his interview with Hubbard, Bee-son apparently had talked with his fiancee, Laura Kiernan, a Washington Post reporter, about Hubbard’s supposed press contacts. Although Kiernan refused to offer any information, Beeson claims to have had a “gut feeling” that Hubbard had made improper contacts with the press during the Capitol Hill investigation. Although Beeson admitted that he acted on these unverified suspicions, he did not share them with Graff or Steakley. As a consequence, Hubbard was told that he was rejected for employment because he lacked the requisite experience in white collar and corporate investigations. The District Court found as follows:
Because Hubbard had veteran’s preference status, Beeson was required to prepare a “passover” document to justify selection of any applicant with a lower ranking than Hubbard on the certificate of eligibles. The passover document finally submitted to the EPA Personnel [456]*456Office indicated that Hubbard was not selected because he lacked the requisite white collar or corporate investigative experience. However, Hubbard had some white collar experience through training and school and, furthermore, had extensive experience in class I felony investigations. This experience satisfied the criteria listed in the Vacancy Announcement. See Joint Exhibit 1 (position requires skill in conducting investigations involving major corporations, white collar crime, and fraud). Moreover, several of the successful applicants had less white collar or corporate experience than Hubbard.
735 F.Supp. at 437.
Later in 1982, Hubbard discovered that MPD colleagues with no corporate or white collar crime investigation experience had been hired. After pursuing administrative remedies, he sued, originally bringing actions under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, and the Constitution. Under the Constitution, Hubbard sought both equitable relief based on the First Amendment and Bivens-type damages. After the District Court dismissed all of his claims, Hubbard appealed and this court reinstated his equitable action, but affirmed the dismissal of his damages action. Hubbard v. EPA, 809 F.2d at 11-12; Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d at 226-30.
Following remand and trial on the First Amendment claim, the District Court found that EPA had refused to hire Hubbard in violation of his First Amendment rights. Hubbard v. EPA, 735 F.Supp. 435 (D.D.C.1990). In its initial opinion on remand, the District Court ruled that Hubbard should be instated and awarded back pay, but that no attorneys’ fees would be awarded. Id. at 440. In a subsequent memorandum opinion, 739 F.Supp. 654 (D.D.C.1990), the District Court affirmed its liability ruling but reversed its award of back pay.
Hubbard’s appeal challenges the denial of back pay and attorneys’ fees. EPA cross appeals, contending that the District Court erred in finding that it violated Hubbard’s speech rights.
II. The FiRST Amendment Claim
In Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 574, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1738, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968), the Supreme Court held that an employee’s “exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.” In evaluating challenges under Pickering, the courts have utilized a four-prong test:
[T]he Pickering cause of action has four elements. First, the public employee must have been speaking on a matter of public concern. If the speech is not of public concern, “it is unnecessary ... to scrutinize the reasons for [the] discharge,” at least “absent the most unusual circumstances.” Second, the court must “balance” the interests of the employee, “as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public interest and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through it employees.” Third, the employee must prove that his speech was a substantial or motivating factor in his discharge. Finally, the government employer must be given an opportunity to prove that it would have reached the same decision even absent the protected conduct.
The first two inquiries are questions of law for the court to resolve. The latter two are questions of fact ordinarily left to the jury.
Hall v. Ford, 856 F.2d 255, 258 (D.C.Cir.1988) (citations omitted).
EPA does not seriously contest the first and third prongs of the test. The District Court found, and we agree, that Hubbard’s speech touched a matter of public concern. “Certainly, the allegation that members of Congress use illegal narcotics is a matter of public concern.” 735 F.Supp. at 438. Additionally, at the time he communicated with Representative Doman, Hubbard was not involved in any dispute regarding his job. Often, where speech has been found not to be of public concern, “the content, form, and context” have revealed it to address personal employment grievances. See Connick v. Myers, 461 [457]*457U.S. 138, 147-48, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1690-91, 76 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). Hubbard had no such personal grievances in this case. The Government points to some testimony suggesting that Hubbard was frustrated with MPD’s slow pace on the investigation, Trial Transcript (“Tr.”) vol. I, at 155, reprinted in Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 140, but this surely does not contradict or otherwise detract from the conclusion that the disputed event was a matter of public concern. Indeed, Hubbard’s motivation, unless personal, is irrelevant to whether the speech itself is a matter of public concern.1
EPA also effectively concedes that Hubbard’s speech was a “substantial” or “motivating” factor in the decision not to hire him. Beeson admitted as much at trial, e.g., Tr. vol. I, at 170-75, reprinted in J.A. 155-60, and the District Court specifically found that Beeson’s belief that Hubbard had press contacts, not lack of corporate crime investigation experience, was “the real reason” Beeson did not hire Hubbard. 735 F.Supp. at 437.
In light of the foregoing, we find that Hubbard was “speaking on a matter of public concern,” and that his “speech was a substantial or motivating factor” in EPA’s decision not to hire him. We turn now to consider the second and fourth prongs of the Pickering test, the principal foci of EPA’s cross-appeal.
A. The Pickering Balance
Under the second prong of Pickering, the court’s task “is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. at 1374-75. In this case, the District Court struck the balance in favor of Hubbard.
[T]he government in this case failed to demonstrate that Hubbard, by virtue of his prior contacts with the press, could not perform the job of criminal investigator with the EPA successfully. Nor did the government attempt to show that it had an interest in discipline or morale in the workplace which would be irreparably compromised by Hubbard’s presence.
735 F.Supp. at 438-39 (citations omitted).
The EPA asserts that the District Court struck the wrong balance and erred by (1) requiring a showing of harm to discipline and morale, thereby ignoring the impact on the efficiency of the office, (2) discounting the special deference that should be accorded law enforcement agencies, and (3) imposing an irreparable harm standard. We disagree. The District Court committed no legal error in its judgment and, on the record at hand, the court was fully justified in reaching the result that it did.
Hubbard’s investigation for MPD began as a result of tips received from the Anderson staffers and continued through Hubbard’s cover in Representative Dor-nan’s office. Hubbard did not communicate outside this circle and asked Dornan’s office to keep the written memo “confidential.” Tr. vol. I, at 124-25. Thus, this case does not present a situation in which a government employee has jeopardized an employer’s operation by calling a press conference or indiscriminately leaking sensitive information. Nor does this case involve an employee who acted with disloyalty or in a manner otherwise at odds with the legitimate interests of his employer. Hubbard was not disciplined by MPD; he was not found to have engaged in insubordinate or otherwise wrongful conduct; and [458]*458he did not compromise the Capitol Hill drug investigation. See 735 F.Supp. at 439. These findings by the trial court, which are not clearly erroneous, make it clear that Hubbard did nothing to impair the efficiency of the MPD operation, and nothing that he did at MPD reasonably indicated that he would adversely affect the efficiency of EPA’s operation.
Even if we owe no deference to the factual findings of the District Court and engage in de novo review, we would still find in Hubbard’s favor.2 Hubbard’s report to Representative Dornan clearly served the public interest by informing a policymaker responsible for drug policy of suspected use and distribution among Members of Congress and their staffs. EPA introduced no evidence that the Capitol Hill drug investigation suffered in any way. Although the documentary evidence suggests that Hubbard’s claims that Members of Congress were involved may have been exaggerated, no names were made public by Anderson’s office until after those names were presented to the federal grand jury and the House Ethics Committee. See H.R.Rep. No. 559, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 390 (1983) (reprinting a Jack Anderson column), introduced as Defendant’s Exhibit A. In fact, the Special Counsel appointed by the House Ethics Committee found that Hubbard did not leak the names of Members to Anderson. Id. at 14. Finally, as noted above, the MPD Chief of Police reviewed the case and specifically declined to take any disciplinary action against Hubbard.
It is hardly surprising that Hubbard suffered no discipline at MPD; as the trial court correctly found, Hubbard’s contacts with Dornan were authorized.
[I]t was United States Representative Robert K. Dornan who authorized the use of his office and telephone number as a front for Hubbard’s undercover work on Capitol Hill. Conducting an investigation with the aid of persons outside the police organization carries a certain amount of risk of unauthorized or premature disclosure. It appears to the Court that in authorizing this investigation, the Metropolitan Police Department made a judgment that the benefits of cooperation in this case outweighed this risk. In light of these circumstances, it is clear to the Court that Hubbard’s initial contacts with the press and Representative Dornan were authorized, and deserving of first amendment protection.
739 F.Supp. at 656.
Furthermore, we find the EPA’s alleged concern over the efficiency and confidentiality of its investigations to be pretextual. This rationale was not offered until after Beeson had decided not to hire Hubbard. When he first passed over Hubbard, Bee-son acted on nothing more than a “gut feeling” he assertedly developed when he mentioned Hubbard’s name to his fiancee, Laura Kiernan. Tr. vol. I, at 174, reprinted in J.A. 159. After talking with Kier-nan, Beeson apparently rejected Hubbard on the basis of supposed press contacts without knowing anything about the context of those contacts. Beeson testified that he “press[ed] [Laura Kiernan] on more than one occasion for information she might have [on Hubbard],” but she “refused to give it and basically made it clear that [any information she had] was not firsthand but rather it was hearsay.” Tr. vol. I, at 148, reprinted in J.A. 133. Nonetheless, Beeson confirmed that he
had made a determination, based on basically my gut feeling from my interactions with Laura, together with an absence of white collar crime and corporate experience, that Mr. Hubbard was not going to be hired; that I would pass him over, and we drafted a passover document for that purpose. And, the passover document was based on his lack of white collar crime and corporate defendant experience.
Tr. vol. I, at 151-52, reprinted in J.A. 136-37.
As Beeson admitted, “the primary reason” he passed over Hubbard was the in[459]*459formation that he gleaned from his fiancee. Tr. vol. I, at 164-65, reprinted in J.A. 149-50. The “other reason,” i.e., Hubbard’s alleged lack of white collar crime experience, id., was a sham. On this latter point, the trial court specifically found that
the real reason Beeson decided not to hire Hubbard was his belief that Hubbard was responsible for press leaks which compromised the Capitol Hill investigation. The Court is troubled by the fact that officials at EPA were not straightforward with their true reasons for passing over Hubbard. Their attempts to conceal the truth, and the assertion of a patently inadequate basis for rejecting Hubbard, buttress the Court’s conclusion that EPA’s actions regarding Hubbard’s application were constitutionally suspect.
It was only after Beeson had acted to block the hiring of Hubbard that he had occasion to discuss Hubbard’s involvement in the Capitol Hill drug investigation with MPD Detective Dave Hopkins. Hopkins told Beeson that Hubbard had communicated with Representative Dornan about the investigation. But at no time did Beeson find out exactly what was said, to whom, or to what effect. Although he gained no concrete information from Hopkins, Beeson nonetheless claimed that his talk with Hopkins “provided an additional sign of [Hubbard’s] lack of sensitivity to the proper handling of sensitive information in an ongoing investigation.” Tr. vol. I, at 157, reprinted in J.A. 142. On cross-examination, however, Beeson reiterated that his view not to hire Hubbard was formed well before he talked with Hopkins:
Q. As I understand it, your decision not to hire Mike Hubbard was made on the 19th of August, at least two weeks before your conversation with Mr. Hopkins; right?
A. Yes. At that point my decision was based on my gut feelings in talking with Laura [Kiernan].
Tr. vol. I, at 170-71, reprinted in J.A. 155-56. Thus, based solely on his “gut feelings” about Hubbard’s unverified contacts with the press, Beeson rejected Hubbard’s bid for employment.
The obvious weakness in the Government’s case is that there was no real content to Beeson’s rejection of Hubbard on the basis of supposed press contacts; thus, we are left with an adverse employment action based on nothing more than the speech of a prospective employee with respect to a matter of public concern. In an apparent effort to avoid this hole in its case, the Government now asserts that law enforcement agencies are entitled to something approaching an irrebuttable presumption that their efficiency is compromised whenever their employees speak publicly. This position is baseless.
As we have held in the past, a police officer does “not completely shed his First Amendment rights when he accept[s] employment as a public servant. ‘Policemen, like teachers and lawyers, are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights.’ ” Tygrett v. Washington, 543 F.2d 840, 849 (D.C.Cir.1974) (quoting Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500, 87 S.Ct. 616, 620, 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967)). We recognize that some decisions have held that “[t]he First Amendment does not protect personal behavior in the law enforcement context to the same extent that it does in other areas of Governmental concern,” McMullen v. Carson, 754 F.2d 936, 939-40 (11th Cir.1985). Even accepting this as true, however, it does not follow that the individualized consequences of an officer’s speech may be ignored. See Tygrett, 543 F.2d at 849-50 (“[Discharge [can] be justified only by a specific finding that the statements in question adversely affected his efficiency as a police officer or the efficiency of the Department as a police force.”) (emphasis added); McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137 (D.C.Cir.1983) (conducting a case specific review of the CIA’s decision, pursuant to regulations, to censor parts of a former agent’s writings).
Furthermore, this is not a case in which the employer claims that the employee violated some agency “regulation” prohibiting the release of information. See, e.g., Jurgensen v. Fairfax Cty., 745 F.2d 868, 883-84 (4th Cir.1984). Hubbard was authorized [460]*460to work through Congressman Dornan; the trial court found that he engaged in no act of insubordination with respect to the investigation; and it is undisputed that he was never disciplined by MPD for any improper conduct during the investigation.3 Thus, even if a “regulation” against the release of information could obviate the need for an individualized assessment under Pickering, there is no evidence in this case to indicate that MPD invoked any such regulation or that Hubbard breached it.
EPA also argues that its decision is entitled to increased deference because it was faced with a hiring decision, not a disciplinary decision. Merely because an employer is hiring rather than firing, however, does not justify unconstitutional action. There can be no serious question that even individuals without property interests in their jobs cannot be discriminated against on the basis of their speech. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383-84, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 2896-97, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987) (holding that a probationary employee may not be fired for speech reasons); Mount Healthy Board of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84, 97 S.Ct. 568, 574, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977) (same); Franklin v. Atkins, 562 F.2d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir.1977) (In a Pickering case, the court wrote: “[T]he Regents need give no reason for a refusal to hire, and in fact need have no reason at all. However, it is equally obvious that they could not refuse to hire for a constitutionally impermissible reason.”) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 994, 98 S.Ct. 1645, 56 L.Ed.2d 83 (1978).
In making hiring decisions, employers are free to draw “reasonable inferences of harm from the [prospective] employee's speech, his position, and his working relationship with his superior.” Hall v. Ford, 856 F.2d at 261. Indeed, in assessing prospective employees, an employer need not prove actual harm or make a showing of “irreparable injury” in order to survive a challenge under Pickering. As the Court said in Connick, an employer is not required to “tolerate action which he reasonably believed would disrupt the office, undermine authority, and destroy close working relationships,” 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (emphasis added); and an employer need not “allow events to unfold” in determining whether actual harm might occur, id. at 152, 103 S.Ct. at 1692. Nonetheless, it is also clear that “unadorned speculation as to the impact of speech ... on the government’s enterprise will not suffice.” Hall, 856 F.2d at 261. In this case, Hubbard was denied a job solely on the basis of Beeson’s “unadorned speculation” about Hubbard’s supposed press contacts.
EPA failed to show in any way that Hubbard's discussions with Dornan, Mitchell and Badhwar compromised his efficiency or the efficiency of the MPD. With the District Court, we conclude that “the selecting official at EPA made the decision not to hire Hubbard on an impermissible basis — Hubbard’s exercise of his first amendment right of free speech,” 739 F.Supp. at 656, and that “the government in this case failed to demonstrate that Hubbard, by virtue of his prior contacts with the press, could not perform the job of criminal investigator with the EPA successfully.” 735 F.Supp. at 438.
On the basis of all of the foregoing, we conclude that, under the second prong of Pickering, the balance of interests clearly weigh in favor of Hubbard.
B. Would EPA Have Made the Same Decision Absent Hubbard’s Speech?
Under the fourth prong of Pickering, the employer must be given the opportunity to prove that it would have reached the same decision even absent the protected conduct. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287, 97 S.Ct. at 576; Hall, 856 F.2d at 258. This is a question of fact, Hall, 856 F.2d at 258, and, as such, the trial court’s findings on this point may not be set aside unless “clearly erroneous.” See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-81, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511-15, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982). The Dis[461]*461trict Court found that Beeson’s beliefs about Hubbard’s speech were the but-for cause of EPA’s refusal to hire. We have no basis to overturn this finding.
EPA asserts that Hubbard’s lack of white collar and corporate crime investigation experience made Hubbard unqualified. But, the trial testimony demonstrated that white collar and corporate crime experience was not a mandatory qualification; experience investigating class I felonies, which Hubbard had, was an adequate substitute. Tr. vol. I, at 63 (Testimony of William Steakley). Other candidates without white collar or corporate crime experience were hired. Id. at 86. The District Court concluded:
The record reflects that Hubbard’s qualifications were equal to or exceeded those of lower-ranked candidates ultimately hired for the positions. Hubbard was not offered a position despite the recommendation of Steakley, shared by Graff, that he be hired. In light of this evidence, the Court concludes that were it not for Hubbard’s speech regarding the Capitol Hill investigation, he would have been hired as a criminal investigator by EPA.
735 F.Supp. at 439.
In sum, there can be no doubt on this record that the District Court was correct in finding that EPA violated Hubbard’s First Amendment rights when it refused to hire him.
III. Attorneys’ Fees
Because we affirm the District Court’s liability determination, we proceed to decide whether Hubbard may recover attorneys’ fees or back pay or both. In this section, we conclude that the District Court on remand should entertain a petition for attorneys’ fees.
In his proposed findings of fact and law, Hubbard requested the opportunity to submit a petition for attorneys’ fees under the relevant part of the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988). Relying on Unification Church v. INS, 762 F.2d 1077 (D.C.Cir.1985), the District Court held that Hubbard could not recover fees under section 2412(b) because his claim was not analogous to an action that would give rise to a fee award claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 735 F.Supp. at 440. Hubbard sought reconsideration, asserting that his claim would fall under section 2412(d), which awards attorneys’ fees
in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988). The District Court denied the motion for reconsideration.
In light of EPA’s appeal on the liability issue, there is no harm done in the District Court’s failure to consider the request for fees under section 2412(d). See Melkonyan v. Sullivan, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 2157, 2162, 115 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991) (time for bringing EAJA petition begins when judgment is final and not appealable). The District Court was in error, however, in suggesting that there was no issue under section 2412(d). Hubbard clearly is a “prevailing party” under relevant case law, see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (holding that a partially prevailing party is still a prevailing party), and would be even if he had only been entitled to instatement, as the District Court thought. See also Raton Gas Transmission Co. v. FERC, 891 F.2d 323, 327-28 (D.C.Cir.1989). On remand the District Court should entertain Hubbard’s petition for fees.
IV. The Claim for Back Pay
The District Court heard Hubbard’s First Amendment action pursuant to its general federal question jurisdiction to decide all cases “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). “This jurisdictional grant provides not only the authority to decide whether a cause of action is stated by a plaintiff’s claim that he has been injured by a violation of the Constitution, [462]*462but also the authority to choose among available judicial remedies in order to vindicate constitutional rights.” Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 374, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 2409, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983) (citation omitted).
Hubbard clearly is entitled to full equitable relief. Both the prior panel and en banc decisions, while ruling out Bivens-damages, held that the court could grant equitable relief. Hubbard, 809 F.2d at 11-12; Spagnola, 859 F.2d at 229-30. Equitable relief against the United States is authorized by the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988),4 which waives sovereign immunity for relief other than money damages. Hence, Hubbard’s ability to recover back pay, as distinct from Bivens-dam&ges, turns on whether or not back pay is properly characterized as equitable relief. We believe that it is.5
A. Back Pay as Equitable Relief
Courts have recognized the equitable nature of back pay awards in a number of different contexts. Generally, these decisions hold that back pay constitutes the very thing that the plaintiff would have received but-for the defendant’s illegal action; back pay is thus seen to reflect equitable restitution. Some decisions also justify a back pay award as incidental to an equitable instatement order. On either rationale, there is strong authority supporting Hubbard’s claim for back pay relief in this case.
A case in point is Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 108 S.Ct. 2722, 101 L.Ed.2d 749 (1988), in which the Supreme Court expressly described back pay as an equitable award. The Court in Bowen considered a challenge to a disallowance of Medicaid disbursements made by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The Court held that section 702’s waiver of sovereign immunity extended to monetary awards which could be characterized as equitable relief. The Court specifically cited “reinstatement ... with back pay” to illustrate a form of equitable relief, as distinguished from money damages.
Our cases have long recognized the distinction between an action at law for damages — which are intended to provide a victim with monetary compensation for an injury to his person, property, or reputation — and an equitable action for specific relief — which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with back pay, or for “the recovery of specific property or monies, ejectment from land, or injunction either directing or restraining the defendant officer’s actions.”
487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (quoting Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 688, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 1460, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949)). Although the reference to “back pay” is offered only by way of example in Bowen, it is a critically important citation because the entire Bowen decision focuses on the distinction between money awarded in equity as specific relief and “money damages.”
The Court’s statement in Bowen is hardly surprising, for the concept of back pay as equitable relief has been recognized by the Supreme Court in other contexts as well. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975), for example, the Court characterized back pay under Title YII as equitable relief. Although noting that Congress had [463]*463included back pay among several statutory remedies available to redress Title VII violations, the Court observed that the judicial discretion to award back pay “is equitable in nature,” consistent with the “historic power of equity to award lost wages.” Id. at 416, 95 S.Ct. at 2371. In fact, the Court characterized the statutory reference to back pay, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988), as a congressional reference to courts’ inherent authority, not as a grant of any new remedial authority.
It is true that “[ejquity eschews mechanical rules ... [and] depends on flexibility.” But when Congress invokes the Chancellor’s conscience to further transcendent legislative purposes, what is required is the principled application of standards consistent with those purposes and not “equity [which] varies like the Chancellor’s foot.” ...
It is also the purpose of Title VII to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination. This is shown by the very fact that Congress took care to arm the courts with full equitable powers. For it is the historic purpose of equity to “se-cur[e] complete justice.”
422 U.S. at 417-18, 95 S.Ct. at 2371-72 (quoting Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396, 66 S.Ct. 582, 584, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946); Brown v. Swann, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 497, 503, 9 L.Ed. 508 (1836)); see also 118 Cong.Rec. 7168 (1971) (“The provisions of this subsection are intended to give the courts wide discretion in exercising their equitable powers to fashion the most complete relief possible.”) (statement of Senator Williams, introducing the Conference Report to the 1972 Title VII amendments).
In Seventh Amendment cases, where the right to a jury trial turns on whether the relief sought is legal or equitable, the Court has continued to note the equitable nature of Title VII back pay awards. In Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974), the Court held that damages under Title VIII for race-based denials of housing were legal in nature and must be awarded in a jury trial. For contrast, the Court cited the back pay remedy under Title VII.
We need not, and do not, go so far as to say that any award of monetary damages must necessarily be “legal” relief. A comparison of Title VIII with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, where the courts of appeals have held that jury trial is not required in an action for reinstatement and backpay, is instructive, although we of course express no view on the jury trial issue in that context. In Title VII cases the courts of appeals have characterized backpay as an integral part of an equitable remedy, a form of restitution.
Id. at 196-97, 94 S.Ct. at 1009-10 (citations and footnote omitted). Similarly, in Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 110 S.Ct. 1339, 108 L.Ed.2d 519 (1990), the Court reiterated that it has noted that “backpay sought from an employer under Title VII would generally be restitutionary in nature.” 110 S.Ct. at 1349.6 See also Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 166-67, 101 S.Ct. 2698, 2704-05, 69 L.Ed.2d 548 (1981); Great American Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 375, 99 S.Ct. 2345, 2350, 60 L.Ed.2d 957 (1979); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584-85, 98 S.Ct. 866, 872, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978).
Those Courts of Appeals which have addressed the issue have been unanimous in holding that an action for back pay under Title VII, at least when joined with a claim for reinstatement and not joined with a damages claim, is equitable and gives rise to no jury trial right. See Ramos v. Roche Products, Inc., 936 F.2d 43, 49-50 (1st Cir.1991); Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 69, 84 (3d Cir.1977); Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 14 (4th Cir.1972); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir.1969); Moore v. Sun Oil Co., 636 F.2d 154, 156 [464]*464(6th Cir.1980); Grayson v. Wickes Corp., 607 F.2d 1194, 1196 (7th Cir.1979); Harmon v. May Broadcasting Co., 583 F.2d 410 (8th Cir.1978) (per curiam); Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir.1975); Snider v. Circle K Corp., 923 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir.1991); Lincoln v. Board of Regents, 697 F.2d 928, 934 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826, 104 S.Ct. 97, 78 L.Ed.2d 102 (1983). This line of cases also answers the possible contention that Title VII awards, because authorized by statute, are somehow different than back pay awards. The constitutional question does not change because Congress has created the right. See Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194, 94 S.Ct. at 1008.
Although not confronting the Seventh Amendment question directly, this Circuit has endorsed the proposition that in a Title VII action “back pay is not in the nature of a claim for damages, but rather an integral part of the statutory equitable remedy.” Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 186 (D.C.Cir.1974) (quoting Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 417 F.2d at 1125).7
Another area in which the Supreme Court has recognized the equitable nature of back pay awards is in actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act. In Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 80 S.Ct. 332, 4 L.Ed.2d 323 (1960), the Court held that courts had equitable jurisdiction to award back pay. The Court first characterized the specific action in question, an action by the Secretary of Labor to enjoin violations of section 15(a)(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), as an equitable action. Id. at 292, 80 S.Ct. at 335. The Court then held it within a court’s equitable jurisdiction to award back pay to protect the rights created in the Act. Id. at 292-93, 80 S.Ct. at 335-36. Notably, the remedial section of the FLSA, unlike Title VII, at the time contained no reference either to back pay or equitable relief in general. See 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1958) (District Courts may “for cause shown, ... restrain violations of section 15”). The Court expressly refuted the idea that a statute must authorize a back pay award. “The court below took as the touchstone for decision the principle that to be upheld the jurisdiction here contested ‘must be expressly conferred by an act of Congress or be necessarily implied from a congressional enactment.’ In this' the court was mistaken.” 361 U.S. at 290, 80 S.Ct. at 334. Quoting from Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398, 66 S.Ct. 1086, 1089, 90 L.Ed. 1332 (1946), where the Court used its equitable jurisdiction to force the refund of rents extracted in violation of wartime price controls, the Court continued: “Unless otherwise provided by statute, all the inherent equitable powers of the District Court are available for the proper and complete exercise of that jurisdiction.” 361 U.S. at 291, 80 S.Ct. at 334.
Implied private rights of action under the Title VI prohibition of discrimination against the handicapped provide yet another context in which the Supreme Court has recognized the equitable nature of back pay awards. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 104 S.Ct. 1248; 79 L.Ed.2d 568 (1984). In Darrone, the Court faced as a threshold matter the question whether or not the implied right of action survived the plaintiff’s death. The Court held that it did:
Without determining the extent to which money damages are available under § 504 [29 U.S.C. § 794], we think it clear that § 504 authorizes a plaintiff who alleges intentional discrimination to bring an equitable action for backpay.
Id. at 630, 104 S.Ct. at 1252.
In addition to the foregoing areas, the courts of appeals have authorized equitable back pay awards in a number of other cases. See, e.g., Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, 613 F.2d 245, 250 (10th Cir.1979) (en banc) (equitable back pay remedy available in Pickering cases); McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1116 n. 3 (9th Cir.1983) (same); Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc., 689 F.2d 481, 488-90 (4th Cir.1982) (recognizing equitable nature of back pay [465]*465award under Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 281 (8th Cir.1983) (same); Troy v. City of Hampton, 756 F.2d 1000, 1002 (4th Cir.) (back pay under Veteran’s Reemployment Rights Act is equitable), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864, 106 S.Ct. 182, 88 L.Ed.2d 151 (1985); Skeets v. Johnson, 805 F.2d 767, 774-75 (8th Cir.1986) (awarding equitable back pay for interim between termination in violation of due process and the required hearing), rev’d on other grounds, 816 F.2d 1213 (8th Cir.1987) (en banc); McGhee v. Draper, 639 F.2d 639, 646 (10th Cir.1981) (same); Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 626 F.2d 1115, 1122 (3d Cir.1980) (awarding equitable back pay in action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to victim of discrimination on the basis of blindness), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923, 101 S.Ct. 1375, 67 L.Ed.2d 352 (1981); McFerren v. County Board of Educ., 455 F.2d 199, 203-04 (6th Cir.) (holding there was no jury trial right where court ordered reinstatement and back pay to teachers fired after desegregation order; in discrimination case, back pay is equitable), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934, 92 S.Ct. 2461, 32 L.Ed.2d 817 (1972); Santiago-Negron v. Castro-Davila, 865 F.2d 431, 441 (1st Cir.1989) (in patronage hiring case, back pay award, if not joined with damages claim, is equitable).8
These precedents aside, we think in this case Hubbard’s back pay request constitutes an equitable remedy. In Terry, the Supreme Court considered two ways the plaintiffs’ action for back pay might be equitable: if it was restitutionary or if it was incidental to or intertwined with in-junctive relief. 110 S.Ct. at 1348. Both of these factors apply here. Hubbard was denied a specific job and the pay that goes with it. An award of instatement and back pay gives Hubbard the precise thing to which he was entitled and therefore constitutes specific restitution. See Restatement of Restitution § 4 (1937) (equity awards the specific thing taken). Although such an award involves money, that alone does not take it outside equity. See Dan B. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies 135 (1973) (“[ojccasionally a money award is also a specie remedy”), quoted in Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. at 895, 108 S.Ct. at 2732.
In arguing that back pay cannot be restitution, the dissent, in our opinion, makes two errors. First, it assumes that restitution can only derive from unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment, however, defines only half the field.
Lawyers use the word “restitution” in at least two senses. “Restitution” means recovery based on and measured by unjust enrichment. It also means restoration in kind of a specific thing. Both usages are part of any complete definition of restitution. [George] Palmer [author of the leading restitution treatise] and the Restatement [o/ Restitution ] use the word both ways....
Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 Tex.L.Rev. 1277, 1279 (1989) (footnotes omitted). It is in the sense of restoration that Dobbs’ statement that money can be a specie remedy is best understood. Second, the dissent misconceives the “thing taken.” By stating that back pay “compensates for the time [Hubbard] was wrongfully kept off the job,” the dissent has conceived of the thing taken solely as the right to work. By analogy to a specific performance action, the dissent’s hypothetical employment contract contains only one term — that Hubbard shall work for the EPA. Such a contract, although possibly not void for lack of consideration, is surely not what either party would have imagined and is surely not what Hubbard [466]*466would have received but-for EPA’s unconstitutional actions. The “thing taken” must have been both the position and the pay. Our interpretation does not eliminate the concept of compensatory damages. Here, they might have been damages for stigmatic injury, costs incurred for retraining or relocation, or other consequential injuries. Simply because the restitutionary measure equals the primary compensatory element does not cause it to lose its character as restitution. See Laycock, supra, at 1285-86.
The money that Hubbard seeks would not be awarded to compensate for an infringement of an intangible right, as in Bivens actions. Rather, it is intertwined with, and flows directly from, an award of instatement — relief that can only be granted by a court in equity.
B. Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
Our conclusion that a back pay award to Hubbard would constitute equitable relief largely disposes of any question regarding sovereign immunity. Section 702 of the APA waives that immunity for all suits seeking specific relief and we think an equitable award of back pay clearly qualifies.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bowen v. Massachusetts makes clear that section 702’s proviso excluding money “damages” Aid not mean that no monetary relief could be awarded. 487 U.S. at 891-901, 108 S.Ct. at 2730-31. As noted above, the Court used an equitable award of back pay as an example of the relief that would be permitted under section 702.9 Since Bowen, two courts have stated, albeit one in dicta, that an award of back pay would fall within section 702. Ulmet v. United States, 888 F.2d 1028, 1030-31 (4th Cir.1989) (finding jurisdiction in the district court to award back pay, although sanctioning its decision to defer to the Claims Court); DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 911 F.2d 1377, 1381 (10th Cir.1990) (dicta), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 799, 112 L.Ed.2d 860 (1991); see also Gleason v. Malcom, 718 F.2d 1044, 1048 (11th Cir.1983) (in rejecting a First Amendment damages claim, the court wrote: “As a federal employee, she could have sought equitable relief, i.e., reinstatement and back pay, pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act”); Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239, 251 n. 4 (D.C.Cir.1991) (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Moreover, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bowen, it would appear that even had Nixon sought back pay in this action, his suit would still not be one for ‘money damages’ within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 702.”).10
[467]*467If Bowen’s use of back pay as an illustration is not sufficiently persuasive, we think the reasoning of that decision compels a finding that back pay is within section 702’s waiver. By its terms, section 702 waives sovereign immunity for all relief other than “money damages.” The Bowen Court relied heavily on this circuit’s decision in Maryland Dept. of Human Resources v. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 763 F.2d 1441 (D.C.Cir.1985), to construe that term and held that it did not encompass all monetary relief. Money given “to substitute for a suffered loss” constituted damages whereas “ ‘attempts] to give the plaintiff the very thing to which he was entitled’ ” were specific relief and within the waiver. See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 895, 108 S.Ct. at 2732; Maryland Dept. of Human Resources, 763 F.2d at 1446 (quoting D. Dobbs, supra, at 135). “The fact that in the present case it is money rather than in-kind benefits ... cannot transform the nature of the relief sought — specific relief, not relief in the form of damages.” 487 U.S. at 895, 108 S.Ct. at 2733; 763 F.2d at 1446. No less than the funds restored to Massachusetts in Bowen, we think Hubbard’s back pay, being part of the very thing EPA unconstitutionally withheld, constitutes specific relief.11
Reviewing the legislative history of section 702, the Bowen Court noted that Congress intended “to eliminate the sovereign immunity defense in all equitable actions for specific relief against a Federal agency or officer acting in an official capacity.” H.R.Rep. No. 1656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1976); S.Rep. No. 996, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976), quoted in Maryland Dept. of Human Resources, 763 F.2d at 1447; Bowen, 487 U.S. at 899, 108 S.Ct. at 2734 (emphasis added). The dissent, in distinguishing between equitable relief and specific relief, glosses over this statement from both committees. Both Bowen and Maryland Dept, of Human Resources applied this statement to a list of actions contemplated by the committee which included not only “Federal grant-in-aid programs,” but also “agricultural regulations, governmental employment, tax investigations, postal-rate matters, administration of labor legislation, control of subversive activities, [and] food and drug regulation.” H.R.Rep. No. 1656 at 9; S.Rep. No. 996 at 8 (emphasis added).
We agree with the dissent that little in the legislative history of section 702 points toward including back pay awards within the waiver. The question may not have occurred to the committee given the existence of the Back Pay Act. Nonetheless, despite the dissent’s reference to “the hard nosed rules of statutory construction,” nothing in the statute or the legislative history excludes back pay recoveries. The interpretation question is whether back pay constitutes “money damages” within the meaning of section 702’s exclusion. The Supreme Court in Bowen held that an award of money constituted “money damages” only when the money “substitute[s] for a suffered loss.” Bowen, 487 U.S. at 894, 108 S.Ct. at 2732 (quoting Maryland Dept. of Human Resources, 763 F.2d at 1446 (quoting D. Dobbs, supra, at 135)). Here, the back pay does not substitute for any damage, such as pain or defamation, but is the exact thing Hubbard should have received. Second, the dissent’s statutory construction argument, being built on si[468]*468lence, is actually based on the cited canon of construction that sovereign immunity waivers should be narrowly construed. To the extent canons are reliable in statutory interpretation, see, e.g., William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Cases And Materials On Legislation: Statutes And The Creation of Public Policy 689 (1988) (noting that canons may be used on any side of a construction argument), “remedial statutes should be broadly construed” might be more appropriate given Congress’ expressed intent that plaintiffs with meritorious claims against the government not be barred by sovereign immunity. See H.R.Rep. No. 1656 at 8, 9; S.Rep. No. 996 at 7, 8: (“enactment of [the bill] is ‘urgent’ in order to remove ‘the unnecessary injustice caused by sovereign immunity’ ” (quoting Professor Kenneth Davis); “the time now [has] come to eliminate the sovereign immunity defense in all equitable actions for specific relief”).12
The Government contends that, under Bowen, money awarded can only be specific relief when there is a statutory requirement that those monies be paid. In other words, the Government seems to argue that equitable relief can never include money unless the money sought is given pursuant to a specific statutory authorization. But of course this makes no sense in light of the Court’s reference to “back pay” as equitable relief and the legislative history which lists “government employment” among the equitable actions for which specific relief may be granted. Although Bowen refers to the Medicaid statute which Massachusetts used to assert that payments had been wrongfully withheld, the opinion of the Court focuses on the dichotomy between substitutionary and restitu-tionary relief. See, e.g., 487 U.S. at 901, 108 S.Ct. at 2735. The Court’s reasoning in this regard appears to draw on the equitable maxim “Equity regards that as done which ought to be done.” See generally George L. Clark, Principles of Equity § 20 (1919); 1 Melville M. Bigelow, Joseph Story's Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence 68-69 (13th ed. 1886). An equity court seeks to restore the plaintiff to the position she would have been in had the defendant’s illegal action never taken place. Cf. Jacksonville Port Auth. v. Adams, 556 F.2d 52, 56-57 (D.C.Cir.1977) (holding that District Court may award money due under a statute even though time for disbursement had expired). Had EPA acted constitutionally, Hubbard would have received the pay in question.
Additionally, in Bowen and Maryland Dept, of Human Resources, the statutory entitlement was necessary to create the cause of action. The grant-in-aid statutes, and only the statutes, provided the grounds on which the plaintiffs could complain that they, in the words of section 702, had “suffered] a legal wrong ... or [been] adversely affected within the meaning of a relevant statute.” 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988). Here, the First Amendment provides the cause of action and, as noted above, the Supreme Court has held that even plaintiffs with no prior property interest in their employment cannot be discharged for exercising those rights. As the resolution of [469]*469the fourth prong of the Pickering test necessarily shows, only EPA’s violation of Hubbard’s First Amendment rights prevented him from being employed and paid as a criminal investigator.
That the First Amendment creates the rights sued upon also points up the error in the District Court’s ruling. Relying on United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 96 S.Ct. 948, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976), the District Court held that it did not have the power to award back pay, because, it said, “[t]he established rule is that one is not entitled to the benefit of a position until he has been duly appointed to it.” 739 F.Supp. at 655. Testan, however, concluded only that no relief was due because there was no statute covering failures to upgrade job classifications. The plaintiffs in Testan asserted no cause of action except those based on the Back Pay Act and the Classification Act. And, as the Court noted, neither statute created a substantive right whose breach makes the United States liable for pay lost through allegedly improper classifications. See 424 U.S. at 398-407, 96 S.Ct. at 953-57. Here, however, the First Amendment gives that substantive right.13
Finally, to the extent that statutory definition of the amount due may be necessary to characterize monetary awards as specific relief, we find no difficulty here. Hubbard’s grade and step, and hence pay, are governed by federal employment regulations. And, to the extent the District Court is required to exercise discretion, we think it no different than interpreting the Medicaid statute or determining back pay in a Title VII dispute.
V. Conclusion
In sum, we find that EPA violated Michael Hubbard’s First Amendment rights when it refused to hire him ás a criminal investigator. He is, therefore, entitled to instatement and back pay as if he had been hired. Furthermore, the District Court on remand should entertain an attorneys’ fees petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d).