Great American Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny

442 U.S. 366, 99 S. Ct. 2345, 60 L. Ed. 2d 957, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 109, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 30,004, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1482

Opinions

Mr. Justice Stewart

delivered the opinion of the Court.

More than a century after their passage, the Civil Rights Acts of the Reconstruction Era continue to present difficult problems of statutory construction. Cf. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U. S. 600. In the case now before us, we consider the scope of 42 U. S. C. § 1985 (3) (1976 ed., Supp. II), the surviving version of § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.¹

The respondent, John R. Novotny, began his career with the Great American Federal Savings and Loan Association (hereinafter Association) in Allegheny County, Pa., in 1950. By 1975, he was secretary of the Association, a member of its board of directors, and a loan officer. According to the allegations of the complaint in this case the Association “intentionally and deliberately embarked upon and pursued a course of conduct the effect of which was to deny to female employees equal employment opportunity . . . When Novotny expressed support for the female employees at a meeting of the board of directors, his connection with the Association abruptly ended. He was not re-elected as secretary; he was not reelected to the board; and he was fired. His support for the Association’s female employees, he alleges, was the cause of the termination of his employment.

Novotny filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under Title VII of the Civil Eights Act of 1964.² After receiving a right-to-sue letter,³ he brought this lawsuit against the Association and its directors in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. He claimed damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1985 (3) (1976 ed., Supp. II), contending that he had been injured as the result of a conspiracy to deprive him of equal protection of and equal privileges and immunities under the laws.⁴ The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. It held that § 1985 (3) could not be invoked because the directors of a single corporation could not, as a matter of law and fact, engage in a conspiracy. 430 F. Supp. 227, 230.⁵

Novotny appealed. After oral argument before a three-judge panel, the case was reargued before the en banc Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which unanimously reversed the District Court’s judgment. 584 F. 2d 1235. The Court of Appeals ruled that Novotny had stated a cause of action under § 1985 (3). It held that conspiracies motivated by an invidious animus against women fall within § 1985 (3), and that Novotny, a male allegedly injured as a result of such a conspiracy, had standing to bring suit under that statutory provision. It ruled that Title VII could be the source of a right asserted in an action under § 1985 (3), and that intra-corporate conspiracies come within the intendment of the section. Finally, the court concluded that its construction of § 1985 (3) did not present any serious constitutional problem.⁶

We granted certiorari, 439 U. S. 1066, to consider the applicability of § 1985 (3) to the facts alleged in Novotny’s complaint.

II

The legislative history of § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, of which § 1985 (3) was originally a part, has been reviewed many times in this Court.⁷ The section as first enacted authorized both criminal and civil actions against those who have conspired to deprive others of federally guaranteed rights. Before the 19th century ended, however, the Court found the criminal provisions of the statute unconstitutional because they exceeded the scope of congressional power, United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629; Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678, and the provisions thus invalidated were later formally repealed by Congress. The civil action provided by the Act remained, but for many years was rarely, if ever, invoked.

The provisions of what is now § 1985 (3) were not fully considered by this Court until 1951, in the case of Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U. S. 651.⁸ There the Court concluded that the section protected citizens only from injuries caused by conspiracies “under color of state law.” ⁹ Twenty years later, in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88, the Court unanimously concluded that the Collins Court had accorded to the provisions of § 1985 (3) too narrow a scope.¹⁰ The fears concerning congressional power that had motivated the Court in the Collins case had been dissolved by intervening cases. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, supra, at 96-97, 104-106. Therefore, the Court found that § 1985 (3) did provide a cause of action for damages caused by purely private conspiracies.

The Court’s opinion in Griffin discerned the following criteria for measuring whether a complaint states a cause of action under § 1985 (3):

“To come within the legislation a complaint must allege that the defendants did (1) ‘conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another’ (2) ‘for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.’ It must then assert that one or more of the conspirators (3) did, or caused to be done, ‘any act in furtherance of the object of [the] conspiracy,’ whereby another was (4a) ‘injured in his person or property’ or (4b) ‘deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.’ ” 403 U. S., at 102-103.

Section 1985 (3) provides no substantive rights itself; it merely provides a remedy for violation of the rights it designates. The primary question in the present case, therefore, is whether a person injured by a conspiracy to violate § 704 (a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is deprived of “the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws” within the meaning of § 1985 (3).¹¹

Under Title VII, cases of alleged employment discrimination are subject to a detailed administrative and judicial process designed to provide an opportunity for nonjudicial and nonadversary resolution of claims. As the Court explained in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 44:

“Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seg., to assure equality of employment opportunities by eliminating those practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... Cooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the preferred means for achieving this goal. To this end, Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and established a procedure whereby existing state and local employment opportunity agencies, as well as the Commission, would have an opportunity to settle disputes through conference, conciliation, and persuasion before the aggrieved party was permitted to file a lawsuit.”

As part of its comprehensive plan, Congress provided that a complainant in a State or locality with a fair employment commission must first go to that commission with his claim. Alternatively, an employee who believes himself aggrieved must first file a charge with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.¹² The time limitations for administrative and judicial filing are controlled by express provisions of the statute.¹³ At several different points, the statutory plan prevents immediate filing of judicial proceedings in order to encourage voluntary conciliation.¹⁴ The EEOC has the power to investigate and to prosecute a civil action in a complainant's case.¹⁵ The Act provides for injunctive relief, specifically including backpay relief.¹⁶ The majority of the federal courts have held that the Act does not allow a court to award general or punitive damages.¹⁷ The Act expressly allows the prevailing party to recover his attorney’s fees, and, in some cases, provides that a district court may appoint counsel for a plaintiff.¹⁸ Because the Act expressly authorizes only equitable remedies, the courts have consistently held that neither party has a right to a jury trial.¹⁹

If a violation of Title VII could be asserted through § 1985 (3), a complainant could avoid most if not all of these detailed and specific provisions of the law. Section 1985 (3) éxpressly authorizes compensatory damages; punitive damages might well follow. The plaintiff or defendant might demand a jury trial. The short and precise time limitations of Title VII would be grossly altered.²⁰ Perhaps most importantly, the complainant could completely bypass the administrative process, which plays such a crucial role in the scheme established by Congress in Title VII.

The problem in this case is closely akin to that in Brown v. GSA, 425 U. S. 820. There, we held that § 717 of Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination claims of those federal employees that it covers. Our conclusion was based on the proposition that

“[t]he balance, completeness, and structural integrity of § 717 are inconsistent with the petitioner’s contention that the judicial remedy afforded by § 717 (c) was designed merely to supplement other putative judicial relief.” 425 U. S., at 832.

Here, the case is even more compelling. In Brown, the Court concluded that § 717 displaced other causes of action arguably available to .assert substantive rights similar to those granted by § 717. Section 1985 (3), by contrast, creates no rights. It is a purely remedial statute, providing a civil cause of action when some otherwise defined federal right — to equal protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities under the laws — is breached by a conspiracy in the manner defined by the section. Thus, we are not faced in this case with a question of implied repeal. The right Novotny claims under § 704 (a) did not even arguably exist before the passage of Title VII. The only question here, therefore, is whether the rights created by Title VII may be asserted within the remedial framework of § 1985 (3).

This case thus differs markedly from the cases recently decided by this Court that have related the substantive provisions of last century’s Civil Rights Acts to contemporary legislation conferring similar substantive rights. In those cases we have held that substantive rights conferred in the 19th century were not withdrawn, sub silentio, by the subsequent passage of the modern statutes. Thus, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409, 413-417, we considered the effect of the fair housing provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 on the property rights guaranteed by the Civil Rights Act of 1866, now codified at 42 U. S. C. § 1982. And in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U. S. 454, 457-461, we held that the passage of Title VII did not work an implied repeal of the substantive rights to contract conferred by the same 19th-century statute and now codified at 42 U. S. C. § 1981. See also Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U. S. 229, 237-238; Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 174-175.²¹

Somewhat similarly, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, the Court upheld an employee’s invocation of two alternative remedies for alleged employment discrimination: arbitration under a collective-bargaining agreement, and litigation under Title VII. As the Court pointed out:

“In submitting his grievance to arbitration, an employee seeks to vindicate his contractual right under a collective bargaining agreement. By contrast, in filing a lawsuit under Title VII, an employee asserts independent statutory rights accorded by Congress. The distinctly separate nature of these contractual and statutory rights is not vitiated merely because both were violated as a result of the same factual occurrence. And certainly no inconsistency results from permitting both rights to be enforced in their respectively appropriate forums.” Id., at 49-50.

This case, by contrast, does not involve two “independent” rights, and for the same basic reasons that underlay the Court’s decision in Brown v. GSA, supra, reinforced by the other considerations discussed in this opinion,.we conclude that § 1985 (3) may not be invoked to redress violations of Title VII. It is true that a § 1985 (3) remedy would not be coextensive with Title VII, since a plaintiff in an action under § 1985 (3) must prove both a conspiracy and a group animus that Title VII does not require. While this incomplete congruity would limit the damage that would be done to Title VII, it would not eliminate it. Unimpaired effectiveness can be given to the plan put together by Congress in Title VII only by holding that deprivation of a right created by Title VII cannot be the basis for a cause of action under § 1985 (3).

Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

1

Title 42 U. S. C. §1985 (3) (1976 ed., Supp. II), Rev. Stat. § 1980, provides:

“If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws; or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.”

2

42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq.

3

42 U. S. C. §2000e-5 (f)(1).

4

His complaint also alleged, as a second cause .of action, that his discharge was in retaliation for his efforts on behalf of equal employment opportunity, and thus violated § 704 (a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 257, as amended, 86 Stat. 109. Section 704 (a), as set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-3 (a), reads in relevant part:

“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees .. . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subehapter.”

5

As to the Title VII claim, the District Court held that Novotny was not a proper plaintiff under § 704 (a).

6

The Court of Appeals ruled that Novotny had also stated a valid cause of action under Title YII. It held that § 704 (a) applies to retaliation for both formal and informal actions taken to advance the purposes of the Act. That holding is not now before this Court.

We note the relative narrowness of the specific issue before the Court. It is unnecessary for us to consider whether a plaintiff would have a cause of action under § 1985 (3) where the defendant was not subject to suit under Title VII or a comparable statute. Cf. United, States v. Johnson, 390 U. S. 563. Nor do we think it necessary to consider whether § 1985 (3) creates a remedy for statutory rights other than those fundamental rights derived from the Constitution. Cf. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88.

7

A partial list of the opinions in this Court that have discussed the Act’s legislative history includes Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U. S. 600, 608-612 (opinion of the Court); id., at 650-658 (White, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 627-640 (Powell, J., concurring); Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 665-689; District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U. S. 418, 423, 425-429; Griffin v. Breckenridge, supra, at 99-101; Adickes v. S. H. Kress Co., 398 (opinion of the Court); id., at 215-231 (BrenNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 172-185 (opinion of the Court); id., at 194-198 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 225-236 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

8

At least two earlier cases in this Court involved causes of action based upon what is now § 1985 (3). In Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, the plaintiff had stated claims based on the predecessors of both § 1985 (3) and 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The opinions of Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr. Justice Stone both discussed the § 1983 cause of action, but neither discussed the conspiracy claim. In Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1, the plaintiff had also stated claims under the predecessors of both sections. The Court held that no constitutional violation had been shown, and did not consider whether the statutes could have been utilized if such a showing had been made.

9

Mr. Justice Burton dissented, joined by Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas. 341 U. S., at 663.

10

Mr. Justice Harlan concurred, with one reservation. He found it unnecessary to rely, as the Court did in part, on the defendants’ alleged interference with the right of interstate travel. 403 U. S., at 107.

11

For the purposes of this question, we assume but certainly do not decide that the directors of a single corporation can form a conspiracy within the meaning of § 198.5 (3).

12

Title 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (b) provides for filing charges with the federal Commission. When a State or locality has a “State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto,” filing a complaint with that authority is a predicate for assertion of the federal rights involved. 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5 (c). If a member of the EEOC files a charge alleging violations in such a State or locality, the federal Commission must notify the state or local authority of the charge before taking any action. 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(d). Cf. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U. S. 522.

13

The statute requires that a complaint be filed with the federal agency within 180 days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred . . . If the complainant has filed a charge with a state or local agency, the time is extended to 300 days from the event, or 30 days from the end of state or local proceedings, whichever is sooner. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (e). After a “right to sue” letter issues from the EEOC, the complainant is given another 90 days to bring a civil action in a federal district court. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (f) (1). Cf. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553.

14

Within 10 days of the Commission’s receipt of a complaint, it must notify the employer of the charge, including the date, place, and circumstances of the alleged violation. 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000&-5 (b), (e). Only if the Commission has been unable to secure an acceptable conciliation agreement from the employer within 30 days of the filing of the charge may it bring a civil action against the employer. 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(f)(1). The complainant must await notice from the Commission of his right to bring a suit. This notice is provided if (1) the Commission dismisses his charge, (2) neither the Commission nor the Attorney General has filed a civil action in his case within 180 days of the filing of the charge, or (3) the Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which he is a party. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (f)(1). Cf. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U. S. 355.

15

42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e-5 (a), (b), (f)(1). See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, supra.

16

Section 706 (g) of the Act, as amended, as set forth in 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5 (g), provides:

“If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission. Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable. No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of section 2000e-3 (a) of this title.”

See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405.

17

See EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F. 2d 301, 308-310 (CA6 1975); Richerson v. Jones, 551 F. 2d 918, 926-928 (CA3 1977); cases collected in id., at 926 n. 13.

18

Title 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (k) provides:

“In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.”

See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412.

Title 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5 (f)(1) provides that “[u]pon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for such complainant and may authorize the commencement of the action without the payment of fees, costs, or security.”

19

See Slack v. Havens, 522 F. 2d 1091, 1094 (CA9 1975); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., supra, at 308; Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 417 F. 2d 1122, 1125 (CA5 1969); Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 360 F. 2d 577, 581 (CA4 1966) (en bane). See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, at 441-445 (RehNQüist, J., concurring).

20

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently applied a 6-year Pennsylvania statute of limitations to employment discrimination claims brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1981. Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 681 F. 2d 335, 337 (1978). See also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U. S. 454, 462-466.

21

Another difference between those cases and this one is to be found in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and the Civil Rights Act of 1968. As the Court noted in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, supra, and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409, the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 were explicitly discussed during the course of the legislative debates on both the Civil Rights Act of 1968 and the 1972 amendments t’o the 1964 Act, and the view was consistently expressed that the earlier statutes would not be implicitly repealed. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, supra, at 457-459; Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., supra, at 413-417. Specific references were made to §§ 1981 and 1983, but, significantly, no notice appears to have been taken of § 1985. See case below, 584 F. 2d 1235, 1252 n. 86.