Mr. Justice Moody,
after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
In the view we take of the case we do not deem it necessary to consider whether, with respect to the Federal question, there is any difference in the situation of the two defendants'. It is assumed, in respect of each, that the jury were instructed that they might draw an unfavorable inference against him from his failure to testify, where it was within his power, in denial of the evidence which tended to incriminate him. The law of the State, as declared in the case ¿t bar, which accords with other decisions (Parker v. State, 61 N. J. L. 308; State v. Wines, 65 N. J. L. 31; State v. Zdanowicz, 69 N. J. L. 619; State v. Banuski, 64 Atl. Rep, 994), permitted such an inference to be drawn. The judicial act of the highest court of the [91]*91State, in authoritatively construing and enforcing its laws, is the act of the State. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226. The general question, therefore, is, whether such a law violates the Fourteenth Amendment, either by abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or by depriving persons of their life, liberty or property without due process of law. In order to bring themselves within the protection of the Constitution it is incumbent on the defendants to 'prove two propositions: first, that'the exemption from compulsory self-incrimination is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution against impairment by the States; and, second, if it be so guaranteed, that the exemption was in fact impaired in the case at bar. The first proposition naturally presents itself for earlier consideration. If the right here asserted is not a Federal right, that is the end of the case. We have no authority to go further and determine whether the state court has erred in the interpretation and enforcement of its own laws.
The exemption from testimonial compulsion, that is, from disclosure as a witness of evidence against oneself, forced by any form of legal prpcess, is universal in American law, though there may be differences as to its exact scope and limits. At the time of the. formation of the Union the principle thát no person could be compelled to be a witness against himself had become embodied in the common law and distinguished it from all other systems of jurisprudence. It was generally regarded then, as now, as a privilege of great value, a protection to the innocent though a shelter to the guilty, and a safeguard against heedless, unfounded or tyrannical prosecutions. Five of the original thirteen States (North Carolina, 1776; Pennsylvania, 1776; Virginia, 1776; Massachusetts, 1780; New .Hampshire, 1784) had then guarded the principle from legislative or judicial change by including it in constitutions or bills of rights; Maryland had provided in her constitution (1776) that “no man ought to be compelled to give evidence against [92]*92himself, in- a common court' of law, or in any other court, but in such cases as have been usually practiced in this State or may hereafter be directed by the legislature;” and in the remainder of those States there seems to be no doubt that it was recognized by the courts. The privilege was not included in the Federal Constitution as originally adopted, but was placed in one of the ten Amendments which were recommended to the States by the first Congress, and by them adopted. Since then all the States of the Union have, from time to time, with varying form- but uniform meaning, included the privilege, in their constitutions, except the States of New Jersey and Iowa, and in those States it is held' to be part of the existing law. State v. Zdanowicz, supra; State v. Height, 117 Iowa, 650. It is obvious from this short statement that it has been supposed by the States that, so far as the state courts are concerned, the privilege had its origin in the constitutions and laws of the States, and that persons appealing to it must look to the State for their protection. Indeed, since by the unvarying decisions of. this, court the first ten Amendments of the Federal Constitution are restrictive only of National action, there was nowhere else to look up to the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth .Amendment, and the State, at least until then, might give,, modify or withhold the privilege at its will. The Fourteenth Amendment withdrew from the States powers theretofore enjoyed by them to an extent not yet fully ascertained, • or rather, to--speak more accurately, limited those powers and restrained their exercise. There is no doubt of the duty of this court to enforce the limitations, and restraints whenever they exist, and there has been no hesitation in the performance of the duty. But whenever a new limitation or restriction is declared it is a matter of grave import, since, to that extent, it diminishes the authority of the State, so necessary to the perpetuity of our dual form of government, and changes its relation to its people and to the Union. The question in the case at bar has been twice before us, and been left undecided, as the cases were disposed of on other grounds. Adams v. New [93]*93York, 192 U. S. 585; Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U. S. 541. The defendants contend, in the first place, that the exemption from self-incrimination is one of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States which the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the States to abridge. It' is not argued that the defendants are protected by that part of the Fifth Amendment which provides that “no person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,” for it is recognized by counsel that by a long line of decisions the first ten Amendments are not operative on the States. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243; Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131; Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172; Barrington v. Missouri, 205 U. S. 483. But it is argued that this privilege is one of the fundamental rights of National citizenship, placed under National protection by the Fourteenth Amendment, and it is specifically argued that the “privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States,” protected against state action by that Amendment, include those fundamental personal rights which- were protected against National action by the first eight Amendments; that this was the intention of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that this part of it would otherwise have little or no meaning and effect. These arguments are not new to this court and the answer to them is found in its decisions. The meaning of the phrase “privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States,” as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, came under early consideration in the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36. A statute of Louisiana created a corporation and conferred upon it the exclusive privilege, for a term' of years, of establishing and maintaining within a fixed division of the city of New Orleans stock-yards and slaughter-houses. The act provided that others might use these facilities for a prescribed price, forbade the landing for slaughter or the slaughtering of animals elsewhere or otherwise, and established a system of inspection. Those persons who were driven out of independent business by this law denied its validity in suits which came to this [94]*94court by writs of error to the Supreme Court of the State which had sustained the act. It was argued, inter alia, that the statute abridged the privileges and immunities of the plaintiffs in error as citizens of the United States, and the particular privilege which was alleged to be violated .was that of pursuing freely their chosen trade, business or calling. The majority of the court were not content with expressing the opinion that the act did not in fact deprive the plaintiffs in error of their right to exercise their trade (a proposition vigorously disputed by four dissenting justices), which would have disposed of the case, but preferred to rest the decision upon the broad ground that the right asserted in the case was not a privilege or immunity belonging to persons by virtue of their National citizenship, but, if existing at all, belonging to them only by virtue of their state citizenship. The Fourteenth Amendment, it is observed by Mr. Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of _ the court, removed the doubt whether there could be a citizenship of the United States independent of citizenship of the State, by recognizing or creating and defining the former. “ It is quite clear, then,” he proceeds to say (p. 74), “ that there is a citizenship of the United States and a citizenship of a State, which are distinct from each other, and which depend upon different characteristics or circumstances in the individual.” The description of the privileges and immunities of state citizenship, given by Mr. Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371, is then quoted, approved and (p. 76) said to include “those rights which are fundamental,” to embrace “nearly every civil right for the establishment and protection of which organized government is instituted,” and “to be the class of rights which the state governments were created to establish and secure.” This part of the opinion then concludes with the holding that the rights relied upon in the case are those which belong to the citizens of States as such and are under the sole care and protection of the state governments. The conclusion is preceded by the important declaration that the civil rights theretofqre appertaining to citizenship of the States [95]*95and under the protection of the States, were not given the security of National protection by this clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The exact scope and the • momentous consequence of this decision are brought into- clear light by the dissenting opinions. The view of Mr. Justice Field, concurred in by Chief Justice Chase and Justices Swayne and Bradley, was that the fundamental rights of citizenship, which by the opinion of the' court were held to be rights of state citizenship, protected only by the state government, became, as the result of the Fourteenth Amendment, rights of National citizenship protected by the National Constitution. Said Mr. Justice Field (p. 95):
“The fundamental rights, privileges and immunities which belong to him as a free man and a free citizen, now belong to him as a citizen of the United States, and are not dependent upon his citizenship of any State. . . . The Amendment does not attempt to confer any new privileges or immunities upon citizens, or to enumerate or define those already existing. It assumes, that there are such privileges and immunities which belong of right to citizens as such, and ordains that they shall not be abridged by state legislation. If this inhibition has no reference to privileges and immunities of this character, but only refers, as held by the majority of the court in their opinion, to such privileges and immunities as were-before its adoption specially designated in the Constitution or necessarily implied as belonging to citizens of the United States, it was a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing, and most un- . necessarily excited Congress and the people on its passage. With privileges and immunities thus designated or implied no State could ever have interfered by its laws, and no new constitutional provision was required to inhibit such interference. The supremacy of the Constitution and laws of the United States always controlled any state legislation of that character. But if the Amendment refers to the natural and inalienable rights which belong to all citizens, the inhibition has a profound significance and consequence.”
[96]*96In accordance with these- principles it is -said by the learned justice that the privileges and immunities of state citizenship described by Mr. Justice .Washington, and held by the majority of the court still tó pertain exclusively to state citizenship and to be protected solely by the state government, have been guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment as privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. And see the concurring opinions of Mr. Justice Field and Mr. Justice Bradley in Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129, and in Butchers’ Union Company v. Crescent City Company, 111 U. S. 746. There can be no doubt, so far as the decision in the Slaughter-House Cases has determined the question, that the civil rights sometimes described as fundamental and inalienable, which before the war Amendments were enjoyed by state citizenship and protected by. state government, were left untouched by this clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Criticism of this case has never entirely ceased, nor has it ever received universal assent by members of this court. Undoubtedly, it gave much less effect to the Fourteenth Amendment than.some of the public men active in framing it intended, .and disappointed many others. On the other hand, if the views of the minority had prevailed it is easy to see how far the authority and independence of the States would have been diminished,' by subjecting all their legislative and judicial acts to correction by the legislative and review by the judicial branch of the National Government. But we need not now- inquire into the merits of the original dispute. This part at least of the SlaughterHouse Cases has been steadily adhered to by this court, so-that it was said of it, in a case where the same clause of the Amendment was under consideration (Maxwell v. Dow, 178 U. S. 581, 591), “The opinion upon the matters actually involved and maintained by the judgment in the case has never been doubted or overruled by any judgment of this court.” The distinction between National and state citizenship and their respective privileges there drawn has come to be firmly established. And so it was held that the right of peaceable assem[97]*97bly for a lawful purpose (it not appearing that the purpose had any reference to the National Government) was not a right secured by the Constitution of the United States, although it was said that the right existed before. th,e, adoption pf the Constitution of the United States, and that “it is and always has been one of' the attributes of citizenship under a free government.” United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 551. And see Hodges v. United States, 203 U. S. 1. In each case the Slaughter-House Cases were cited by the court, and. in the latter case the rights described by'Mr. Justice Washington were again treated as rights pf state citizenship under state protection. If then it be assumed, without deciding the point, that an exemption from compulsory self-incrimination is what is described as a fundamental right belonging .to. all who live under a free government, and incapable of impairment by legislation or judicial decision, it is, so far as the States are concerned, a fundamental right inherent in state citizenship, and is a privilege or immunity of that citizenship only. , Privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, on the other hand, are only such as arise out of the nature and essenT tial character of the National Government, or are specifically granted or secured to all citizens or persons by the Constituí tion of the United States. Slaughter-House Cases, supra, p. 79; In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 448; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377, 382.
Thus among the rights and privileges of National citizenship recognized by this court are the right to pass freely from State to State, Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35; the right to petition Congress for a redress of grievances, United. States v. Cruikshank, supra; the right to vote for National officers, Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651; Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 58; the right to enter the public lands, United States v. Waddell, 112 U. S. 76; the right to be protected against violence while in the lawful custody of a United States marshal, Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263; and the right to inform the United States authorities of violation of its laws, In re Quarles, 158 U. S. 532. [98]*98Most of these cases were indictments against'individuals for conspiracies to deprive persons of rights secured by the Constitution of the United States, and met with a different fate in this court from the indictments in United States v. Cruikshank and Hodges v. United States, because the rights in the latter cases were rights of state and not of National citizenship. • But assuming it to be true that the exemption from self-incrimination is not, as a fundamental right of National citizenship; included in the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, counsel insist that, as a right specifically granted or secured by the Federal Constitution, it is included in them. This view is based upon the contention which must now be examined, that the safeguards of personal rights which are enumerated in the first eight Articles of amendment to the Federal Constitution, sometimes .called the Federal Bill of Rights, though they were by those Amendments originally secured only against National action, are among the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United-States, which this clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against state' action. This view has been, at different times, expressed by justices of'this court (Mr. Justice Field in O’Niel v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323, 361; Mr. Justice Harlan in the same case, 370, and in Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 606, 617), and was undoubtedly that entertained by some of those, who framed the Amendment. It is, however, not profitable to examine the weighty arguments in its favor, for the question is no longer open in this court. The right of trial by jury in civil cases, guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment (Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90), and the right to bear arms guaranteed by the Second Amendment (Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252), have been distinctly held not to be privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the States, and in effect the same decision was made in respect of the guarantee against prosecution, except by indictment of a grand jury, contained in the Fifth Amendment (Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516), [99]*99and in respect of the right to be confronted with witnesses, contained in the Sixth Amendment. West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 258. In Maxwell v. Dow, supra,- where the plaintiff in error had been convicted in a state court of a felony upon an information, and by a jury of eight, persons, it was held that the indictment, made indispensable by the Fifth Amendment, and the trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, were not privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as those words were used in the Fourteenth Amendment. The discussion in that case ought not,to be repeated. All the arguments for the other view were considered and answered, the authorities were examined and analyzed, and the decision rested upon the ground that this clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not forbid the States to abridge the personal rights enumerated in the first eight Amendments, because those rights were not within the meaning of the clause “privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.” If it be possible to render the principle which governed the decision more clear, it is done so by the dissent of Mr. Justice Harlan. We conclude, therefore, that the exemption from compulsory self-incrimination is not a privilege or immunity of National citizenship guaranteed by this clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the States.
The defendants, however, do not stop here. They appeal to another clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and insist that the self-incrimination, which they allege the instruction to the jury compelled, was a denial of due process of law. This contention requires separate consideration, for it is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226. If this is ‘so, it is not because those rights are enumerated in the first eight Amendments, but because they are of such a nature that they are included in the conception of due process of law. Few [100]*100phrases of the law are so elusive of exact apprehension as this. Doubtless the difficulties of ascertaining its connotation have been increased in American jurisprudence, where it has been embodied in constitutions and put to new uses as a limit on legislative power. This court has always. declined to give a comprehensive definition of it, and has preferred that its full meaning should be gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of. cases as they arise. There are certain general principles well settled, however, which narrow the field of discussion and may serve as helps to correct-conclusions. These principles grow out of the proposition universally accepted by American courts on the authority of Coke, that the words “due process of law” are’equivalent in meaning to the words “law of the land,” contained in that chapter of Magna Carta, which provides that “no'freeman-shall be taken, or imprisoned, or dis-seised, or outlawed, or exiled, or any wise destroyed; nor shall we go upon him, nor send upon him, but by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.” Murray v. Hoboken Land Co., 18. How. 272; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97; Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray, 329; Cooley, Const. Lim. (7th ed.), 500; McGehee, Due Process of Law, 16. From the consideration of the meaning of the words in the light of their historical origin this court -has drawn the following conclusions :
First. What is due process of law may be ascertained by an examination of those-settled usages and modes, of proceedings existing in the common and statute law of England before the emigration of our ancestors, and shown not to have been unsuited to their civil; and political condition by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this country. This test was adopted by the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Curtis, in Murray v. Hoboken Land Co., 18 How. 272, 280 (approved in Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U. S. 314, 320; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 390, but see Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U. S. 81, 85). Of course, the part’ of the Constitution then [101]*101before the court was the Fifth Amendment. If any different meaning of the same words, as they are used in the Fourteenth Amendment, can be conceived, none has yet appeared in judicial decision. “A process of law,” said Mr. Justice Matthews, commenting on this statement of Mr. Justice Curtis, “ which is not otherwise forbidden, must be taken to be due process of law, if it can show the sanction of settled usage both in England and this country.” Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 528.
■ Second. It does not follow, however, that a procedure settled in English law at the time of the emigration, and brought to this country and practiced by our ancestors, is an essential element of due process of law. If that were so the procedure of the first half of the seventeenth century .would be fastened upon the American jurisprudence like a straightjacket, only to be .unloosed by constitutional amendment. That, said Mr. Justice Matthews, in the same case, p. 529, “would be to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable of progress or improvement.” Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 388; Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, 175.
Third. But, consistently with the requirements of due process, no change in ancient procedure can be made which disregards those fundamental principles, to be ascertained from time to time by judicial action, which have relation to process of law and protect the citizen in his private right, and guard him against the arbitrary action of government. This idea has been' many times expressed in differing words by this court, and it seems well to cite some expressions of it. The words due process of law “were intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of govern-. ment, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice.” Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wh. 235, 244 (approved in Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 527; Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462, 468; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34, 45). “This court has never attempted to define [102]*102with precision the words 'due process of law/ . . . It is sufficient to say that there are certain immutable principles of justicé which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of the Union may disregard.” Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 389. “The same words refer to that law of the land in each State, which derives its authority from the inherent and reserved powers of the State, exerted within the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.” In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 448. “The limit of the full control which the State has in the proceedings of its courts, both in civil and criminal cases, is subject only to the qualification that such procedure must not work a denial of fundamental rights or conflict with specific and applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution.” West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 258, 263.
The question under consideration may first be tested by the application of these settled doctrines of this court. If the statement of Mr. Justice Curtis, as elucidated in Hurtado v. California, is to be taken literally, that alone might almost be decisive. For nothing is more certain, in point of historical fact, than that the practice of compulsory, self-incrimination in the courts and elsewhere existed for four hundred years after the granting of Magna Carta, continued throughout the feign of Charles I (though then beginning to be seriously questioned), gained at least some foothold among the early colonists of this country, and was not entirely omitted at trials in England until the eighteenth century. Wigmore on Evidence, § 2250 (see for the Colonies, note 108); Hallam’s Constitutional History of England, ch. VIII, 2 Widdleton’s American ed., 37 (describing the criminal jurisdiction of the Court of Star Chamber); Bentham’s Rationale of 'Judicial Evidence, book IX/ch. Ill, § IV. ‘
' Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, in his studies of- the reports of English trials for crime, has thrown much light on the existence of the practice of questioning persons' accused of [103]*103crime and its gradual decay. He considers, first, a group of trials which occurred between 1554 and 1637. Speaking of the trial before the jury, he says:
“The prisoner, in nearly every instance, asked, as a favor, that he might not be overpowered by the eloquence of counsel denouncing him in a set speech, but, in consideration of the weakness of his memory, might be allowed to answer separately t.o the different matters which might be alleged against him. This was usually granted, and the result was that the trial became a series of excited altercations between the prisoner and the different counsel opposed to him. Every statement of counsel operated as a question to the prisoner, and indeed they were constantly thrown into the form of questions, the prisoner either admitting or denying or explaining what was alleged against him. The result was that, during the period in qüestion, the examination of the prisoner, which is at present scrupulously and I think even pedantically avoided, was the very essence of the trial, and his answers regulated the production of the evidence; the whole trial, in fact, was a long argument between the prisoner and counsel for the Crown, in which they questioned each other' and grappled with each other’s arguments with the utmost eagerness and closeness of reasoning.” Stephen, 1' Hist, of the Crim. Law, 325.
This description of the questioning of the accused and the meeting of contending arguments finds curious confirmation in the report of the trial, in 1637, of Ann Hutchinson (which resulted in banishment), for holding and encouraging certain theological views which were not approved by the majority of the early Massachusetts rulers. 1 Hart’s American History Told by Contemporaries, 382. The trial was presided over and the examination very largely conducted by Governor Winthrop, who had been for some years before his emigration an active lawyer and admitted to the Inner Temple. An examination of the* report of this trial will show that he was not aware of any privilege against self-incrimination or conscious of [104]*104any duty to respect it. Stephen says of the trials between 1640 and 1660- (lb., 358): “In some cases the prisoner was questioned, but never to any greater extent than that which it is practically impossible to avoid when a man has to defend himself without counsel. When so questioned the prisoners usually refused to answer.” Jle further says (lb., 440): “Soon after the Revolution of 168$ the practice of questioning the prisoner died out.” But committing magistrates were authorized to take the examination of persons suspected, which if not under oath, was admissible; against him on his trial, until by the 11 & 12 Viet., c’h. 2, the prisoner was given the option whether he would speak, and warned that what he said might be used agaiftst him. But even now there seems to be a very well-recognized and Important exception in English law to the rule that no person can be compelled to furnish evidence against himself.' A practice in bankruptcy has existed from ancient times, and still exists, which would not be constitutionally possible under our national bankruptcy law or under the insolvency l^fw of any State whose constitution contains the customary prohibition of compulsory self-incrimination. The Bankruptcy' Act of 1 James I, ch. 15, § 7 (1603), authorized the commissioners of bankruptcy to compel, by commitment if necessary, the bankrupt to submit to an examination touching his estate and dealings. The provision was continued in the subsequent acts, and in 1820, in Ex parte Cossens, Buck, Bkcy. Cases, 531, 540, Lord Eldon, in the course of a discussion of the right to examine a bankrupt, held that he could be compelled tqxlisclose his violations of law in respect of his trade and estate, and, while recognizing the general principle of English law, that no one could be compelled to incriminate himself, said: “ I have always understood the proposition to admit of a qualification with respect to the jurisdiction in bankruptcy.” The act of 6 Geo. IV, ch. 16, § 36 (1825), authorized the compulsory examination of the bankrupt “touching all matters relating either to his trade, dealings, or estate, ‘ or which may tend to disclose any [105]*105secret grant, conveyance or concealment of his lands.” The act of 12 & 13 Vict., ch. 106, § 117 (1849), contained the same provision. Construing these acts, it was held that the bankrupt must answer, though his answer might furnish evidence of his crime, and even if an indictment were pending against him, and that the evidence thus compelled was admissible on his trial for crime. Re Heath, 2 D. & Ch. 214; Re Smith, 2 D. & Ch. 230, 235; Reg. v. Scott, Dearsley & Bell, 47; Reg. v. Cross, 7 Cox C. C. 226; Reg. v. Widdop, L. R. 2 C. C. R. 3. The act of 46 & 47 Viet., ch. 52, § 17 (1883), which we understand to be (with some amendment not material here) the present law, passed after the decisions cited, expressly provided that the examination shall be taken in writing and signed by the debtor, “ and may thereafter be used in evidence against him.” It has since been held that other evidence of his testimony than that written and signed by him may be used. Reg. v. Erdheim (1896), 2 Q. B. D. 260, and see Rex v. Pike (1902), 1 K. B. 552.1 It is to be observed that not until 1883 did Parliament, which' has an unlimited legislative power, expressly provide that the evidence compelled from the bankrupt could be used in proctf of an indictment against him. The rule had been previously firmly established by judicial decisions upon statutes simply authorizing a compulsory examination. If the rule had been thought to be in conflict with “the law of the land” of Magna Carta,- “a sacred text, the nearest approach to an irrepealable, ‘ fundamental statute ’ that England has ever had,” 1 Pollock & Maitland, 152, it is inconceivable that such a consideration would not have received. some attention from counsel and judges. We think it is manifest, from this review of the origin, growth, extent and limits of the /exemption from compulsory self-incrimination in the- English law, that it is not regarded as a part of the law of the land of Magna Carta or the due process of law, which [106]*106has been deemed an equivalent expression, but, on the contrary, is regarded as separate from and independent of due process. It came into existence not as an essential part of due process, but as a wise and beneficent rule of evidence developed in the course of judicial decision. This is a potent argument when it is remembered that the phrase was borrowed from English law and that to that law we must look at least for its primary meaning.
But without repudiating or questioning the test proposed by Mr. Justice Curtis for the court, or rejecting the inference drawn from English law, we prefer to rest our decision on broader grounds, and inquire whether' the exemption from self-incrimination is of such a nature that it must be included in the conception of due process. Is it a fundamental principle of liberty and justice which inheres in the very idea of free government and is the inalienable right of a citizen of such a government? If it is, and if it is of a nature that pertains to process of law, this court has declared it to be essential to due process of law. In approaching such a question it must not be forgotten thát in a free representative government nothing is more fundamental than the right of the people through their appointed' servants to govern themselves in -accordance with their own will, except so far as. they have restrained themselves by constitutional limits specifically established, and that in our peculiar dual form of government nothing is more fundamental than the full power of the State to order its own affairs and govern its own people, except so far as the Federal Constitution expressly or by fair implication has withdrawn that power. The power of the people of the States to make and alter their laws at pleasure is the greatest security for liberty and justice, this court has said in Hurtado v. California, supra. We are not invested with the jurisdiction to pass upon the expediency, wisdom or justice of the laws of the States as declared by their courts, but only to determine their' conformity with the Federal Constitution and ■ the paramount laws ■ enacted pursuant to it. Under the guise of interpreting the Constitution we must [107]*107take care that we do not import into the discussion our own personal views of what would be wise, just and fitting rules of government to. be adopted by a free people and confound them with constitutional limitations. The question before us is the meaning of a constitutional provision' which forbids the States to deny to any person due process of law. In the decision of -this question we have the authority to take into, account only those fundamental rights which are expressed in that provisión, not the rights fundamental in citizenship, state or National, for they are secured otherwise, but the rights fundamental in due process, and therefore an essential part of it. We have to consider whether the right is so fundamental in due process that a refusal of the right is a denial of due process. One aid to the solution of the question is to inquire how the right was rated during the time when the meaning of due process was in a formative state and before it was incorporated in American constitutional law. Did those who then were formulating and insisting upon the rights of the people entertain the view' that the right was so¡ fundamental that there could be no due process without it? It. has already, appeared that, prior to the formation of the American Constitutions, in which the exemption from compulsory self-incrimination was specifically secured-, separately, independently, and side by side with' the requirement of due process, the doctrine was formed, as other doctrines of the law of evidence have been -formed, by the course of decision in the courts covering a long period of time. Searching further, we find, nothing to show that it was then thought to be- other than a just and useful principle of law. None of the great instruments in which we are accustomed to look for the declaration of the fundamental rights made reference to it. The privilege was not dreamed of for hundreds of- years-after Magna Carta (Í215), and could not have been implied .in the “law of . the land” there secured. The Petition of Right (1629),- though it insists upon the right secured by Magna Carta to be .condemned only by the law of the'land, and sets forth by way of grievance divers violations of [108]*108it, is silent upon the practice of compulsory self-incrimination, though it was then a matter of common occurrence in all the courts of the realm. The Bill of Rights of the first year of. the reign of William and Mary (1689) is likewise silent, though the practice of questioning the prisoner at his trial had not then ceased. The negativé argument which arises out of the omission of all reference to any exemption from compulsory self-incrimination in these three great declarations of English liberty (though it is not supposed to amount to a demonstration) is supported by the positive argument that the English Courts and Parliaments, as we have seen, have dealt with the exemption as they would have dealt with any other rule of evidence, apparently without a thought that the question was affected by the law of the land of Magna Carta, or the due process of law which is its equivalent.
We pass by the meager records of the early colonial time, so far as they have come to our attention, as affording light too uncertain for guidance. See Wigmore, § 2250, note 108; 2 Hennings St. at Large, 422 (Va., 1677); 1 Winthrop’s History of New England, 47, Provincial Act, 4 W. & M. Ancient Charters, Massachusetts, 214. Though it is worthy of note that neither the declaration of rights ofi the Stamp Act Congress (1765) nor the declaration of rights of the Continental Congress (1774) nor the ordinance for the government of the Northwestern Territory included the privilege in their enumeration of fundamental rights.
But the history of the incorporation of the privilege in an amendment to the National Constitution is full of significance in this connection. Five States, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia and Connecticut, ratified the Constitution without proposing amendments. Massachusetts then followed with a ratification,- accompanied by a recommendation of nine amendments, none of which referred to the privilege; Maryland with a ratification without proposing amendments; South Carolina with a ratification accompanied by a recommendation of four amendments, none of which referred to the privilege, [109]*109and New Hampshire with a ratification accompanied by a recommendation of twelve amendments, none of which referred to the privilege. The nine States requisite to put the Constitution .in operation ratified it without a suggestion of incorporating this privilege. Virginia was the tenth State to ratify, proposing, by separate resolution, an elaborate Bill of Rights under twenty heads, and in addition twenty amendments to the body of the Constitution. Among the rights enumerated ás “essential and inalienable” is that no man “can be compelled to give evidence against himself,” and “no freeman ought to be deprived of his life, liberty or property but by the law of the land.” New York ratified with á proposal of numerous amendments and a declaration of rights which the convention declared could not be violated and were consistent with the Constitution. One of these rights was that “No'person ought to be taken, imprisoned or deprived of his freehold, or be exiled or. deprived-of. his privileges, franchises, life, liberty or property but by due process of law;” and another was that “in all criminal prosecutions the accused . . . should not be compelled to give evidence against himself.” North Carolina and Rhode Island were the last to ratify, each proposing a large number of amendments, including the provision that no roan “can be compelled to give evidence against himself;” and North Carolina, that “no freeman ought to be . . . deprived of his life, liberty or property but by the law of the land;” and Rhode Island, that “no freeman ought to be . . . deprived of his life, liberty or property but by the trial by jury, or by the law of the land.”
Thus it appears that four only of the thirteen original States insisted upon incorporating the' privilege in the Constitution, and they separately and simultaneously with the requirement of due process of law, and that three States proposing amendments were silent upon this subject. It is worthy of note that two of these four States did not incorporate the privilege in their own" constitutions, where it would have had a much wider field of usefulness, until many years after. • New'York [110]*110in 1821 and Rhode Island in 1842 (its first constitution). This survey does not tend to show that it was then in this country the universal or even general belief that the privilege- ranked among the fundamental and inalienable rights of mankind; and what is more important here, it affirmatively shows that the privilege was not conceived to be inherent in due process of law, but on the other hand a right separate, independent and outside of due process. Congress, .in submitting the amendments to the several States,' treated the two rights as exclusive of each other. Such also has been the view of the States in framing their own constitutions, for in every-case, except in New Jersey and Iowa, where the due process clause or its equivalent is included, it has been thought necessary to include separately the privilege clause. Nor have we been leferred to any decision of a state court save one (State v. Height, 117 Iowa, 650), where the exemption has been held to be required by due process of law. The inference is irresistible that it has been the opinion of constitution makers that the privilege, if fundamental in any sense, is not fundamental in due process of law, nor an essential part of it. We believe that this opinion is proved to have been correct by every historical test by which the meaning of the phrase can be tried.
The decisions of this court, though they are silent on the precise question before us, ought to be searched to,discover if they present any analogies which are helpful in its decision. The essential elements of due process of law, already established by them, are singularly few,- though of wide application and-'deep significance. We are not here concerned with the effect of due process in restraining substantive laws, as, for example, that which forbids the taking of private property for public use without compensation. 'We need notice now only those cases which deal with the principles which must be observed in the trial of criminal and civil causes. Due process requires that the court which assumes to determine the rights of parties shall have jurisdiction, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 733; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34; Old Wayne Life Association [111]*111v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, and that there shall be notice and opportunity for hearing given the parties, Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 409; Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398; and see Londoner v. Denver, 210 U. S. 373. Subject to these two fundamental conditions, which seem to be universally prescribed in all systems of law established by civilized countries, this court has up to this time sustained all state laws, statutory or judicially declared, regulating procedure, evidence and methods of trial, and held them to be consistent with due process of law.* Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90; Re Converse, 137 U. S. 624; Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U. S. 692; Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462; Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U. S. 314; McNulty v. California, 149 U. S. 645; McKane v. Durston, 153 U. S. 684; Iowa Central v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389; Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U. S. 81; Allen v. Georgia, 166 U. S. 138; Hodgson v. Vermont, 168 U. S. 262; Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172; Bolln v. Nebraska, 176 U. S. 83; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581; Simon v. Craft, 182 U. S. 427; West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 258; Marvin v. Trout, 199 U. S. 212; Rogers v. Peck, 199 U. S. 425; Howard v. Kentucky, 200 U. S. 164; Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U. S. 638; Felts v. Murphy, 201 U. S. 123.
Among the most notable of these decisions, are those sustaining the denial of jury trial both in civil and criminal cases, the substitution of informations for indictments by a grand jury, the enactment that the possession of policy slips raises a presumption of illegality, and the admission of the deposition of an absent witness in a criminal case. The cases proceed upon the theory that, given a court of justice which has jurisdiction and acts, not arbitrarily but in conformity with a general law, upon evidence, and after inquiry made with notice to the parties, affected and opportunity to be heard, then all the requirements of due process, so far as it relates to procedure in court and methods of trial and character and effect of evidence, are complied with. Thus it was said in Iowa Central v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 393: “ But it is clear that' the Fourteenth Amendment in no way undertakes to control the [112]*112power of the State to determine by what process legal rights may be asserted or legal obligations be enforced, provided the method of procedure adopted gives' reasonable notice and affords fair opportunity to be heard before the issues are decided;” and in Louisville & Nashville Railroad, Company v. Schmidt, 177 U. S. 230, 236: “It is no longer open to contention that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States does not control mere forms of procedure in state courts or regulate practice therein. All its requirements are complied with, provided in the proceedings which are claimed not to have been due process of law the person condemned has had sufficient notice and adequate opportunity has been afforded him to defend;” apd in Hooker v. Los Angeles, 188 U. S. 314, 318: “The Fourteenth Amendment does not control the power of a State to determine the form of procedure by which legal rights may be ascertained, if the method adopted gives reasonable notice and affords a fair opportunity to be héard;” and in Rogers v. Peck, 199 U. S. 435: “Due process of law, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, does not require the State to adopt a particular form of procedure, so long as it appears that the accused has had sufficient notice of the accusation and an adequate opportunity to defend himself in -the prosecution.” It is impossible to reconcile the reasoning of these cases and the rule which governed their decision with the theory that an exemption.' from compulsory self-incrimination is included in the conception of due process of law. Indeed the reasoning for including.indictment by a grand jury and trial by a petit jury in that conception, which has been rejected by this court in Hurtado v. California and Maxwell v. Dow, was historically and in principle much stronger.- Clearly appreciating this, Mr. Justice Harlan, in his dissent in each of these'cases, pointed out that the inexorable logic of the reasoning of the court was to allow the States, so far as the Federal Constitution was concerned’, to compel any person to be a witness against himself. In Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S.- 22, Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking [113]*113for the whole court, said, m effect, that the Fourteenth Amendment would not prevent a State from adopting or continuing the civil law instead of the common law. This dictum has been approved and made an essential part of the reasoning of the decision in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 387, 389, and Maxwell v. Bow, 176 U. S. 598. The statement excludes the possibility that the privilege is essential to due process, for it hardly need be said that the interrogation of the accused at his trial is the practice in the civil law.
Even if the historical meaning of due process of law ánd the decisions of this court did not exclude the privilege from it,' it would be going far to rate it as an immutable principle of justice which is the inalienable possession of- every citizen of a free government. Salutary as the principle may seem to the great majority, it cannot be ranked with the right to hearing before condemnation,-the immunity from arbitrary power not acting by general laws, and the inviolability of private property. The wisdom of the exemption has never been universally assented to since the days of Bentham; many doubt it to-day, and it is best defended not as an unchangeable principle of universal justice but as a law proved by experience to be expedient. See Wigmore, § 2251. It has no place in the jurisprudence of civilized and free countries outside the domain of the common law, and it is nowhere observed among our own people in the search for truth outside the administration of the law. It should, must and will be rigidly observed where it is secured by specific constitutional safeguards, but there is nothing in it which gives it a sanctity above and before constitutions themselves. Much might be said in-favor of the view that the privilege was guaranteed against state impairment as a privilege and immunity of National citizenship, but, as has been shown, the decisions of this court have foreclosed that view. There seems to be no reason whatever, however, for straining the meaning of due process of law to include this privilege within it, because, perhaps, we may think it of great value. The States had guarded the privilege [114]*114to the satisfaction of their own people up to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. No reason is perceived why they cannot continue to do so. The power of their people ought not to be fettered, their sense of responsibility lessened, and their capacity for sober and restrained self-government weakened by forced construction of the Federal Constitution. If the people of New Jersey are not content, with the law as declared in repeated decisions of their courts, the remedy is in their own hands. They may, if they choose, alter it by legislation, as the people of Maine did when the courts’ of that State made the same ruling. State v. Bartlett, 55 Maine, 200; State v. Lawrence, 57 Maine, 574; State v. Cleaves, 59 Maine, 298; State v. Banks, 78 Maine, 490, 492; Rev. Stat. ch. 135, § 19.
We have assumed only for the purpose of discussion that what was done in the case at har was an infringement of the privilege against self-incrimination. We do not intend, however, to lend any countenance to the truth of that assumption. The courts of New Jersey, in adopting the rule of law which is complained of here, have deemed it consistent with the privilege itself and not a denial of it. The reasoning by which this view is supported will be found in the cases cited from New Jersey and Maine, and see Reg. v. Rhodes (1899), 1 Q. B. 77; Ex parte Kops (1894), A. C. 650. The authorities upon the question are in conflict. We do not pass upon the conflict, because, for the reasons given, we think that the exemption from compulsory self-incrimination in the courts of the States is not secured by any part of the Federal Constitution.
Judgment affirmed.