COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Michael D. Carey brought this suit against Mt. Desert Island Hospital (“MDI”) for gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of [34]*34the Civil - Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17, and the Maine Human Rights Act, 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 4551-4632. He alleged that he was discharged from his position as Vice-President of Finance because he was male.'
After a seven day trial, a jury returned a verdict in Carey’s favor, awarding compensatory and punitive damages of $210,000 and $400,000, respectively. The district court reduced the $610,000 total to $200,000 to conform with the statutory cap for awards of compensatory and punitive damages under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(C). The court declined to award front pay, reasoning that it was included under the statutory cap, and was inappropriate under the circumstances of the case. The court awarded back pay in the amount of $110,070, making the total amount of recovery $310,070.
The parties cross-appealed, MDI attacking the verdict and Carey challenging the post-verdict rulings limiting his recovery. MDI appeals on five points: (1) sufficiency of the evidence; (2) jury instructions on the role of gender discrimination in the decision to terminate; (3) peremptory challenges to four female prospective jurors; (4) admission of certain deposition evidence; and (5) admission of a remark by an MDI employee manifesting anti-male animus. Carey argues that the court erred in failing to award front pay and in limiting the back pay award.
Our review of the record reveals that this was a case with much to say on either side, involving the always difficult question of probing the wellsprings of human motivation. Moreover, it was in our minds an exceptionally hard fought trial. While the verdict could have gone either way, our review persuades us that no error was committed below such as to justify reversal. We therefore affirm the judgments.
I. Sufficiency of the evidence
Title VII makes it unlawful, inter alia, to discharge any individual because of his sex. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Where the plaintiff must prove his case by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct evidence, as here, “the plaintiff must make out a prima facie case of discrimination, the employer must then come forward with some non-discriminatory justification, and the plaintiff finally is given the opportunity to convince the trier of fact that the justification was pretextual and that the real reason was discriminatory.” Molloy v. Blanchard, 115 F.3d 86, 91 (1st Cir.1997) (quoting Cuello-Suarez v. Puerto Rico Elec. Power Auth., 988 F.2d 275, 278 (1st Cir.1993)); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (setting forth the burden shifting framework); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). At all times, the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion.
There is no real dispute that Carey has established a prima facie case, as he has shown that he had a satisfactory job performance record but was terminated and replaced by a woman. See Byrd v. Ronayne, 61 F.3d 1026, 1031 (1st Cir.1995) (listing requirements for the prima facie case) (citation omitted). And MDI has presented a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination, namely, Carey’s continued mismanagement of his financial responsibilities.
Our focus in determining whether or not there was sufficient evidence to justify the verdict therefore rests on the third stage of the Title VII analysis — whether Carey introduced sufficient evidence to show that MDI’s justification was false and that the real reason for his discharge was gender. Carey may rely on the same evidence to prove pretext and discrimination. See Udo v. Tomes, 54 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir.1995). In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, we take the record in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Troy v. Bay State Computer Group, Inc., 141 F.3d 378, 382 (1st Cir.1998).
A. Events leading to termination.
MDI is a thirty-nine bed community hospital in Bar Harbor, Maine, with approximately 200 employees. In 1983, James Mroch, the Hospital’s CEO, hired Carey as Comptroller. In 1991, Carey was promoted to Vice President of Finance. His responsibilities included preparation of budgets and financial re[35]*35ports, working with outside auditors, service on various committees, including the Management Committee, and supervision of the Hospital’s accounting and' business offices.
The critical period in this case begins in January 1993 and extends to June 1994. In January 1993, MDI’s Board of Trustees discharged Mroch, and Dan Hobbs carried out the duties of CEO until September of that year. In the meantime, Lynda Tyson, who had become a Board member in 1989 and chairperson in 1993, engaged'a professional recruiter, Anna Phillips, to find a permanent replacement for Mroch. Carey applied for the position but in June was told-he would not be considered further. In July 1993, after its first choice, David Pagniucei, declined the offer, the Board offered the job to Leslie Hawkins. She accepted and commenced employment in mid-September 1993.
In the interim, on April 30, 1993, MDI’s new outside auditors, Berry, Dunn, McNeil & Parker (“Berry, Dunn”) prepared a “1993 Management Letter” reporting conditions observed during its end of the fiscal year audit of MDI. The letter contained, without specific identification, both “reportable conditions” and “other observations.” “Reportable conditions were defined as ‘matters ... relating to significant deficiencies in the design or operation of the internal control structure that, in- our judgment, could adversely affect the Organization’s ability to record, process, summarize, and report financial data consistent with the assertions of management in the consolidated statements’.”
Shortly after Hawkins commenced her duties, in September 1993, Tyson'arranged a meeting with Hawkins, the Board, and the Berry, Dunn auditors to discuss the Management Letter. Carey was not invited. The auditors said that while the items in the letter were serious and needed to be addressed, the finance department, with some assistance, should be able to rectify them before the next audit.
In April 1994, Hawkins asked Carey to present a proposed fiscal 1995 budget to the Board before April 30. Realizing one week before the deadline that he could not complete the assignment in time, Carey asked for and was granted a one month extension. In May, he submitted a budget, which projected large deficits and some high expenses. Hawkins and MDI’s finance committee found the proposal unacceptable and sent the budget back for reworking.
In June, Hawkins met with the Berry, Dunn auditors, who told her that the bulk of the deficiencies noted in the 1993 Management Letter were still present. On June 23, Hawkins terminated Carey, followed soon by his female assistant, Robinson. She gave as reasons the uneorreeted problems noted in the 1993 Management Letter, lack of a budget, and lack of confidence in Carey and Robinson. Hawkins .advised Lynda Tyson, the Executive Committee, and the full Board; all supported her action.
B. Pretext.
The series of events and concerns described above indicates a very legitimate, non-discriminatory justification for discharging Carey. More than speculation or random evidence of satisfactory performance is required to constitute a sufficient basis for a jury finding that incompetency and mismanagement were not the re^l reason for the discharge. Cf. Byrd, 61 F.3d at 1030 (addressing the summary judgment context). We therefore _ distill all the evidence that points to pretext.
We begin by examining Carey’s work record. In evaluating Carey in 1992, Mroch said: • .
Mike works very hard, adapts quickly to change, and keeps going even when doing so is difficult. Mike has responded very well to difficult situations brought about by various board members. Mike’s fiscal abilities are excellent.
More recent and therefore more germane is Hobbs’ recommendation to the CEO Search Committee in June 1993 that Carey be considered for the position of CEO:
I have worked closely with Mike since early February during this difficult budgeting process and Mike has shown great tact and diplomacy in negotiating with department heads in an attempt to reduce the budget expenses, particularly in pay[36]*36roll. I have been very impressed with the manner in which it was done and which made the decision more acceptable by those directly involved.
Then there is the key 1993 Management Letter itself. What sounds like a massive indictment could have been read by a skeptical jury as a list of technical accounting recommendations to be expected from a firm making its first impression on a client. Certainly, it appears difficult for a reader to distinguish what the accountants deemed a fairly serious “reportable condition” from one of the “other observations.” The suggestions included recording cash on hand to the general ledger, locking up the blank checks, avoiding imposing too many payroll functions on a single individual (i.e., using more personnel), retaining outpatient records, insuring loss of records, and use of disaggregated balance sheets to show that individual restricted funds are in monthly balance.
A jury could reasonably conclude that nothing in this suggested an alarming hazard or a smoking gun, such as that portrayed by Hawkins. Indeed, at least five of the recommendations ended with the observation that the finance staff 'ivas already attacking the problem. Berry, Dunn highlighted that many balance sheet accounts were not regularly reconciled or analyzed, requiring that numerous audit adjustments be made. They also explained in conclusion: “This letter appears critical by its nature because it is intended to present suggestions for management’s consideration. It does not comment on the positive aspects we noted in the Hospital’s system of internal accounting control and procedures during our engagement.”
Even more revealing may have been the auditors’ June 21,1994 status letter prepared at Hawkins’ request two days before Carey’s discharge. This letter identified the areas listed in the 1993 letter that remained problematic. In contrast to normal practice, it was developed without input from Carey and his staff. Berry, Dunn auditors concluded that the bulk of deficiencies were still present in 1994. But upon a close reading of the 1993 and 1994 letters the jury might have understood the letters quite differently.
The 1993 letter occupied six pages and contained thirteen areas of criticism, whereas the 1994 letter had three pages, with five surviving areas of criticism. The remaining eight areas of reported deficiencies had been resolved, substantially improved, or, in one area, could not be addressed due to equipment malfunction. The principal remaining problem was inability to reconcile balance sheet accounts to supporting documentation. This, of course, might have been a critical shortcoming, but the jury need not have so concluded. Such a status letter, even in the absence of staff opportunity to defend and explain, might well have appeared to the jury as less than a clarion call for termination.
The jury also heard the testimony of Carey’s expert witness, Israel Laeger, senior member of a Bangor, Maine, accounting firm. Laeger had reviewed all CPA audits and management letters from 1990 to 1995. He pointed out that (1) a new accounting firm may seek to impress a client with a sizeable list of criticisms; (2) “reportable conditions” are basically judgment calls that are the product of the accountant’s subjective view of seriousness; (3) an “opinion audit” is one where the auditor can vouch for the accuracy of a financial statement; (4) a “qualified opinion” means that there are some “things not up to snuff’ preventing an unqualified opinion; (5) all the audit opinions of MDI were unqualified, meaning that “they were given a clean bill of health”; and (6) the number of deficiencies identified in audit reports had steadily decreased from 1992 to 1994. Lae-ger concluded that nothing in the audit reports and letters indicated that Carey was not living up to his responsibilities as Chief Financial Officer.
Finally, the jury might have doubted the facial justifications advanced by Hawkins concerning the relative infrequency of meetings between Hawkins and Carey, whose offices were in close proximity. And they may have suspected that she thwarted his ability to succeed based on evidence that she refused to allow Carey to fill all the budgeted positions allotted him, did not give him any advance warnings of serious trouble despite earlier assurance that she would inform him if she had problems with his job perfor-[37]*37manee, and the absence of any effort to institute “progressive discipline” or corrective action, as was general practice, before dismissal.
We therefore cannot say that disbelief of the reasons proffered by MDI would be unsupported or unfounded.
C. Evidence of gender discrimination.
This conclusion, however, would not be enough to support the verdict. It may very well be that Hawkins, Tyson, and the entire Board had come to the point where they did not like Carey’s style, finding him too openly critical of others and insensitive in his public utterances. If such were the real motivation for his discharge, it might or might not be fair but certainly would not be discrimination prohibited by law. It therefore was incumbent on Carey to introduce sufficient evidence to enable a reasonable jury to find that the justifications advanced by MDI for his discharge were, a cover for an underlying anti-male animus.
In a case such as this, where a plaintiff must rely on circumstantial as opposed to direct evidence of gender discrimination, the evidence will necessarily be composed of bits and pieces, which may or may not point to an atmosphere of gender discrimination. While an employer should not find itself in jeopardy by reason of occasional stray remarks by ordinary employees,
circumstantial evidence of a discriminatory atmosphere at a plaintiffs place of employment is relevant to the question of motive in considering a discrimination claim.... [Ejvidence of a corporate state-of-mind or a discriminatory atmosphere is not rendered irrelevant by its failure to coincide precisely with the particular actors or timeframe involved in the specific events that generated a claim of discriminatory treatment.
Conway v. Electro Switch Corp., 825 F.2d 593, 597-98 (1st Cir.1987) (citations omitted).
The record reveals the following evidence in support of Brennan’s claim of sex based discriminatory animus:
—In August 1992, Fundraising and Public Relations Director (and member of the Management Committee) Carol Gordon had a discussion with Carey and another employee about a television program on child abuse at day care centers. She concluded the discussion with, “we live in a patriarchal society, and men shirk their duties toward child raising. And because men have money, power and position, because they have penises, then this is the type of thing that happens as a result.” Carey told Evans that the remarks were inappropriate and filed a sexual harassment complaint with the Personnel Director, Penny Evans. Shortly thereafter, Evans expressed regret to Carey that he had taken her remark the wrong way and that he had filed a complaint.
—In late 1992, the steering committee for MDI’s new Women’s Health Center, whose members included Jeanne DuLong, Director of Nursing, Evans, Gordon, and Carey (the only male), prepared a mission statement for the Center. As first drafted, the statement barred the employment of men, including male physicians. Carey objected to the draft, indicated it could be illegal and sought a legal opinion. After obtaining the opinion, the mission statement was changed so.as not to exclude men.
—In the spring of 1993, a management committee member, Brian McCarthy, complained to Evans about another employee’s having thrown water in his face. He testified that Evans was not receptive to his complaint, telling him not to worry about it. When he asked what she would do in the event water was thrown at a female employee, Evans said the person would probably be fired. She explained, “we have different standards for men and women.”
■ — -Tyson, then Vice-Chair of the Board, helped secure the discharge of Mroch as President and CEO. Upon his termination in early 1993, she hired an executive search firm, placing Anna Phillips in charge of identifying a prospective-CEO for MDI. In the summer of 1993, Gordon, Brian McCarthy, David Frongillo, Director of the MDI Pharmacy, and Hawkins, who was then a candidate, met with Phillips. Frongillo asked if there was a selection criterion involving gender, to which Gordon-responded, “it’s about [38]*38time that we get a woman for this position,” and Phillips said that “they would very much like to put a woman in that position.” Meanwhile, Carey’s own application received short shrift. He testified that Phillips interviewed him for only about thirty minutes, never asked about his qualifications, and appeared not to have read his resume. Tyson testified that Evans, DuLong, and Gordon had all told her that they would not be “comfortable with Mr. Carey as CEO.”
—By the time Hawkins was hired, Tyson and Gordon were close friends, as were Evans and Gordon, and all were uncomfortable with Carey. When Hawkins was hired, Tyson told her that she faced several challenges, “one of which was the financial stability and ... that she might have some problems in the finance department.”
—In late 1993, MDI conducted an employee opinion survey, a summary of which was placed in an administrative mailbox used by both Carey and Hawkins. Although obviously intended for Hawkins, Carey saw the responses and noted on the summary page a statement from an unnamed employee that Hawkins needed to take action against “the power-hungry men in administration.” Although the comment itself is entitled to little weight, that this message was intended for administration eyes and that the compiler of the survey results saw fit to place the comment on the summary page for Hawkins are more significant.
—Finally, Carey, when facing performance problems, appears to have been treated differently by Hawkins than were Evans, Gordon, and DuLong. Although only Carey and DuLong were Vice-Presidents, the other two were senior managers and all served on the Management Committee. “The test is whether a prudent person, looking objectively at the incidents, would think them roughly equivalent and the protagonists similarly situated. ... Exact correlation is neither likely nor necessary, but the cases must be fair congeners.” Molloy, 115 F.3d at 91 (quoting Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir.1989)). All three women had encountered problems in their jobs and were given “progressive discipline,” i.e., assistance and time to take corrective action, rather than prompt termination.
MDI in its briefs and argument compartmentalizes the above evidence, isolating each incident, relationship, or statement, arguing that each has no bearing on any animus that could have influenced Hawkins. But all of the evidence was presented to the jury and we would find it very difficult indeed to say that the totality fell below a triable threshold. The statements and incidents did not relate to miscellaneous low level employees but to a fairly tight group of top officials. We therefore hold that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that deficiencies in Carey’s handling of financial controls were not the real reason for his discharge but instead covered an action stemming from gender discrimination.
We see no point in separately analyzing the court’s refusal to order a new trial. As is evident from our discussion on the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not consider the court’s action to be an abuse of discretion. See Simon v. Navon, 71 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir.1995).
II. Jury Instructions
MDI argues that the court in its original jury instructions committed error by charging that the plaintiff had the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that “gender was a motivating factor” in MDI’s decision to fire him. It had urged the court to use the words “a determining factor” or “the motivating factor,” reasoning that, in cases resting on circumstantial rather than direct evidence, such language should be used to accord with our opinions in LeBlanc v. Great American Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 842, 846 (1st Cir.1993), and Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 828 (1st Cir.1991).
The court resisted, observing that in Le-Blanc and other First Circuit cases we have used both “motivating” and “determining” without any dear indication that one was preferable. The court was persuaded that “a motivating factor” was the correct instruction by the wording chosen by Congress in Section 107(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, an amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 107(a), codified as 42 § 2000e-2(m), [39]*39states, “an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that ... sex ... was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”
MDI argues that the court misapplied 42 § 2000e-2(m), which it maintains covers direct but not circumstantial evidence cases, and therefore committed reversible error. What MDI has not adverted to in its brief was that after the jury had been out for about ninety minutes, the jury sent the court a note asking for a legal definition of “motivating factor” with specific reference to “how much weight is to be rendered to make decision.” What followed was, in our opinion, of crucial importance insofar as decision in this ease is concerned.
Court and counsel proceeded to engage in a substantial colloquy, spanning eighteen pages of transcript. After hearing argument from counsel, the court dictated a draft supplemental instruction, which read in relevant part:
The plaintiff therefore has the burden of establishing that it is more likely than not that gender was a motivating or determining factor in the firing of the plaintiff by the defendant. In other words, it is for the jury to determine, based on all the evidence, that it is more likely than not that the defendant’s decision to terminate the plaintiff was motivated by gender discrimination. If you find that the plaintiff was discharged for reasons other than his gender you must find for the defendant.
At this juncture, Carey’s counsel proposed adding, at the end of the first sentence, “even though other factors also motivated the practice.” The court expressed concern that the proposed addition “conveys an impression that they need not concern themselves with what really caused the termination. As long as there’s a drop of causal effect by any of these factors in the mix, they can find for the plaintiff.”
Carey’s counsel then tried to persuade the judge to drop the last sentence. Before doing so, the court called upon MDI’s counsel to weigh in on the proposed language. MDI’s counsel responded as follows:
MR.. JOHNSTON: Well, I think that last sentence is a perfectly accurate statement of the law, and I don’t think it’s misleading at all.
MS. FARRELL (co-counsel): It does balance out the rest of it.
After the court refused a request by Carey’s counsel to add that gender discrimination need not be the sole motivating factor, the court accepted the draft supplemental instruction, unchanged.
We are aware of the controversy that exists over whether the “a motivating factor” language in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) applies to all discrimination cases, as the language indicates, or was intended only to overrule in part the standard set forth in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989). If the latter is true, as MDI maintains, then the amendment is limited to “direct evidence/mixed motive” cases and leaves unscathed the McDonnell Douglas approach to “circumstantial evidence/pretext” cases. We see no need to enter this thicket at the moment. For the purposes of this case we assume that the court’s original instruction was in error.
But we look upon the court’s colloquy with counsel, the supplemental instruction, and the input from counsel as a thorough and effective effort to clarify an earlier misunderstanding. The first sentence of the supplemental instruction, it is true, does not specify what factor is determinative. But the second sentence, beginning with “in other words,” narrows the meaning, clarifying that the decision must have been motivated by gender. If any doubt were to remain, the last sentence clearly conveys the thought that the defendant escapes liability unless the plaintiff establishes that the sole motivation was gender. Indeed, if anything, this wording favors defendant more than it should, for it goes beyond the concept of “determining,” requiring that if any reason other than gender played, however minimal, a part in the discharge, Carey may not recover.
To cap all this, both counsel for MDI affirmatively indicated their approval of the sup[40]*40plemental instruction to the court.1 In our opinion, to hold under these circumstances that the trial court committed reversible error would impose an unrealistic burden of perfection on a court facing the constant pressures of trial.
III. Miscellaneous Issues
As a very small tail on a very long dog, several other issues raised by MDI may be touched upon briefly. The first is that Carey’s counsel, by peremptorily challenging four female potential jurors, and indicating that he was, in so doing, relying on a juror rating system which consisted of such factors as occupation, education, and familiarity with the local region, violated the teaching of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Inasmuch as MDI challenged three males and one female, the jury as drawn contained five men and five women, and, after Carey offered his rating system explanation, MDI indicated to the court that it had no more questions on the Batson issue, we find it difficult to find that the court abused its discretion in not pursuing explanations any further.
MDI also claims error in the admission into evidence of deposition testimony of Anna Phillips, which allegedly included hearsay and irrelevant material. MDI makes cursory reference in its brief to “feminist” beliefs of members of the search committee, arguing that these were not relevant to the present case. We confess ourselves unable, upon a thorough search of the record, to identify such material in Phillips’ testimony. In any event, we cannot believe that in this lengthy trial discussion by Phillips of “feminist” beliefs held by persons at MDI could have made any impact. No case of reversible error has been made to us.
We find the same as to certain notes of Phillips that were not admitted into evidence but allowed to be shown in an overhead projector. MDI tells us they were “inherently unreliable, prejudicial and irrelevant.” But we are not told just what they were and how they would have adversely impacted MDI. We expect more from counsel serious about asserting reversible error.
Finally, MDI claims error in admitting over objection Gordon’s “penis and power” comment, with which we commenced our search for gender discriminatory indicia. The specific claim is that the prejudicial effect of the comment greatly outweighed its probative value. Were this an isolated remark or incident, this would be a more viable argument. But in context, particularly in light of the evidence of Gordon’s close friendship with Tyson and her senior position in management, we simply cannot say that the court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence. To ask for a new trial on the basis of this ruling strains our credulity.
IV. Front and Back Pay
Carey appeals the denial of front pay and the partial reduction of his back pay award for failure to mitigate damages. We review the district court’s decision to deny these awards for an abuse of discretion. See Selgas v. American Airlines, Inc., 104 F.3d 9, 12-13 (1st Cir.1997) (“[t]rial courts have discretion to fashion awards in Title VII ■ cases so as to fully compensate a plaintiff in a manner that suits the specific facts of the ease”).
Carey alleges error in the court’s conclusion that front pay was included under the statutory cap, see 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(C), and that such an award was unnecessary given other relief granted Carey. We elect not to address the statutory cap issue as we find the district court’s determination that Carey received sufficient compensation without front pay to be entirely within the court’s discretion.
The court addressed the merits of Carey’s front pay request on two occasions. On November 20, 1996, after receiving briefing from both parties on the front pay issue, the court ruled that front pay is included under the statutory cap and
[41]*41in any event, the Court would be reluctant to award additional front pay in this case because of the substantial liquidated damages awarded by the jury ... [A]ny additional award of front pay would be inappropriate under the circumstances of this ease. Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 616 (1st Cir.1985) [finding that future damages were unnecessary, given that the plaintiff had been awarded compensatory damages, liquidated damages, and double and additional damages under state law].
And on February 20, 1997, the court denied Carey’s motion to reconsider, stating,
[wjhether front pay is included under the statutory cap or not, the Court indicated that it would not award Plaintiff front pay in this case. The $200,000 in damages Plaintiff will recover after the jury’s award of $610,000 is capped, plus the back pay the Court will award Plaintiff, the exact amount of which is still uncertain, will more than adequately compensate plaintiff.
We discern from these statements that the court appears to have looked to the jury’s award of punitive damages rather than to the statutorily capped damage award in denying front pay on November 20, 1996. While this was inappropriate as the liquidated damages award was not an accurate measure of the award Carey would actually receive, it is clear that on February 20, 1997, the court found the $200,000 cap and back pay award fully sufficient to compensate Carey. This determination, standing alone, is entirely supportable, and we can see no basis to conclude, as Carey would have us do, that it was “tainted” by the November 20, 1996 ruling. We can find no “strong evidence of a lapse in judgment,” Selgas, 104 F.3d at 12, as required for a finding of an abuse of discretion.
Neither can we discern an abuse of discretion as to the back pay award. Carey was entitled to recover for what he would have earned absent the discharge, reduced by any compensation that he actually received and any additional amount that he would have received through reasonable efforts to mitigate the damages, with the employer bearing the burden of proof on the issue of mitigation. See Troy, 141 F.3d at 382; Wilcox v. Stratton Lumber, Inc., 921 F.Supp. 837, 842 (D.Me.1996); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(g)(1).
Correctly applying this standard, the court concluded that MDI had successfully shown through expert testimony and evidence, concerning the actual number of applications made relative to the number of positions available that Carey did not exercise reasonable diligence in seeking comparable employment. The result was an award to Carey of $110,070 in back pay, which represented a reduction by $100,000 for failure to fully mitigate damages and a reduction by the amount of money Carey earned or received in unemployment during the relevant period.
In support of his abuse of discretion argument, Carey essentially repeats the evidence he presented below, relying particularly on testimony from his expert to rebut evidence by MDI’s expert. We see no need to pursue this further. The court’s order demonstrates a thoughtful weighing of the credibility of the witnesses and the various evidence presented by each party, resulting in an award that was somewhere in between that desired by each party. Such weighing was fully within the court’s discretion and is supported by the evidence.
V. Conclusion
We therefore affirm the district court on all issues raised by both parties on appeal. Each party shall pay its own costs.