Arthur D. Little, Inc. v. Dooyang Corp.

147 F.3d 47, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13569, 1998 WL 327368
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedJune 25, 1998
Docket98-1010
StatusPublished
Cited by124 cases

This text of 147 F.3d 47 (Arthur D. Little, Inc. v. Dooyang Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Arthur D. Little, Inc. v. Dooyang Corp., 147 F.3d 47, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13569, 1998 WL 327368 (1st Cir. 1998).

Opinion

LYNCH, Circuit Judge.

This case demonstrates the high costs Massachusetts imposes on businesses which engage in unfair or deceptive trade practices prohibited by Mass. Gen. Laws eh. 93A. The legal question raised here, one of first impression for this court, is whether when one business engages in unfair and deceptive practices towards another and the harm consists of a delay in payments owed (and the usual accompanying expenses), that is a “loss of money or property” establishing a violation under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 11. The high costs imposed are that the damages awarded are not those attributed solely to the nonpayment but rather may be multiples of the amount of payments originally owed.

Guided by the decisions of the courts of Massachusetts, as we must be in this diversity case, we answer this question in the affirmative and affirm the judgment of the district court. We resolve the “loss of money or property” issue and the other issues against appellants Dooyang. 1 For Dooyang’s failure to pay invoices totaling $460,000, the jury and court awarded Arthur D. Little 2 $920,-000 in damages, plus interest, plus over a million dollars in attorney’s fees and costs.

I.

Two large international companies, each unhappy with its dealings with the other, and each with some justification for that unhappiness, are involved in this litigation. We review the facts 3 “as the jury and district court could have found them.” Cambridge Plating Co. v. Napco, Inc., 85 F.3d 752, 756 (1st Cir.1996). “Where specific findings are lacking, we view the record in the light most favorable to the ruling, making all reasonably supported inferences.” Roche v. Royal Bank of Canada, 109 F.3d 820, 821 *50 (1st Cir.1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

ADL is an international consulting firm with its home office in Cambridge, Massachusetts. ADL has an office in Caracas, Venezuela. Dooyang is an industrial conglomerate with headquarters in Seoul, South Korea. Dooyang hired ADL from 1988 to 1991 to assist it in a conceptualized aluminum smelter project. Though projects in other countries were initially considered, Dooyang soon instructed ADL to focus on opportunities for building a new smelter in Venezuela.

At the outset, ADL informed Dooyang that it also worked for the Corporación Venezola-na de Guayana (“CVG”), an arm of the Venezuelan government responsible for awarding-valuable “debt-equity swap” subsidies, and for the Venezuelan minister responsible for energy and metal production. ADL was assisting CVG to attract investment in Venezuela. Acquisition of the debt-equity swap subsidies awarded by CVG was thought to be the key to the success of a smelter project in Venezuela. Dooyang consented to this conflict, apparently believing that ADL’s insider influence would redound to Dooyang’s benefit. In March of 1989, ADL recommended that Dooyang invest in the construction of a new smelter rather than join an existing project.

Soon after, and wearing its other hat, ADL met with CVG to assist it in attracting international investment in the Venezuelan aluminum industry, and contracted with CVG to evaluate the relative merits of various aluminum smelter proposals. Obviously, one of the proposals ADL could end up evaluating was that of its other client, Dooyang.

In June of 1989, ADL and Dooyang entered into the first in a series of agreements under which ADL would assist Dooyang in developing a new smelter. ADL pledged to use its “best efforts” to assist Dooyang in a wide variety of areas, including assembling the necessary financing and technical support, and lobbying the Venezuelan government on Dooyang’s behalf. ADL evaluated and selected advisers and partners in the project. At no time, however, was ADL empowered to enter into contracts or make other commitments on Dooyang’s behalf.

In its other capacity, ADL advised CVG in July of 1989 to seek an investor which had the capacity to develop a smelter without partners. ADL advised CVG to focus on projects by ALCOA and ALUMAX, and to consider as a third possibility either Cisne-ros/Rich or Austria Metall. Dooyang could not develop a smelter by itself, but had to enter into partnerships with other companies. At this point, however, Dooyang had not decided to go forward with a project in Venezuela, and so had no proposal then for consideration. But that changed: in January of 1990, Dooyang and CVG entered into an agreement which stated Dooyang’s intent to build a smelter in Venezuela.

The contract between ADL and Dooyang was to expire by its terms at the end of 1989. ADL and Dooyang agreed to extend the contract for an additional six months in January of 1990. During 1990, ADL also represented CVG in negotiations with other potential investors such as ALCOA. Dooyang was aware that ADL’s work for CVG involved contacting other competing investors. ADL and Dooyang agreed to a third six-month extension of the contract in July of 1990.

In April of 1990, ADL compared for CVG the relative merits of three smelter project proposals by ALCOA, Dooyang, and ALU-MAX. ADL stressed that ALCOA was the only company capable of proceeding with a smelter on its own. ADL recommended that CVG “be more aggressive” with ALUMAX in order to keep its interest. With regard to Dooyang, ADL said that Dooyang was “serious about the project” and that they were “spending major funds to advance their position,” and that ADL was “confident that they will continue to move very rapidly.” ADL later reiterated to CVG that because ALCOA had all of the needed elements “in house,” great effort should be expended to realize the ALCOA project. In a July 1990 report, ADL identified the ALCOA and ALUMAX projects as the “focus” projects, and stated that Dooyang was “one of the leading projects.”

Dooyang was aware that ADL was evaluating competing projects for CVG. ADL provided Dooyang with partial copies of its pre *51 sentations to CVG, and assured Dooyang that ADL had convinced CVG “that the Dooyang project is the number one project to support.” Dooyang submitted its project proposal and bid for subsidies from the Venezuelan government in December of 1990. 4 Dooyang and its equity partners proposed building a smelter on the Orinoco river, dubbed the “Orinoco project.” CVG rejected Dooyang’s Orinoco project application in March of 1991 in favor of the ALCOA project.

Dooyang met with ADL in Caracas to discuss resubmitting the proposal. In early 1991, ADL and Dooyang again extended the letter agreement. At least by April 20,1991, as the district judge subsequently found, Dooyang decided not to pay ADL. Dooyang felt that ADL should do the work on the second subsidy application for free because Dooyang had spent millions on this project with no result. 5

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147 F.3d 47, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13569, 1998 WL 327368, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/arthur-d-little-inc-v-dooyang-corp-ca1-1998.