Eason v. Town of Salem CV-00-525-M 02/12/02 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Rhonda Eason, Plaintiff
v. Civil No. 00-525-M Opinion No. 2002 DNH 043 Town of Salem, Defendant
O R D E R
Rhonda Eason brings this action against her former employer,
the Town of Salem, seeking damages under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. She claims that
the Town wrongfully discharged her from her position as a Special
Police Officer based on her gender. The Town denies any
wrongdoing and moves for summary judgment. Eason objects.
Standard of Review
When ruling on a party's motion for summary judgment, the
court must "view the entire record in the light most hospitable
to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable
inferences in that party's favor." Griggs-Ryan v. Smith. 904
F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990). Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals "no genuine issue as to any material fact
and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In this context, "a fact is
''material' if it potentially affects the outcome of the suit and
a dispute over it is 'genuine' if the parties' positions on the
issue are supported by conflicting evidence." Intern'1 Ass'n of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green Nursing Center,
103 F.3d 196, 199-200 (1st Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
Background
In October of 1997, the Salem Police Department hired Eason
as a "Clerk II," an administrative position that involved the
processing and maintenance of pawn slips and police department
records. Eason's immediate supervisor with regard to police
records was Sharon Savage. Her supervisor with regard to pawn
slips was Captain Alan Gould, who, in turn, reported to Police
Chief Stephen MacKinnon. A little less than one year later, in
August of 1998, the Town hired Eason as a Special Police Officer.
She worked as both a Clerk II and Special Police Officer for the
Town until August 29, 1999, when she resigned from her position
as a Clerk II. She remained on the Town's roster of Special
2 Police Officers until February 18, 2000, when her employment was
terminated.
Although Eason acknowledges that her Title VII claim relates
exclusively to her discharge as a Special Police Officer, her
memorandum in opposition to summary judgment chronicles several
events that transpired during the course of her work as a Clerk
II. She recounts those events "for evidentiary purposes,"
because she "believes that the discriminatory treatment she
experienced as a Clerk II is relevant to her present claims."
Plaintiff's objection (document no. 10) at 2 n.l. Reduced to
their essence, those claims suggest that Eason felt that her co
workers (mostly women) treated her unfairly (e.g., stopped
speaking to her, accused her of drug use and promiscuity) and her
male supervisors either did nothing to stop that behavior or, in
some cases, actively encouraged it.
From the Town's perspective, Eason appears to have been
something less than the model employee. See, e.g.. Exhibit 8 to
plaintiff's memorandum (document no. 10), memorandum from Captain
Gould to Chief MacKinnon ("Since Ms. Eason was hired [as a Clerk
3 II] in October of 1997, I have spent more time trying to resolve
issues for her than any other employee I can remember. Most of
these issues were personality conflicts that occurred between Ms.
Eason and other members of the clerical staff. . . . Although I
helped Ms. Eason with these conflicts for more than a year, I
realized several months ago that Ms. Eason needs to accept
responsibility for most of the issues which have been created.").
The first incident that gave rise to disciplinary action
against Eason arose in July of 1999, in the context of her job as
a Clerk II, when she confronted and allegedly used profanity
toward her supervisor, Sharon Savage. Ms. Savage filed a written
complaint with Captain Gould, who then referred the matter to the
Chief. An administrative hearing was held, at which Eason
appeared along with a union representative. Eason acknowledged
that her behavior was inappropriate and she was issued a written
warning. See Exhibit C-5 to defendant's memorandum (document no.
6) .
The day after Eason received notice of the written warning,
she filed a written complaint of harassment, in which she set
4 forth five instances of alleged harassment to which she was
subjected (again, all of those instances related to Eason's
employment as a Clerk II). See Exhibit 5 to plaintiff's
memorandum; Exhibit C-7 to defendant's memorandum. Chief
MacKinnon conducted an investigation into Eason's allegations,
which included taking statements from all pertinent parties and
soliciting additional information from Eason (some of which she
declined to provide). See generally Exhibit B to defendant's
memorandum. Affidavit of Stephen B. MacKinnon at para. 11. See
also Exhibit C-7 to defendant's memorandum (documents relating to
Chief MacKinnon's investigation). In the end, the Chief issued a
written report, discussing each of Eason's complaints, the
results of his investigation into each alleged incident of
workplace harassment, and his conclusion that each claim raised
by Eason was unfounded or that Eason had refused to provide
sufficient information to permit a meaningful investigation. See
Exhibit C-8 to defendant's memorandum.
On July 25, 1999 (i.e., approximately a year after she was
hired as a Special Police Officer), Eason was assigned to traffic
detail and instructed to direct traffic near the grand opening of
5 a Target store. During the course of that detail, a driver
apparently misunderstood Eason's hand signal and incorrectly
proceeded through the intersection. Eason allegedly screamed at
the driver and ordered him to pull over. He complied. Eason
then radioed for backup and two Salem police officers responded
to the scene (a third officer arrived subsequently, but it
appears that she never exited her cruiser). The situation was
soon resolved and the driver was permitted to leave the scene
with an oral warning to more carefully heed the hand signals
given by police officers.
The following day. Chief MacKinnon received an anonymous
phone call from a person he assumed to be the driver involved in
the previous day's incident (the "Target incident"). That person
complained to the Chief about the treatment he had received at
the hands of Eason. The Chief conducted an informal
investigation that included, among other things, speaking with
the police officers who responded to Eason's call for backup.
Their recollection of the events in question supported the claims
made by the anonymous caller. The Chief then advised Eason's
immediate supervisor of the incident and recommended that Eason
6 be counseled on various issues relating to professionalism and
proper treatment of members of the public. See Exhibit 9 to
plaintiff's memorandum. As a result of that incident and the
prior incident that resulted in the written reprimand, the Chief
concluded that Eason would benefit from stress and/or anger
management training.
On August 12, 1999, Chief MacKinnon met with Eason to
discuss the Target incident. During the course of that meeting,
the Chief decided that Eason was giving evasive, if not
inaccurate, responses to his questions. In particular, the Chief
appeared concerned that Eason was claiming that she had been
struck by the vehicle, notwithstanding the fact that police logs
and Eason's own communications with other police officers that
day showed that she said she was "almost hit" by the vehicle.
See, e.g.. Exhibit 9 to plaintiff's memorandum (revealing, among
other things, that one of the officers who responded to Eason's
request for backup reported that Eason told him that the driver
almost struck her with his automobile). The Chief was also
troubled by Eason's failure to follow various police protocols,
as well as other conduct on her part that he viewed as
7 unprofessional. See generally Exhibit B to defendant's
memorandum. Affidavit of Stephen B. MacKinnon.
Following that meeting. Chief MacKinnon decided to
temporarily remove Eason from the roster of Special Police
Officers. He drafted a memorandum outlining the basis for his
decision, concluding that:
Based on these observations, I am not confident in your abilities to carry out the duties of a Special Police Officer. Therefore, I will be removing you from the work schedule with the exception of attending Special Officer Training sessions and general meetings of the entire roster. During this time you are not to identify yourself as a Special Police Officer or take any other actions as a police officer.
During this time I will attempt to locate appropriate training for you to address these performance concerns. Once that is achieved I will consider allowing you to return to the work schedule.
Exhibit 10 to plaintiff's memorandum.
Chief MacKinnon says that notwithstanding his reasonable
efforts, he was unable to locate appropriate training sessions
for Eason through either the New Hampshire Police Standards and
Training Council or private organizations. See MacKinnon Affidavit at para. 15. During the same time frame, the Salem
Police Department began a review of the hours and tasks performed
by its Special Police Officers, with an eye toward reducing the
department's staffing. See MacKinnon Affidavit at para. 16.
See also Memorandum of Chief MacKinnon to Mary Donovan, dated
February 9, 2000, attached to plaintiff's affidavit (document no.
12). In that memorandum, the Chief solicited Ms. Donovan's
thoughts with regard to the following observations and proposals:
I have made a review of all the Special Officer's activity in 1999. We have a number of Special Officers who have worked little or no hours and have not been available to work when called. There are seven employees that fit this definition. Since we still maintain liability insurance on them and have to keep them trained to maintain their certifications (i.e., firearms qualifications) it would be my intent to advise the Police Academy that they are no longer Specials within Salem and tell Payroll to take them off the computer. It is not cost effective to keep them on the roster.
In addition, there are an additional 7 Special Officers that have questionable commitment. I plan to send a letter to each of them asking [them] to respond in writing within a certain time frame if they are still interested in working with us. No answer, no job. The letter would also include an expectation of more activity seen by them within the next 6 months or they will be taken off the roster as well.
9 Id. It is unclear from the record whether Chief MacKinnon ever
sent the letters he referenced in that memorandum. Eason denies
ever receiving such a letter.
Shortly thereafter, Eason and ten other Special Police
Officers (all men) were removed from the department's roster, as
part of a reduction in force. Eason was notified of her
permanent removal from the Special Officer roster by letter dated
February 18, 2000. Exhibit B-16 to defendant's memorandum.
Chief MacKinnon says Eason was terminated "due to the force
reduction, her past poor performance and anger/stress-management
issues, and her dishonesty in the course of the inquiry into the
Target incident." MacKinnon Affidavit at para. 17. He denies
that Eason's gender played any role in that decision. Id.
Eason, on the other hand, says her termination was wrongfully
motivated by a gender-based animus and, therefore, violated Title
VII.
10 Discussion
I. Title VII and Gender-Based Discrimination.
A. The Analytical Framework.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as amended) makes
it unlawful for employers "to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2 (a). In cases such as this, where there is little overt
evidence of gender-based discrimination, courts typically employ
the burden-shifting framework articulated by the Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See also
Carev v. M t . Desert Island Hosp., 156 F.3d 31, 34 (1st Cir.
1998).
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has summarized
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting paradigm as follows:
Under this formulation, a plaintiff opens with a prima facie showing of certain standardized elements suggestive of possible discrimination. -k
11 Establishment of the prescribed prima facie case creates a presumption that the employer engaged in impermissible [gender] discrimination. However, to rebut this presumption, the employer need only articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's termination. The employer's obligation is simply one of production. The burden of persuasion remains the employee's at all times.
LeBlanc v. Great American Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 842 (1st Cir.
1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). More
recently, the court described the elements of a prima facie case
of gender-based discrimination - the first step in the burden
shifting paradigm - as follows:
[The plaintiff] must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was performing her job at a level that rules out the possibility that she was fired for inadequate job performance; (3) she suffered an adverse job action by her employer; and (4) her employer sought a replacement for her with roughly equivalent qualifications.
Smith v. Stratus Computer, Inc.. 40 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 1994).
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a
legitimate, non-discriminatory justification for the adverse
employment action taken against the plaintiff. If the defendant
succeeds in carrying that burden of production, the burden
12 reverts to the employee, who must then demonstrate that the
reason articulated by the employer was a mere pretext for
unlawful gender discrimination. See St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993) . See also LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at
842. To carry that burden, the employee must produce "not only
minimally sufficient evidence of pretext, but evidence that
overall reasonably supports a finding of discriminatory animus."
Id., at 843 (citation and internal quotations omitted) . He or
she "may not simply refute or question the employer's reasons.
To defeat summary judgment at this stage, a plaintiff must
produce evidence that the real reason for the employer's actions
was discrimination." Gadson v. Concord Hosp., 966 F.2d 32, 34
(1st Cir. 1992).
B. Eason's Claims and Evidence.
Assuming that Eason has established a prima facie case of
unlawful gender-based discrimination,1 the burden falls upon the
1 It is doubtful that Eason has established that she was performing her job "at a level that rules out the possibility that she was fired for inadequate job performance" or that she has shown that "her employer sought a replacement for her with roughly equivalent qualifications." Stratus Computer, 40 F.3d at 15. Nevertheless, the court has assumed the minimal evidence proffered by Eason is sufficient to meet her initial burden.
13 Town to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory justification
for the adverse employment action it took against her. As noted
above, "[a]t this second stage, the framework imposes on the
defendant only a burden of production. The burden of persuasion
remains at all times with the plaintiff." Thomas v. Eastman
Kodak C o ., 183 F.3d 38, 56 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 1161 (2000). The Town has met that burden by credibly
asserting that Eason was terminated as part of a reduction in
force, and because of her history of unprofessional conduct, her
stress and/or anger-management issues, and her dishonesty when
questioned about the so-called Target incident. If taken as
true, such evidence supports the Town's assertion "there was a
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action" taken against
her. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509.
So, the burden of persuasion reverts to Eason, who must
introduce sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable trier of
fact to conclude that the Town's stated motivations are simply a
pretext for unlawful gender-based discrimination. At this stage,
Eason must:
14 demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision. This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination. She may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.
Texas Dept, of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256
(1981) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05)). See also
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147
(2000) ("Proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of
credence is . . . one form of circumstantial evidence that is
probative of intentional discrimination."). Importantly,
however, Eason may not simply deny or question the Town's reason
for terminating her. "To defeat summary judgment at this stage,
a plaintiff must produce evidence that the real reason for the
employer's actions was discrimination." Gadson. 966 F.2d at 34.
See also Stratus Computer. 40 F.3d at 16. She has failed to
carry that burden.
In an effort to demonstrate that the Town's proffered
justification for her termination is merely a pretext for
unlawful gender-based discrimination, Eason points to the events
15 that gave rise to the general animosity she felt from her co
workers as a Clerk II, as well as the following "incidents" that
occurred in the context of her work as a Special Police Officer:
1. The plaintiff was treated with "kid gloves" by her male Field Training Officer and was kept "out of harm's way" during an incident in which they had to draw their weapons.
2. During the "Target Incident," referred to by the defendant, the plaintiff's version of the event was not believed by other male officers who responded to the scene and her suggestions about how to handle the situation were not followed.
3. After the "Target Incident" the plaintiff's version of the event (which included her statement that the motorist's vehicle made contact with her person during the incident) were not believed by Chief of Police Stephen MacKinnon and she was removed from the Special Police Roster and required to undergo stress and anger-management training.
4. Chief MacKinnon never located stress and anger-management training for the plaintiff to attend.
5. Although the plaintiff was authorized to attend Special Police Officer training sessions as well as general meetings of the Special Police Officers, she never received notice of sessions and meetings as was the customary practice.
Plaintiff's memorandum at 3-4 (citations omitted).
16 Even crediting those allegations as true and giving Eason
the benefit of all reasonable inferences that might be drawn from
them, they are insufficient to permit a reasonable fact-finder to
conclude that the Town's proffered justification for terminating
Eason's employment is merely a pretext for unlawful gender-based
discrimination.
With regard to her complaint that her Field Training Officer
treated her with "kid gloves" and tried to keep her "out of
harm's way," Eason testified that she had never observed that
officer interact with a male partner. Consequently, she could
not say whether his conduct was gender based or merely his
customary behavior toward a fellow officer, designed to protect
his partner from harm and offer appropriate support (particularly
when that fellow officer is still undergoing training). See
Eason deposition at 150-51. As to Eason's complaints concerning
the investigation in the wake of the Target incident. Chief
MacKinnon spoke to the responding officers (one of whom flatly
contradicted Eason's claim that she was struck by the vehicle),
reviewed all of the incident reports generated after that
incident, reviewed Eason's own taped transmissions with the
17 dispatch officer, and examined Eason's conduct immediately
following the incident (including, for example, the fact that,
contrary to established protocols governing officers injured on
the job, Eason never submitted any written report concerning a
work-related injury stemming from her claim to have been struck
by the vehicle). See Exhibits 8 and 9 to plaintiff's memorandum.
After conducting that investigation, he concluded that, contrary
to Eason's subsequent representations, she had not been struck by
the vehicle. Based upon the evidence before him, one cannot say
that Chief MacKinnon's conclusion was unreasonable. Even more
importantly, however, there is nothing in the record to suggest
that his conclusion (even if wrong) was the product of any
gender-based discriminatory animus toward Eason.
As to Eason's claims concerning Chief MacKinnon's failure to
locate an anger and/or stress-management course for her, nothing
in the record even remotely suggests that the Chief's proffered
explanation is either false or that he purposefully avoided
finding such programs due to some unlawful bias against Eason.
With regard to Eason's claim that she never received the
"customary" notice of meetings of Special Police Officers, she
18 has failed to provide any evidence that such meetings were ever
conducted during the relevant time frame. Consequently, it is
entirely possible that she received no notice of such meetings
because none ever occurred.
Finally, while the incidents suggestive of an allegedly
hostile work environment relating to Eason's tenure as a Clerk II
might be relevant to her wrongful discharge claim, see, e.g.,
Cummings v. Standard Register Co., 265 F.3d 56, 63-4 (1st Cir.
2001), they are insufficient, even when viewed in light of all
other evidence produced by Eason, to permit a rational trier of
fact to conclude that Eason was discharged from her position as a
Special Police Officer on account of her gender. That evidence
suggests, at most, that there were some personality conflicts
among the women with whom Eason worked (at least some of which
might have been caused by Eason herself); it does not support the
inference that Eason was subjected to any sort of gender-based
bias in the workplace.
In sum, Eason's evidence of unlawful gender-based
discrimination within the Salem Police Department is, at best.
19 sparse and of minimal persuasive value. It is certainly
insufficient to rebut the Town's proffered, non-discriminatory
basis for terminating her employment. Nor does it provide any
basis from which to conclude that the Town's true (undisclosed)
motivation was unlawful, gender-based discrimination.
Conclusion
Even making the doubtful assumption that Eason has met the
minimal requirements necessary to make out a prima facie claim of
unlawful gender-based discrimination, the Town has responded with
a credible, non-discriminatory justification for her termination
that is well supported in the record. In response, Eason has
failed to point to evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the
Town's proffered explanation for her termination is pretextual
and, in fact, designed to disguise its true, unlawful,
discriminatory conduct. Consequently, the Town is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Its motion for summary judgment
(document no. 6) is, therefore, granted. The Clerk of the Court
shall enter judgment in accordance with this order and close the
case.
20 SO ORDERED.
Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge
February 12 ,2002 cc: Thomas J. Gleason, Esq. Diane M . Quinlan, Esq.