Martin v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Ninth Circuit

Martin v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

472 F. App'x 580

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit·Decided March 26, 2012·No. 10-17674·Unpublished·Cited by 23 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

The administrative law judge (ALJ) erred when formulating Martin’s residual functional capacity (RFC) because the RFC neither incorporated Dr. Steiner’s opinion of Martin’s work limitations nor gave specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting it. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir.1996). The limitations assessed by Dr. Steiner were potentially inconsistent with the ALJ’s determination that Martin could engage in “light work.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b); see also SSR 83-10. As a result, the VE’s testimony based on the flawed RFC had no evidentiary value. See Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422-23 (9th Cir.1988). In evaluating Martin’s RFC on remand, the ALJ should address Dr. Steiner’s opinion.

The ALJ did not err in discrediting Martin’s testimony as to the severity of Martin’s pain. The ALJ provided “specific, clear and convincing” reasons and cited multiple portions of the record that were inconsistent with assertions of total disability. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir.1996). These reasons were also germane to discredit the testimony of Martin’s wife, see Valentine v. Comm’r *581 Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir.2009), but because the ALJ did not specifically comment on this testimony, the ALJ should do so on remand.

The district court shall remand this case to the Commissioner for proceedings consistent with this memorandum disposition. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

The administrative law judge (ALJ) erred when formulating Martin’s residual functional capacity (RFC) because the RFC neither incorporated Dr. Steiner’s opinion of Martin’s work limitations nor gave specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting it. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir.1996). The limitations assessed by Dr. Steiner were potentially inconsistent with the ALJ’s determination that Martin could engage in “light work.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b); see also SSR 83-10. As a result, the VE’s testimony based on the flawed RFC had no evidentiary value. See Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422-23 (9th Cir.1988). In evaluating Martin’s RFC on remand, the ALJ should address Dr. Steiner’s opinion.

The ALJ did not err in discrediting Martin’s testimony as to the severity of Martin’s pain. The ALJ provided “specific, clear and convincing” reasons and cited multiple portions of the record that were inconsistent with assertions of total disability. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir.1996). These reasons were also germane to discredit the testimony of Martin’s wife, see Valentine v. Comm’r *581 Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir.2009), but because the ALJ did not specifically comment on this testimony, the ALJ should do so on remand.

The district court shall remand this case to the Commissioner for proceedings consistent with this memorandum disposition. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

Martin v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 472 F. App'x 580 (9th Cir. 2012).

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