Manos v. Melton

100 N.W.2d 235, 358 Mich. 500, 124 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 144, 1960 Mich. LEXIS 519
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 4, 1960
DocketDocket 66, Calendar 47,832
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 100 N.W.2d 235 (Manos v. Melton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Manos v. Melton, 100 N.W.2d 235, 358 Mich. 500, 124 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 144, 1960 Mich. LEXIS 519 (Mich. 1960).

Opinion

Edwards, J.

Plaintiff * in this case filed suit in equity seeking to enjoin his former associate in the-plating business from disclosing to his competitors, what he claimed to be secret processes, in claimed violation of the agreement whereby plaintiff acquired sole control of the business. The circuit judge, sitting in chancery, after hearing the evidence, decided that no obligation of nondisclosure of a secret process had been established, and that no violation of the agreement had been proved. He dismissed plaintiff’s bill of complaint, and plaintiff appeals.

Defendant Melton had been in the hard chrome plating business for some time in a partnership. In June, 1953, plaintiff Manos and defendant formed a corporation under the name of Perfection Industries, Inc. They held or controlled equal portions of the stock.

In 1956 defendant Melton expressed a desire to-get out of the business and go West to engage in ranching. As a result, on September 28, 1956, by-written agreement, plaintiff bought out defendant’s interest in Perfection Industries by purchasing his stock at book value. Plaintiff paid on this basis $13,000 in cash, and gave defendant a company note and mortgage for $9,400. Of this latter, some $5,400 represented the balance of the book value of defendant’s stock, and $4,000 represented repayment of a loan made by defendant to the company for it *503 to purchase stock owned by his (defendant’s) mother.

The agreement made no reference to any secret processes, and there was no consideration paid to ■defendant above book value except as stated in section 6.

In this section, the agreement did include a no-competition clause, phrased as follows:

“6. Melton further agrees that in consideration ■of the purchase of his stock by Manos and in consideration of the assignment and transfer to him "bv the company of a 1954 Buick automobile that he will not engage in a similar or competitive business, ■either directly or indirectly, either as employee^ agestj proprietor, member of a firm or corporation for a period of 4 years from this date in the State of Michigan.”

It is agreed that prior to signing, the words “employee, agent” were stricken from the clause by mutual agreement.

■ Subsequent to the signing of the agreement, there was a claim by defendant Melton of a failure on the part of plaintiff to pay on schedule on the notes, and litigation was initiated in regard thereto by defendant, which litigation was ultimately settled.

Shortly after this event, defendant went to work for a competitor of Perfection Industries, called Precision Hard Chrome Company. Defendant’s arrangement with Precision was for employment for 3 months on chrome plating work, at the rate of $1,000 a month. Defendant actually worked there for 2 months, but was paid the total sum of the $3,000 originally contemplated.

A fair construction of this record seems to us to require the conclusion that during these 3 months he showed Precision certain techniques for “reverse etching” drive shafts, with the ultimate result that Precision subsequently received allocation of such shafts from Vickers, Inc. As a result, Perfection, *504 which had been practically a sole supplier of such work to Vickers, received substantially less work. It is by computing profits, anticipated but not received because of this competition, that plaintiff claims damages in this suit.

Having discovered defendant’s role at Precision, plaintiff Manos filed this suit for injunction and damages on the legal grounds previously stated.

We will discuss the other facts shown by the record as we deal with the questions submitted on plaintiff’s appeal which we believe can be summarized thus:

Did plaintiff prove the existence of a secret process which belonged to plaintiff and to Perfection Industries, and which defendant unlawfully disclosed?

Did defendant’s actions in relation to Precision Hard Chrome Company constitute violation of the stock purchase agreement?

The second of these questions, we find easiest to deal with. The contract as signed specifically deleted the prohibition on defendant becoming an employee or an agent in the plating industry. We find no testimony that persuades us, any more than it did the circuit judge, that his relationship with Precision Hard Chrome Company was such as to constitute a violation of the stock purchase agreement. There is no proof at all that defendant engaged “in a similar or competitive business, either directly or indirectly, either as proprietor, member of a firm or corporation for a period of 4 years from this date in the State of Michigan.”

Further, there is no mention of secret process in the written agreement. Nor is there any testimony from which it could reasonably be implied that the agreement constituted a prohibition on defendant to refrain from demonstrating what he knew about *505 the “reverse etching” process. Like the circuit judge, we find no breach of the contract.

This leaves for our consideration the more difficult problem of whether or not the “reverse etching” process as developed by Manos, Melton, and Perfection Industries was a secret process which belonged to Perfection Industries.

It appears that Vickers had need of a supplier in the plating industry who could achieve a roughened surface for certain axle shafts while holding the shaft to exacting shape and size. Faced with this problem, a representative of Vickers’ research and development division went to Perfection Industries in the first part of 1955 to see if Melton and Manos could suggest a solution.

After some experimentation, they did work out a process which achieved the desired results. The process involved plating the shafts, sandblasting them, and reverse etching them. The latter process appears from this record to be the removal of some of the chrome plating from the part concerned by reversal of the electrolytic process by which the chrome was deposited. The operation also involved masking and waxing portions of the shafts during these processes, and careful control of temperatures and tolerances.

Two facts about the process worked out for the Vickers’ shafts appear undisputed. First, every essential component of the process, including reverse etching, was a well-known technique in the plating industry. Second, it appears that defendant Melton and Manos found a combination of well-known procedures with which they achieved a result which no other plater had achieved profitably in relation to these particular shafts.

Plaintiff Manos described the method and the discovery thus:

*506 “Q. You talk about a high voltage situation. Why is high voltage not considered a normal procedure?

“A. In the first place, ordinary chrome is plated between 4 and 6 volts, and Walt worked in a lot of shops, and he knew more about chrome plating than I did at the time. I kept learning.

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Bluebook (online)
100 N.W.2d 235, 358 Mich. 500, 124 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 144, 1960 Mich. LEXIS 519, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/manos-v-melton-mich-1960.