Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Central Stock Yards Co.

212 U.S. 132, 29 S. Ct. 246, 53 L. Ed. 441, 1909 U.S. LEXIS 1802

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: February 1, 1909
• Docket: 51
• Status: Published

Opinions

Mr. Justice Holmes

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a proceeding in equity prosecuted in the courts of Kentucky, similar in the main to one in the United States courts between the same parties,.that was decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals in 118 Fed. Rep. 113, and by this court in 192 U. S. 568. The latter was brought by the Central Stock Yards Company, a Delaware corporation, against the Railroad Company,., a Kentucky corporation, to compel it to receive live stock tendered to it outside the State of Kentucky for the Central Stock Yards station, and to deliver the same at a point of physical connection between its road and the Southern Railway, for ultimate delivery to or at the Central Stock Yards. The Central Stock Yards station is at the Central Stock Yards, just outside the boundary line of Louisville, Kentucky, on the Southern Railway Company’s line, and by agreement between the two companies the Central Stock Yards were the live stock depot for the purpose of handling live stock to and from Louisville on the Southern Railway. The Louisville and Nashville Railroad, by a similar arrangement, had made the . Bourbon Stock Yards its live stock depot for Louisville, and declined to receive live stock billed to the Central Stock Yards, or to deliver live stock destined to Louisville elsewhere than at the Bourbon Yards. There were physical connections between the Louisville and Nashville and the Southern tracks at a point between the two stock yards which was passed by the greater portion of the live stock carried by the Louisville and Nashville Company, and at another point that would be more convenient for delivery, a little further to the northward. In order to deliver as prayed the Louisville and Nashville would have been compelled either to build chutes or to hand over, its cars to the Southern Railway. The right was' claimed under the Interstate Commerce Act of February 4, 1887, c. 104, § 3,24 Stat. 379, and the constitution of Kentucky, especially § 213, p. 147, Ky. Stats. Carroll, 1903. The Circuit Court of Appeals and this court agreed that the right was not conferred by the former act. As to the constitution of Kentucky, .the Circuit Court of Appeals held that if it could be given any such construction as to make it purport to give the plaintiff a right to the relief sought, it would be making a void attempt to regulate interstate commerce. This court, on the general principle that a construction was to be adopted, if possible, that would save the instrument from constitutional objections, followed the suggestion of the Circuit Court of Appeals, read the section as not requiring the railroad to deliver its own cars, and affirmed a decree dismissing .the bill.

The material sections of the constitution of Kentucky are as follows:

“Sec. 213. All railroad, transfer, belt lines and railway', bridge companies, organized .under the laws of Kentucky, or operating, maintaining or controlling any railroad, transfer, belt lines or bridges,' or doing a railway business in this State, shall receive, transfer, deliver and switch empty or loaded cars, and shall move, transport, receive, load or unload all the freight in ear loads or less quantities, coming to or going from any railroad, transfer, belt line, bridge or siding thenon," with equal promptnéss and despatch, and without any discrimination as to charges, preference, drawback or rebate in favor of any person, corporation, consignee or consignor, in any matter as to payment, transportation, handling or delivery; and shall so receive, deliver, transfer and transport all freight as above set forth, from and to any point where there is a physical connection between the tracks of said companies. But this section shall not be construed as requiring any such common carrier to allow the use of its tracks for the trains of another engaged in like business.

“Sec. 214. No' railway, transfer, belt line or railway bridge company shall make any exclusive or preferential contract or arrangement with any individual, association or corporation, for the receipt, transfer, delivery, transportation, handling, care or custody of any freight, or for the conduct of any business'as a common carrier.”

The present case was begun by the defendant in error earlier than the one just stated, and sought similar relief without regard to the place where the stock was received. A preliminary injunction was issued, and soon led to proceedings for contempt on the charge that it had been disobeyed. The court of first instance held that the injunction applied to an interstate shipment when the owner had sought to bill it to the Southern Railway at Louisville for delivery to the Central Stock Yards and had been refused, and thereafter, at the.break-up yards, so called, of the Louisville and Nashville road, by giving notice to change the destination, had- attempted to bring about the desired result. This decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals, Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Miller, 112 Kentucky, 464, and thereupon the beforementioned bill in the United States court was brought, to deal with interstate shipments, with a prayer, also, that the railroad be required to recognize changes of destination; while the present proceeding was kept on foot to cover all that it lawfully might. At a later date the petition, as it is called, in this case, was amended so as to pray that the plaintiff in error might be required', Upon tender by the Southern Railway, to receive, at a point of physical connection with the Southern Railway, live stock from the Central Stock Yards, and to deliver the same to the consignee at the Bourbon Stock Yards or any depot on its line.

After the decision in the other case the Railroad Company asked leave to plead the decree as a bar tp so much of the relief in the present action as relates to stock shipped or desired to -be shipped from points outside of Kentucky to.points within Kentucky. The trial court, being of opinion that the decree would not be a bar, ■ refused leave, but ordered the proposed amendment to be made part of the record for the purpose of' appeal. After final hearing a judgment was entered for the plaintiff, the defendant in error, granting all the prayers of the bill. The Railroad Company was ordered (1) to receive at its stations in Kentucky, and “ to bill, transport, transfer, switch and deliver in the customary way,” at some point of physical connection with the tracks of the Southern Railway, and particularly at one described, all live stock or other freight consigned to the Central Stock Yards or to persons doing business, there. (2-) It was ordered further, to transfer, switch and deliver to the Southern Railway at the said point of connection, “any and all live stock or other freight coming over its lines in Kentucky consigned” to the Central Stock Yards or persons doing business there. (3) It was ordered further, to receive at the same point and to “transfer, switch, transport and deliver all live stock” consigned to any one at the Bourbon Stock Yards, “the shipment of which originates at the Central Stock Yards;” with proviso requiring pay or tender of proper charges for its services, whenever demanded, at the time such live stock or other freight is offered. (4). Finally the Railroad Company was required, whenever requested by the consignor, consignee, or owner of the stock, “ at any of the stations, and particularly at its break-up yards in. South Louisville, Kentucky,” to recognize their right to change the destination, and upon payment of the full Louisville freight rate and proper presentation of the bill of lading duly indorsed, the railroad was required to change the destination and deliver at a point of connection with the’ Southern Railway tracks for delivery by the latter to the Central Stock Yards. This judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals' whereupon this writ of error was brought. The points relied upon are that due credit was denied to the decree by the United States court; that if the constitution of Kentucky purports to authorize the requirement in the judgment as to delivery of shipments from outside the State, it attempts to regulate commerce among the States; that if the same instrument authorizes the requirement in the judgment that the Railroad Company, should give up possession of its cars -to the Southern Railway Company it attempts to deprive the railroad of its property without due process of law; and that the. same constitutional objection applies to the attempt to make the railroad do switching work over its terminal property in Louisville between two points in the city when the shipment was neither coming into the city nor going out of the city over the lines of the plaintiff in error’s road.

The Court of Appeals found itself unable to pass over the bridge laid by this court in its construction of the state constitution, § 213. It held that that section did purport to require the plaintiff in error to deliver its own cars, under the circumstances of the case, to the extent of the judgment that it affirmed. It declined to follow the decision of this court that for the purposes of the case before it, the two stock yards stood on the same footing as if they were the stations of two railroads placed side by side. It decided that the state.constitution as construed by it did not attempt to regulate commerce among the States, and, no doubt for that reason, disregarded the former decree between the same parties, thinking, we presume, that, as' the former bill dealt only with interstate commerce, the decree could have no binding effect as against a judgment which it •deemed to affect only matters within the control of the State.

We are surprised that the Court of Appeals' should have decided that the judgment appealed from did_not deal with commerce among the States. The portion that we have numbered (2) ordered a delivery to the Southern.Railway of all live stock and freight coming over its lines consigned to the Central Stock Yards, and this includes, of course, that coining from other' States. The same is to be said of the requirement in (4) as to change of destination. When the live stock reached the point of connection or the break-up yards the carriage was not at an end, as appears by the very intent of the judgment, and as was decided in McNeill v. Southern Ry. Co., 202 U. S. 543, 559. Moreover, that decision cited and approved the language of the Circuit Court of Appeals, to which we have referred already, in the case between these parties, to the effect that if the Kentucky constitution could be construed as the state Court of Appeals has construed it, it would be attempting what it could not do. Ibid., 562. We think discussion of this part of the case unnecessary, and we should have to’hold the provision of the state constitution void as applied, if we followed the construction given to it by the state court; but we are relieved of that necessity by the fact that those portions of the judgment of which we are speaking are invalid by reason of the previous adjudication of the United States .court.

As we have indicated, the decree was pleaded as a bar only “to so much of the claim for relief as relates to stock shipped or transported, or desired to be shipped or transported from points outside of Kentucky to points within Kentucky.” It was not argued that a decision that certain words in a constitution have a certain meaning, in a suit founded upon them, is conclusive as between the same parties in another suit upon the same words, for the same purpose, except that one is to enforce them with regard to matters outside the control of the ■State, and the other to enforce them with regard to matters within its control. Therefore we express no opinion upon the point. It was argued, howéver, that the requirement that the plaintiff in error should deliver its own cars to another road was void under the Fourteenth Amendment as an unlawful taking of its property. In view of the well known and necessary prac-. tice of connecting roads, we are far from saying that a valid law could not be passed to prevent the cost and loss of time entailed by needless transshipment or breaking bulk, in .case of an unreasonable refusal by a carrier to interchange cars with another for through traffic. We do not pass upon the question. It is enough to observe that such a law perhaps ought to be so limited as to respect the paramount needs of the carrier concerned, and at least could be sustained only with full and adequate regulations for his protection from the loss or undue detention of cars, and for securing due compensation for their use. The constitution of Kentucky is simply a universal undiscriminating requirement, with no adequate provisions such as we have described. The want cannot be cured by inserting them in judgments under it. The law itself must save the parties’ rights, and not leave them to the discretion of the courts as such. See Security Trust & Safety Vault Co. v. Lexington, 203 U. S. 323, 333; Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398, 409; Connecticut River R. R. Co. v. County Commissioners, 127 Massachusetts, 50, 57; Ash v. Cummings, 50 N. H. 591; Moody v. Jacksonville, Tampa & Key West R. R. Co., 20 Florida, 597; Ex parte Martin, 13 Arkansas, 198; St. Louis v. Hill, 116 Missouri, 527. It follows that the requirement of the state constitution cannot stand alone under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the judgment in this respect also, being based upon it, must fall. We do not mean, however, that the silence of the constitution might not be remedied by an act of legislature or a regulation by a duly authorized subordinate body if such legislation should be held consistent with the state constitution by the state court. We should add that the requirement in the first part of the judgment, which we have been discussing, is open to the objections mentioned in the former decision so far as it practically requires.the Louisville and Nashville Railroad to deliver cars at Louisville elsewhere than at its own terminus. 192 U. S. 570, 571. .

There remains for consideration only the third division of the judgment, which requires the plaintiff in error to receive at the cofmecting point, and to switch, transport and deliver all live stock consigned from the Central Stock Yards to any one at the Bourbon Stock Yards. This also is based upon the sections of the constitution that have been quoted. If the principle is sound, every road into Louisville, by making a physical connection with the Louisville and Nashville, can get the use of.its costly terminals and make it do the switching necessary to that end, upon simply paying for the service of carriage. The duty of a carrier to accept goods tendered at its station does not extend to the acceptance of cars offered to it at an arbitrary point near its terminus by a competing road, for the purpose of reaching and using its terminal station. To require such an acceptance from a railroad is to take its property in a very effective sense, and cannot be justified, unless the railroad' holds that property subject to greater liabilities than those incident to its calling alone. • The Court of Appeals did not put its decision upon any supposed special liability, but upon the broad ground that the state constitution requires it and lawfully may require it of a common carrier by rail. Therefore the judgment must be reversed.

. Judgment reversed.