UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ANA BEATRIZ LOPEZ LIMA, et al.,
Plaintiffs, No. 19-cv-346 (EGS) v.
LONCH, INC. t/a LONCH HOME IMPROVEMENT, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs Ana Beatriz Lopez Lima (“Ms. Lopez Lima”) and
Jorge B. Sanchez Argueta (“Mr. Sanchez Argueta”) bring this
action against Defendants Lonch, Inc., trading as Lonch Home
Improvement (“Lonch”), and Steve John Loney (“Mr. Loney,”
together with Lonch, “Defendants”), under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and the D.C.
Minimum Wage Revision Act (“DCMWRA”), D.C. Code § 32-1001 et
seq. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants failed to pay them for
hours worked in excess of forty hours per week at a rate less
than one and one-half times their regular rate. In their Answer,
Defendants assert two counterclaims for conversion and breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing, alleging that Ms. Lopez
Lima engaged in certain misconduct by, inter alia, misusing
Defendants’ property and falsifying time and attendance records. Pending before the Court is Ms. Lopez Lima’s motion to
dismiss Defendants’ Counterclaims under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1). Upon careful consideration of the motion,
opposition and reply thereto, the applicable law, and the entire
record herein, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over Defendants’ two common-law counterclaims pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1367. Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion
to Dismiss Defendants’ Counterclaims.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
The following facts reflect the allegations in the
Complaint and the Counterclaim. See, e.g., Compl., ECF No. 1 at
1-5; Defs.’ Verified Answer & Countercl. (“Defs.’ Countercl.”),
ECF No. 12 at 1-7. 1 In resolving Ms. Lopez Lima’s motion, the
Court “accept[s] as true all of the factual allegations
contained in the [Counterclaim] and draw[s] all reasonable
inferences in favor of [the counter-claimants].” Dalley v.
Mitchell Rubenstein & Assocs., P.C., 172 F. Supp. 3d 6, 11
(D.D.C. 2016).
At all relevant times, Mr. Loney, a resident of the
District of Columbia (the “District”), owned and operated Lonch.
1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the filed document. 2 Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2 ¶ 4, 3 ¶ 14. Lonch is incorporated in the
District, where its principal place of business is located.
E.g., id. at 2 ¶ 3; Defs.’ Countercl., ECF No. 12 at 1 ¶ 2.
Mr. Sanchez Argueta and Ms. Lopez Lima both reside in Maryland,
and they worked for Lonch as supervisors and laborers. Compl.,
ECF No. 1 at 2 ¶ 1-2. Mr. Sanchez Argueta worked there from
“approximately March 2018 until December 7, 2018,” and his
“regular rate of pay was between $18.75 and $30.00 per hour.”
Id. at 3 ¶ 10. Ms. Lopez Lima alleges that she worked for Lonch
from “approximately 2005 until June 19, 2018,” and her “regular
rate of pay was between $18.75 and $30.00 per hour.” Id. at 3 ¶
9.
According to Defendants, Ms. Lopez Lima performed various
tasks for Lonch as an independent contractor on a temporary
basis between 2005 and 2016, including working on lead abatement
projects and providing administrative services. Defs.’
Countercl., ECF No. 12 at 4 ¶ 1-2. And Ms. Lopez Lima did not
perform any tasks for Lonch in 2017. Id. at 4 ¶ 3. In March
2018, Ms. Lopez Lima worked with Lonch on one lead abatement
project over ten days from 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM, and she had a
lunch break from noon to 1:00 PM each day. Id. at 4 ¶ 4. Again,
in July 2018, Ms. Lopez Lima worked on a lead abatement project
at Lonch for a total of thirteen days from 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM
with a lunch break from noon to 1:00 PM per day. Id. at 4 ¶ 5.
3 From August 2018 to December 2018, Ms. Lopez Lima worked on
different lead abatement projects, and she served as the “charge
person” for Lonch in the absence of the assigned project
manager. Id. at 4-5 ¶ 6.
As a result of Mr. Loney’s illness, Mr. Loney entrusted
Ms. Lopez Lima in September 2018 with “handling business
matters,” including: (1) “managing and tracking employee time
and attendance records”; and (2) “securing and maintaining
equipment and materials required for the projects and contracts
of [Lonch].” Id. at 5 ¶ 7. Between October 1, 2018 and November
23, 2018, Ms. Lopez Lima maintained the time and attendance
records for Lonch’s projects, which included recording and
maintaining those records for herself, Mr. Sanchez Argueta, and
other individuals working on the projects. Id. at 5 ¶ 8.
B. Procedural History
On February 11, 2019, Ms. Lopez Lima and Mr. Sanchez
Argueta filed this action under the FLSA and the DCMWRA,
alleging that “Defendants did not pay [them] one-and-one-half
times (1.5x) their hourly rate for hours worked in excess of 40
during a single work week.” Compl., ECF No. 1 at 3 ¶ 12.
According to Ms. Lopez Lima and Mr. Sanchez Argueta, “Defendants
paid [them] by money order, rather than payroll check” to “hide
the number of hours that [they] worked per week.” Id. at 3 ¶ 13.
Based on Defendants’ alleged failure to make overtime payments
4 to Ms. Lopez Lima and Mr. Sanchez Argueta, id. at 4 ¶ 16, they
assert that Defendants acted in bad faith by willfully and
intentionally failing to compensate them for hours worked in
excess of forty hours per week in violation of the FLSA (“Count
I”) and the DCMWA (“Count II”), id. at 4 ¶¶ 17-23, 5 ¶¶ 24-29.
In response, Defendants filed the Verified Answer and
Counterclaim on April 5, 2019, asserting two common-law
counterclaims against Ms. Lopez Lima. See Defs.’ Countercl., ECF
No. 12 at 4-7 ¶¶ 1-22. First, Defendants allege in support of
their conversion claim—Count I—that Ms. Lopez Lima:
(1) “converted several thousand dollars, if not more, of the
Defendants’ money to herself” and she “never sought consent from
Defendants to convert these funds for her own personal use,” id.
at 5 ¶ 11; (2) “falsely recorded and maintained time and
attendance records not only for herself and [Mr.] Sanchez
Argueta, but for other workers on the projects involving [Lonch]
specifically, by recording days and hours for time they did not
report for and for work they did not perform,” id. at 5-6 ¶ 12;
(3) “took into her own personal possession, removed and/or
discarded materials, equipment and other property of value owned
by the Defendants without knowledge, authorization, permission
or consent of the Defendants and converted [the] same for [her]
own personal enrichment,” id. at 6 ¶ 14; and (4) “specifically
took into her own personal possession, removed and/or discarded
5 employee time and attendance records that were the property of
[Lonch] without knowledge, authorization, permission or consent
of the Defendants,” id. at 6 ¶ 15. Defendants allege that
Ms. Lopez Lima engaged in this conduct between October 1, 2018
and November 23, 2018. Id. at 5-6 ¶¶ 11-12, 14-15.
Next, Defendants assert that Ms. Lopez Lima’s actions
constitute a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
(“Count II”), alleging that “Ms. Lopez Lima was not authorized
to use Defendants’ funds for her own personal use and benefit
nor was she authorized to use Defendants’ property for [her] own
personal use and benefit.” Id. at 7 ¶ 21; see also id. at 6 ¶ 16
(“[Ms.] Lopez Lima engaged in a pattern and practice of using
[Lonch’s] funds, equipment, materials and other property in her
own personal interest and/or to enrich herself.”). Defendants
further allege that they suffered damages as a result of
Ms. Lopez Lima’s breach. Id. at 7 ¶ 22; see also id. at 6 ¶ 17
(“[Ms.] Lopez Lima has failed and refused to return, refund,
reimburse and/or turn over money, equipment, material, employee
time and attendance records and other property of the Defendants
that she converted for her own personal use and/or gain.”).
C. Ms. Lopez Lima’s Motion
On April 10, 2019, Ms. Lopez Lima moved to dismiss both
counterclaims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule
12(b)(1), see generally Pl.’s Mot. to Dismiss Defs.’ Countercl.
6 (“Pl.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 13, arguing that Defendants brought
their counterclaims to “intimidate and retaliate against her
protected rights under the FLSA and the [DCMWRA],” Pl.’s Mem. in
Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. (“Pl.’s Mem.”), ECF No. 13-1 at 2.
Defendants then filed their opposition brief. See generally
Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 15. Thereafter, Ms. Lopez Lima filed her
reply brief. See generally Pl.’s Reply, ECF No. 16. The motion
is ripe and ready for the Court’s adjudication.
II. Legal Standard
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.”
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377
(1994). On a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the party seeking
to invoke a federal court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of
establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.
Wisey’s #£1 LLC v. Nimellis Pizzeria LLC, 952 F. Supp. 2d 184,
188 (D.D.C. 2013). “Because Rule 12(b)(1) concerns a court’s
ability to hear a particular claim, the court must scrutinize
the [party]’s allegations more closely when considering a motion
to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) than it would under a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).” Schmidt v. U.S.
Capitol Police Bd., 826 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65 (D.D.C. 2011). In
accepting as true all of the factual allegations in the
counterclaim and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of
the counterclaimant, the court “may consider materials outside
7 the pleadings in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction.” Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA,
402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
“When a federal court has an independent basis for
exercising federal jurisdiction, it may, in certain
circumstances, also exercise pendent, or supplemental,
jurisdiction over related claims under state law.” Women
Prisoners of D.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 93
F.3d 910, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“A district court’s decision to
resolve state law claims is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.”). A court employs “a two-part test to determine
when the assertion of jurisdiction over a state law claim is
appropriate.” Id. The court first “determine[s] whether the
state and the federal claims ‘derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact’; if they do, the court has the power, under
Article III of the Constitution, to hear the state claim.” Id.
(quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725
(1966)). The court “must then decide whether to exercise its
discretion to assert jurisdiction over the state issue,”
considering factors such as “judicial economy, convenience and
fairness to litigants.” Id. (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726).
“If the court finds the claims do not derive from a common
nucleus of operative fact, it cannot exercise supplemental
jurisdiction and the claims must be dismissed under Rule
8 12(b)(1).” Wisey’s #£1 LLC, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 188.
III. Analysis
Neither party disputes that the Court lacks an independent
basis for subject-matter jurisdiction over Defendants’
counterclaims. See, e.g., Pl.’s Mem., ECF No. 13-1 at 1-2, 7;
Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 1-4. There is no federal question
jurisdiction over Defendants’ common-law counterclaims because
Defendants assert them under District of Columbia law, see 28
U.S.C. § 1331; and there is no diversity jurisdiction because
Defendants fail to plead an amount in controversy that exceeds
$75,000, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Accordingly, the Court may
only exercise supplemental jurisdiction as set forth in
28 U.S.C. § 1367. See City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of
Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 165 (1997) (explaining that Congress
codified the principles for supplemental jurisdiction in
§ 1367). For the reasons explained below, the Court will
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Defendants’ common-law
counterclaims.
A. The Court Has Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Defendants’ Counterclaims
Section 1367(a), in relevant part, provides that in civil
actions in which federal district courts have original
jurisdiction, “the district courts shall have supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims
9 in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form
part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the
United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A federal
district court “may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a [state] claim” on four grounds. Id.
§ 1367(c). First, “the claim raises a novel or complex issue of
State law.” Id. Second, “the claim substantially predominates
over the claim or claims over which the district court has
original jurisdiction.” Id. Third, “the district court has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”
Id. And fourth, “in exceptional circumstances, there are other
compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” Id. 2
In this case, there is no dispute that the Court has
original jurisdiction over this action because the FLSA claim
squarely falls within this Court’s federal question
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2 ¶ 8; Pl.’s Mem.,
ECF No. 13-1 at 2-5; Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 1-4. The
parties, however, dispute whether Ms. Lopez Lima’s FLSA claim
and Defendants’ counterclaims “derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact” such that the Court “would ordinarily be
expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding.” Gibbs, 383
2 For purposes of the supplemental jurisdiction analysis, “the term ‘State’ includes the District of Columbia.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(e). 10 U.S. at 725. “A federal claim and a state law claim form part of
the same Article III case or controversy,” in turn, “if the two
claims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact such that
‘the relationship between [the federal] claim and the state
claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the
[C]ourt comprises but one constitutional case.” Lindsay v. Gov’t
Emps. Ins. Co., 448 F.3d 416, 423–24 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). “[S]tate law claims do
not derive from a common nucleus of operative facts if there is
almost no factual or legal overlap between the state and federal
claims.” Chelsea Condo. Unit Owners Ass’n v. 1815 A St., Condo
Grp., LLC, 468 F. Supp. 2d 136, 141 (D.D.C. 2007).
With these principles in mind, the Court finds that there
is sufficient factual overlap between the FLSA claim and the
common-law counterclaims. Ms. Lopez Lima acknowledges this
overlap between the two sets of claims, stating that:
(1) “Defendants’ counterclaims share only minimal factual
overlap with [her] overtime claims,” Pl.’s Mem., ECF No. 13-1 at
4; and (2) “[a]t best, Defendants’ counterclaims share
background facts with [her] wage claims,” id. at 5. But
Ms. Lopez Lima contends that “Defendants’ allegations [in the
counterclaims] are far afield from the current litigation, which
is squarely focused on the narrow issue of Plaintiffs’ unpaid
overtime.” Id. at 4. Ms. Lopez Lima argues that “Defendants’
11 state law counterclaims do not arise from a common nucleus of
operative facts with [her] FLSA claim.” Id. at 5.
To support her contention, Ms. Lopez Lima relies on cases
in which courts have held that state-law counterclaims do not
share a common nucleus of operative fact with FLSA claims where
the counterclaims arose from either a “close working
relationship” or an “employer-employee relationship.” Id. at 4-5
(citing Molnoski v. Batmasian, 246 F. Supp. 3d 1336, 1338-39
(S.D. Fla. 2017); Williams v. Long, 558 F. Supp. 2d 601, 606 (D.
Md. 2008)). Some “[c]ourts that have so held have recognized
that adjudicating counterclaims filed by an employer in the same
context as a suit seeking unpaid wages may be inconsistent with
the purpose of the FLSA—to assure to the employees of a covered
company a minimum level of wages.” Ayub v. Picco, 293 F. Supp.
3d 215, 216 (D.D.C. 2018) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). That approach, however, is not uniform. See id.; see
also Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 3 (citing cases).
Other courts have held that FLSA claims and state law
claims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. See,
e.g., Jones v. Changsila, 271 F. Supp. 3d 9, 22 (D.D.C. 2017)
(concluding that “the factual bases for [the] FLSA and state law
[tort] claims overlap[ped] in sufficient respects” because
“[b]oth sets of claims concern[ed] the same parties, the same
employment relationship, and the same subject matter—[the
12 plaintiff’s] wages”); Garcia v. Nachon Enters., Inc., No. 15-
23416-CIV, 2016 WL 1077107, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 2016)
(concluding that the FLSA claims and the counterclaims for
breach of fiduciary duty and conversion were “logically related
and stem[med] from the parties’ employer-employee relationship”
where the plaintiff allegedly “clock[ed] into work but then
[left] the store for extended periods of time to handle personal
matters and then submit[ted] fraudulent hours”); Nicholsen v.
Feeding Tree Style, Inc., No. 12 CIV. 6236 JPO, 2014 WL 476355,
at *3-*4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2014) (finding factual overlap
between the “faithless servant counterclaims” and the FLSA
claims where the court would need to determine whether the
plaintiff had stolen a ledger recording employees’ work hours).
Here, the outcome of this case may turn on whether Lonch
maintained accurate payroll records. See 29 U.S.C. § 211(c)
(employer must preserve proper records of hours worked by
employees and wages paid to employees); see also Defs.’ Opp’n,
ECF No. 15 at 3 (“The FLSA requires employers to keep accurate
time and attendance records.”). Ms. Lopez Lima, who claims to be
a former “employee” of Lonch within the meaning of the FLSA, see
Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2 ¶ 6, will bear “the burden of proving
that [she] performed work for which [she] was not properly
compensated,” Akinsinde v. Not-For-Profit Hosp. Corp., No. 16-
CV-00437 (APM), 2018 WL 6251348, at *5 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2018)
13 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “However, this
burden is lessened when . . . the employer has not maintained
proper records of wages and hours.” Id.
Defendants contend that Ms. Lopez Lima took and destroyed
time and attendance records, and those records are “critical to
showing the hours worked by [Ms. Lopez Lima, Mr. Sanchez
Argueta,] and others.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 3. Defendants
claim that Ms. Lopez Lima “acknowledged prior to filing suit
that [she] knowingly and intentionally discarded materials and
time and attendance records that were the property of [Lonch]
and that were, maintained in the ordinary course of business of
[Lonch].” Id. Defendants argue that “[s]aid materials and time
and attendance records are vital and would have served as
evidence showing the exact dates and number of hours worked by
[Ms. Lopez Lima and Mr. Sanchez Argueta],” and that those
records “would have served to dispute the claims of . . . over-
time pay.” Id. And Ms. Lopez Lima notes that Defendants may
argue that she “somehow tampered with Defendants’ records” even
if their counterclaims are dismissed. Pl.’s Reply, ECF No. 16 at
1 n.1.
The Court concludes that at least two issues—(1) whether
Lonch maintained accurate records; and (2) whether Ms. Lopez
Lima took and destroyed those records—illustrate the substantial
factual overlap between the federal overtime claims and the
14 common-law counterclaims. “The existence and accuracy of [the]
records [of hours worked] will be at issue in [this] litigation,
providing an important factual overlap between [Ms. Lopez
Lima’s] original claims and Defendants’ allegations that
[Ms. Lopez Lima] padded [her] hours.” Turban v. Bar Giacosa
Corp., No. 19-CV-1138 (JMF), 2019 WL 3495947, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 1, 2019) (emphasis added). Indeed, Defendants allege that
Ms. Lopez Lima recorded days and hours for certain periods of
time that she and Mr. Sanchez Argueta did not actually work.
Defs.’ Countercl., ECF No. 12 at 6 ¶ 12. Defendants further
allege that other workers, including Plaintiffs, were
compensated for time and work that they did not perform. Id. at
6 ¶ 13; see also Pl.’s Reply, ECF No. 16 at 2 (acknowledging
that “any time and pay records will likely be evidence in
Plaintiffs’ FLSA and [DCMWRA] case”). The Court therefore finds
that the FLSA claim and Defendants’ counterclaims share a common
nucleus of operative fact to support supplemental jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 3
3 Having found that there is factual overlap between the FLSA claim and the counterclaims, the Court need not address whether there is legal overlap because a common nucleus of operative fact exists if there is “factual or legal overlap between the state and federal claims.” Chelsea Condo. Unit Owners Ass’n, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 141. (emphasis added). This Court will not consider Ms. Lopez Lima’s argument that “[t]he elements of [the counterclaims] will not overlap” with her claims because she raised it for the first time in her reply brief. Pl.’s Reply, ECF No. 16 at 2; see also Singletary v. District of Columbia, 15 B. The Court Will Not Decline to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction
The Court next considers whether it should decline
supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
Although the Court has the “power to hear [Defendants’
counterclaims],” the Court is not required to do so. Prakash v.
Am. Univ., 727 F.2d 1174, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Supplemental
jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at
726. As previously stated, the Court may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims based on the
four reasons enumerated in Section 1367(c).
The Court will not decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Defendants’ counterclaims for conversion and
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing for three
reasons: (1) those common-law claims do not raise any novel or
complex issues of state law; (2) the FLSA claims have not been
dismissed; and (3) there are no other compelling reasons to
refuse jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The remaining
issue is whether Defendants’ counterclaims “substantially
predominate[]” over the FLSA action, thereby providing this
Court with a reason not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the counterclaims. Id. § 1367(c)(2).
685 F. Supp. 2d 81, 92 (D.D.C. 2010) (“[C]ourts should decline to consider arguments raised for the first time in reply.”). 16 The Court is not persuaded by Ms. Lopez Lima’s argument
that Defendants’ counterclaims “would predominate over the
discrete issues raised by Plaintiffs’ wage claims.” Pl.’s Mem.,
ECF No. 13-1 at 6. Ms. Lopez Lima contends that “Defendants’
counterclaims raise numerous issues of state law . . . that do
not relate to Plaintiffs’ overtime.” Id. at 6. But Ms. Lopez
Lima fails to specify what those issues are in her memorandum of
law. See id. Accordingly, Ms. Lopez Lima has failed to
demonstrate that Defendants’ allegations—her alleged destruction
of the time and attendance records, falsification of records,
and receipt of payments for work not performed—would
substantially predominate over the FLSA claims. See Beltran v.
Medcure, Inc., No. 6:13-CV-234-ORL-28, 2013 WL 3833208, at *3
(M.D. Fla. July 23, 2013) (finding that supplemental
jurisdiction was proper where “[t]here [was] no showing that the
[conversion] claim for the [plaintiff’s] alleged overpayment
[would] predominate over the FLSA claim”). The Court therefore
finds that Defendants’ counterclaims do not substantially
predominate over the FLSA claims, over which this Court has
original jurisdiction, for purposes of Section 1367(c)(2).
Finally, “the values of judicial economy, convenience,
fairness, and comity” militate in favor of this Court retaining
jurisdiction over all of the claims. Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v.
Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). In response to Defendants’
17 argument that this Court should resolve Plaintiffs’ claims and
Defendants’ counterclaims based on those values, see Defs.’
Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 3-4, Ms. Lopez Lima “fear[s] that
Defendants’ counterclaims would overtake Plaintiffs’ claims and
cloud the process,” Pl.’s Reply, ECF No. 15 at 3. To the
contrary, “any discovery conducted on the [FLSA claims] might
aid a gathering of facts relevant to local-law issues.” Prakash,
727 F.2d at 1183; see also Beltran, 2013 WL 3833208, at *3
(finding that “the traditional rationales (judicial economy,
convenience, fairness to the parties, and whether all the claims
would be expected to be tried together) all favor[ed] retaining
jurisdiction” over a conversion counterclaim and a FLSA claim).
Accordingly, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over Defendants’ counterclaims.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES
Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Counterclaims.
Plaintiff shall file an answer to Defendants’ Counterclaims
within fourteen days of the date of this Memorandum Opinion. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A). A separate Order accompanies this
Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan United States District Judge March 24, 2020