MARTIN, Chief Judge.
Plaintiffs (“plaintiffs-Libertarians”) and intervenors (“intervenors-Greens”) appeal from the trial court’s determination that N.C.G.S. §§ 163-96(a)(l)-(2) and 163-97.1 do not violate Article I, Sections 1, 10, 12, 14, and 19, or Article VI, Sections 1 and 6, of the North Carolina Constitution. For the reasons stated, we affirm.
The parties stipulate to the following facts:
1. Historically states, including North Carolina, have imposed requirements on political parties to gain and retain recognition for their parties and their affiliated candidates.
[325]*3252. To gain recognition in North Carolina, a political party has been required to submit a petition with the signatures of a number of registered voters supporting the recognition of that party; once a party has obtained recognition as a political party, its candidates have been listed on ballots throughout North Carolina.
3. From 1935 through 1981, the North Carolina signature requirement was 10,000 registered voters. North Carolina Code of 1935 § 5913.
8. In 1983, the General Assembly increased the number of registered voter signatures required for recognition of a new political party ... to two percent of the number who voted in the last gubernatorial election. 1983 Sess. Laws C. 576, § 1. Parties who are seeking recognition as political parties in North Carolina may begin gathering these signatures as soon as the gubernatorial election is over.
9. For the 2008 election, a party must submit 69,734 signatures from registered voters in order to gain recognition as a political party pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 163-96. These signatures must be submitted to the State Board of Elections by the first day of June.
11. In order to retain recognition, a political party has historically been required to receive a threshold percentage of the votes cast statewide in the most recent gubernatorial or presidential election.
12. From 1935 to 1949, the ballot retention requirement was 3% of the statewide vote. North Carolina Code of 1935 § 5913.
13. In 1948, the States Right Party polled 8.8% of the vote.
14. In the next legislative session, the General Assembly raised the ballot retention requirement to 10% of the statewide vote.
15. Only one party other than the Democratic or Republican Party, the American Party in 1968, has ever met the 10% requirement. The Democratic and Republican Parties are the only two political parties to maintain continuous recognition since the enactment of N.C.G.S..§§ 163-96 and -97.
[326]*32616. Effective January 1, 2007, after the filing of this action on September 21, 2005, the General Assembly amended N.C.G.S. § 163-96 to lower the retention requirement to 2%. 2006 Sess. Laws C. 234, §§ 1 and 2.
17. Once a political party is officially recognized, under § 163-96 its cándidate must receive at least 2% of the statewide vote ' for governor or president for the party to remain officially recognized and for its candidates to be listed on the ballot for any office anywhere in the state. Thus, even if candidates of the party receive more than two percent of the vote in a particular city or county, they cannot be listed on the ballot and their party identified in ballots in that community if the party did not receive two percent of the vote statewide.
38. Persons desiring to get on the ballot in North Carolina can also qualify as unaffiliated candidates pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 163-122 and as write-in candidates pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 163-123, though in neither circumstance will the candidate’s political party appear with a party label. N.C.G.S. § 163-122 requires unaffiliated candidates for statewide office to submit signatures of registered voters equal to two percent of the voters who voted in the most recent gubernatorial election; for district or local offices, signatures equal to four percent of the registered voters in that district or locality must be submitted. N.C.G.S. § 163-123 requires write-in candidates for statewide office to submit 500 signatures of registered voters.
The parties further stipulate that the Libertarian Party of North Carolina has been in continuous existence since 1976, and has achieved recognition as a political party in North Carolina in most recent elections through the petition process set forth in N.C.G.S. § 163-96(a)(2). On the other hand, members of the North Carolina Green Party “have never met the state’s petition requirements; have never gained recognition as a political party pursuant to [N.C.G.S.] § 163-96; and consequently, have never received the benefits of party recognition, including the right to run as candidates for public office under the Green Party label.”
On 21 September 2005, plaintiffs-Libertarians filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to declare “the state statutes governing the recognition of political parties” in violation of several provisions of [327]*327the North Carolina Constitution. On 7 April 2006, intervenors-Greens filed a motion to intervene, which the trial court granted. On 26 February 2007, with the consent of defendants, plaintiffs-Libertarians and intervenors-Greens jointly filed a Second Amended Complaint asking the trial court to declare “the state statutes governing the recognition of political parties” in violation of the North Carolina Constitution under Article I, Sections 1, 10, 12, 14, and 19, and Article VI, Sections 1 and 6. Defendants filed their Answer to the Second Amended Complaint on 28 March 2007. Defendants moved the trial court to dismiss the action pursuant to North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and plaintiffs-Libertarians and intervenorsGreens filed a motion seeking summary judgment. The trial court denied both motions.
After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, the Wake County Superior Court concluded that plaintiffs-Libertarians and intervenors-Greens failed to overcome the presumption that the challenged statutes are constitutional, and further concluded that N.C.G.S. §§ 163-96(a)(1)-(2) and 163-97.1 do not violate Article I, Sections 1, 10, 12, 14 and 19, or Article VI, Sections 1 and 6, of the North Carolina Constitution. Accordingly, on 27 May 2008, the trial court entered judgment in favor of defendants. On 10 June 2008, plaintiffs-Libertarians and intervenors-Greens gave timely notice of appeal to this Court from the trial court’s order.
Defendants first raise the question of whether plaintiffs-Libertarians’ appeal is moot because defendants claim that “any decision of this Court cannot have a practical effect on [plaintiffs-Libertarians’] status as a recognized political party.” “[A] declaratory judgment should issue (1) when [it] will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations at issue, and (2) when it will terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity and controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” Augur v. Augur, 356 N.C. 582, 588, 573 S.E.2d 125, 130 (2002) (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). When, during the course of litigation, “ ‘it develops that the relief sought has been granted or that the questions originally in controversy between the parties are no longer at issue, the case should be dismissed, for courts will not entertain or proceed with a cause merely to determine abstract propositions of law.’ ” Pearson v. Martin, 319 N.C. 449, 451, 355 S.E.2d 496, 497 (quoting In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 147-48, 250 S.E.2d 890, 912 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929, 61 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1979)), reh’g denied, 319 [328]*328N.C. 678, 356 S.E.2d 789 (1987); see also Morris v. Morris, 245 N.C. 30, 36, 95 S.E.2d 110, 114 (1956) (“[A] moot question is not within the scope of our Declaratory Judgment Act.”). Nevertheless, when “(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again,” a case may be excepted from the mootness doctrine as being “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” See Crumpler v. Thornburg, 92 N.C. App. 719, 723, 375 S.E.2d 708, 711 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), disc. review denied, 324 N.C. 543, 380 S.E.2d 770 (1989).
As we mentioned above, the only method by which the Libertarian Party has qualified to be recognized as a political party for candidates appearing on a North Carolina ballot in elections through 2008 has been by satisfying the 2% petition requirement set forth in N.C.G.S. § 163-96(a)(2). N.C.G.S. § 163-96(a)(2) provides:
[A political party within the meaning of the election laws of this State is a]ny group of voters which shall have filed with the State Board of Elections petitions for the formulation of a new political party which are signed by registered and qualified voters in this State equal in number to two percent (2%) of the total number of voters who voted in the most recent general election for Governor. Also the petition must be signed by at least 200 registered voters from each of four congressional districts in North Carolina. To be effective, the petitioners must file their petitions with the State Board of Elections before 12:00 noon on the first day of June preceding the day on which is to be held the first general State election in which the new political party desires to participate. The State Board of Elections shall forthwith determine the sufficiency of petitions filed with it and shall immediately communicate its determination to the State chairman of the proposed new political party.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-96(a)(2) (2007). Once a political party is recognized, it can retain its recognition only if, “at the last preceding general State election, [that political party] polled for its candidate for Governor, or for presidential electors, at least two percent (2%) of the entire vote cast in the State for Governor or for presidential electors.” See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-96(a)(1) (2007). In the event that a recognized political party is unable to satisfy the 2% retention requirement set forth in N.C.G.S. § 163-96(a)(1), the political party “shall cease to [329]*329be a political party within the meaning of the primary and general election laws” of Chapter 163 of the General Statutes. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-97 (2007). Thus, in order to be recognized as a political party, that group of voters must once again satisfy the 2% petition requirement set forth in N.C.G.S. § 163-96(a)(2).
In the present case, after failing to garner sufficient votes to retain its recognition following the 2004 general election — in which “the Libertarian Party candidate for Governor received 52,513 votes (1.5% of the total votes cast) and the Libertarian Party candidate for President received 11,731 (0.5% of the total votes cast)” — the Libertarian Party was de-certified by the State Board of Elections on 27 August 2005. However, following its de-certification, “five people collected more than 85,000 signatures for the Libertarian Party.” As a result, “the Libertarian Party succeeded, following trial, in obtaining recognition as a political party for the 2008 election” in accordance with the 2% petition requirement of N.C.G.S. § 163-96(a)(2). Moreover, because the Libertarian Party’s 2008 candidate for governor garnered over 2% of the statewide vote for that office in the 2008 election, the Libertarian Party generated sufficient votes to retain recognition as a political party through the next gubernatorial and presidential elections in 2012, in accordance with the 2% retention requirement of N.C.G.S. § 163-96(a)(1). It is because of this success in retaining its recognition as a political party until 2012 that defendants claim plaintiffs-Libertarians’ appeal is moot.
Nevertheless, the Libertarian Party’s current status as a recognized political party through the 2012 general election does not exempt it from its obligation to continue to satisfy the requirement of N.C.G.S. § 163-96(a)(1) in order to retain its recognition, or from its obligation to satisfy the 2% petition requirement of N.C.G.S. § 163-96(a)(2) in the event that it is unable to retain its recognition as a political party. Additionally, in the event that the Libertarian Party is required to satisfy the 2% petition requirement set forth in subsection (a)(2) but fails to do so by the June preceding the “first general State election in which the new political party desires to participate,” see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-96(a)(2), the five or six months during which plaintiffs-Libertarians could bring a similar action challenging the constitutionality of the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 163-96(a)(1) and (2) would be too short to allow the matter to be fully litigated prior to the next election. Therefore, we hold that plaintiffs-Libertarians’ appeal is not moot.
[330]*330Plaintiffs-Libertarians and intervenors-Greens assign as error the trial court’s Conclusion of Law 17, in which the court concluded “[n]either the 2% retention requirement contained in [N.C.G.S.] § 163-96(a)(1) nor the 2% signature requirement contained in [N.C.G.S.] § 163-96(a)(2) violate Article I, §§ 1, 10, 12, 14 and 19, or Article VI, §§ 1 or 6, of the North Carolina Constitution.” Appellants also assign as error the court’s Conclusion of Law 18, in which the court concluded “[t]he provisions of [N.C.G.S.] § 163-97.1 do not violate Article I, §§ 1, 10, 12, 14 and 19, or Article VI, §§ 1 or 6, of the North Carolina Constitution.” However, in their brief, with the exception of citing the constitutional provisions themselves, plaintiffs-Libertarians and intervenors-Greens have failed to advance an argument or cite relevant authority in support of their assertion that the statutes at issue implicate Article I, Sections 1 and 10, or Article VI, Sections 1 and 6, of the North Carolina Constitution. Additionally, plaintiffs fail to provide argument in support of their assignments of error which assert that N.C.G.S. §§ 163-96(a)(1) and 163-97.1 are unconstitutional under any of the aforementioned constitutional provisions. Therefore, since “[assignments of error not set out in the appellant[s’] brief, or in support of which no reason or argument is stated or authority cited, will be taken as abandoned,” see N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2009) (amended Oct. 1, 2009), we consider only whether N.C.G.S. § 163-96(a)(2) is violative of Article I, Sections 12 or 14, or of the “law of the land” clause of Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution.
Because the North Carolina Constitution “is a restriction of powers, and those powers not surrendered are reserved to the people to be exercised by their representatives in the General Assembly, so long as an act is not forbidden, the wisdom and expediency of the enactment is a legislative, not a judicial, decision.” Guilford Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Guilford Cty. Bd. of Elections, 110 N.C. App. 506, 510, 430 S.E.2d 681, 684 (1993) (citing Wayne Cty. Citizens Ass’n v. Wayne Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 328 N.C. 24, 29, 399 S.E.2d 311, 315 (1991)). “Therefore, the judicial duty of passing upon the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly is one of great gravity and delicacy. This Court presumes that any act promulgated by the General Assembly is constitutional and resolves all doubt in favor of its constitutionality.” Id. at 511, 430 S.E.2d at 684. “In challenging the constitutionality of a statute, the burden of proof is on the challenger, and the statute must be upheld unless its unconstitutionality clearly positively and unmistakably appears beyond a reasonable doubt or it cannot be upheld on any reasonable ground.” Id.
[331]*331“Only [our Supreme] Court may authoritatively construe the Constitution and laws of North Carolina with finality.” Lea Co. v. N. C. Bd. of Transp., 308 N.C. 603, 610, 304 S.E.2d 164, 170 (1983). Accordingly, “it must be remembered that in construing and applying our laws and the Constitution of North Carolina,” neither this Court nor our Supreme Court is “bound by the decisions of federal courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, although in our discretion we may conclude that the reasoning of such decisions is persuasive.” See State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 449-50, 385 S.E.2d 473, 479 (1989). “[W]e have the authority to construe our own' constitution differently from the construction by the United States Supreme Court of the Federal Constitution, as long as our citizens are thereby accorded no lesser rights than they are guaranteed by the parallel federal provision.” State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 713, 370 S.E.2d 553, 555 (1988). For all “practical purposes, therefore, the only significant issue for this Court when interpreting a provision of our state Constitution paralleling a provision of the United States Constitution will always be whether the state Constitution guarantees additional rights to the citizen above and beyond those guaranteed by the parallel federal provision.” State v. Jackson, 348 N.C. 644, 648, 503 S.E.2d 101, 103 (1998).
Federal courts have recognized that, “[a]s a rule, state laws, that restrict a political party’s access to the ballot always implicate substantial voting, associational and expressive rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” McLaughlin v. N.C. Bd. of Elections, 65 F.3d 1215, 1221 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1104, 134 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1996); see also Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 193, 93 L. Ed. 2d 499, 504 (1986) (“Restrictions upon the access of political parties to the ballot impinge upon the rights of individuals to associate for political purposes, as well as the rights of qualified voters to cast their votes effectively, and may not survive scrutiny under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” (citation omitted)). “That is because ‘it is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech,’ ” McLaughlin, 65 F.3d at 1221 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787, 75 L. Ed. 2d 547, 556 (1983)), and “because ‘[t]he right to form a party for the advancement of political goals means little if a party can be kept off the election ballot and thus denied an equal opportunity to win votes.’ ” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31, 21 L. Ed. 2d 24, [332]*33231 (1968); citing Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288, 116 L. Ed. 2d 711, 722-23 (1992); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214, 93 L. Ed. 2d 514, 523 (1986)).
As we acknowledged above, we cannot construe the provisions of the North Carolina Constitution to accord the citizens of North Carolina any lesser rights than those which they are guaranteed by parallel federal provisions in the federal Constitution. See Carter, 322 N.C. at 713, 370 S.E.2d at 555. Therefore, we conclude that the challenged statute, which has been held to implicate fundamental rights protected by parallel provisions in the federal Constitution, see McLaughlin, 65 F.3d at 1221, also implicates the fundamental associational and expressive rights protected by Article I, Sections 12 and 14 of our Constitution, as well as by the “law of the land” clause of Article I, Section 19. See N.C. Const. art. I, § 12 (“The people have a right to assemble together to consult for their common good, to instruct their representatives, and to apply to the General Assembly for redress of grievances . . . .”); N.C. Const. art. I, § 14 (“Freedom of speech and of the press are two of the great bulwarks of liberty and therefore shall never be restrained .. ..”); N.C. Const. art. I, § 19 (“No person shall be ... in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land.”); see also Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow Cty., 94 N.C. App. 453, 462-63, 380 S.E.2d 602, 607 (1989) (“Our Supreme Court has held that the term ‘law of the land,’ as used in Article 1, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution, is synonymous with ‘due process of law’ as that term is applied under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
“[A] law which burdens certain explicit or implied fundamental rights must be strictly scrutinized. It may be justified only by a compelling state interest, and must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate interests at stake.” Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow Cty. (Treants 86), 83 N.C. App. 345, 351, 350 S.E.2d 365, 369 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted), disc. review denied, 319 N.C. 411, 354 S.E.2d 730, aff'd, 320 N.C. 776, 360 S.E.2d 783 (1987).
The United States Supreme Court has continuously held that “[t]here is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political organization’s candidate on the ballot — the interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception, and even frustration of the democratic process at the general election.” Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442, 29 L. Ed. 2d-554, 562-63 (1971); see also [333]*333Munro, 479 U.S. at 194, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 505 (“States have an undoubted right to require candidates to make a preliminary showing of substantial support in order to qualify for a place on the ballot.... We reaffirm that principle today.” (omission in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, the Supreme Court has “never required a State to make a particularized showing of the existence of voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, or the presence of frivolous candidacies prior to the imposition of reasonable restrictions on ballot access.” Munro, 479 U.S. at 194-95, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 505. The Court determined that such a requirement “would necessitate that a State’s political system sustain some level of damage before the legislature could take corrective action.” Id at 195, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 506. Instead, the Court concluded, “Legislatures, we think, should be permitted to respond to potential deficiencies in the electoral process with foresight rather than reactively, provided that the response is reasonable and does not significantly impinge on constitutionally protected rights.” Id. at 195-96, 93 L. Ed. 2d 506. In the present case, we see no reason to determine that the State of North Carolina has any less of a compelling interest in regulating the administration of its elections under the North Carolina Constitution than do all states in regulating the administration of elections under the federal Constitution.
Accordingly, we are left only to determine whether the 2% petition requirement set forth in N.C.G.S. § 163-96(a)(2) is “narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate interests at stake.” See Treants 86, 83 N.C. App. at 351, 350 S.E.2d at 369.
Plaintiffs-Libertarians and intervenors-Greens contend N.C.G.S. § 163-96(a)(2) is not the “least restrictive” means to serve the State’s interest because it is “undisputed” that North Carolina had “no substantial problems with its ballots” when the statutory requirement for the creation of a political party was limited to 10,000 signatures between 1929 and 1981, and that, when North Carolina required only 5,000 signatures for ballot access in 1982, there were only four political parties that qualified for recognition on the ballot. We recognize that the General Assembly’s former requirement that a group of voters collect the signatures of 10,000 registered voters is a considerably lower threshold than the State’s current 2% petition requirement. Nevertheless, we cannot agree with appellants’ assertion that, therefore, the State’s current 2% petition requirement is not narrowly tailored to meet the State’s compelling interest to ensure that, before a group is recognized by the State’s election laws, a political party must [334]*334have some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support among the current voting population of North Carolina.
When the Fourth Circuit considered the constitutionality of North Carolina’s ballot access scheme under the federal Constitution, it determined that, “[w]hile all states condition ballot access on a showing of some preliminary [significant] modicum of support, it is beyond judicial competence to identify, as an objective and abstract matter, the precise numbers and percentages that would constitute the least restrictive means to advance the state’s avowed and compelling interests.” McLaughlin, 65 F.3d at 1222 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. (stating that “[t]his inquiry brings us into hazardous terrain”). For this reason, the Fourth Circuit adopted the approach taken by the Supreme Court in its review of such cases, and stated that “ballot access restrictions must be assessed as a complex whole[, whereby] ... a reviewing court must determine whether ‘the totality of the [state’s] restrictive laws taken as a whole imposes a[n unconstitutional] burden on voting and associational rights.’ ” McLaughlin, 65 F.3d at 1223 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Williams, 393 U.S. at 34, 21 L. Ed. 2d at 33).
Under North Carolina’s 2% petition requirement, voters who sign any such petition are not required to join or support the party if it is recognized, nor are voters required to vote for the candidates of said party in the event that the party is recognized on the ballot. Additionally, a group has more than three-and-a-half years to gather signatures for their petition — from the time one gubernatorial election ends until the June preceding the next gubernatorial election. Cf. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 433, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 557-58 (upholding as constitutional a Georgia ballot access statutory scheme which provided that a political party could be recognized upon the filing of a petition bearing the signature of registered voters “of not less than five percent [(5%)] of the total number of electors eligible to vote in the last election for the filling of the office the candidate is seeking” and allowing the total time for circulating the petition of only 180 days).
We acknowledge, however, as did the Fourth Circuit in McLaughlin, that “[b]y directing that a political party cannot run a candidate for election to any office in the state unless it garners the petition support of 2% of the electorate,” “the Libertarian Party (and potentially any other small party) has been forced to expend great effort to obtain statewide and local ballot access before each gubernatorial and presidential election only to lose that access -in to to immediately thereafter.” See McLaughlin, 65 F.3d at 1224. Neverthe[335]*335less, the Fourth Circuit ultimately upheld North Carolina’s statewide .recognition and retention requirements for political parties — which were then 2% and 10%, respectively — as constitutional under the Supreme Court’s decision in American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 39 L. Ed. 2d 744, reh’g denied, 416 U.S. 1000, 40 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1974). See McLaughlin, 65 F.3d at 1225 (stating that, in American Party, the ballot access scheme in Texas — like the one in North Carolina — .“did not provide a separate avenue for small parties to run candidates for local elections”); see also id. at 1225 n.11 (noting that “the Texas and North' Carolina [ballot access laws] are indistinguishable” with regard to their respective reliance on “statewide, rather than more localized, voting figures as the benchmark for determining whether a party has a sufficient modicum of voter support”).
While we agree with the Fourth Circuit’s assessment that, under North Carolina’s ballot access scheme, “the [S]tate inevitably burdens the associational rights of members of... small parties as well as the informational interests of all voters regardless of their party affiliation,” see McLaughlin, 65 F.3d at 1225, we also agree with the Supreme Court that “associational rights” are “not absolute arid are necessarily subject to qualification if elections are to be run fairly and effectively.” See Munro, 479 U.S. at 193, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 504. As we recognized above, “[t]he legislative department is the judge, within reasonable limits, of what the public welfare requires, and the wisdom of its enactments is not the concern of the courts.” State v. Warren, 252 N.C. 690, 696, 114 S.E.2d 660, 666 (1960). “As to whether an act is good or bad law, wise or unwise, is a question for the Legislature and not for the courts — it is a political question.” Id. Because we conclude that a'legislative enactment “must be upheld unless its unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears beyond a reasonable doubt or it cannot be upheld on any reasonable ground,” see Guilford Cty. Bd. of Educ., 110 N.C. App. at 511, 430 S.E.2d at 684, we hold that the trial court did not err when it concluded that N.C.G.S. § 163-96(a)(2) was not violative of Article I, Sections 12 or 14, or of the “law of the land” clause of Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution.
Affirmed.
Judge STEELMAN concurs.
Judge CALABRIA concurs in part and dissents in part.