LaBarge v. Zebco

1988 OK 147, 769 P.2d 125, 1988 Okla. LEXIS 170, 1988 WL 139876
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedDecember 20, 1988
Docket68221
StatusPublished
Cited by33 cases

This text of 1988 OK 147 (LaBarge v. Zebco) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
LaBarge v. Zebco, 1988 OK 147, 769 P.2d 125, 1988 Okla. LEXIS 170, 1988 WL 139876 (Okla. 1988).

Opinions

KAUGER, Justice.

The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the medical evidence submitted by the respondent, Zebco (employer), complied with the A.M.A. Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment pursuant to 85 O.S.Supp.1987 Ch. 4, App., Rule 20.1 We find that the medical report was not competent evidence because it did not comply with Rule 20, and that it could not be used as a basis for the trial court’s decision.

On March 16, 1985, petitioner, Alice La-Barge (employee), was injured while operating a forklift for her employer. Dr. L. performed surgery for two ruptured discs caused by the accident. The employee filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits claiming injuries to the left knee, left leg, left hip and back. She received temporary total disability payments until August 27, 1985, when the parties mutually agreed to terminate the payments. On April 10, 1986, the employee filed for continuing medical treatment and permanent disability attaching a medical report from Dr. K. which concluded that the employee had suffered 40% disability to the whole body. On August 29, 1986, the employee amended her petition to add the issue of psychological overlay resulting from the accident.

At the trial on September 8, 1986, the employee objected to the competency of Dr. L.’s medical report submitted by the employer because it failed to follow the percentages of disability delineated in the AMA Guides. The Guides provide that each operated disc must be accorded a minimum of 5% impairment.2 Although Dr. L. [127]*127performed the operation which involved two of the employee's discs he rated the employee as having 5% impairment to the whole body. Over the employee’s objection Dr. L’s medical report was admitted into evidence. The trial court found that: (1) the employee had sustained an accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment; (2) the employee had sustained 12% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole as a result of the injury to the back; (3) the employee did not sustain permanent partial disability to the left hip, left leg or left knee, and; (4) it reserved the issue of psychological overlay for further hearing. The employee appealed the order to the Review Panel. The Review Panel found that the order of the trial court was neither contrary to law nor against the clear weight of the evidence. The trial court was affirmed, and the employee appealed.

The employee contends that a medical report which does not rate the employee’s impairment according to the A.M.A. Guides, and which does not explain any deviation from those Guides, is not competent evidence. We agree. Medical reports must comply with the A.M.A. Guides as provided by the legislature in Rule 20.3

Here, Dr. L.’s report consists of four letters and a discharge report. Three of the letters are neither signed nor verified. One letter has the physician’s signature. However, it contains an unsigned verification statement rubber stamped at the bottom. The discharge report is signed, but it does not contain a verification statement. The unverified discharge summary and the three letters cannot be melded into a medical report which is in substantial compliance with Rule 20. Only one of the letters can be considered as the medical report, because Rule 20 requires the report to be signed by the physician and contain a verification statement. The signed letter is facially flawed and fails to comply with Rule 20 because:

1) It does not contain a history of the claimant as required by Rule 20(a).
2) It does not contain any description or findings of diagnostic tests conducted to determine disability as required by Rule 20(c).
3) It does not contain the date of injury, and whether the injury was job-related as required by Rule 20(d).
4) It does not discuss physical rehabilitative procedures rendered or recommended as required by Rule 20(f).
5) It does not provide the period during which the claimant was temporarily and totally disabled and date of termination as required by Rule 20(g). (The employee did receive temporary total disability payments.)
6) It does not contain a basis for his determination that the employee is 5% disabled as'required by Rule 20(i).
7) The letter states that it is in accordance with the A.M.A. Guides. However, the doctor rates the employee’s disability as 5% to the whole body when the A.M. A. Guides provide that each operated disc constitutes 5% disability to the body as a whole. This doctor operated on two of the employee's discs which under the A.M.A. Guides would be a 10% disability to the whole body. It is apparent from this alone, the doctor did not use the percentages in the A.M.A. Guides as required by Rule 20(i).

We held in Perlinger v. J.C. Rogers Constr. Co., 753 P.2d 905, 907 (Okla.1988), that medical evidence supplied by a written medical report must be in substantial compliance with Rule 20. Evidence which is not in substantial compliance with Rule 20 is not competent evidence upon which the trial court can base its conclusions.4 Dr. L.’s letter was incompetent evidence and it could not be used by the trial court. On [128]*128the other hand, with the exception of the date of termination of the temporary total disability benefits, Dr. K.’s report is a textbook example of a competent medical report in absolute compliance with Rule 20.

In Special Indemnity Fund v. Stockton, 653 P.2d 194 (Okla.1982), the cause was remanded to the trial court for a determination because none of the medical reports complied with Rule 20. Dr. K.’s report is' the only competent evidence submitted as proof of the employee’s disability.5 The Perlinger teaching is that when only one medical report, which constitutes competent evidence, is uncontroverted by opposing competent evidence, it may become unnecessary for the trial court to made an independent diagnosis of the employee’s condition. Here, Perlinger controls because there is a total failure of proof by the employer. We recognize that the decision to remand such cases must be made on a case by case basis because not every case will be so facially flawed or so completely lacking in probative evidence.

The issue of permanent disability is one of science, and it must be proven by medical expert testimony. When, as here, a party essentially offers no evidence to establish a defense, there is a failure of proof. The legislature in Rule 20, has made an accomodation for doctors to provide a medical report rather than appear at trial to avoid professional inconvenience. Even though the proceedings are informal, these unsigned letters do not pass muster. Precious judicial resources must not be frittered away in a “game of overs” by either the employer or the employee. The employer has had its day in court to establish its defense on a time and materials basis. It is elementary that where there is a failure of proof there can be no judgment in that party’s favor.6

Pursuant to Parks v. Norman Municipal Hospital, 684 P.2d 548, 552 (Okla.1984), this Court must reverse a trial tribunal’s decision unsupported by any competent evidence. The only competent evidence was Dr. K.’s report finding 40% disability to the whole body.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1988 OK 147, 769 P.2d 125, 1988 Okla. LEXIS 170, 1988 WL 139876, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/labarge-v-zebco-okla-1988.