Keener v. United States

165 Ct. Cl. 334, 1964 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 79, 1964 WL 8585
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedApril 17, 1964
DocketNo. 198-60
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 165 Ct. Cl. 334 (Keener v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Keener v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 334, 1964 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 79, 1964 WL 8585 (cc 1964).

Opinion

Davis, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

John R. Keener is a career government employee who first entered the federal service in 1937 as an Assistant National Bank Examiner in the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. There he stayed until the advent of World War II when, in 1942, he joined the Navy as a lieutenant. After he was honorably discharged into the Naval Reserve in 1946, he took private employment, first as assistant vice president of a bank in Illinois and, later, as vice president of a bank in Indiana. In September 1949, he re-entered the federal service as Special Assistant, Loans and Finance, Navy Department. In 1956 came his employment as a loan officer with the Small Business Administration (SBA), a GS-15 excepted Schedule A position. He advanced to membership [336]*336on the Loan Review Board of the SBA, a GrS-16 excepted Schedule A position, and became chairman of that body. On September 1,1957, he was again promoted in the SBA to Director of the Office of Financial Assistance, an excepted Schedule C position1 in grade GS-18, with a salary of $17,-500 per year.

As Director, plaintiff was responsible for administering the SBA’s financial assistance programs. His authority was delegated from his immediate superior, the Deputy Administrator (then Albert C. Kelly), who, in turn, received his powers from SBA Administrator Wendell B. Barnes. It was Mr. Kelly who recommended plaintiff for the position of Director; at that time, Mr. Kelly thought well of Mr. Keener’s abilities and qualifications; he considered plaintiff a valuable employee of the SBA and the two had a congenial personal relationship, professionally and socially. This good feeling, however, did not last long after Mr. Keener was promoted to Director. In the late summer (or early fall) of 1958 plaintiff became troubled by some of Mr. Kelly’s actions which plaintiff believed to be unjustified “meddling” into the affairs of his office. Orders were issued to, and there was consultation with, some of Mr. Keener’s subordinates without his knowledge; certain mail was rerouted around him ; two of his staff, whose transfer he was considering, were summarily transferred by Mr. Kelly (who wanted speedier action); plaintiff was sent on a trip to field offices with little prior notice. The once pleasant relationship between plaintiff and Mr. Kelly became quite strained.

On September 18, 1958, the SBA Administrator, Mr. Barnes, conferred with plaintiff and told him that, unless the difficulty with Mr. Kelly came to an end, plaintiff “would have to go.” The next day, plaintiff and Mr. Kelly discussed the problem and the subject of plaintiff’s resignation arose (though it is not clear who brought up the matter). There was no resolution of the problem, but plaintiff began to believe that his position was in jeopardy. In October 1958, his name was removed from a list of speakers to and participants in the Regional Directors Conference of SBA; also, during [337]*337October and November, he was not invited to be present at area conferences of SBA Financial Chiefs, a type of meeting he had customarily attended in the past.

Administrator Barnes, Deputy Administrator Kelly and plaintiff held a meeting on November 20, 1958, at which the latter was told that there would be a reorganization of the Office of Financial Assistance which entailed the abolishment of plaintiff’s grade 18 position. The Administrator had decided to divide the functions of the Office into a Loan Processing Section and a Loan Administration Section, with a grade 17 Director to head each part. This change was explained as necessary because of the alarmingly high rate of loan delinquencies. The loan administration function, as distinguished from the making of loans, had been given little emphasis at the SBA and it was thought that the proposed reorganization would improve the delinquency record. Mr. Keener took the reorganization to be, in reality, a means of firing him. Mr. Barnes denied that such was the case and stated that there would be other positions available within the agency and that, if plaintiff would be embarrassed in taking a reduction in grade, the Administrator would help him find a job elsewhere in government work or in the private area.

The next day, plaintiff received a letter from the Administrator stating that he, Mr. Barnes, had determined after “a careful study” that the Office of Financial Assistance would have “more efficient and economical operation” through a reorganization resulting in the abolishment of plaintiff’s GS-18 position; and that the separation would take effect December 31, 1958. The letter explained plaintiff’s rights of administrative appeal and that “all facilities of this Agency will furnish you every possible assistance in locating other employment.”2 There was no mention, however, of the new grade 17 positions as being open to plaintiff, and in fact he was not considered for those posts. Plaintiff did not avail himself of the offer to relocate him, but filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission. On April 16, 1959, the Appeals Examining Office of the Commission decided that, as a preference eligible, plaintiff “was entitled [338]*338to assignment to either of the established GrS-17 levels at the option of the agency and was entitled to compete for retention in the level at the time he was separated from the agency.” See finding 3. The SBA appealed to the Board of Appeals and Review, but the case was referred directly to the Commissioners who reversed the Appeals Examining Office. On November 24, 1959, plaintiff was informed that the Commission had ruled that his separation was a reduction-in-force action and “he was properly reached for action by reduction in force in the excepted position of Director, Office of Financial Assistance, GrS-18. In view of his excepted appointment, he was not entitled as a matter of right to an offer of position change in lieu of separation.” On May 25,1960, the petition was filed in this court.

Plaintiff’s major theme is that the Civil Service Commission’s final determination was arbitrary and capricious because the reorganization within the SBA had no other real purpose than his discharge. If that was so, he was not properly reduced in force under Section 12 of the Veterans Preference Act, 5 U.S.C. § 861, and the Commission’s regulations 3 which permit such a reduction only upon a valid reorganization (there being, admittedly, no other authorized ground for reduction present in his case).4 Alternatively, if the alleged reorganization was only a veil for plaintiff’s summary discharge without any adequate reason personal to him, there would be a violation of Section 14 of the Veterans Preference Act, 5 U.S.C. § 863, requiring that a veteran’s dismissal be for “such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service”' — after notice, written charges, and a .chance to be heard. Cf. Knotts v. United States, 128 Ct. Cl. 489, 121 F. Supp. 630 (1954); Gadsden v. United States, [339]*339111 a. Cl. 487, 78 F. Supp. 126 (1948). See, also, Preble v. United States, 150 Ct. Cl. 39, 46 (1960). If, however, the reorganization was not a subterfuge, plaintiff cannot complain that his grade 18 position was abolished or that he could no longer hold it.

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Bluebook (online)
165 Ct. Cl. 334, 1964 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 79, 1964 WL 8585, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/keener-v-united-states-cc-1964.