Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HARRY T. EDWARDS.
Separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.
HARRY T. EDWARDS, Circuit Judge:
John Edmond and Pamela Lyles were indicted and thereupon arrested for mail fraud. After the indictment was dismissed, they brought a constitutional tort action against Postal Service inspectors, United States and Maryland prosecutors, and private parties, claiming a conspiracy to violate their Fourth and Sixth Amendment rights. The District Court dismissed four defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, then the tort claims as a matter of law. We reverse in part and remand. Two colorable tort theories were presented in the complaint and subsequent filings, but the District Court failed to address them. Appellants are also entitled to discovery on the question of personal jurisdiction, because they made specific and nonspecula-tive allegations that a conspiracy acted to cause them injury in the District of Columbia.
I. BACKGROUND
In early 1986, United States Postal Service Inspector M. Sherwin Green began an investigation of Landover Contact Lens Center (“Landover”), a mail-order firm located in Maryland. John Edmond owned Landover; Pamela Lyles was Edmond’s counsel, but she held no apparent ownership interest in the firm. Green’s investigation eventually led to an administrative consumer protection proceeding initiated by the Maryland Office of Attorney General against Landover, a Postal Service action halting the delivery of mail to Landover and, finally, the arrest upon indictment of Edmond and Lyles.
On February 17, 1987, a federal grand jury in Maryland indicted John Edmond and Pamela Lyles for mail fraud. One day later, they were arrested at their Maryland residence by Postal Inspector Green, his supervisor Thomas Krautheim and other officers. It is undisputed that the arrest took place during the pre-dawn hours of February 18,1987 1; that no arrest warrant was produced when Green and his cohorts entered appellants’ residence; that, following their “arrest,” Edmond and Lyles were first taken to a Postal Service office in Washington, D.C., where they were questioned and fingerprinted2; that an arrest warrant was not produced until the arres-tees reached the office3; and that they were returned from Washington to the U.S. District Court in Maryland and held for nine hours (for which no explanation has been offered) before their bail hearing.4 In addition, appellants claim that Edmond was taken from his residence in his bedclothes5; that Green verbally abused and humiliated them, and then attempted to prevent Edmond from wearing shoes as they left the residence6; that they were photographed at the Postal Service office7; and that the purpose of the procedures there was to [418]*418shore up Green’s insubstantial case.8 Finally, it is alleged that the named defendants conspired to “frame” Edmond and Lyles, and that Wendy Arnell, an Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Maryland, secured the indictment against Edmond and Lyles by using the perjured testimony of Richard Spitz, a businessman who had leased manufacturing facilities to Landover.9
After their arrest, Edmond and Lyles were released pending trial. Appellants then filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for prosecutorial vindictiveness. After the charge of vindictiveness was set for hearing, the prosecutor moved to dismiss the indictment, thus mooting the claim of vindictiveness.10
In February, 1988, Edmond and Lyles filed this action pro se in the District Court. They claimed false arrest and malicious prosecution pursuant to a racially-motivated conspiracy. The alleged conspirators, named as defendants, were Green, Krautheim, Arnell and Spitz; another Postal Service supervisor, Dewey Sparks; Spitz’ lawyer Arnold Popkin; and Roger Wolf, a Maryland prosecutor who apparently was involved in the consumer protection proceedings against Edmond. The government employees were sued both officially and individually, and the United States Postal Service General Counsel was sued as well. Suit was predicated on a number of constitutional amendments; on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985; on Maryland law; and on 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (Fair Credit Reporting Act) and 12 U.S.C. § 3408 (Right to Financial Privacy Act), for Green’s alleged misuse of credit information.
The case never went to trial or even discovery. When appellants attempted to depose Spitz and Popkin, the District Court granted a protective order. Soon thereafter, in April, 1988, these two defendants were dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. In September, 1988, Roger Wolf was dismissed on the same grounds, and the court also dismissed “all nonconstitu-tional tort claims actionable under the Federal Tort Claims Act,” Order at 2-3, reprinted in App. 61, 62-63, but the federal officials remained as defendants to the constitutional causes of action. However, the trial court had stayed discovery at the same time Spitz and Popkin were dismissed, and this stay remained effective throughout the proceedings.
In April, 1989, appellants moved to rename Spitz and Popkin, supporting their motion with a crucial affidavit by Dr. Joseph Serian. See Declaration of Dr. Joseph S. Serian (“Serian Affidavit”), reprinted in App. 91. Serian, a former client of Pamela Lyles, assertedly was telephoned by Spitz, Popkin and Green during the Landover investigation. The Serian Affidavit states that “[e]ach of the telephone calls was characterized by extremely vicious and hostile comments____ Popkin and Spitz repeatedly called Pamela Lyles and John Edmond ‘thieving niggers.’ ” Green, Popkin and Spitz “repeatedly stated that they were determined to put Pamela Lyles and John Edmond behind bars,” and “admitted that they had no evidence to prove any crime had been committed” by the two. Finally, the Serian Affidavit asserts that the three appellees “begged [Serian] to help them by giving penurious testimony which could convict” appellants, and “Spitz indicated that he had presented false testimony to the grand jury which indicted” Edmond and Lyles. Serian Affidavit at ¶¶ 8-9, reprinted in App. 91, 92-93.
The District Court never explicitly ruled on the motion to rename Spitz and Popkin. Rather, by Memorandum of Opinion and Order dated November 14, 1989 (“Memorandum Opinion”), 727 F.Supp. 7, reprinted in App. 65, Wendy Arnell was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction; the federal officers were dismissed in their official capacities; and dismissal was ordered on [419]*419all the constitutional tort claims. Only the Fair Credit Reporting Act claim against Green remained pending, and he was subsequently granted summary judgment on January 31, 1990. On the same day, the trial court also denied a motion by Edmond and Lyles to amend the judgment of November 14, 1989. Order Re Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend Judgment, reprinted in App. 85.
In dealing with appellants’ Fourth Amendment claims, the trial court’s Memorandum Opinion focuses exclusively on a so-called “Probable Cause” theory of the case, which is what the Government had focused on in moving for dismissal. In pressing this point, the Government asserted that “the ‘seizure’ of plaintiffs, i.e., their arrest, was by their own admission based on indictments. Therefore, probable cause had already been found to exist and the Complaint fails to state a claim under the Fourth Amendment.” Dismissal Motion at 29; see also id. at 39. The District Court apparently accepted this characterization of the Fourth Amendment claims and, accordingly, dismissed the Fourth Amendment claims on this sole ground:
Although every person has the constitutional right to be free from arrest or detention without probable cause, the finding of an indictment, fair upon its face, by a properly constituted grand jury conclusively determines the existence of probable cause to arrest. Probable cause exists even «/the indictment is based on unreliable, incompetent or even perjured testimony.
Memorandum Opinion at 7 (citation omitted), reprinted in App. 65, 71. The trial court did acknowledge the “factual material” in the Serian Affidavit, but found it to be “vague” with respect to allegations of wrongdoing under a Probable Cause theory. Memorandum Opinion at 8 n. 13, reprinted in App. 65, 72.
In thus finding that appellants’ “fourth amendment claims fail as a matter of law,” Memorandum Opinion at 8, reprinted in App. 65, 72, the trial court completely failed to address two additional, and distinct, theories of the case that had been raised in appellants’ complaint, in other related documents and in “factual material” (such as the Serian Affidavit). One of these theories, which might be called Perjurer’s Liability, asserts that someone who causes an indictment and consequent arrest by perjuring himself or arranging for the submission of perjured testimony before the grand jury violates the Fourth Amendment. In their claims before the trial court, appellants clearly raised this theory in contending that the alleged conspirators caused them to suffer a wrongful arrest by effecting perjury before the Maryland grand jury, upon whose indictment the arrest warrants issued.
The second theory, which might be called Detour-and-Delay, rests on an assertion that the manner in which an arrest was accomplished was unlawful. Appellants raised this theory before the trial court in asserting, inter alia, that Edmond and Lyles were humiliated by the arresting officers, taken on a detour from Maryland to Washington and back again, and held for more than nine hours without good cause before their bail hearing.
Although the Perjurer’s Liability and Detour-and-Delay theories of liability were pursued by appellants before the District Court, these claims were totally ignored in the trial court’s Memorandum Opinion. And these two theories were again ignored in the court’s Order Re Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Judgment (Jan. 31,1990), reprinted in App. 85.
After an unfavorable judgment was entered, Edmond and Lyles filed a timely appeal pro se. The theories they present to this court are Perjurer’s Liability and Detour-and-Delay. These theories are given a Fourth Amendment rubric, and appellants also preserve their contention that the arrest of Lyles (Edmond’s counsel) violated his Sixth Amendment rights. Appellants conceded at oral argument that no other constitutional claims and no statutory or common law claims are raised for review. The only other issue remaining on appeal is whether the District Court should have dismissed Spitz, Popkin, Arnell and Wolf for lack of personal jurisdiction without afford[420]*420ing appellants an opportunity to discover jurisdictional facts.
II. Analysis
A. The Fourth Amendment Issues
1. Introduction: The Posture of This Appeal
This appeal comes to us in a curious posture. During oral argument before this court, Government counsel conceded that the so-called Perjurer’s Liability and Detour-and-Delay theories may raise causes of action cognizable under the Fourth Amendment; counsel also conceded that appellants’ complaint embraces both theories of action and, therefore, the case could not properly be dismissed on a 12(b)(6) motion 11 for failure to state a cause of action. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (“In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow ... the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”); Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3189, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990) (“[A] Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss on the pleadings ... presumes that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.”).
Furthermore, there is no doubt that the District Court never even purported to address the Perjurer’s Liability and Detour- and-Delay theories that had been advanced by appellants. The Government conceded this point as well during oral argument. Thus, it cannot be asserted that the trial court somehow granted “summary judgment” against appellants on the substance of these theories — the theories were never addressed.
Recognizing this inherent weakness in its case, the Government argued before this court that, although the complaint raised the Perjurer’s Liability and Detour-and-Delay theories, Edmond and Lyles thereafter pursued only the Probable Cause theory before the District Court, thereby waiving review of the other two theories. For the reasons set forth below, we reject this contention. We find that appellants raised and did not abandon or relinquish the disputed theories; therefore, we reverse and remand for further consideration of these issues.
2. Appellees’ Claim of Waiver Regarding the Fourth Amendment Issues
As noted above, in considering appellees’ claim of waiver, it is important to keep this appeal in proper focus. Appellants seek review on two theories of liability that were eoncededly raised in their complaint; however, the District Court never addressed the claims that are now the subject of our inquiry on appeal. Under these circumstances, “[i]t is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below.” Singleton v. Wulff 428 U.S. 106, 120, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 2877, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976). Appellees seek to avoid application of this rule with their assertion that appellants abandoned, or otherwise waived, the disputed claims by failing to pursue them during the course of the proceedings before the trial court. We reject this argument.
The complaint clearly alleged that appel-lees used perjury to secure the indictment and thereupon the arrest of Edmond and Lyles.12 And in opposing dismissal, appellants clearly argued that these facts made out a cause of action under the Fourth [421]*421Amendment. Although the relevant section of the opposition was entitled “Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment Claim — Arrest Without Probable Cause,” the main theory presented there was actually Perjurer’s Liability.
[I]t is clear that defendants were part of a conspiracy. The general plan, as stated by defendant Green, Popkin and Spitz was to put plaintiffs behind bars. In furtherance of the conspiracy defendant Green exchanged information with Pop-kin and Spitz, ... suborned perjury and happily carried out the illegal arrest and imprisonment of plaintiffs, knowing there was no evidence that they had committed any crime.
Opposition to Dismissal at 9, 14. To be sure, appellants’ presentation was often confused. But their emphasis was surely on the fact that the alleged conspirators had themselves participated in the perjury. The argument-in-chief was not Probable Cause: that Green et al. would be liable for arresting upon an indictment rooted in perjured testimony, whatever their role in the grand jury proceedings. Rather, appellants evidently used the words “probable cause” to describe the right that the conspirators had caused to be violated: the right to have some true factual predicate, not perjury, as the basis for their arrest.
Nor did appellants waive the second Fourth Amendment theory, Detour-and-Delay. Even if the fact of their arrest was not unlawful, they argue, the manner of that arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. Again, this theory’s factual basis was plainly asserted in the complaint.
In the early morning hours of February 18, 1987, defendants Green and Krautheim came to plaintiffs residence in the company of several armed postal inspectors and police officers and arrested the plaintiffs. Defendant Green was laughing and smiling during said arrest and attempted to prevent plaintiff John Edmond from putting on his shoes in hopes that plaintiff would be required to walk barefoot in the snow. Fortunately, another postal inspector intervened and allowed the plaintiff to put his shoes on although the plaintiff was required to accompany the defendants in his bedclothes.
Upon inquiry by plaintiff Pamela Lyles, the defendants Green and Krau-theim did not produce an arrest warrant during said arrest in hopes of provoking the plaintiffs into resisting arrest____
Plaintiffs were transported to the U.S. Postal Service offices located at 900 Brentwood Road, N.E., Washington, D.C., questioned and fingerprinted and then taken to the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland where they were incarcerated for nine hours before being brought before Magistrate Rosenberg.
Complaint ¶¶ 27-29, reprinted in App. 1, 13-14. The Opposition to Dismissal cited these facts in describing how Edmond and Lyles were harmed by their arrest:
The injury which plaintiffs sustained as a result of defendants’ wrongful conduct is readily apparent. Plaintiffs were not only roused from their beds at gunpoint pursuant to an illegally obtained indictment, they were effectually kidnapped and taken from the State of Maryland into the District of Columbia for the sole purpose of obtaining plaintiffs’ fingerprints and mug shots by hostile, vindictive adversaries.
Opposition to Dismissal at 16.
Although appellants did not precisely argue Detour-and-Delay in the alternative to Perjurer’s Liability, that was surely an obvious reading of their case. The claim that they were arrested in an unlawful manner was obviously separable from the claimed illegality in the very fact of arrest, and the District Court was obliged to consider Detour-and-Delay as a separate theory. See Self Directed Placement Corp. v. Control Data Corp., 908 F.2d 462, 466-67 (9th Cir.1990) (reversing summary judgment where trial court failed to consider theory of liability that was combined with another in plaintiff’s opposition). The days are long over when misnomer legitimately could occasion dismissal of a plea.
However tempting it might be to require utter clarity when parties plead and [422]*422argue before our courts, the very concept of an “inartful pleading” or motion belies the existence of such a requirement. “There is no bright-line rule to determine whether a matter has been properly raised” in moving papers, In re E.R. Fegert, Inc. (O’Rourke v. Seaboard Sur. Co.), 887 F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir.1989); and when a plaintiffs opposition is “less than paradigmatic, ... the question becomes one of sufficiency, i.e., whether in light of the policies behind the rule of waiver plaintiff sufficiently raised the issue below so that waiver should not apply,” Yorger v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 733 F.2d 1215, 1221 (7th Cir.1984) (rejecting argument that, because plaintiffs did not file opposing affidavit in response to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, plaintiff had waived issue on appeal). The waiver “policy,” of course, encourages parties to communicate with each other and the trial judge; in the instant case, the communication was surely audible. Even the most passive listener could hardly have failed to hear appellants’ plea: in their own words, that they were “effectually kidnapped.” In short, they did enough to state and preserve for further airing a claim pursuant to the Detour-and-Delay theory.
It is also important to recall that the District Court did not grant summary judgment against appellants on either the Perjurer’s Liability or the Detour-and-Delay theory; nor did the trial court suggest that these theories of liability had been waived or abandoned. The theories were never addressed because appellants' case was incorrectly characterized in the Memorandum Opinion; consequently, there was no actual judgment on the points here in issue. The burden was on the defendants who moved for summary judgment to establish that Edmond and Lyles had no claim as a matter of law. As defendants never addressed these theories before the District Court, dismissal was clearly improper.
Indeed, given the posture of the case before the trial court at the time of dismissal, it is inconceivable that appellants’ claims on Perjurer’s Liability and Detour- and-Delay could have been disposed of pursuant to summary judgment. The Serian Affidavit, alone, raised substantial and disputed “factual material,” Memorandum Opinion at 8 n. 13, reprinted in App. 65, 72, supporting the Perjurer’s Liability theory; and, whatever the trial court may have thought about the affidavit with respect to the Probable Cause theory, it surely could not be disregarded as being too “vague,” see id., with respect to a claim under Perjurer’s Liability. As for the Detour-and-Delay claim, the complaint, along with Edmond’s affidavit, the opposition to dismissal filed by appellants, plus the Government’s failure to deny or account for the extraordinary episode underlying appellants’ claim, militate against summary judgment for appellees. In short, on both theories, appellants dramatically set forth specific, highly uncommon facts and adequately indicated viable legal claims. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The unanswered and grave allegations made should have survived the motion for summary judgment.
In sum, appellees’ waiver argument is wholly unavailing. The record belies any contention that appellants abandoned the aforementioned theories of liability so plainly springing from their complaint. Both of the theories presented on appeal were adequately raised and preserved below.13
3. The Fourth Amendment Issues to Be Faced on Remand
In rejecting appellees’ so-called waiver argument, we have pointed out that Perjur[423]*423er’s Liability is a valid constitutional tort theory, as appellees conceded at oral argument. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986), would appear to settle that question.14 Appellees also conceded that Detour-and-Delay states a constitutional tort claim. This theory is arguably cognizable under the Fourth Amendment, although, in a case of this sort, it may be better articulated under the Fifth Amendment (because Edmond and Lyles already had been indicted at the time of alleged wrongdoing). See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).15 These issues should be considered on remand.16
B. The Sixth Amendment Issue
On remand, the District Court should also reexamine appellants’ Sixth Amendment claim: that the wrongful arrest of Pamela Lyles violated Edmond’s right to counsel. The trial court held:
The record in no way demonstrates ... that Mr. Edmond did not have the assistance of counsel at a critical stage of prosecution____15
Memorandum Opinion at 9 & n. 15, reprinted in App. 65, 73. Although Morrison did indeed leave open the question whether alleged interference with the right to counsel states a constitutional tort claim, see 449 U.S. at 367, 101 S.Ct. at 669, this court has given an affirmative answer to the question.
The threat of significant harm required by Weatherford [v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 [97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30] (1977),] does not, however, have to amount to ‘prejudice’ in the sense of altering the actual outcome of the trial. Although the Sixth Amendment is concerned primarily with fairness at trial, it is not limited to that function. The right to counsel protects the whole range of the accused’s interests implicated by a criminal prosecution. These interests may extend beyond the wish for exoneration to include, for example, the possibilities of a lesser charge, a lighter sentence, or the alleviation of the practical burdens of a trial.
[424]*424Briggs v. Goodwin, 698 F.2d 486, 494 (D.C.Cir.) (citations and internal quotations omitted) (citing Morrison), vacated on reh’g on other grounds, 712 F.2d 1444 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040, 104 S.Ct. 704, 79 L.Ed.2d 169 (1984).17
If Edmond had not alleged that he was arrested in a wrongful manner, then the only apparent injury to him from Lyles’ arrest would have been emotional, and we would have to decide whether emotional injury, without more, is “significant harm” under Briggs. See Cinelli v. City of Revere, 820 F.2d 474, 477-78 (1st Cir.1987), cert. denied sub nom. Cutillo v. Cinelli, 485 U.S. 1037, 108 S.Ct. 1600, 99 L.Ed.2d 915 (1988); Briggs, 698 F.2d at 494 n. 24. In this case, however, appellants have asserted more than just emotional injury. They have contended that, because of her arrest, Lyles was unable to serve her client, presumably by preventing his detour to the Postal Service office in the District of Columbia and the ensuing delay in his bail hearing, and that these and other alleged indignities “significantly harmed” him in connection with the practical burdens related to the proposed prosecution against him. The District Court failed to consider this Sixth Amendment theory, and should do so on remand.
C. Personal Jurisdiction
Appellants assert personal jurisdiction over Richard Spitz, Arnold Popkin, Wendy Arnell and Roger Wolf based on section 13-423(a)(3) of the D.C. long-arm statute.
(a) A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person’s—
(3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in the District of Columbia____
(b) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a claim for relief arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him.
D.C.Code Ann. § 13-423(a)(3) (1989). Even though subject-matter jurisdiction is here predicated upon a federal question, Edmond and Lyles must rely on D.C. law to sue nonresident defendants, since no federal long-arm statute applies. See Omni Capital Int’l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 108 S.Ct. 404, 98 L.Ed.2d 415 (1987); First Chicago Int’l v. United Exch. Co., 836 F.2d 1375, 1377-79 (D.C.Cir.1988) (using D.C. long-arm statute in federal question case). Edmond and Lyles have the burden of proving personal jurisdiction, and can satisfy that burden with a prima facie showing, see, e.g., First Chicago, 836 F.2d at 1378, unless the trial court holds an evidentiary hearing, see Reuber v. United States, 750 F.2d 1039, 1052 (D.C.Cir.1984).
Appellants point to their temporary incarceration in the District of Columbia as the tortious event necessary to satisfy the requirements of section 13-423(a)(3). There is no evidence that Spitz, Popkin, Wolf and Arnell directly participated in this event. Rather, Edmond and Lyles argue that these four appellees participated through the agency of their co-conspirators Green and Krautheim, who were arresting officers, and that this indirect participation satisfies the proviso of section 13-423(a) allowing “personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts ... by an agent.” 18 We do [425]*425not decide whether Edmond and Lyles have indeed made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction under section 13-423(a)(3), but instead remand for discovery on that question.
As a general matter, discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be freely permitted, and this is no less true when discovery is directed to personal jurisdiction. See Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 788 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied sub nom. Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Clark, 467 U.S. 1210, 104 S.Ct. 2399, 81 L.Ed.2d 355 (1984); see generally Wyatt v. Kaplan, 686 F.2d 276, 283-84 (5th Cir.1982) (Wisdom, J.). At the same time, a district court has broad discretion in structuring discovery, and we should not overturn the District Court’s decision to stay discovery against Popkin, Wolf, Arnell and Spitz unless this discretion has been abused. See Naartex, 722 F.2d at 788. In Naartex, where jurisdiction over nonresident defendants hinged on an alleged conspiracy, and where the allegations of conspiracy were conclusory, we upheld the denial of discovery. The allegations here, however, are far from conclusory, and the District Court’s protective orders are appropriately reversed. See Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758 (D.C.Cir.1987) (remanding for jurisdictional discovery, where district court had dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction); Collins v. New York Cent. Sys., 327 F.2d 880 (D.C.Cir.1963) (same).
To be sure, this court in Naartex spoke of “specific [alleged] facts that could establish the requisite contacts with the District,” 722 F.2d at 788, as the prerequisite for a jurisdictional-discovery remand. But the plain language of this test does not demand that a contact be specifically alleged for each nonresident defendant, nor did Naartex mean to make such a demand. Furthermore, even assuming that due process requires the nonresident to have known about and assented to the alleged injury-causing act, the plaintiff need not specifically allege this mens rea to obtain discovery because the nonresident’s participation in the conspiracy entails a significant probability that he did know and assent. Otherwise, the existence of a conspiracy would be wholly superfluous to the discovery calculus, and Naartex surely does not intend that.
We do not at this stage attempt to address the limits on the use of conspiracy theory to establish personal jurisdiction.19 Whatever those limits, it is an abuse of discretion to deny jurisdictional discovery where the plaintiff has specifically alleged: (1) the existence of a conspiracy, (2) the nonresident’s participation, and (3) an injury-causing act of the conspiracy within the forum’s boundaries.
Appellants have the strongest jurisdictional case against Spitz and Popkin. The Serian Affidavit, connecting Spitz and Popkin with Green, is enough to require jurisdictional discovery against Spitz and Popkin. Although the affidavit was introduced subsequent to their dismissal, the District Court had the authority to reverse its own interlocutory order, see 11 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2852, at 145 (1973); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 642 F.2d 578, 583-84 (D.C.Cir.1980), and its failure to do so was an abuse of discretion.20
The Serian Affidavit does not mention Wendy Arnell. Nor would the allegation that she suborned perjury and made false representations to the grand jury be sufficient for this court to overrule the denial of discovery against her. These allegations are not conclusory, but they are speculative: appellants have no apparent basis for direct knowledge of Arnell’s state of mind, nor do they have any basis for direct knowledge that Arnell prosecuted their in-[426]*426dietment. However, circumstantial evidence suggests she was the prosecutor: appellees admit her connection to the Postal Service investigation and subsequent civil proceedings,21 and Edmond and Lyles make specific and nonspeculative allegations of her participation in criminal proceedings related to the indictment.22 Given this evidentiary background, the (apparently admitted) fact23 that Arnell dismissed the indictment prior to trial, after a hearing on prosecutorial vindictiveness had been scheduled, should have led to jurisdictional discovery against Arnell. If the Serian Affidavit is true, and Green et al. were indeed conspiring against appellants, Arnell’s decision to dismiss the indictment would be nontrivial evidence of her participation in the conspiracy. Added to this were the allegations that Arnell had threatened to indict Edmond if he filed for bankruptcy,24 and that she mocked appellants during the bail hearing,25 plus the undisputed fact that Arnell had informed the D.C. Bar Counsel about the indictment but failed to communicate its dismissal.26 It was therefore an abuse of discretion for the District Court to dismiss Wendy Arnell without jurisdictional discovery.27
The denial of discovery against Roger Wolf is a much closer question. Appellants make numerous allegations about Wolf, for example, that he “knowingly made false statements to reporters”; “knowingly and maliciously suborned perjury by procuring perjured testimony from” Spitz in the Maryland proceeding; “concealed from the [Maryland] hearing officer documents which would have contradicted” Spitz; and, in a bankruptcy action Edmond had filed, “sought to obtain [Edmond’s] financial records while knowing full well that [Edmond] had not been served with” a subpoena and “falsely stated to [the bankruptcy judge] that the release of [Edmond’s] financial records by [his] financial institutions was not imminent.” Complaint ¶¶ 10-11, 13, 50, 53, reprinted in App. 1, 7-9, 20. However, these allegations are telling evidence of Wolf’s status as a co-conspirator only if the speculation about mens rea is taken as true — only if Edmond and Lyles are assumed to know Wolf’s state of mind. Stripped of this speculative element, the [427]*427allegations (if true) prove only that Wolf made misstatements and procedural mistakes while proceeding against appellants.
To be sure, the District Court could have allowed discovery against Wolf under the “freely permitted” standard of Rule 26. But the denial of discovery was not an abuse of discretion, in the absence of specific and nonspeculative allegations linking Wolf to the conspiracy. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court as to Wolf.
III. Conclusion
The constitutional claims predicated on appellants’ arrest are reinstated. Richard Spitz, Arnold Popkin and Wendy Arnell are renamed as parties, and discovery permitted against Spitz, Popkin and Arnell limited to the question of personal jurisdiction.
There is one further point that deserves mention. When this case returns for further proceedings before the District Court, appellants will be well advised to seek the services of counsel to prosecute their claims. We recognize that Ms. Lyles is an attorney. We do not mean to judge her performance in suggesting that new counsel, in lieu of pro se representation, might be advisable; nor do we mean to ignore the fact that appellants may not be able to afford the expense of legal representation. It seems clear, however, that it would be difficult for any attorney in Ms. Lyles’ shoes to be appropriately detached in a case of this sort, where her personal stake in the outcome is so great. We think that, assuming that appellants are able to retain counsel, some of the difficult issues yet to be faced might be better addressed with the assistance of an attorney who has no direct stake in the outcome of the litigation.