Schooley v. Islamic Republic of Iran

District Court, District of Columbia·Decided June 27, 2019·No. Civil Action No. 2017-1376·Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

WILLIAM M. SCHOOLEY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Civil Action No. 17-1376 (BAH)

v.

Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On June 25, 1996, a gasoline tanker, modified to serve as a bomb, exploded with the force of 20,000 pounds of TNT next to the Khobar Towers complex, a residential complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia housing coalition forces “charged with monitoring compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolutions.” Pls.’ Amend. Compl. (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 19–21, ECF No. 21. Nineteen U.S. Air Force personnel were killed, and hundreds more were injured, including the 101 service member plaintiffs in this case. Id. ¶¶ 22, 38. The total of 219 plaintiffs in the instant case also include 118 “immediate family members” of the 101 injured service members. Id. ¶ 6. The plaintiffs allege that the three defendants, the Islamic Republic of Iran (“Iran”), the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security (“MOIS”), and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”), are responsible for the terrorist attack on Khobar Towers, id. ¶ 13, and seek to hold these defendants liable as foreign state sponsors of international terrorism under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) terrorism exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. The defendants have failed to enter appearances, or defend against this action, despite being properly served, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4). See Return of Service/Affidavit of Summons and Complaint Executed, ECF No. 13; Clerk’s Entry of Default, ECF No. 15. The plaintiffs now seek the entry

of a default judgment against the defendants as to liability and damages. Pls.’ Mot. for Judicial Notice of Prior Related Cases and for Default J. as to Liability and Damages Against Iranian Defendants (“Pls.’ Mot.”), ECF No. 146. For the reasons detailed below, the plaintiffs’ motion is granted. I. BACKGROUND “‘[T]he history of litigation’ in this Court ‘stemming from the bombing of Khobar Towers . . . is extensive.’” Akins v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 332 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Rimkus v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 750 F. Supp. 2d 163, 167 (D.D.C. 2010) (Lamberth, J.) (citing Blais v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 2d 40, 46–51 (D.D.C. 2006) (Lamberth, J.) and Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 466 F. Supp. 2d 229, 248 (D.D.C. 2006) (“Heiser I”) (Lamberth, J.))). Specifically, in Heiser I, the Court heard evidence and witness testimony for 17 days, see Heiser I, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 250, including from 7 expert witnesses.1 The plaintiffs correctly point out that in prior cases “the Court found that the three [instant] Iranian Defendants were liable for the Khobar Towers bombing,” Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Pls.’ Mot. Judicial Notice of Prior Related Cases (“Pls.’ Mem.”) at 2, ECF No. 146, and that they “dealt with identical issues regarding the liability [of these defendants],” id. In light of this prior litigation, plaintiffs request that this Court take “[j]udicial notice of these proceedings.” Id.

Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence authorizes a court to take judicial notice, on its own or at the request of a party, of adjudicative facts that are “not subject to reasonable dispute

1 Expert witnesses testifying in Heiser I included: (1) Louis Freeh, the former Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), (2) Dr. Patrick Clawson, a scholar of Middle Eastern politics who has frequently provided expert testimony regarding Iran’s involvement in sponsoring terrorism, (3) Dr. Bruce Tefft, a founding member of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Bureau and regular consultant on issues of terrorism, and (4) Dale Watson, the former Deputy Counterterrorism Chief of the FBI, see Heiser I, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 260–65, as well as (5) Dr. Thomas Parsons, a medical examiner, see id. at 268, (6) Dr. Dana Cable, a licensed psychologist and expert on grief process, see id. at 269–70, and (7) Dr. Herman Miller, an economic consultant, see id. at 273–74.

because” they “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” FED. R. EVID. 201(a)–(c). “ʻ[A]djudicative facts are simply the facts of the particular case’ while ‘legislative facts . . . are those which have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the enactment of a legislative body.’” Nat’l Org. for Women, Wash., D.C. Chapter v. Social Sec. Admin., 736 F.2d 727, 737 n.95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robinson, J., concurring) (quoting Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. EVID. 201(a)). Rule 201 has been applied frequently in this Court to take notice of, and rely on, facts found in earlier proceedings, “without necessitating the formality of having that evidence reproduced,” Harrison v. Republic of Sudan, 882 F. Supp. 2d 23, 31 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Taylor v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 811 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2011)), “even when those proceedings have taken place in front of a different judge,” Foley v. Syrian Arab Republic, 249 F. Supp. 3d 186, 191 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing Brewer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 664 F. Supp. 2d 43, 54 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Relying on the pleadings and the . . . findings of other judges in this jurisdiction.”)).

In this way, rather than require litigants to present such evidence anew in each lawsuit stemming from the same terrorist attack, courts have “determined that the proper approach is one ‘that permits courts in subsequent related cases to rely upon the evidence presented in earlier litigation . . . without necessitating the formality of having that evidence reproduced,’” so that “courts may reach their own independent findings of fact” predicated “on judicial notice of the evidence presented in the earlier cases.” Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 753 F. Supp. 2d 68, 75 (D.D.C. 2010) (Lamberth, J.) (quoting Rimkus, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 172); see also Foley, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 191 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (finding same “approach appropriate” and “tak[ing] judicial notice of the requested findings”); Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 879 F. Supp. 2d

44, 50 (D.D.C. 2012) (Lamberth, J.) (quoting Rimkus, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 163) (finding courts permitted “in subsequent related cases to rely upon the evidence presented in earlier litigation”); Estate of Botvin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 873 F. Supp. 2d 232, 237 (D.D.C. 2012) (Lamberth, J.) (taking “judicial notice of the evidence presented in the earlier cases”).

Factual evidence developed in other cases “involving the same conduct by the same defendants is admissible and may be relied upon in this case.” Akins, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 11. While factual evidence may be relied upon, judicial findings derived from that evidence are not dispositive because courts must “reach their own, independent findings of fact in the cases before them.” Rimkus, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 172. Persuaded that this approach is both “efficient and sufficiently protective of the absent defendants’ interests,” Akins, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 11, this Court will adopt it and grant the plaintiffs’ request to take judicial notice of the evidence presented in Heiser I, Blais, Valencia v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 774 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010), and Rimkus.2 The evidence regarding the terrorist attack at issue is summarized below, followed by an overview of the procedural history of this case.

A. The Attack on Khobar Towers “The Khobar Towers was a residential complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, which housed the coalition forces charged with monitoring compliance with U.N. security council resolutions.” Blais, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 47. Ten minutes before 10:00 p.m. on June 25, 1996, “a large gasoline tanker truck pulled up alongside the perimeter wall of the Khobar Towers complex.” Heiser I, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 252; Compl. ¶ 20. The guards on the top of the building “started to give

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Schooley v. Islamic Republic of Iran, (D.D.C. 2019).

Schooley v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Schooley v. Islamic Republic of Iran) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Bank One, Texas, N.A. v. Taylor
970 F.2d 16 (Fifth Circuit, 1992)
Hill v. Republic of Iraq
328 F.3d 680 (D.C. Circuit, 2003)
Mwani, Odilla Mutaka v. Bin Ladin, Usama
417 F.3d 1 (D.C. Circuit, 2005)
United States v. Reeves
586 F.3d 20 (D.C. Circuit, 2009)
Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic
646 F.3d 1 (D.C. Circuit, 2011)
Medina v. District of Columbia
643 F.3d 323 (D.C. Circuit, 2011)
Rothstein v. UBS AG
708 F.3d 82 (Second Circuit, 2013)
United States v. Parnell
524 F.3d 166 (Second Circuit, 2008)
Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic
580 F. Supp. 2d 53 (District of Columbia, 2008)
Brewer v. Islamic Republic of Iran
664 F. Supp. 2d 43 (District of Columbia, 2009)
Acosta v. the Islamic Republic of Iran
574 F. Supp. 2d 15 (District of Columbia, 2008)