OPINION OF THE COURT
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE CASE
This matter is before this court on appeal following proceedings having an unusual procedural history. Appellee, McAllister Brothers, Inc., is a tugboat operator on the Delaware River in the Philadélphia area. McAllister employed John Bethel as a river docking pilot between December 1987 and December 1990, when it discharged him. Thereafter, Bethel brought this action against McAllister in the district court but he died after the trial. Consequently, Thomas Bethel, the administrator of his estate, is now the appellant. Our references to “Bethel” in this opinion, however, are to John Bethel.
Bethel alleged in the complaint that he sustained personal injuries on December 17, 1990, while working as a docking pilot for McAllister, which shortly thereafter wrongfully discharged him. He also contended that McAllister defamed him by asserting that it fired him because he refused to take a drug test after his injury, thereby suggesting that he was a drug user and hindering his efforts to obtain employment in the maritime and shipping industry. In addition to McAllister, Bethel sued appellee Frank J. Huesser, a supervisor at McAllister, charging that he was also liable for these alleged wrongs. Bethel obtained a judgment for his personal injuries under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, which McAllister satisfied, and McAllister obtained a judgment as a matter of law on the wrongftd discharge claim, which is not at issue on this appeal. Inasmuch as we are not concerned with these claims, and because Huesser’s presence in this litigation in no way affects our disposition of the issues, as a matter of convenience we will treat this case [378]*378as simply a defamation action between Be-thel, succeeded by the appellant, and McAl-lister. Of course, we nevertheless have considered the arguments Huesser set forth both in his brief and at oral argument.
At the trial, Bethel recovered a judgment for $554,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive damages on the defamation claim. McAllister then successfully moved for a judgment as a matter of law under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). The court concluded that the other towing companies in the Philadelphia area, which Bethel alleged would not hire him after McAllister discharged him, did not understand McAllister’s statements as indicating that Bethel was a drug user, and further concluded that Bethel failed to prove that McAllister’s statements caused him “special harm” as required by Pennsylvania law which is applicable to the defamation issues in this action. Agriss v. Roadway Express, Inc., 334 Pa.Super. 295, 483 A.2d 456, 461 (1984); see also Solosko v. Paxton, 383 Pa. 419, 119 A.2d 230, 232 (1956).
Bethel then appealed, but before we could hear and decide the appeal, he died on December 4, 1993, so appellant was substituted for him as a party. On February 4, 1994, over a dissent, in an unreported opinion we reversed the order granting the judgment as a matter of law and remanded the case for entry of a judgment in favor of the appellant. Bethel v. McAllister Bros., Inc., 19 F.3d 642 (3d Cir.1994). We found that there was sufficient evidence that McAllister had defamed Bethel to support the jury’s verdict. Furthermore, we concluded that there was evidence that he had suffered special harm because Riverbus, Inc., a ferry operator that employed him after McAllister discharged him, terminated that employment when it learned from McAllister that it had discharged him for refusing to take a drug test.1 In reaching this result, we relied on Bethel’s testimony that Riverbus fired him when it acquired that information in a background check. We also indicated that the award of compensatory damages was predicated, at least in part, on Riverbus having fired him. On April 12, 1994, the district court entered judgment in favor of Bethel against McAllis-ter in accordance with our mandate.
On March 1,1994, McAllister moved in the district court for relief from the judgment to be entered on the remand pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3), relying on evidence that it discovered after we reversed the judgment in favor of McAllister to establish that Bethel committed fraud at the trial.2 The evidence was Bethel’s testimony in an arbitration proceeding against Riverbus after it discharged him. Bethel testified in that proceeding that Riverbus discharged him for a myriad of reasons, of which his refusal to take the drug test as directed by McAllister was but one.
The district court granted McAllister’s motion in an opinion and accompanying order, both dated July 11, 1994. The court found that Bethel had given “patently misleading” testimony and had “knowingly concealed a material fact” at the trial and thus had committed fraud. Consequently, the court vacated the judgment of April 12,1994, and granted McAllister a new trial on both liability and damages. Thereafter, at appellant’s request, the district court amended the order of July 11, 1994, by certifying it under 28 U.S.C. § 1291(b) so that he could seek leave to appeal. We, however, denied leave to appeal on September 19, 1994. In the meantime, the appellant sought reconsideration of the order of July 11, 1994, with respect to the scope of the retrial, which he argued the court should have limited to damages. The district court, by order entered December 13, 1994, adhered to its decision that the new trial would be on both liability and damages.
The appellant did not wish to retry the case, as he had concluded that in light of the district court’s findings that Bethel had committed perjury,3 he could not succeed in a [379]*379retrial. Thus, in his view, the order granting a new trial effectively awarded McAllister a final judgment. Therefore, at a conference on November 3, 1994, the appellant requested that the court enter a final judgment in McAllister’s favor so that he could appeal the granting of the new trial. The court, though acknowledging that the appellant was in a difficult position, did not do so. In this regard we are perplexed by the appellant’s articulated concerns because we can conceive of no way that the jury at a retrial could have learned of the district court’s conclusion that Bethel had committed perjury, though we can understand how McAllister might have been able to use Bethel’s testimony from the arbitration hearing at the retrial, particularly if appellant used Bethel’s testimony from the first trial at a second trial. We explored the point at oral argument and appellant’s attorney acknowledged that the district court never said that its holding under Rule 60(b)(3) somehow would be made known to the jury at the new trial.
In any event, appellant persisted in his efforts to have a final judgment entered in McAllister’s favor. In a motion filed January 27, 1995, he reiterated that such a judgment should be entered because he could not proceed and wished to appeal immediately. The district court instead listed the case for trial. Appellant then unsuccessfully moved again for entry of judgment.
Ultimately, the case came on for trial on April 27, 1995. At that time, appellant was free to proceed with the trial but did not do so. Accordingly, the district court entered a final judgment against him, but did not do so on the ground that its opinion and order of July 11, 1994, granting relief under Fed. R.CivJP. 60(b)(3), effectively had been a final judgment. Rather, as the court recited in its order of April 28, 1995, it dismissed the matter because of appellant’s “failure to prosecute” the case. Appellant then appealed from the orders of July 11, 1994, December 13, 1994, and April 28, 1995.4
II. THE SCOPE OF THE APPEAL
We initially address an objection raised by McAllister to our entertaining this appeal. In its brief, McAllister urges that appellant “has Waived his right to Appeal the July 11, 1994 and December 1[3], 1994 Orders [granting a new trial] by Failing to Prosecute his Case at the Second Trial of this Action.” McAllister seemed to believe, however, that appellant could and did appeal from the order of dismissal, as it did not suggest that he could not appeal from it and it supported the dismissal on the merits.5
We understand why McAllister concluded that appellant might be seeking a reversal of the order of dismissal. .After all, the notice of appeal recites that appellant is appealing from that order. Furthermore, his brief sets forth the standard of review for orders of dismissal citing, inter alia, Titus v. Mercedes Benz of N. Am., 695 F.2d 746, 749 (3d Cir.1982), and indicates that we can reverse the district court if it abused its discretion in dismissing the case. Brief at 28. Yet it did not appear clear to us from his overall brief that appellant was challenging the dismissal of the case or was seeking a new trial, for at the conclusion of his brief he requested that we reverse only the orders of July 11, 1994, and December 13, 1994, and enter judgment in his favor.
We explored this ambiguity at oral argument and inquired whether appellant was seeking a new trial. The answer was absolutely clear: his attorney stated that this was an all-or-nothing appeal in which appellant was seeking only the reinstatement of the judgment predicated on the verdict. Thus, regardless of how we decided the appeal our decision would end the ease, either because [380]*380the judgment entered on the verdict would be reinstated or because appellant would not proceed with a new trial as permitted by the district court in its orders of July 11, 1994, and December 13, 1994. Consequently, we need not decide whether we should uphold the order of dismissal, as appellant does not challenge that order.
McAllister predicates its contention that appellant waived his right to appeal from the July 11, 1994 and December 13, 1994 orders principally on three cases, Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439 (3d Cir.1994); Sullivan v. Pacific Indemn. Co., 566 F.2d 444 (3d Cir.1977); and Marshall v. Sielaff, 492 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.1974). In Spain, a female employee of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought a district court action against the EEOC, charging sexual and racial discrimination, sexual harassment and unlawful retaliation. Immediately prior to the trial, the district court excluded certain evidence which the employee intended to offer in support of her sexual discrimination and harassment claims and barred her from proceeding on those claims on the basis of her remaining evidence. Nevertheless, the employee was free to proceed with her claims for racial discrimination and retaliation. But she declined to do so, as she regarded the excluded evidence as closely connected to those claims. The court then dismissed her case to the extent it was predicated on these remaining claims.
We held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the disputed evidence and we reversed the order dismissing the sexual discrimination and harassment claims. Nevertheless, we affirmed the dismissal of the racial discrimination and retaliation claims, as the employee “was obliged to proceed with the trial notwithstanding the exclusion of the evidence.” 26 F.3d at 454. In reaching this conclusion, we explained that “[a] party disappointed with a court’s ruling may not refuse to proceed and then expect to obtain relief on appeal from an order of dismissal or default.” Id.
Spain clearly is distinguishable from this case. In that case the employee, though refusing to proceed with a trial though free to do so, later sought relief from the order entered as a consequence of her refusal to go forward. This case is different because while the appellant, like the employee in Spain, would not go forward with the trial he, unlike the employee in that case, does not seek to be relieved of the consequences of his failure to proceed. Quite to the contrary, he does not now seek a trial but argues only that a new trial should not have been granted.
Sullivan, 566 F.2d 444, is somewhat like Spain. There the plaintiffs sought to bring a class action against an insurance company predicated on a claim that it overcharged certain physicians for malpractice insurance. The named plaintiffs moved to certify a class of plaintiffs, but on the day of trial the district court denied the motion to certify. The plaintiffs then refused to present any evidence, whereupon the court dismissed the action for failure to prosecute.
The plaintiffs then appealed, seeking only a review of the order denying class certification, as they did not contend that the dismissal was erroneous. Id. at 445. In these circumstances, we held that the plaintiffs had appealed from an interlocutory order, and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Sullivan differed from Spain in one respect, however, because in the latter ease the employee urged that the district court improperly dismissed the balance of the ease for failure to prosecute after it entered the earlier order to which the employee objected. Thus, in Spain, unlike in Sullivan, we did not dismiss the appeal and instead affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute.
Sullivan does not support McAllister’s contention that we lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal from the orders of July 11, 1994, and December 13, 1994. In Sullivan, the order denying the motion to certify the class was interlocutory because a reversal of it would not have ended the litigation, as the certification of the class would have been a futile gesture unless the plaintiffs could proceed to trial. Thus, in Sullivan, unlike in this ease, a reversal of the order denying certification and predating the dismissal would have resulted in further litigation, which would have required reinstatement of [381]*381the action. Here, a reversal, no less than an affirmance, would end this litigation.
Marshall, 492 F.2d 917, is also similar to Spain. In Marshall, a prisoner who brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison officials and medical personnel at the prison, would not proceed with the trial after the district court refused to grant a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum for certain persons the prisoner desired to call as witnesses at the trial. The district court dismissed the action for failure to prosecute, whereupon the prisoner appealed from both the dismissal and the denial of the writ. We affirmed the dismissal for lack of prosecution but would not reach the issues generated by the court having denied the application for the writ, pointing out that “[i]f a litigant could refuse to proceed whenever a trial judge ruled against him, wait for the court to enter a dismissal for failure to prosecute, and then obtain review of the judge’s interlocutory decision, the policy against piecemeal litigation and review would be severely weakened.” Id. at 919.
Yet Marshall, too, is distinguishable from this case. In Marshall, as in Sullivan, the appellant wished to appeal an order prior to the final order as a prelude to further litigation. Furthermore, in Marshall, as in both Spain and Sullivan, the appellant could obtain meaningfid relief in the action only if the order of dismissal was vacated or reversed and there then was a trial on the merits.
Our decisions in Spain, Sullivan, and Marshall, of course, fundamentally were premised upon the federal policy against piecemeal appeals, codified in the final judgment rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Carr v. American Red Cross, 17 F.3d 671, 678 (3d Cir.1994) (“The finality rule ‘reflects federal policy against piecemeal appeals.’ ”) (quoting Praxis Properties, Inc. v. Colonial Sav. Bank, 947 F.2d 49, 54 n. 5 (3d Cir.1991)). Section 1291 provides that “[t]he courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States.” While we give “a practical rather than technical construction” to section 1291, we must take care not to sacrifice the policy of limited appellate jurisdiction. Id. (citing Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon, 807 F.2d 1150, 1156 (3d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070, 107 S.Ct. 2463, 95 L.Ed.2d 872 (1987)). With limited exceptions, we will not entertain an appeal unless the district court’s order “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., — U.S. -, -, 114 S.Ct. 1992, 1995, 128 L.Ed.2d 842 (1994) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Bryant v. Sylvester, 57 F.3d 308, 311 (3d Cir.1995). That standard permitting appellate review has been met here. If we set aside the district court’s orders of July 11, 1994, and December 13, 1994, appellant will be entitled to entry of a judgment in his favor, and if we affirm the orders, by his own stipulation, he will not be entitled to a trial. In contrast to the situations raised by the appeals in Spain, Sullivan, and Marshall, the litigation would be terminated in either case. Consequently we are persuaded that notwithstanding their original character, the orders of July 11, 1994, and December 13, 1994, are final and appealable.
In this regard, we observe that it is well established that otherwise non-appeal-able orders may become appealable where circumstances foreclose the possibility of piecemeal litigation. For example, an order dismissing a complaint without prejudice is ordinarily not appealable. Where, however, the plaintiff cannot cure the defect in the complaint or elects to stand on the complaint without amendment, the order becomes final and appealable. See Welch v. Folsom, 925 F.2d 666, 668 (3d Cir.1991); see also Umbenhauer v. Woog, 969 F.2d 25, 30 n. 6 (3d Cir.1992) (holding that order of dismissal without prejudice was appealable where counsel informed court of appeals at oral argument that statute of limitations had run). Indeed, the orders in this case have even greater indicia of finality than an appealable order dismissing a complaint without prejudice as their reversal, unlike the reversal of an order dismissing a complaint without prejudice, will not lead to a trial in the district [382]*382court.6
Moreover, an otherwise non-'appeal-able order may become final for the purposes of appeal where a plaintiff voluntarily and finally abandons the other claims in the litigation. See Fassett, 807 F.2d at 1155-57. In Fassett, for example, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of all the defendants save one in a diversity action. Choosing not to proceed to trial against the remaining defendant, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their complaints against him. Id. at 1154. On appeal, we held that the summary judgments were appealable for two independent reasons. First, we found that the statute of limitations had run on the plaintiffs’ claims against the remaining defendant at the time of the dismissals. Id. at 1155. Second, the plaintiffs represented at oral argument that they would not pursue their claims against the remaining defendant in the federal courts. Id. at 1156-57. In either case, there were no outstanding issues or parties remaining in the district court so that we had jurisdiction over the appeal. Id. at 1155, 1157. We explained that “it would be anomalous to hold that a plaintiff had no right to appeal the dismissal of all but one of his claims after that one claim not initially dismissed, had thereafter been voluntarily and finally abandoned.” Id. at 1155. See also Tieman v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 1031 (3d Cir.1991) (holding that settlement agreements between plaintiffs and three of four defendants were appealable where plaintiffs renounced claims against fourth defendant at oral argument).7
We note a persuasive analogy in this case to our review of orders granting a new trial pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59. Like the grant of a Rule 60(b) motion, an order grants ing a new trial under Rule 59 ordinarily is interlocutory and non-appealable. National Passenger R.R. Corp. v. Maylie, 910 F.2d 1181, 1183 (3d Cir.1990) (‘When an order granting a Rule 60(b) motion merely vacates the judgment and leaves the case pending for further determination, the order is akin to an order granting a new trial and in most instances, is interlocutory and nonappealable.”). The grant of a new trial under Rule 59, however, does not escape review. On appeal following the new trial, we will review the order and may reinstate the judgment from the first trial if we find that the new trial should not have been granted. Blancha v. Raymark Indus., 972 F.2d 507, 511-12 (3d Cir.1992). In this ease, it is as if the appellant were challenging the grant of a new trial after an adverse judgment in the second trial. The appellant is essentially willing to concede defeat in the second trial and to rest his success or failure completely on the outcome of our review of the district [383]*383court’s order granting a new trial under Rule 60(b).
Finally, we point out that the order of dismissal does not preclude us from reviewing the orders of July 11, 1994, and December 13, 1994, even though the dismissal terminated the case in the district court and is not being reviewed. The appeal here is similar to an appeal from an order entered prior to a remand of a case by a district court to the state court from which the case had been removed. In such a case, an order entered prior to remand may be appealable even though the order of remand itself may not be appealable. See Aliota v. Graham, 984 F.2d 1350, 1353 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 68, 126 L.Ed.2d 37 (1993). The sequence of events is the same here. The July 11, 1994, and December 13, 1994 orders predated the order of dismissal. Of course, we do not go so far as to hold that orders entered before dismissal always are appealable after a dismissal. Sullivan demonstrates that they are not. Rather, we confine ourselves to the unique circumstances here in which a reversal of the earlier order would mean that the proceedings leading to the dismissal never should have been held. Other factual scenarios may lead to different results. Overall, we are satisfied that we have jurisdiction to review the July 11, 1994 and December 13, 1994 orders, and thus we reach the merits of this appeal.
III. THE MERITS
In discussing the merits, we first summarize the district court’s comprehensive opinion of July 11, 1994. In that opinion, the court set forth the procedural background of the case and then described the facts. It indicated that Bethel had been injured on McAllister’s vessel on December 17, 1990, when he fell down a flight of stairs. The following day, McAllister told Bethel to report to work to submit to a drug test that it claimed was being administered to all its river docking pilots that day. Bethel refused to report because he was unable to do so. On December 21, 1990, McAllister told Be-thel that his employment was terminated, and he received a letter to that effect the following day.
Thereafter, rumors circulated in the Delaware River maritime community that McAllister terminated Bethel’s employment because he was a drug user. Bethel never again obtained full-time employment as a river docking pilot, although Riverbus, a New Jersey ferry operator, employed.him as a captain operating boats between Camden and Philadelphia from March 25, 1992, until June 28, 1992. His Riverbus employment ended about three weeks before the trial in this case, which was from July 21, 1992, through July 27,1992. Bethel testified that Riverbus fired him as the result of a background check, which he understood to mean that McAllister told Riverbus about Bethel’s refusal to take the drug test.
The district court indicated that McAllister sought relief from the judgment on remand under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3) because of Bethel’s fraud. In particular, the alleged fraud was that Bethel did not testify truthfully about the reasons Riverbus gave him for his discharge as Bethel, at an arbitration hearing in a proceeding against Riverbus ten months after the trial in this case, said Riverbus gave him additional reasons for his discharge. The district court also pointed out that, as we recognized in the earlier appeal, Bethel claimed three possible sources of lost earnings in this case, full-time docking pilot work, part-time docking pilot work, and the position at Riverbus which paid $37,000 per year. However, any claim based on loss of income from the first source was weak.
The district court compared Bethel’s testimony at the jury trial on July 21, 1992, in this case, with his arbitration testimony ten months after the trial on May 17, 1993. At the jury trial, Bethel had testified that River-bus told him that it was terminating his employment “due to an unsatisfactory background check” and he then explained that “[w]hat was told to me, is that they had called my previous employer and they had become aware that allegedly I refused to take a drug test. Therefore they did not— they would not have me in their employ.” Yet, at the arbitration hearing Bethel testified that on June 23,1992, Riverbus gave him eight reasons why it was terminating his employment, which the district court in a fair [384]*384characterization of his testimony at the arbitration hearing described in its July 11, 1994 opinion as follows: “(1) a bad background check, that included talking to McAllister, who told [Riverbus] that plaintiff refused to take a drug test; (2) having been fired by former employers for being drunk; (3) failing to draw up a schedule for crew assignments; (4) reporting to work drunk; (5) not conducting a fire drill; (6) being late for work; (7) failure to get along with fellow employees; and (8) improperly changing the logs.”
The court pointed out that the reasons that Riverbus gave Bethel for discharging him must have been fresh in his mind when he testified at the jury trial, as Riverbus had given them to him only three weeks earlier. Despite this fact, the court then indicated that it now knew in light of Bethel’s testimony at the arbitration hearing that his “testimony given to the jury was patently misleading as to the reasons for his being discharged from Riverbus. A review of the versions of the testimony at both the trial and the arbitration discloses that [Bethel] only told the jury one of the reasons given for his firing. This turned out to be the reason the Third Circuit would later cite as the strongest evidence of his damages, in an otherwise “weak’ case.” The court concluded that if the jury knew about the additional reasons Riverbus gave Bethel for the discharge, it could have found that Bethel’s failure “to take the drug test for defendant McAllister had little or nothing to do with the equally or more substantial ground advanced by Riverbus” for the discharge. The court concluded that Be-thel “knowingly concealed a material fact— indeed, seven material facts, being the undisclosed other grounds — for being discharged by Riverbus.”
The court discussed numerous precedents under Rule 60(b), but naturally in the inherently fact-specific inquiry triggered by a Rule 60(b)(3) motion, all differed on the facts. The court then said that there “can be no doubt that the withheld information was well within the scope of the question being asked, which foreclosed plaintiffs right to pick and choose those items of truth he preferred the jury to hear.” The court indicated that while it is possible that McAllister’s attorney could have cross-examined Bethel about the reasons for the firing more extensively than he did, the attorney’s methods were understandable as Riverbus terminated Bethel long after discovery had been closed and only three weeks before trial. The judge indicated that Bethel’s testimony was the only basis for the $554,000 award and that the jury had been told that Bethel who was 37 years old was earning $37,000 annually at Riverbus. In these circumstances, the court held that McAllister was entitled to a new trial. Furthermore, the trial was to be on both liability and damages because Bethel’s testimony regarding what Riverbus told him was relevant on both issues.
We use the abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the district court’s orders under Rule 60(b)(3). Central W. Rental Co. v. Horizon Leasing, 967 F.2d 832, 836 (3d Cir.1992). In this review, we ascertain whether the misconduct prevented McAllister from fully and fairly presenting its defense. See Stridiron v. Stridiron, 698 F.2d 204, 206-07 (3d Cir.1983).
We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in granting the new trial. In addition to the patent inconsistency between Bethel’s trial testimony and arbitration testimony that we already have noted, there were other inconsistencies between his trial and arbitration evidence. At trial, Bethel testified that Riverbus gave him a letter dated June 24, 1992, which stated that “due to unsatisfactory background check, that I was to be put on probation for the rest of my life.” In fact, the letter, which was not produced at trial, said “that an unsatisfactory background cheek and performance rating has been given to Captain John Bethel and that [he] is placed on probationary status until further notice.”8 Furthermore, as the district court noted, Bethel also testified at the arbitration hearing that Riverbus told him on June 28, 1992, the date it actually discharged him, that it was doing so because [385]*385he “refused to take a drug test in McAllis-ter’s and ... didn’t show up for work on the weekend.” In the circumstances, it is perfectly clear that Bethel created a false impression that Riverbus told him that his difficulties arising from McAllister’s discharge of him cost him his job at Riverbus, whereas he knew that Riverbus had told him that much more was involved.
This misrepresentation was not merely material to his case. It was crucial. Indeed, on the first appeal, though we reversed the district court’s order granting McAliister a judgment in its favor under Rule 50(b), we characterized Bethel’s case as “thin” and described aspects of it as “not ... strong” and “weak.” Indeed, it was so thin that the district court felt that the verdict could not stand and, on the first appeal, one judge of this court agreed with him. The misrepresentation thus buttressed a weak case and was almost certainly the basis for the award of damages, as we cannot understand how the jury could have settled on its large award of compensatory damages, except on the basis of Bethel’s loss of earnings attributable to Riverbus’s discharge. Clearly, by concealing the actual reasons Riverbus gave him for his discharge, Bethel prevented McAllister from fully and fairly presenting its defense, as these events took place after discovery was closed and immediately before the trial.
We acknowledge that it is less clear that the misrepresentation was responsible for the verdict on liability, though it well may have been, as it is possible that the jury might have believed that Riverbus had not discharged Bethel because it believed him to be. a drug user if it knew that Riverbus gave Bethel additional reasons for discharging him. In any event, in view of the appellant’s concession that he does not want a new trial, any uncertainty of the consequence of the perjury on the verdict of liability does not matter, as a finding of liability without an opportunity for a damages trial would be of no use to him. As we have indicated, appellant made it clear at oral argument that the only relief he wanted on this appeal was a reinstatement of the verdict in Bethel’s favor and entry of a judgment on it.9 In these circumstances, we need not explore the possibility that even if we held that the district court should have limited its order for a new trial to a trial on damages, the line of cases culminating in Spain, which we discussed above, would preclude appellant from proceeding with the case on the theory that he refused to proceed on a trial which would have included damages, when he had an opportunity to do so.10
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the orders of July 11, 1994, and December 13, 1994, and will dismiss the appeal to the extent that appellant recited in his notice of appeal that it was taken from the order of April 28,1995.