OPINION OF THE COURT
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Three witnesses appeal from the final order of the District Court holding them in civil contempt and ordering them confined for refusing to testify before a grand jury investigating their father. The witnesses justify their refusal to testify on religious grounds and contend that the District Court failed to follow the procedures mandated by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4. This appears to be the first Court of Appeals decision to consider the [828]*828application of that Act to a grand jury subpoena.
I.
A federal grand jury is currently sitting in Newark, New Jersey, to investigate various crimes allegedly committed by an Orthodox Jewish Rabbi. Between August and September 1998, the government subpoenaed three of the Rabbi’s daughters to testify before the grand jury concerning, inter alia, the roles of the witnesses as employees of their father. By mutual agreement, the return date of the subpoenas was eventually adjourned until October 29, 1998. On October 27, 1998, the District Court issued an order immunizing the witnesses in order to overcome any Fifth Amendment obstacle to their giving testimony. The next day, the witnesses responded by filing a Motion to Quash, which the government opposed by memorandum submitted on the following day. In support of its opposition, the government filed with the court, ex parte and in camera, a Schofield affidavit, see generally In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield I), 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir.1973), setting forth the nature of the grand jury proceedings and the government’s interest in and need for the witnesses’ testimony.
The District Court denied the motion to quash. It also denied the request made on behalf of the witnesses for an evidentiary hearing and for an opportunity to review the government’s Schofield affidavit. On October 29, 1998, the court ordered the witnesses to comply with the subpoenas. All three witnesses appeared before the grand jury but refused to testify on the ground that to do so would violate their deeply held religious beliefs. The same day, the District Court held each in contempt and ordered them remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal for the duration of the term of the grand jury. The court stayed its imprisonment order pending an expedited appeal, and the witnesses filed a Notice of Appeal on November 4, 1998. On November 18, 1998, the District Court issued a written opinion describing the earlier proceedings and explaining its oral decisions of October 29, 1998.
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. This court has jurisdiction to consider the witnesses’ appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We expedited our hearing and consideration.
II.
In 1963, the Supreme Court stated, “[A]ny incidental burden [a statute imposes] on the free exercise of ... religion may be justified by a ‘compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate.’ ” Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963)). As the Court further explained in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972), “activities of individuals, even when religiously based, are often subject to regulation by the States in the exercise of their undoubted power to promote the health, safety, and general welfare, or the Federal Government in the exercise of its delegated powers.” However, the Court noted, “only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.” Id. at 215, 92 S.Ct. at 1533. We, along with the other courts, interpreted these passages to mean that a statute that imposed an incidental burden on religion would survive First Amendment scrutiny only if it were the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling state interest. See, e.g., United States v. Dickens, 695 F.2d 765, 772 (3d Cir.1982).
The Supreme Court called the validity of this prevalent interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause into significant doubt in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 [829]*829S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). There it held, “[the] right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).” Id. at 879, 110 S.Ct. at 1600 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
It is against this background that Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. In so doing, Congress stated, “laws ‘neutral’ toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2). It thus attempted “to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder.” Id. § 2000bb(b)(l) (cita-tiqns omitted).
Thereafter, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997), the Supreme Court held RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the actions of a local zoning authority, based in part on the Tenth Amendment. Courts have since disagreed over whether RFRA is constitutional as applied to the federal government. See In re Young, 141 F.3d 854, 860-61 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 43, 142 L.Ed.2d 34 (1998); United States v. Grant, 117 F.3d 788, 792 n. 6 (5th Cir.1997); cf. United States v. Muhammad, 165 F.3d 327, 336-37 (5th Cir.1999) (declining to consider in the first instance on appeal argument that RFRA protected federal prisoner from involuntary civil commitment for psychiatric treatment). In our recent decision in Adams v. CIR, 170 F.3d 173 (3d Cir.1999), we noted the issue, but assumed without deciding that RFRA is constitutional as applied to the federal government. Here also, we need not decide whether any part of RFRA survives Flores, because we conclude that the federal government’s actions in this case would survive constitutional scrutiny even under the rigorous RFRA standard.
III.
RFRA states, in relevant part:
(a) In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l. Thus, once a party has shown that the application of a neutral law substantially burdens his or her religion, the government bears the burden of proving that enforcement of the law is the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling state interest.
The witnesses argue (1) that the District Court failed to properly apply RFRA by underestimating the burden that forcing them to testify will place on their free exercise of religion, (2) that the government failed to prove that its interest in securing their testimony is compelling, and (3)that enforcing the subpoenas is not the least restrictive means of furthering whatever interest the government may have. We consider each issue in turn.
A.
The witnesses contend that their religion, Orthodox Judaism, prohibits them from providing testimony to be used against their father. The prohibition, they explain, stems from the commandment of the Old Testament, “Honor thy father and thy mother.” In support, they cite the affirmation of Rabbi Feivel Cohen, the [830]*830family’s Decisor,1 which was submitted together with the Motion to Quash, to the effect that it would be “a fundamental sin which cannot be expunged on Yom Kippur (the Day of Atonement)” for the children to “testify! ] before members of the public in order to provide the prosecutors evidence to be used against their father.” App. at 12.
The District Court expressed some skepticism about whether Jewish tenets in general, or the witnesses’ religious beliefs in particular, actually prohibit them from testifying before the grand jury. See App. at 60 n. 1. For purposes of decision, however, it “accept[ed] the religious beliefs of the witnesses as such.” App. at 60.
The witnesses argue on appeal that, in expressing such skepticism, the District Court underestimated the burden that enforcement of the subpoenas will place on the witnesses’ practice of their religion.2 The witnesses contend, “To the extent the district court determined that the weight to be accorded the religious burden was lightened by these factors, it was inappropriate and the judgment below should be vacated.” Appellants’ Br. at 38. They further note that the District Court improperly described the burden on their religion as “incidental.” Appellants’ Br. at 36.
The witnesses misapprehend the District Court’s use of the term “incidental” in this context. It was used in precisely this manner by the Supreme Court in Smith, where the Court said:
[I]f prohibiting the exercise of religion (or burdening the activity of printing) is not the object of the tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 878, 110 S.Ct. 1595.
As to the witnesses’ objection to what appears to be the District Court’s questioning of the sincerity of their beliefs and its attempt to interpret for itself the strictures of Orthodox Judaism, we note, first, that the government assumed that the witnesses had shown a substantial free exercise burden and, second, that the District Court assumed for purposes of decision both that the witnesses’ religious beliefs were sincere and that testifying against their father would violate these beliefs. In light of the court’s assumption, the witnesses were not injured by any skepticism the District Court may have expressed.
B.
The witnesses next complain that the government failed to establish a compelling interest in securing their testimony. The District Court found that the government has an interest in “investigating and successfully prosecuting crimes, which invariably includes taking the grand jury testimony of witnesses.” App. at 61. Citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 687-88, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972), a case in which the Supreme Court refused to recognize under the First Amendment a blanket reporters’ privilege to refuse to testify in grand jury proceedings, and the general principle that the “public has a right to every man’s evidence ... particularly ... [in] grand jury proceedings,” id. at 688, 92 S.Ct. at 2660, the District Court concluded that the government’s interest was compelling. It stated, “That the government should investigate suspected criminal wrongdoing is essential and implements its paramount responsibil[831]*831ity for the general safety and welfare of all its citizens.” App. at 61.
The witnesses contend that, rather than relying on Branzburg in basing its finding of a compelling state interest on the generalized need for criminal investigation, the court should have conducted a more particularized inquiry into the facts and circumstances of this case. They contend that the District Court was required to consider the nature of the investigation and the relationship between that investigation and the testimony sought before deciding whether the government’s interest in questioning the witnesses was compelling. They assume that the crime under investigation is a revenue crime, rather than a capital one, and therefore assert that this fact reduces the weight of the government’s interest in investigation. The witnesses further contend that the criminal process is more of a burden on religious beliefs than civil or administrative processes because of the “dramatic” nature of the effect. Appellants’ Br. at 35. In support they quote the portion of Justice O’Con-nor’s concurrence in Smith, where she wrote, “A neutral criminal law prohibiting conduct that a State may legitimately regulate is, if anything, more burdensome than a neutral civil statute placing legitimate conditions on the award of a state benefit.” 494 U.S. at 898-99, 110 S.Ct. at 1611.
Although the Supreme Court has not considered whether the government’s interest in securing testimony pursuant to a grand jury subpoena is compelling, three courts of appeals have considered a similar issue under the law as it existed prior to Smith, and all three concluded that the government’s interest in securing the particular evidence sought for the particular purposes alleged in those cases was compelling. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings of John Doe, 842 F.2d 244, 247-48 (10th Cir.1988); Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423, 432-33 (5th Cir.1985); Smilow v. United States, 465 F.2d 802, 804-05 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 409 U.S. 944, 93 S.Ct. 268, 34 L.Ed.2d 215 (1972). These cases remain a useful aid in interpreting RFRA in light of the expressed congressional intent to restore the status of the law before Smith. See Adams, 170 F.3d at 177.
In Smilow, a grand jury was investigating a fire-bombing, which killed a young woman. Appellant, a 17-year-old high school student and a suspect in the bombing, refused to answer the grand jury’s questions on the grounds that doing so would violate his faith as an observant Jew. The district court held the student in contempt, sentenced him to jail, and committed him to a federal detention center. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the state has a compelling interest “in uncovering evidence of serious crimes of violence.” Smilow, 465 F.2d at 804.
In Port, Bernard and Odette Port were summoned before a state grand jury to give testimony about Bernard’s natural son, David, the primary suspect in a murder the grand jury was investigating. When the Ports refused to testify, the state court held them in contempt and sentenced them to jail. The Ports filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court, arguing, inter alia, that, as observant Jews, they had the right under the Free Exercise Clause to refuse to testify against their son. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected the Ports’ argument, holding, “in the context of this case, the state’s interest in procuring every person’s testimony for the thorough investigation of the crime of homicide outweighs the Ports’ First Amendment claims.” Port, 764 F.2d at 432.
The decision of the Tenth Circuit in Doe presents a situation parallel to the one before us: a 15-year-old Mormon child was given immunity and called to testify against a parent. He declined because “his deeply held religious beliefs” prohibited him from testifying against his mother or other members of his family. The court of appeals decided that the government’s [832]*832“compelling ■ interest in investigating offenses against the criminal laws of the United States” outweighed the witness’s free exercise rights. Doe, 842 F.2d at 248. These cases provide ample support for the District Court’s decision.
There are cases in which this court has recognized traditional common law testimonial privileges over the government's interest in securing grand jury testimony. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 384 (3d Cir.1990) (“Although there are countervailing considerations, we have no doubt -that the need for protecting the [priest-penitent] relationship outweighs them.”). However, in a recent decision, we refused to recognize a general parent-child testimonial privilege, see In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1146-56 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom, Roe v. United States, 520 U.S. 1253, 117 S.Ct. 2412, 138 L.Ed.2d 177 (1997), thereby following the overwhelming majority of state and federal courts on that issue.
We need not decide in this case whether the government’s interest in investigating and prosecuting crime is always compelling under RFRA because we are convinced that the government’s interest in securing the evidence needed to punish the criminal activity alleged here is compelling. The District Court correctly recognized that the duty to prosecute persons who commit serious crimes is part and parcel of the government’s “paramount responsibility for the general safety and welfare of all its citizens.” App. at 61. Grand jury proceedings play an essential role in the government’s ability to fulfill this duty. A review of the Schofield affidavit confirms both that the crimes that this grand jury is investigating are weighty and that these witnesses are likely to possess substantial relevant information. The dissent makes much of the fact that “[t]his is not a situation involving violence or disruption or a threat to public safety.” Dissenting Op. at 840. Although it -is true that this case does not concern crimes of extreme violence, such as those at issue in Port and Smilow, the crimes alleged here, like many white collar crimes, may seriously impact the public welfare. We therefore conclude that enforcing these subpoenas would serve a compelling state interest.
C.
RFRA imposes yet another requirement, i.e., that the government actions, here enforcing the grand jury subpoenas, must be the least restrictive means of serving the government’s compelling interest. According to the witnesses, the subpoenas are not a narrowly drawn means to this end. They contend that the government can secure similar evidence from other sources and that, under RFRA, it has an obligation to do so. They insist that other witnesses can provide, and may already have provided, the same or similar evidence. And, they assert that “there are records that establish some of the operative facts.” Appellants’ Br. at 33.
The government denies that “there were other means of obtaining the information.” Appellee’s Br. at 26. It further memorialized this denial in a sworn Schofield affidavit explaining the circumstances under investigation and the witnesses’ relationship thereto, which affidavit was submitted under seal to the District Court in the first instance and to us on appeal. The District Court reviewed the affidavit in camera and found that the government needs the witnesses’ testimony “with regard to their employment status ... [and] the various business interests of the target.” App. at 48.
After reviewing the government’s submission ourselves, we reach the same conclusion. There is substantial reason to believe that the witnesses possess relevant information necessary for the prosecution of serious crimes. Their role as employees of the target of the investigation suggests that they are uniquely situated to have first-hand knowledge of the target’s past business conduct. Moreover, the witnesses have submitted no evidence beyond [833]*833their own self-serving allegations to contradict that suggestion or to establish that the government can conveniently obtain comparable information from other sources.
The dissent’s contentions to the contrary notwithstanding, see Dissenting Op. at 841, we do not suggest that the witnesses bore the burden of proving that less restrictive means were available. We merely point out that the evidence of record, which is contained in the government’s sworn affidavit and which supports its position, remains uncontradicted. Although the witnesses were denied an evidentiary hearing, they were not denied an opportunity to submit evidence, as the dissent implies. See Dissenting Op. at 842. The witnesses were aware that they could submit evidence in the form of affidavits because they did submit an affirmation of Rabbi Feivel Cohen. Nothing prevented them from submitting affidavits concerning the availability of relevant business records or the potential testimony of other witnesses, which their counsel argue exist.
The dissent contends that although we owe at least some deference to the District Court’s conclusion, that conclusion was faulty because it relied on the untested affidavit of the prosecution. See Dissenting Opinion at 840. The dissent fails to note, however, that the affidavit was sworn by an Assistant United States Attorney, an officer of the court. Under these circumstances, there is nothing inappropriate about relying on the affidavit. We therefore conclude that, in this case, enforcing the subpoenas is the least restrictive means of advancing the government’s compelling interest.3
IV.
In addition to the substantive arguments discussed above, the witnesses raise several procedural objections to the District Court’s determination. They argue that RFRA and pr e-Smith precedent required the District Court to hold a hearing regarding the constitutionality and reasonableness of enforcing the subpoenas, and they claim that it was error under RFRA for the District Court to refuse to disclose the government’s affidavit.
The witnesses interpret RFRA, and the pre~Smith precedent that it draws on, to mandate an evidentiary hearing whenever a free exercise defense to the enforcement of a grand jury subpoena is raised. They cite language from Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Smith suggesting that "the First Amendment at least requires a case-by-case determination ..., sensitive to the facts of each particular claim,” 494 U.S. at 899, 110 S.Ct. at 1611, as well as a passage from Justice Black-mun’s dissent in which he states: “[T]his court’s prior decisions have not allowed a government to rely on mere speculation about potential harms, but have demanded evidentiary support for a refusal to allow a religious exception.” 494 U.S. at 911, 110 S.Ct. at 1617.
There is a difference between requiring evidentiary support and requiring a hearing. Neither Supreme Court precedent nor our prior decisions require that a hear[834]*834ing be held whenever a subpoena is challenged on reasonableness grounds. Indeed, this court has specifically rejected any such suggestion, leaving the decision to hold a hearing to the district court’s discretion. See In re Grand Jury Matter, 770 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir.1985); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 507 F.2d 963, 966 (3d Cir.1975). Nor does precedent or policy require a different rule when the challenge is a constitutional one.
In Schofield II, we explained the procedure that a district court must follow when asked to enforce a grand jury subpoena:
[T]he party seeking enforcement of a grand jury subpoena [must] make some minimal showing by affidavit of the existence of a proper purpose.... “[T]he Government [is] required to ... [show] that each item is at least relevant to an investigation being conducted by the grand jury and properly within its jurisdiction, and is not sought primarily for another purpose.”
[Although] the burden is generally on the witness to show abuse of the grand jury process, Schofield I requires the government to present affidavits in every case irrespective of whether the witness has challenged the propriety of the subpoena....
[W]here the district court is not satisfied with the affidavits presented by the government, whether because the matters set forth challenge the court’s credibility or because the witness has made some colorable challenge to the affidavits, the court can require something more.
507 F.2d at 964-65 (footnote and citation omitted) (quoting Schofield I, 486 F.2d at 93).
We went on to discuss the broad discretion a district court enjoys in exercising this supervisory role:
The district judge is vested with considerable discretion in determining whether additional proceedings are warranted. Various avenues of inquiry are open to a court which questions the sufficiency of the affidavits, among them discovery, in camera inspection, additional affidavits and a hearing.... [W]e emphasize ... that the decision to require additional investigation is committed to the sound discretion of the court.
Id. at 965. We set forth the factors that should inform a district court’s decision whether to order further inquiry into whether the government is abusing the subpoena process:
[TJhe court must in deciding that request (for additional proceedings,) weigh the quite limited scope of an inquiry into abuse of the subpoena process, and the potential for delay, against any need for additional information which might cast doubt upon the accuracy of the Government’s representations.
Id. (quoting Schofield I, 486 F.2d at 93). We treated “the realization that the grand jury must be given broad investigative powers” as a primary consideration in crafting appropriate procedures and rejected “any holding that would ‘saddle’ a grand jury with minitrials ... [thereby] impeding] its investigative duty.” Id. at 966. Finally, we emphasized that our review of a district court’s determination would be deferential: “We will not disturb a decision to deny additional review unless we find that the district court’s ‘weighing’ was an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 965.
The same considerations are applicable here; therefore, similar procedures are appropriate. The District Court had a duty to satisfy itself that the witnesses’ testimony was necessary to serve the government’s compelling interest without unduly delaying or interfering with the functioning of the grand jury. The government bore responsibility for establishing the propriety of enforcing the subpoenas. We therefore conclude that the submission of a Schofield affidavit was a suitable means for the government to fulfill its obligation. And, we hold that, in deciding whether to order further pro[835]*835ceedings, it was appropriate for the District Court to weigh the same factors outlined in Schofield I and Schofield II: the scope of inquiry (here under RFRA), the potential for delay, and “any need for additional information which might cast doubt upon the accuracy of the Government’s representations.” Schofield II, 507 F.2d at 965; Schofield I, 486 F.2d at 98. Because, weighing these factors in this case, we cannot say it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court not to order further inquiry, we will not disturb its determination.
The dissent misinterprets our statement that “similar procedures are appropriate” to mean that the same substantive standard applies whenever a grand jury subpoena is challenged, whether on abuse of process or First Amendment grounds. See Dissenting Op. at 841. Lest there be any confusion, we reiterate: in deciding whether to enforce a grand jury subpoena over a RFRA objection, the district court must satisfy itself that the witness’s testimony is necessary to serve a compelling state interest. In its discretion, the district court may permit the government, which bears the burden of proving the existence of a compelling purpose and the unavailability of less restrictive means, to meet that burden through the ex parte in camera submission of a sworn affidavit.
The witnesses argue that, although the procedures set forth above may be appropriate in the context of an abuse of process inquiry, RFRA heightens the need for a hearing. They point to RFRA’s requirement of individualized judgments and a balancing of facts and circumstances in every case, and they note that RFRA shifts the burden of proof to the government.
It is true that our past decisions have relied in part on a division of the burdens of proof that does not apply under RFRA. For example, in District Council 33, we upheld the district court’s decision to enforce a subpoena without requiring an evi-dentiary hearing on the grounds that “[gjrand jury proceedings are entitled to ‘a presumption of regularity’ ” and that “the party objecting to the enforcement of a grand jury subpoena has the burden of demonstrating some irregularity in those proceedings.” 770 F.2d at 40 (quoting Schofield I, 486 F.2d at 92). In doing so, we reaffirmed our previous holding that “ ‘the decision to require additional investigation’ beyond the Schofield affidavit, ‘is committed to the sound discretion of the district court.’” Id. at 39 (quoting Schofield II, 507 F.2d at 965).
Under RFRA, the government, rather than the party challenging the subpoena, bears the burden of proof as to compelling interest and least restrictive means. Nothing in this different distribution of the burdens of proof, however, undercuts our determination that similar procedures are appropriate. The fact that the witnesses did not bear the burden of proof on the issues they sought to explore by a hearing makes it less, not more, likely that they were injured by the District Court’s denial of that request. We thus reject the witnesses’ claim that an evidentiary hearing is always required under RFRA. Of course, we do not suggest that an evidentiary hearing would never be required when the party subpoenaed claims both a substantial burden on his or her religious beliefs and either the absence of a compelling government interest or the availability of a less restrictive alternative. We merely hold that in this case the District Court, which had the discretion to decide, did not abuse that discretion in rejecting the request.
In addition to seeking an evidentia-ry hearing, the witnesses’ counsel requested a copy of the government’s Schofield affidavit, which request the District Court denied. The witnesses challenge that denial on appeal, noting that “[i]n Schofield, the affidavit was not only turned over to the defense, it was replicated in the body of the opinion.” Appellants’ Br. at 43. [836]*836They ask this court (without making a formal motion) to “order that [the affidavit] be turned over and permit a supplementary brief by the petitioners to address its application to the merits.” Id. at 44. We find no merit to the witnesses’ challenge and will deny their request.
We have consistently endorsed the use of in camera proceedings to preserve grand jury secrecy. In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d at 1145 (“Ex parte in camera hearings have been held proper in order to preserve the ongoing interest in grand jury secrecy.”); In the Matter of Grand Jury Empanelled Oct 18, 1979 (Hughes), 633 F.2d 282, 288 (3d Cir.1980). This procedure is consistent with Supreme Court precedent. See United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 302, 111 S.Ct. 722, 112 L.Ed.2d 795 (1991).
Our decision in In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140 (3d Cir.1997), resolved a similar issue under similar' circumstances. A 16-year-old, asserting a parent-child privilege, moved to quash a grand jury subpoena seeking to elicit her testimony about her father’s involvement in an alleged kid-naping. The district court held a hearing and ordered additional briefing “on the issue of whether the daughter’s testimony would be material and nonduplicative,” and. it required the government to “make a substantial showing that this threshold was met.” Id. at 1143 & n. 6 (citation omitted). The government filed a Scho-field affidavit and voluntarily furnished further particulars at an in camera ex parte hearing. Based on these in camera and ex parte submissions, the district court concluded, “ ‘the government’s interests in compelling the testimony outweigh the privacy interests asserted by the moving parties’ and denied the motion to quash on those grounds.” Id. at 1144. We affirmed on appeal, stating:
[W]e find little merit in the arguments ... pertaining to the Schofield affidavit and the in camera proceedings before the district court.... Ex parte in camera hearings have been held proper in order to preserve the ongoing interest in grand jury secrecy. The secrecy of the grand jury proceedings in the present matter might have been compromised by divulging the specific questions that the government intended to ask during the daughter’s testimony. Judicial supervision and interference with grand jury proceedings should always be kept to a minimum.... We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in hearing the government’s proffer in camera and ex parte.
Id. at 1145-46 (citations omitted).
The only relevant difference we can see between In re Grand Jury and this case is that the witnesses there based their claims on the need to protect the parent-child relationship, whereas here the witnesses assert religious beliefs in support of their privilege claims. The question remaining then is whether more protective procedures are mandated when a claim to privilege is based on religious beliefs than when it is based on secular beliefs about the same parent-child relationship.
The witnesses argue that more protective procedures are required because they view RFRA as “amending” Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) to ease the stringency of grand jury secrecy in order to assure the witnesses a meaningful opportunity to contest the burden on their free exercise of religion. RFRA, however, does not purport to amend the rule of grand jury secrecy. To the extent there is a substantial burden on the witnesses’ free exercise of religion, it is created by the grand jury subpoena and not by the maintenance of grand jury secrecy. And, although we have accepted the substantiality of the burden alleged, we have concluded that in light of the government’s compelling need and the unavailability of less restrictive alternatives, the subpoenas can be enforced.
V.
For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the order of the District Court holding the [837]*837witnesses in contempt. In light of the impending expiration of the grand jury, the mandate shall issue forthwith.