United States v. Hammer

121 F. Supp. 2d 794, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15692, 2000 WL 1610380
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedOctober 24, 2000
Docket4:CR-96-239
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 121 F. Supp. 2d 794 (United States v. Hammer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Hammer, 121 F. Supp. 2d 794, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15692, 2000 WL 1610380 (M.D. Pa. 2000).

Opinion

ORDER

MUIR, District Judge.

THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS FOLLOWS:

On November 4, 1998, this court sentenced David Paul Hammer to die by lethal injection for the first degree murder of Andrew Marti. On November 12, 1998, Mr. Hammer appealed that sentence to the Court of Appeals for this circuit. By opinion of August 31, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed Mr. Hammer’s appeal and remanded the case to this court “to fix an early new date for the implementation of the sentence of death.” United States v. Hammer, 226 F.3d 229, 237 (3d Cir.2000). On September 20, 2000, we received a memorandum from the government regarding the date of the execution. On September 21, 2000, we received a certified copy of the Court of Appeals’ judgment in lieu of a formal mandate.

By order of September 21, 2000, we complied with the direction of the Court of Appeals by issuing an order setting November 15, 2000, as the date for the implementation of the sentence of death. Mr. Hammer is incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary, Terre Haute, Indiana (“USP-Terre Haute”), and the execution will take place at that facility. Terre Haute is located in Vigo County, Indiana.

After we issued the order on September 21, 2000, setting November 15, 2000, as the date for the implementation of the sentence of death, we received on September 21, 2000, a document from Mr. Hammer entitled “Pro Se Defendant’s Response to Government’s Memorandum on Setting Execution Date.” In that document Mr. Hammer requests that the execution be carried out between 10:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. and that he be provided with 30 days’ notice of the tentative time selected for conducting the execution.

By order of September 22, 2000, we directed the government to file a response *797 to Mr. Hammer’s requests. On October 10, 2000, the government filed a memorandum regarding the setting of a particular time frame for the execution. On October 11, 2000, at 4:08 p.m., the Clerk of Court was advised by Mr. Hammer through the law office of stand-by counsel, Ronald C. Travis, that he would not be filing a reply memorandum. On October 5, 2000, Mr. Hammer filed a motion entitled “Pro Se Motion to Preclude Autopsy of David Paul Hammer” and brief in support thereof. Mr. Hammer also filed a motion for expedited briefing. By order of October 6, 2000, we authorized the government to file an expedited brief in opposition. We also authorized the Coroner of Vigo County, Indiana, to file a brief in opposition by October 18, 2000. On October 11, 2000, the government 1 filed a brief in which it argues that we do not have jurisdiction to act on Mr. Hammer’s motion to preclude an autopsy. On October 16, 2000, Mr. Hammer filed a reply brief. On October 18, 2000, Assistant United States Attorney Frederick E. Martin filed a document entitled “Government’s Supplemental Response to Order of October 6, 2000” and the Coroner of Vigo County, Indiana, filed a brief in opposition to Mr. Hammer’s motion to preclude an autopsy. The government also filed a declaration under penalty of perjury of Harry G. Lappin, Warden of USP-Terre Haute, and Vigo County filed an affidavit of Dr. Susan S. Amos, the Coroner of Vigo County. On October 20, 2000, Mr. Hammer responded by filing reply briefs, exhibits and his own declaration under penalty of perjury relating to his sincerely held religious beliefs opposing autopsies. Therefore, both issues—whether we should set a time frame or a specific time of day for the execution to take place and whether we should preclude an autopsy—are ripe for disposition.

We will first respond to a footnote in the government’s memorandum filed on October 10, 2000, regarding the setting of a particular time frame for the execution. That footnote states in relevant part that “the United States does not believe that this Court is the appropriate forum for considering all claims by Hammer regarding the details of his confinement or proposed execution in Indiana.” We reject that position in part. This court is the appropriate forum for considering all claims of Mr. Hammer regarding the details of the scheduled execution in Indiana. It is clear also that the sentence of death must be implemented in a manner-consistent with the law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 18 U.S.C. § 8596; see also H.R. Report No. 467, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess.1994, 1994 WL 107578 (Leg.Hist.).

Section 3596 entitled “Implementation of a sentence of death” states in relevant part as follows:

When the sentence is to be implemented, the Attorney General shall release the person sentenced to death to the custody of a United States marshal, who shall supervise implementation of the sentence in the manner prescribed by the law of the State in which the sentence is imposed. If the law of the State does not provide for implementation of a sentence of death, the court shall designate another State, the law of which does provide for the implementation of a sentence of death, and the sentence shall be implemented in that latter State in the manner prescribed by such law. 2

*798 The term “imposed” throughout the federal death penalty statute relates to the adjudication by the court and not the actual infliction of the punishment. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3595(a) and (c) (“(a) Appeal.—In a case in which a sentence of death is imposed, the sentence shall be subject to review by the court of appeals upon appeal by the defendant.... (c) Decision and disposition.—(1) The court of appeals shall address all substantive and procedural issues raised on the appeal of a sentence of death, and shall consider whether the sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor ... (2) Whenever, the court of appeals finds that—(A) the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; .... ”)(emphasis added). Furthermore, the term “imposed” is commonly used in legal opinions with respect to the court’s adjudication of punishment. In contrast with respect to the actual infliction of the punishment the federal death penalty statute uses the term “implementation.” “Implement” is defined as “to give practical effect to and ensure of actual fulfillment by concrete measures.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1961). “Implementation” is defined as “the act of implementing or the state of being implemented.” Id. The implementation of the death sentence involves a process which includes more than just the method of execution utilized. Congress was no doubt aware of the usage of the terms “imposed” and “implementation” when it passed the federal death penalty statute.

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Bluebook (online)
121 F. Supp. 2d 794, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15692, 2000 WL 1610380, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-hammer-pamd-2000.