SEYMOUR, Chief Judge.
Zions First National Bank (Zions) brought this adversary proceeding against Christian-sen Brothers Inc. (Christiansen). Zions had a perfected security interest in the accounts receivable of debtor Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. (Davidson) and sought to enforce that interest out of accounts receivable Christian-sen allegedly owed Davidson. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to Christiansen, ruling that Christiansen owed Davidson nothing by virtue of Christiansen’s payment of debts that Davidson owed to its suppliers, Diehl Lumber Products (Diehl) and Anderson Lumber (Anderson). Zions appealed to the district court which reversed, holding that Christiansen’s payment of Davidson’s debts did not relieve Christiansen of its obligation to pay Davidson. See Zions First Nat’l Bank, N.A. v. Christiansen Bros. Inc. (In re Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc.), 164 B.R. 773 (D.Utah 1993). The district court accordingly granted summary judgment for Zions. Christiansen appeals, and we reverse.
I.
The relevant facts underlying this litigation are undisputed and may be briefly stated as follows. Davidson filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on February 6, 1986. The case was converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding on April 30, 1987. On February 21, 1986, Davidson and Zions entered into a post-petition financing agreement under which Zions obtained a security interest in Davidson’s accounts receivable. Zions filed a financing statement in this regard under the Utah provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).
Christiansen, as the general contractor on a construction project, bought goods and materials from Davidson post-petition for use on the project. Davidson in turn bought material from Diehl and Anderson and resold it to Christiansen for use in the project. Chris-tiansen was contractually obligated to the owner of the project to deliver the project free of mechanics liens. Davidson did not pay Diehl and Anderson for the materials. On February 24, 1987, Christiansen issued a joint check to Anderson and Davidson as payment for the materials Davidson had purchased from Anderson and resold to Chris-tiansen. Davidson’s president endorsed the check. On February 27, 1987, Diehl filed a notice of mechanics lien on the project under state law based on its lack of payment. Christiansen and Diehl entered into an agreement on March 11, 1987, under which Diehl agreed to release the lien and Chris-tiansen agreed to pay Diehl the amounts Davidson owed Diehl for the material Diehl sold to Davidson for use on the project. Christiansen paid Diehl, and Diehl released the lien. In a letter dated March 13, 1987, Davidson wrote to Christiansen stating that Zions had a security interest in Davidson’s accounts receivable. Davidson further stated that it declined to authorize payment of these accounts to anyone but the bankruptcy estate.
II.
In reviewing a bankruptcy court decision, the district court accepts fact findings unless clearly erroneous and reviews conclusions of law de novo. See Bartmann v. Maverick Tube Corp., 853 F.2d 1540, 1543 (10th Cir.1988). We likewise review a bankruptcy court’s factual determinations for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. Id. We agree with the parties that no material fact disputes exist and that we are called upon to review only legal issues.
The bankruptcy court based its decision on its conclusion that, under Utah law, Christiansen’s payments as a general contractor to suppliers who had not been paid by Davidson, the subcontractor, created a de[1564]*1564fense to Christiansen’s obligation to pay Davidson. The district court disagreed, concluding that nothing in applicable Utah statutes allows a general contractor to extinguish its obligation to a subcontractor by paying directly the subcontractor’s creditors. Accordingly, we turn first to Utah law.
Utah recognizes the principle of setoff,1 under which a defendant may assert a counterclaim against a plaintiff “to be used in full or partial satisfaction of whatever is owed.” Mark VII Fin. Consultants Corp. v. Smedley, 792 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah Ct.App. 1990). The court in Mark VII held that as a general rule setoff is only warranted when the demands between the parties are mutual. Id. at 133 (citing 80 C.J.S. Set-Off and Counterclaim § 48a(2) (1953); 20 Am.Jur.2d Counterclaim, Recoupment, and Setoff § 74 (1965)). As support for that proposition, the court cited authorities which also recognize that a court in equity may permit setoff even when the debts are not mutual in order to effect equity and prevent injustice. See 80 C.J.S. Set-Off and Counterclaim at § 48(b), 20 Am.Jur.2d Counterclaim, Recoupment, and Setoff at § 75.2 Although we have found no decision of the Utah courts addressing whether setoff is available under the circumstances here, we have found no indication in Utah law that setoff would be barred in these circumstances.
Moreover, the Utah courts recognize that the statutes providing for mechanics liens and payment bonds are remedial in nature and are designed to protect suppliers from the contract privity requirement. See Cox Rock Prods. v. Walker Pipeline Constr., 754 P.2d 672, 673-74 (Utah Ct.App.1988). To achieve the protective purposes of these statutes, the Utah courts construe them broadly. See Richards v. Security Pac. Nat’l Bank, 849 P.2d 606, 610 (Utah Ct.App.), cert.
[g]iven the legislature’s creation of a specific statutory preference for mechanics’ lienholders, if the question is framed as a choice between which party should receive a windfall, we believe it should be the mechanics’ lienholder_ Given the statutory protection granted mechanics’ hen-holders, it is much more appropriate to have commercial lenders bear the burden of protecting themselves.
Id. at 612. Although the specific holdings in these cases arose out of fact situations distinguishable from those at issue here, absent otherwise controlling Utah authority the policy in the cases favoring lienholders at the expense of commercial lenders inform our determination of the way in which the Utah courts would resolve the issues before us.3 In keeping with the concern of the Utah courts and legislature that lienholders recover payment for material they have supplied, [1565]*1565we conclude that Utah would permit a general contractor who pays a supplier in order to prevent or to discharge a lien to set that payment off against amounts it owes to the defaulting subcontractor.4
Zions argues that even if Christian-sen had a right to setoff, that right was subordinate to Zions’ perfected security interest in Davidson’s accounts receivable. We disagree. Section 9 — 104(i) of the Utah version of the UCC, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-104(i),5 states that Article 9 does not apply to any right to setoff. See Insley Mfg. Corp. v. Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1986). Utah has joined the majority of jurisdictions construing this provision by holding that a creditor may have a right to setoff without complying with the security agreement and filing provisions of Article 9, although the priority of such a setoff is to be determined under that Article’s priority provisions. Id. at 1344-45.6
The relative rights of account debtors and assignees of accounts receivable are set out in section 9-318 of the UCC. Under that provision the rights of the assignee, here Zions, are subject to “any ... defense or claim of the account debtor [here Christiansen] against the assignor [here Davidson] which accrues before the account debtor receives notification of the assignment.” Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318(l)(b). Contrary to Zions’ assertion, Zions as assignee bears the burden of proving that Christiansen received notice of the assignments so as to cut off Christiansen’s right to set off those payments against the account debt. See 4447 Assocs. v. First Sec. Fin., 889 P.2d 467, 470-71 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (citing cases). Also contrary to Zions’ assertion, filing a financing statement does not provide the actual notice required under section 9-318.
While filing a financing statement is constructive notice that is effective for other purposes under Article 9, see Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-312(5)(a) (1990) (establishing priority among multiple security interests by date of filing), it does not suffice for the actual notice required under section 70A-9-S18. A financing statement only offers notice that a security interest may exist, and requires potential creditors to make further inquiry to confirm the existence of specific details of the transaction. See Sannerud v. First Nat’l Bank, [1566]*1566708 P.2d 1236, 1241 (Wyo.1985); U.C.C. § 9-402 cmt. 2 (1989). An account debtor, unlike a potential creditor, is not obligated to check the UCC recordings continually to ascertain whether the debt has been assigned, and the filed financing statement offers no actual notice of the assignment’s existence that would affect an account debtor’s right to assert subsequent claims and defenses. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318(l)(b) (1990); Chase Manhattan Bank v. State, 40 N.Y.2d 590, 388 N.Y.S.2d 896, 898-99, 357 N.E.2d 366, 369 (1976) (financing statement not actual notice that would bar account debtor from asserting setoff).
Id. at 473 n. 9 (emphasis added).
The only evidence in this record relevant to the notice issue is the letter from Davidson to Christiansen dated March 13, 1987. Even assuming that this letter would constitute sufficient notice under section 9-318(l)(b), see 4447 Assocs., 889 P.2d at 472-75, the letter was dated after Christiansen’s agreement to pay Diehl and after Christian-sen issued the joint check to Anderson and Davidson. Because Christiansen’s claim for setoff arose before it received the notice, if any, provided by the March 13 letter, Zions’ rights as assignee are subject to that claim.7
III.
Zions further argues that allowing setoff here would violate several provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, specifically those pertaining to post-petition financing, use of cash collateral, setoff, and the automatic stay. We begin our consideration of these claims by turning to a long line of eases addressing these and similar arguments in the context of the construction industry. This authority provides a framework for evaluating Zions assertions and supports our determination that the Utah courts would allow setoff in this situation.
The court in Selby v. Ford Motor Co., 590 F.2d 642 (6th Cir.1979), discussed at length the special problems that arise with respect to payment down the line in the construction industry. The court pointed out that the Michigan trust fund statute at issue there was
designed to remedy problems in the construction industry. Like the law merchant of an earlier day, the building trades have gradually created a set of commercial expectations as the result of the customs and practices of the industry. The nature of the industry is such that the commercial expectations of the parties are defeated when a building contractor or subcontractor does not use accounts paid to him on a job to pay subcontractors or materialmen. Unless the parties see that construction funds are properly applied down the line, the liabilities of the parties up the line are affected. The unpaid workers must undertake the lengthy and wasteful process of filing, perfecting and foreclosing on their mechanics liens. The owner’s property and the construction lender’s security are encumbered.
Id. at 647. The court observed that to preserve the economic viability of the multi-tier payment system used in the construction industry,
courts and legislatures have increasingly found that the parties have an independent legal duty arising from reasonable commercial expectations to see to the proper application of construction funds. In the absence of statute, courts have declared that construction funds in the hands of a contractor are held subject to a constructive trust or an equitable assignment or an equitable lien. Even in the absence of a state builders trust statute, federal bankruptcy courts in a variety of situations have refused to apply the property, preference and statutory liens sections of the Bankruptcy Act to favor unsecured credi[1567]*1567tors over the equitable claims of subcontractors and materialmen to the proceeds of a construction project in the hands of a bankrupt contractor.
Id. at 648 (footnotes omitted).8
One of the earliest eases in this area arose out of a factual setting very similar to that before us. The court was required to determine “whether direct payments by the bankrupt’s debtor (a general contractor) to the bankrupt’s creditor (a supplier to the bankrupt), made under obligation of California law, were invalid as setoffs” under the prior Bankruptcy Act. Bel Marin Driwall, Inc. v. Grover (In re Bel Marin Driwall, Inc.), 470 F.2d 932, 933 (9th Cir.1972). Under the California law applicable at the time, “a general contractor and his surety were subject to judgment in favor of unpaid materialmen and suppliers.” Id. at 935. The court pointed out that the general contractor thus paid the suppliers pursuant to a mandatory obligation imposed by statute which existed independently of any duty which the bankrupt subcontractor owed to those suppliers to pay for materials furnished to him. Id. The court held that when payment is made pursuant to such an independent legal obligation, setoff is proper. Id. at 935-36.
In Scherer Hardware & Supply, Inc. v. Charles H. Eichelkrawt & Son, Inc. (In re Scherer Hardware & Supply, Inc.), 9 B.R. 125 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1981), the court also addressed whether a general contractor who pays a bankrupt subcontractor’s supplier pursuant to an independent legal duty may set this payment off against the debt owed to the subcontractor. The court recognized that according to the holding in Bel Marin, “where a debtor of the bankrupt paid a claim of one of the bankrupt’s creditors, a setoff should be allowed if the claim had been acquired as the result of a direct or independent legal obligation.” In re Scherer, 9 B.R. at 129. The court further held that under Bel Marin, the requisite independent legal obligation can come from the general contractor’s direct legal duty, “whether contractual or statutory, to pay all claims for labor and materials, regardless of the claimant’s privity of contract with the general contractor.” Id. Subsequent cases have similarly held in the bankruptcy context that where a general contractor pays suppliers pursuant to an independent legal obligation imposed either by statute or by contract, the general contractor may set that debt off against amounts owing to the subcontractor. See, e.g., Stoebner v. Horizon Fabricators, Inc., 153 B.R. 840 (D.Minn.); In re E. & D. Elec. Co., Inc., 68 B.R. 3 (Bankr.S.D.Miss.1986); In re Flanagan Bros., Inc., 47 B.R. 299 (Bankr.D.N.J.1985).
Equally significant to our consideration of Zions’ arguments are those cases holding that when a general contractor pays a supplier on the basis of an independent legal obligation, those payments do not become part of the bankruptcy estate. See e.g., Crocker v. Braid Elec. Co. (In re Arnold), 908 F.2d 52, 56 (6th Cir.1990); Shaw Indus., Inc. v. Gill (In re Flooring Concepts, Inc.), 37 B.R. 957, 961 (9th Cir. BAP 1984); Rieser v. Brack Plastics Co. (In re Trinity Plastics, Inc.), 138 B.R. 203, 207 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1992). The case of Georgia Pacific Corp. v. Sigma Service Corp., 712 F.2d 962 (5th Cir.1983), upon which both the district court and Zions rely, is distinguishable in significant respects and therefore does not compel a different result. In Sigma, the court considered whether a constructive trust existed under the applicable state law in funds owed to a general contractor in favor of that contractor’s unpaid suppliers. The court held that even if a trust existed, because the debtor had legal title to the funds they became part of the estate subject to the suppliers’ equitable interest under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a), (d). See Sigma, 712 F.2d at 964-68. But see Begier v. I.R.S., 496 U.S. 53, 59, 110 S.Ct. 2258, 2263, 110 L.Ed.2d 46 (1990) (“Because the debtor does not own an equitable interest in property he holds in trust for another, that [1568]*1568interest is not ‘property of the estate.’”). The court in Sigma further held that no constructive trust arose under state law in any event. Significantly, the court’s discussion was directed only to the argument that the funds were not part of the estate because they were subject to a constructive trust. The court did not address the line of cases holding that payments made by a debtor’s debtor to that debtor’s creditor under an independent obligation are not part of the bankruptcy estate.9
Considering Zions’ arguments in light of the above authority, we first note that Christiansen paid Diehl and Anderson as the result of an independent legal duty imposed by the contract between Christian-sen and the project owner. It is undisputed that this contract obligated Christiansen to deliver the project free from liens, an obligation that required Christiansen to pay the suppliers in the event Davidson did not so as to prevent the suppliers from filing liens. The Utah courts have held that a contract provision materially similar to this one renders the suppliers third party beneficiaries with a right to claim directly against the contract obligor. See Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385-87 (Utah 1989). Consequently, the payments made by Christiansen to the suppliers are generally considered by the authorities cited above to be available for setoff against the debt Christiansen owed the bankrupt, and are not considered part of the bankruptcy estate.10
With the above principles in mind, we turn to Zions’ argument that Christiansen violated 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2) by using the cash collateral attributable to the accounts receivable it owed Davidson to pay the suppliers without the consent of Zions or the bankruptcy court. Section 363(c)(2) provides that “[t]he trustee may not use, sell, or lease cash collateral under paragraph (1) of this subsection unless — (A) each entity that has an interest in such cash collateral consents; or (B) the court, after notice and a hearing, authorizes such use, sale, or lease in accordance with the provisions of this section.” Cash collateral is defined as “cash, negotiable instruments, documents of title, securities, deposit accounts, or other cash equivalents whenever acquired in which the estate and an entity other than the estate have an interest and includes the proceeds, products, offspring, rents, or profits of property subject to a security interest.” 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (emphasis added). As emphasized in the quoted definition, this section is not applicable unless the debtor has an interest in the property. As we have discussed, when a general contractor makes a payment to a supplier under an independent legal obligation, that payment is not part of the bankruptcy estate and the debtor therefore has no interest in it. See In re Arnold, 908 F.2d at 55-56. Accordingly, Christian-sen’s payment did not violate section [1569]*1569363(c)(2).11
Zions also argues that allowing set-off here would violate the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) and (4). Under those provisions, the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates to stay “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate,” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), and to stay “any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate,” id. § 362(a)(4).12
Zions’ security interest, Christian-sen’s debt to Davidson, Davidson’s debt to the suppliers, and Christiansen’s payments to those suppliers all arose after Davidson filed its Chapter 11 petition. We are thus concerned here only with the availability of set-off with respect to post-petition obligations. The Bankruptcy Code does not address set-off in these circumstances. Section 553, which governs the availability of setoff, is directed to mutual debts that arose before the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding. See 11 U.S.C. § 553(a). The automatic stay section deals with setoff specifically, but it is likewise addressed only to a debt owed the debtor that arose before the case was filed. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7).13
Despite the Bankruptcy Code’s failure to address the situation, courts generally recognize that in appropriate circumstances mutual post-petition debts may be set off. See e.g., Mohawk Indus. v. United States (In re Mohawk Indus.), 82 B.R. 174,178-79 (Bankr. D.Mass.1987); Paris v. Transamerica Ins. Group (In re Buckley & Assocs. Ins., Inc.), 78 B.R. 155, 158 (E.D.Tenn.1987); Derg v. General Motors Corp. (In re Fordson Eng’g Carp.), 25 B.R. 506, 511 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1982); In re Shoppers Paradise, Inc., 8 B.R. 271, 277-78 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1980). In considering the availability of setoff, the above-cited cases do not address whether the setoff would be subject to the stay imposed by section 362(a)(3) on acts to obtain possession of property of the estate or to exercise control over such property.
Even if we assume that section 362(a)(3) could apply to the setoff of mutual post-petition obligations, we do not believe Zions may invoke its protection here. The primary function of section 362(a)(7), which as we have observed applies by its terms to the setoff of a prepetition debt, “is to permit rehabilitation of Chapter 11 debtors.” Row Steel, Inc. v. Asphalt & Sealers Equip. Mfg. (In re Row Steel, Inc), 33 B.R. 20, 22 (Bankr.E.D.N.C.1983). “[I]f the right to set-off will not substantially interfere with the debtor’s reorganization effort and has been obtained in good faith, equitable considerations favor lifting the automatic stay to allow set-off.” Id. at 23. The automatic stay is thus intended to promote the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code in rehabilitating Chapter 11 debtors. Presumably the same considerations would apply to the application of section 362(a)(3) to post-petition setoff. “Property acquired by the debtor post-bankruptcy must be used for the benefit of all unsecured creditors or for the debtor’s benefit in reorganizing or for the debtor’s fresh start.” USBI Co. v. Otha C. Jean & Assocs., Inc. (In re Otha C. Jean & Assocs.), 152 B.R. 219, 221 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1993).
[1570]*1570The court in Otha C. Jean refused to allow a bank to invoke the provisions of section 553 to prevent a setoff when allowing setoff would not “violate the reasons behind the rules expressed or implied” by that section. Id. at 222; see also Flanagan Bros., Inc., 47 B.R. at 303 (refusing to bar setoff under section 553 when bar would be contrary to intent behind that section). Here, as in Otha C. Jean, denying the right to setoff would not increase the funds available to pay unsecured claims or give the debtor the use of the money for reorganization or for a fresh start. The setoff would at most only affect an asset, the accounts receivable assigned to the bank, which would otherwise not be available for any of the purposes underlying the automatic stay. Here, too, denying setoff on the basis of the automatic stay “will give [Zions] an advantage based on bankruptcy law for no reason related to the bankruptcy case. [Zions] should not get a windfall because [Davidson] happened to fide bankruptcy. The result should be controlled by the law that would control outside of bankruptcy.” Otha C. Jean, 152 B.R. at 222.
As we discussed in part I swpra, Zions did not avail itself of the state law protection provided in section 9-318 of the U.C.C. by giving timely notice of the assignment to Christiansen. Zions’ rights in the accounts receivable are therefore subject to Christian-sen’s right to setoff. We are not inclined to allow Zions, a sophisticated commercial lender, to invoke the provisions of the automatic stay simply to obtain relief from its failure to act in a commercially prudent manner. It is not appropriate to apply provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to override priorities established by state law and to contravene state public policy when to do so would not further the purposes of the Code provisions at issue.
The above discussion is also dis-positive of Zions’ argument that it should prevail on the basis of 11 U.S.C. § 348(d). Under that provision, when a bankruptcy case is converted from a Chapter 11 proceeding to one under Chapter 7, a claim “against the estate or the debtor that arises after the order for relief but before conversion ... shall be treated for all purposes as if such claim had arisen immediately before the date of the filing of the petition.” This provision is significant in the context of a claim to setoff because “[a] creditor is not permitted to setoff the debtor’s prepetition obligation to him against his obligation to the debtor which arose postpetition, because the two obligations lack mutuality.” In re Mohawk Indus., 82 B.R. at 176. The purpose of section 348(d), as with “any bankruptcy law is to provide a discharge of debts in order to grant the debtor a fresh start. To permit the set off of prepetition debts owed by the debtor against independent postpetition debts owed to the debtor would be a complete frustration of any fresh start.” Id. at 177. Here, however, enforcement of section 348(d) would not further its underlying purpose of providing the debtor with funds for a fresh start or for reorganization; it would merely provide Zions with a priority to which it is not entitled under state law.
Moreover, the decision upon which Zions relies is of doubtful authority in any event. Zions points to the case of Still v. United Pipe & Supply Co. (In re W.L. Jackson Mfg. Co.), 50 B.R. 498 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1985). There the court applied section 348(d) to prevent a setoff, although in so doing the court “realize[d] that this result could affect the rehabilitation of debtors under Chapter 11” by discouraging potential creditors from dealing with a Chapter 11 trustee or debtor in possession. Id. at 504-05. In a subsequent case, the same court refused to apply section 348(d), pointing out that “the law as set out in § 348 is far from clear as to how postbankruptcy debts are to be treated when a Chapter 11 case converts to Chapter 7 after partial performance of a confirmed plan.” Paris v. Transamerica Ins. Group (In re Buckley & Assocs. Ins., Inc.), 67 B.R. 331, 335 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1986). The court believed that in refusing to apply section 348(d) it “reached a result that is not only legally correct but is just as to [the creditor seeking setoff] and the debtor’s other creditors.” Id. at 335. Upon appeal of this decision, the district court reached a different outcome but likewise refused to apply section 348(d), holding that “the appropriate analogy is to cases involving set-off during a Chapter 11, ignoring the conversion to Chapter 7 in [1571]*1571this case.” Paris v. Transamerica Ins. Group (In re Buckley & Assocs. Ins., Inc.), 78 B.R. 155, 158 (E.D.Tenn.1987). The court further observed that “[s]et-off is permissible in Chapter 11 ... where it does not undermine the debtor’s ability to reorganize,” and that “[t]he decision to grant or deny set-off is also guided by equity.” Id
Finally, we consider Zions’ policy argument. Zions has argued throughout these proceedings that unless it prevails, “lenders simply will not provide post-petition financing to Chapter 11 debtors, and the underlying policy of Chapter 11 to help failing businesses rehabilitate themselves will be frustrated.” Br. of Aplee. at 10. In so doing, Zions simply fails to acknowledge the critical fact that commercial lenders such as Zions have a readily available means of protecting their security interest in the accounts receivable of a Chapter 11 debtor against the claim of a party such as Christiansen. They need only give notice under U.C.C. section 9-318 in one of two ways. See 4447 Assocs., 889 P.2d at 472 & n. 8; see also id at 470 n. 5. Mere notice of the assignment under section 9-318(l)(b) would have cut off Christiansen’s ability to setoff its claim against amounts due Davidson, while notice and demand for payment under section 9-318(3) would have required Christiansen to pay the amounts due Davidson directly to Zions. Zions could thus have given notice under section 9 — 318(l)(b) so as to obtain protection against setoff without impeding Davidson’s ability to reorganize by requiring Christiansen to pay the funds to Zions rather than Davidson.
Although Zions is harshly critical of Chris-tiansen’s alleged failure to take action to protect itself, in our view the magnitude of Zions’ failure leaves it in no position to point the finger of blame elsewhere. Zions, as a sophisticated commercial lender extending post-petition financing to a debtor in possession, failed to act in a commercially prudent manner when it did not avail itself of the protection provided under state law. We do not believe the result we reach here will affect the availability of post-petition financing generally because we are convinced that commercial lenders as a rule do not overlook the state law protection that Zions failed to use in this case.
Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND with directions to enter judgment in favor of Christiansen.