ALARCÓN, Circuit Judge:
We must decide whether the district court erred in dismissing this declaratory judgment action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, notwithstanding the existence of an actual controversy between the parties regarding non-frivolous federal claims that could be brought by the defendants in a coercive action. The district court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the anticipated coercive action could, but would not necessarily present a federal question due to the availability of state-law claims. In reversing this judgment, we join seven of our sister circuits in concluding that federal-question jurisdiction exists in a declaratory judgment action if the plaintiff has alleged facts in a well-pleaded complaint which demonstrate that the defendant could file a coercive action arising under federal law.
I
H & R Block, Inc. (“Block”) provides tax preparation services to its customers. For a fee, it will file a customer’s tax return electronically with the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). Electronically filed tax returns enable a taxpayer to obtain a refund within two weeks. For Block’s customers who preferred not to wait that long, Block arranged for Household Bank, f.s.b. or its predecessor-in-interest, Beneficial Financial Bank (collectively “Household”) to make a short-term loan in the amount of the anticipated tax refund. These loans are referred to as tax refund anticipation loans (“RAL”). The loan is secured by the amount of the tax refund. Block’s customers authorized the IRS to deposit the tax refund in Household’s account. Each of Block’s customers signed a contract in which he or she agreed that any dispute relating to the RAL would be resolved by binding arbitration.
In 1998, two national class actions were filed against Household in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (the “Illinois Class Actions”) by Block customers who had received RALs.
Zawikowski v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank,
No. 98-C-2178 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 20, 2002);
Turner v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank,
No. 98-C-2550 (N.D.Ill. Mar.20, 2002). These actions were certified as Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3) “opt-out” class ac
tions. The claims in the Illinois Class Actions alleged violations of the federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), the National Bank Act, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”), and various state-law claims. A settlement was reached in the Illinois Class Actions. Six hundred and seventy-two class members from Alabama, however, exercised their right to opt out of the Illinois Class Actions in order to file their own actions against Household.
On August 2, 2000, counsel for some of the Alabama RAL recipients who opted out of the Illinois Class Actions executed an affidavit which alleged that “if adequate and fair settlements are not able to be obtained, I intend to pursue litigation through the Courts here in Alabama which are favorable to plaintiffs
with valid causes of action such as these.”
(Emphasis added).
On September 7, 2000, Household filed this action for a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) and 9 U.S.C. § 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act against five groups of potential plaintiffs from Alabama who had opted out of Illinois Class Actions (collectively the “Alabama Defendants”).
Household prayed for a declaration that the arbitration provisions in the RAL agreements are enforceable. Household alleged that the district court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), and federal-question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 “because certain of the potential claims by the defendants against Household arise under federal law, including the federal Truth in Lending Act.... ” On the same date, Block filed a claim styled as a “Complaint of Intervention.” Block alleged that the district court had federal-question jurisdiction under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601,
et seq.
and the National Bank Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 85 and 86. The Alabama Defendants filed motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court granted the motions on March 8, 2002 holding that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 1331.
II
Household and Block contend they are entitled to a declaration that the arbitration clause is enforceable because it is uncontested that, prior to the date this action was filed, the Alabama Defendants could have filed a non-frivolous coercive action in federal court under TILA, the Bankruptcy Act, or RICO. This court reviews de novo the dismissal of an action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Woodruff v. United States Dept. of Labor,
954 F.2d 634, 636 (11th Cir.1992).
The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1
et seq.,
does not provide an independent basis for a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 4, however,
[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any / United States district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.
9 U.S.C. § 4 (2002). Accordingly, we must determine whether the complaints filed by Household and Block set forth facts showing that there is an independent basis for federal court jurisdiction.
See Tamiami Partners v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians,
177 F.3d 1212, 1222-23 (11th Cir.1999) (“[T]he Federal Arbitration Act alone is insufficient to confer federal jurisdiction over disputes involving arbitration agreements, ... an independent basis of jurisdiction-such as diversity or a federal question-is required.”). The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §' 2201(a),, also requires that the plaintiff allege facts showing that the controversy is within the court’s original jurisdiction. Section 2201(a) provides in pertinent part:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, ... any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, .may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.
“[T]he operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural only.”
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth,
300 U.S. 227, 240, 57 S.Ct. 461, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937). If there is an underlying ground for federal court jurisdiction, the Declaratory Judgment Act “allow[s] parties to precipitate suits that otherwise might need to wait for the declaratory relief defendant to bring a coercive action.”
Gulf States Paper Corp. v. Ingram,
811 F.2d 1464, 1467 (11th Cir.1987).
In Article III, § 2 of the Constitution, the founders provided that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States "and Treaties made or which shall be made under this Authority....”
Id.
In 1875, Congress authorized federal trial courts to exercise original jurisdiction over civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470 (codified as amended at 28 U.S1C. § 1331).
Household alleged in its complaint that the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction “under federal law, including the federal Truth in Lending Act.” Block also alleged that the district court had federal-question jurisdiction “because the potential claims by Defendants against Household and/or Block arise under federal law, including the Federal Truth in Lending Act.” Additionally, it is undisputed between the parties that there is an actual controversy between them arising under federal law. The Alabama Defendants contend that there are also state law controversies. Citing the Fifth Circuit’s unpublished decision
in Battiste v. H & R
Block,
Inc.,
209 F.3d 719 (5th Cir.2000) (table), Block has alleged, though, that “the potential [RAL] claims of the Defendants are completely preempted by the
National Bank Act, 120 U.S.C. §§ 85 and 86.”
The dismissal of a federal-question claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is “justified only if that claim were ‘so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,’ or ‘frivolous.’”
Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 199, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962) (internal citations omitted). The district court did not conclude that the claims by Household and Block were “absolutely devoid of merit, or frivolous.” Instead, it dismissed this action because of its determination that
[t]he position of the Plaintiffs would eviscerate the long-standing principle that the plaintiff is the master of his claim: if a declaratory judgment plaintiff may seek relief in federal court based on the fact that the declaratory judgment defendant
may
assert a federal claim, even though he may also limit his coercive action to only state claims, that is tantamount to allowing a declaratory judgment plaintiff to force the other party to litigate a claim that he may have no intention of pursuing.
Household Bank v. JFS Group,
191 F.Supp.2d 1292, 1303 (M.D.Ala.2002). The district court ruled that “while the DJA does allow a plaintiff to precipitate a suit based on federal law, he may only do so where the anticipated coercive action would
of necessity
arise under federal law.”
Id.
In support of this theory, the district court relied upon the following statement in
Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust,
463 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983): “ ‘Federal courts have regularly taken original jurisdiction over declaratory judgment suits in which, if the declaratory judgment defendant brought a coercive action to enforce its rights, that suit would necessarily present a federal question.’ ”
Household,
191 F.Supp.2d at 1301 (quoting
Franchise Tax Bd.,
463 U.S. at 19, 103 S.Ct. 2841).
The district court characterized the quoted language from
Franchise Tax Board
as a “rather unassuming passage.”
Id.
It did not refer to it as a holding, or even obiter dictum. Nevertheless, the district court concluded that “this court understands the
Franchise Tax Board
passage to stand for the more limited proposition that where a declaratory judgment defendant’s anticipated coercive action would
have
to be federal in nature, the court would have federal court jurisdiction.”
Id.
at 1301-02. We disagree. The “rather unassuming passage” in
Franchise Tax Board
was a mere observation of the historical fact that federal district courts have taken original jurisdiction when a declaratory judgment defendant’s potential coercive action necessarily presents a claim arising under federal law. The Court did not hold in
Franchise Tax Board
that a district court lacks original jurisdiction over an action filed under the federal Declaratory Judgment Act where the plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint alleges that the defendant could assert non-frivolous state
and
federal law claims in a coercive action.
The jurisdictional issue addressed by the Court in
Franchise Tax Board
is clearly distinguishable from the question presented in this appeal. In
Franchise Tax Board,
the Appellant state agency filed a complaint in a California court against the Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California (“CLVT”). It alleged in its first cause of action that CLVT had violated a California statute that requires any person who possesses property belonging to a taxpayer to withhold the amount of any tax, interest, or penalty due from the taxpayer and to transmit the amount withheld to the Franchise Tax Board.
Franchise Tax Bd.,
463 U.S. at 5,
103 S.Ct. 2841. In its second cause of action, the Franchise Tax Board requested that the state court grant declaratory relief under California’s Declaratory Judgment Act, CaLCode Civ. Proc. § 1060 (West 1980) and hold that CLVT was not entitled to pre-emption under § 514 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) 88 Stat. 829 as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001
et seq.
(1976 ed. and Supp. V).
Id.
at 6-7.
CLVT removed the action in
Franchise Tax Board
to the United States District Court for the Central District of California. That court denied Franchise Tax Board’s motion for a remand to the state court. It ruled that ERISA did not preempt the State’s power to levy on funds held in trust by CLVT.
Id.
at 7. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment. It held that ERISA preempted California’s attempt to levy on the vacation trust fund for unpaid taxes.
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Const. Laborers Vac. Trust,
679 F.2d 1307, 1308-09 (9th Cir.1982).
The Supreme Court held that the federal courts had no jurisdiction to decide the questions presented by the Franchise Tax Board in its complaint. The Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and directed it to remand the matter to the state trial court from which it was removed.
Franchise Tax Bd.,
463 U.S. at 28, 103 S.Ct. 2841.
The Court ruled that the district court did not have removal jurisdiction over the Franchise Tax Board’s first cause of action to enforce its levy under state law because it did not present a substantial question of federal law under the well-pleaded complaint rule.
Id.
at 13. Regarding the Franchise Tax Board’s second cause of action for declaratory relief under California law, the Court declared that under § 502(a) of ERISA 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), only certain persons — participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, or the Secretary of Labor — may file an action in federal court.
Id.
at 21-25. The Court reasoned as follows:
[Section 502(a) ] did not go so far as to provide that any suit
against
such parties must also be brought in federal court when they themselves did not choose to sue. The situation presented by a State’s suit for a declaration of the validity of state law is sufficiently removed from the spirit of necessity and careful limitation of district court jurisdiction that informed our statutory interpretation in
Shelly Oil
and
Gully
to convince us that, until Congress informs us otherwise, such a suit is not within the original jurisdiction of the United States district courts.
Id.
at 21-22.
In this matter, Household and Block alleged that the Alabama Defendants could file a coercive action asserting federal claims under the Truth in Lending Act, the National Bank Act and RICO. Unlike the limited jurisdictional provisions of ERISA, the statutes that could support a federal claim in a coercive action filed by the Alabama Defendants do not expressly limit the persons who may invoke the original jurisdiction of the federal courts.
In
Franchise Tax Board,
the Court noted that the only question in dispute between the parties was whether “section 514 of ERISA preempts state law and that the trustees lack the power to honor the levies made upon them by the State of California.”
Id.
at 6. The Supreme Court held that
a suit by state tax authorities both to enforce its levies against funds held in trust pursuant to an ERISA-covered employee benefit plan, and to declare the validity of the levies notwithstanding ERISA, is neither a creature of ERISA itself nor a suit of which the federal
courts will take jurisdiction because it turns on a question of federal law.
Id.
at 28. The Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the federal preemption issue because it is only a defense to the Franchise Tax Board’s right- to enforce its levy under California law.
Id.
at 17-19. In reaching this decision, the Court applied the rule it announced in
Shelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
339 U.S. 667, 70 S.Ct. 876, 94 L.Ed. 1194 (1960).
In
Shelly Oil,
the Court concluded that the district court did not have original jurisdiction over the claim for declaratory relief filed by Phillips Petroleum Company because “[wjhatever federal claim Phillips may be able to urge would in any event be injected into the case only in anticipation of a defense to be asserted by [defendants].”
Id.
at 672, 70 S.Ct. 876. The Court instructed that
[sjince the matter in controversy as to which Phillips asked for declaratory judgment is not one that “arises under the ... laws ... of the United States” and since as to Skelly and Stanolind jurisdiction cannot be sustained on the score of diversity of citizenship, the proceedings against them should have been dismissed.
Id.
at 674, 70 S.Ct. 876. The Supreme Court’s reliance on
Shelly Oil
in
Franchise Tax Board
belies the district court’s determination that an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act may be filed “only ... where the anticipated coercive action would
of necessity
arise under federal law.”
Household,
191 F.Supp.2d at 1303. We note also that in
Shelly Oil,
the Court
affirmed
the order denying the motion to dismiss the action on jurisdictional grounds against Magnolia Petroleum Company. The Court held that the district court had original jurisdiction over Phillips’ state-law claims against Magnolia Petroleum Company based on diversity jurisdiction.
Skelly Oil,
339 U S. at 675-78, 70 S.Ct. 876.
In the matter
sub judice,
the federal claims that could be filed in a coercive action by the Alabama Defendants have not been injected into the complaint by Household and Block as a potential defense to their state-law causes of action. Therefore, under
Franchise Tax Board
and
Shelly Oil,
the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over Household and Block’s request for a declaration that the arbitration provisions of its RAL agreements were enforceable because they alleged in a well-pleaded complaint that the declaratory judgment defendants could file non-frivolous federal claims against them.
Ill
The question whether a district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action unless the defendant’s anticipated coercive action would
of necessity
arise under federal law has not been squarely addressed by this court. In
Gulf States Paper Corp. v. Ingram, 811 F.2d
1464 (11th Cir.1987), however, this court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action brought by the plaintiff to determine its obligations under the Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021
et seq.
(1979).
Id.
at 1466. In Gulf States
all
of the defendant’s possible claims were federal, whereas here it is undisputed that the Alabama Defendants could file a coercive action asserting state or federal claims. Nevertheless, this court’s reasoning in
Gulf States
supports our conclusion that federal subject-matter jurisdiction exists in a declaratory judgment action in which a defendant could have brought a federal or state claim in a coercive action.
In
Gulf States,
this court reasoned as follows:
To decide whether the well-pleaded complaint for declaratory relief in the present case properly asserts a substantial federal claim, we must determine whether, absent the availability of declaratory relief, the instant case
could
nonetheless have been brought in federal court. To do this, we must analyze the assumed coercive action by the declaratory judgment defendant.
The coercive action in this case would be a suit by Ingram under the Veterans’ Reemployment Rights Act seeking reinstatement in her job at Gulf States when she returned from her training program. Ingram’s coercive action clearly would present a federal cause of action. Her suit would satisfy both Holmes’ and Cardozo’s arising under tests. Therefore, Gulf States’ suit here that merely anticipates Ingram’s federal claim against it falls within section 1331 jurisdiction via the bootstrapping mechanism of the declaratory judgment suit.
Id.
at 1467 (emphasis added). This court also stated in
Gulf States
that the Declaratory Judgment Act permits a party, “ ‘to bootstrap its way into federal court’ by bringing a federal suit that corresponds to one the opposing party
might
have brought.”
Id.
at 1467 (emphasis added) (quoting
Superior Oil Co. v. Pioneer Corp.,
706 F.2d 603, 607 (5th Cir.1983)).
In
Gulf States,
this court did not discuss the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in
Franchise Tax Board
in holding that subject-matter jurisdiction is present in a- declaratory judgment action if “the instant case
could
nonetheless have been brought in federal court.”
Gulf States,
811 F.2d at 1467 (emphasis added). In this matter, the district court stated that this court’s holding in
Gulf States
is “consistent with the narrower reading suggested by the use of the word of ‘necessarily’ in
Franchise Tax Board.” Household,
191 F.Supp.2d at 1302. The district court pointed out that this court stated in
Gulf States
that the declaratory judgment plaintiffs coercive action “clearly would present a federal cause of action.”
Id.
(citing
Gulf States,
811 F.2d at 1467).
We disagree with the district court’s interpretation of this court’s holding in
Gulf States.
This court expressly held in
Gulf States
that in deciding whether a district court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a well-pleaded complaint for declaratory relief, it must determine whether “absent the availability of declaratory relief, the instant case could nonetheless have been brought in federal court.”
Gulf States,
811 F.2d at 1467. In applying this rule, this court “analyze[d] the assumed coercive action by the declaratory judgment defendant.”
Id.
Since; the plaintiff in
Gulf States
sought a declaration that it was not liable under the Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistant Act, the well-pleaded complaint clearly raised a federal question.
Here, the district court erred in failing to apply the test set forth in
Gulf States
to determine whether a district court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action. It is undisputed that the Alabama Defendants
could
have filed a coercive action against the Appellants under several federal statutes. Therefore, Appellees’ coercive action “clearly would present a federal cause of action.”
Gulf States,
811 F.2d at 1467. The Supreme Court commented in
Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div., Avco Corp. v. United Auto. Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America,
523 U.S. 653, 118 S.Ct. 1626, 140 L.Ed.2d 863 (1998), that it had observed in
Franchise Tax Board
that “federal courts have regularly taken original jurisdiction over -declaratory judgment
suits in which, if the declaratory judgment defendant brought a coercive action to enforce its rights, that suit would necessarily present a federal question.”
Id.
at 660 n. 4, 118 S.Ct. 1626 (quoting
Franchise Tax Bd.,
463 U.S. at 19, 103 S.Ct. 2841). The Court also stated in
Textron Lycoming
that “[t]he cases brought forward to support that
observation,
however, were suits by alleged patent infringers to declare a patent invalid, which
of course
themselves raise a federal question.”
Id.
at 19 n. 19, 103 S.Ct. 2841 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court’s reference to cases arising under patent law illustrates an obvious example of an action which involves a federal claim within the exclusive jurisdiction of the district court. The test adopted by this court in
Gulf States
is consistent with the Supreme Court’s interpretation in
Tex-tron Lycoming
of its observation in
Franchise Tax
‘
Board
regarding a district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action that necessarily raises a federal law question in a well-pleaded complaint.
The Court’s observation in
Franchise Tax Board
and
Textron Lycoming
is reflected in the following syllogism:
A district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action if the plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint alleges that the defendant could institute a coercive action arising under federal law.
The owner of a patent can assert a coercive action within the exclusive jurisdiction of the district court against an alleged patent infringer.
Therefore, the district court “necessarily” has subject matter jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action filed by an alleged infringer who challenges the validity of a patent.
This conclusion is obvious because disputes over the infringement or the validity of a patent can only be resolved in a federal district court because jurisdiction “shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent ... cases.” 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
In enacting the Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress did not limit a district court’s jurisdiction to federal questions within its exclusive jurisdiction. We lack the power to ignore the words used by Congress in creating the remedy set forth in § 2006(a) where its intention is set forth in plain and unambiguous language. Concerns that permitting a party to seek a declaration under the DJA where the defendant
could
file a coercive action under state
or
federal law eviscerates the principle that plaintiff is the master of his or her claim, must be addressed to the legislative branch of our Government.
In holding that a district court does not have original jurisdiction to issue a declaration regarding an anticipated coercive action unless it is a claim that would,
of necessity,
arise under federal law, the district court expressly declined to apply decisions rejecting this theory from the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. Each of these circuits has concluded that a federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action where the defendant
could
have brought a federal claim in a coercive action.
See Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Drain,
237 F.3d 366, 370-71 (4th Cir.2001) (“Because [the federal declaratory judgment plaintiffs] complaint ... seeks declaratory relief on a matter for which [the declaratory judgment]
could
bring a coercive action ... arising under federal law, we conclude the district court possessed subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 1331.”) (emphasis added);
TTEA v. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo,
181 F.3d 676, 682 (5th Cir.1999) (“If [a federal statutue] gave the [defendant] a right to sue [the plaintiff], we would hold that TTEA
could
sue for declaratory judgment that the [defen
dant] stated no claim.”) (emphasis added);
Standard Ins. Co. v. Saklad,
127 F.3d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir.1997) (“A person may seek declaratory relief in federal court if the one against whom he brings his action
could
have asserted his own rights there.”) (emphasis added);
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players,
95 F.3d 959, 965 (10th Cir.1996) (“Because [the defendant]
could
have brought a federal Lan-ham Act claim as part of a well-pleaded complaint against [the plaintiff] the district court had federal question jurisdiction over this declaratory judgment action.”) (emphasis added).
Three other circuits have also concluded that subject-matter jurisdiction is present where the facts alleged in a declaratory judgment plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint demonstrate that the defendant could allege a coercive claim under federal law. In
Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc. v. Maxus Energy Corp.,
925 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.1991), the Second Circuit held that a district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action in which the defendant threatened litigation under several causes of action, one of which was federal.
Id.
at 562. The court ruled that where a party
“might
assert” a federal claim, a declaratory judgment action could be “properly commenced in light of the real threat of litigation.”
Id.
(emphasis added). Similarly, in
GNB Battery Techs., Inc. v. Gould, Inc.,
65 F.3d 615 (7th Cir.1995), the Seventh Circuit held that a district court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action where the plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint “presumes the
possibility
of an action by [the defendant] under [federal law].”
Id.
at 619 (emphasis added).
In
Fina Oil and Chemical Co. v. Ewen,
123 F.3d 1466 (Fed.Cir.1997), the Federal Circuit held as follows: “We determine whether there is jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action by applying the well-pleaded complaint rule. We apply that rule not to the declaratory judgment complaint but the hypothetical action the declaratory defendant would have brought.”
Id.
at 1470 (internal citation omitted). The Federal Circuit concluded that the declaratory judgment plaintiff satisfied the well-pleaded complaint rule by assuming that it held “a recognized interest in a patent that
could
be adversely affected by an action brought under [35 U.S.C.] section 256.”
Id.
at 1471 (emphasis added).
Under the law of this circuit, pursuant to decision in
Gulf States,
a federal district court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action if, as here, a plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint alleges facts demonstrating the defendant could file a coercive action arising under federal law. No federal appellate court has reached a contrary conclusion.
IV
In this matter, the Alabama Defendants informed the district court that they did not intend to file a federal claim against Household and Block. We were advised during oral argument that some of the Alabama Defendants had filed non-federal claims in state court subsequent to the date that Household and Block filed their complaints in this matter. In determining whether a district court has subject-matter jurisdiction, we must look to the facts as they existed at the time the action was filed.
Keene Corp. v. United States,
508 U.S. 200, 207, 113 S.Ct. 2035, 124 L.Ed.2d 118 (1993);
Leonard v. Enter. Rent A Car,
279 F.3d 967, 972 (11th Cir.2002).
In
Kidder, Peabody,
the declaratory judgment defendant also argued that subject-matter jurisdiction was lacking because, it had “committed never to assert [its federal claims] against [the plaintiff].” 925 F.2d at 562-63. The Second Circuit
held that the dispute was not mooted because without a binding, judicially-enforceable agreement, the defendant could file an action against the declaratory judgment plaintiff asserting claims arising under federal law.
Id.
at 563.
The Alabama Defendants have not entered into a settlement agreement or filed a release of their federal claims in this matter, nor did they request the district court to enter judgment against them. Regardless of their present renunciation, without a binding, judicially enforceable agreement, the Alabama Defendants could still put Household and Block to the task of defending against the non-frivolous federal law claims alleged in this declaratory judgment action. We agree with the Second Circuit that “[a] judicial declaration that [the Plaintiffs are] barred from asserting the [federal] claims would both settle the matter between these parties once and for all and dispel all uncertainty regarding the liability of [the Plaintiffs] for these claims.”
Id.
CONCLUSION
The district court erred in concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this declaratory judgment action. Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment dismissing this action.