Helen Jones v. City of Monroe, Michigan

341 F.3d 474, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 17167, 2003 WL 21981946

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: August 21, 2003
• Docket: 01-2335
• Status: Published

Opinions

GIBBONS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which BATCHELDER, J., joined. COLE, J. (pp. 481-491), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

OPINION

GIBBONS, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant Helen Jones, who has multiple sclerosis, brought suit alleging that the municipal parking program of the City of Monroe, Michigan (“Monroe”)' violates Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Jones filed a motion for a preliminary injunction requesting that the district court order Monroe to modify its parking program to grant Jones free all-day parking adjacent to her place of employment. Specifically, Jones asked that the district court order Monroe to reserve a free parking space for Jones adjacent to her office or to cease ticketing Jones when she parks in a designated one-hour parking space for the entire work day. The district court denied Jones’s motion for a preliminary injunction on the ground that she failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits. Jones appeals this order. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction.

I.

Jones suffers from multiple sclerosis, an incurable, usually progressive disease. Her disability affects her sight, balance and ability to walk. Jones customarily uses a wheelchair, although on occasion she walks for short distances with the use of a cane. Jones is employed by the Salvation Army Harbor Light (“Salvation Army”) as a substance abuse counselor for deaf and hard-of-hearing clients. The Salvation Army is located in downtown Monroe.

Because the building which houses the Salvation Army’s offices lacks private parking spaces, Jones must either park in a space provided by Monroe or in a private commercial parking area. Monroe has several parking areas that provide free parking in the downtown vicinity. One such parking area is immediately adjacent to the downtown Monroe business district as well as Jones’s office. These free parking spaces, however, are each limited to one-hour parking only. Several parking spaces designated for disabled users are located in this one-hour parking area. These spaces are similarly limited to one-hour parking. Monroe also provides free all-day parking in several lots located within two blocks of Jones’s office. According to Jones, she is not able to walk from any of these free all-day parking lots to her office due to her disability.

On numerous occasions Jones has parked her car in a one-hour parking space adjacent to her office for the duration of a work day. Monroe has issued Jones dozens of parking tickets based on her violations of the one-hour time limitation. Jones displays a handicapped parking permit on her vehicle, but Monroe contends that the permit does not allow her to violate the one-hour time limitation.

On April 16, 2001, Jones brought suit alleging that Monroe’s refusal to modify its municipal parking program constitutes unlawful and intentional discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of federal law.¹ In conjunction with filing her complaint, Jones sought a preliminary injunction. On June 15, 2001, the district court held a hearing on Jones’s motion for a preliminary injunction. On August 28, 2001, the district court denied Jones’s motion for a preliminary injunction on the basis that Jones had failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of her claim.

This timely appeal followed.

II.

On appeal, Jones argues that the district court erred in refusing to enjoin Monroe’s allegedly discriminatory parking policies and require that Monroe cease ticketing Jones when she parks in a designated one-hour parking space or provide Jones with a free all-day parking space adjacent to her office pending a final resolution on the merits. This court reviews a lower court’s decision on whether to grant a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion. Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 774 (6th Cir.2003); In re DeLorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1228 (6th Cir.1985). The district court’s determination will be disturbed only if the district court relied upon clearly erroneous findings of fact, improperly applied the governing law, or used an erroneous legal standard. Nightclubs, Inc. v. City of Paducah, 202 F.3d 884, 888 (6th Cir.2000) (quoting Connection Distrib. Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 288 (6th Cir.1998)). Under this standard, we must review the district court’s legal con-elusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Taubman, 319 F.3d at 774.

When considering a motion for preliminary injunction, the district court should consider four factors: (1) whether the moving party has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the moving party will suffer irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether the issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by issuance of the injunction. Nightclubs, Inc., 202 F.3d at 888. The four considerations applicable to preliminary injunction decisions are factors to be balanced, not prerequisites that must be met. DeLorean, 755 F.2d at 1228. Moreover, a district court is not required to make specific findings concerning each of the four factors used in determining a motion for prelimi-, nary injunction if fewer factors are dispositive of the issue. Id.; Mascio v. Public Employees Retirement Sys. of Ohio, 160 F.3d 310, 312 (6th Cir.1998) (affirming the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction based on the district court’s conclusion that the plaintiff had demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits).

Jones argues that the district court erred in finding that Monroe’s parking program complies with federal law and thereby concluding that Jones had failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of her claim.² Jones further claims that the district court erred in failing to address Monroe’s alleged discrimination in refusing to provide Jones with “meaningful access” to the parking program and refusing to grant her a reasonable accommodation.

Jones alleges that Monroe’s parking program violates Title II of the ADA,³ which provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall by reason of such disability be excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities' of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Section 12131 defines “qualified individual with a disability” as “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices ... meets the essential eligibility requirements for receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131. The ADA’s prohibition of discrimination in services, programs, or activities “encompasses virtually everything a public entity does.” Johnson v. City of Saline, 151 F.3d 564, 569 (6th Cir.1998). To make out a prima facie case under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must establish that (1) she has a disability; (2) she is otherwise qualified; and (3) she is being excluded from participation in, being denied the benefits of, or being subjected to discrimination under the program solely because of her disability. See Kaltenberger v. Ohio College of Podiatric Med., 162 F.3d 432, 435 (6th Cir.1998); see also Burns v. City of Columbus, 91 F.3d 836, 841 (6th Cir.1996) (setting forth the prima facie case under the Rehabilitation Act); Doe v. University of Maryland Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1265 (4th Cir.1995) (finding that in order to establish disability discrimination under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that he has a disability; (2) that he is otherwise qualified for the benefit in question; and (3) that he was excluded from the benefit due to discrimination solely on the basis of the disability).

The district court did not address whether Jones is disabled or whether she was otherwise qualified for the benefit in question. Instead, the district court concluded that Monroe is not excluding Jones from participating in or denying her the benefits of the parking system. In evaluating the correctness of this conclusion; we must first examine the nature of the benefit offered by Monroe.⁴ Initially, we note that the benefit is not appropriately defined as free downtown parking generally, but rather as the provision of all-day and one-hour parking in specific locations. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 303, 105 S.Ct. 712, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985) (holding that “adequate health care” was too “amorphous” a concept to define the government service or benefit to which disabled persons may assert a statutory right of access and accommodation).

In the one-hour parking area specifically addressed by Jones, Monroe is offering the benefit of free short-term parking to individuals who wish to transact retail or other business in the downtown business district. The short-term, one-hour nature of the benefit is designed to help downtown businesses by making parking spaces in close proximity to them more readily available. Monroe quite logically has determined that downtown shopping and other downtown business activities are discouraged when patrons cannot easily obtain parking places close to their destination. All-day parking in the current one-hour spaces would thus have a negative impact on downtown businesses.

In specific locations a short distance away from the one-hour parking, Monroe has also provided the benefit of free long-term, all-day parking to all individuals who come downtown, for whatever reason. While the all-day parking is not provided for the specific benefit of individuals who work downtown, they are free to use it.

Access to the one-hour and all-day parking places is facially neutral. The one-hour limit applies to individuals with disabilities and those without disabilities. Similarly, both disabled and able-bodied persons may park in all-day parking. Both one-hour and all-day parking areas have spaces for disabled and nondisabled individuals.⁵ The parking limitations do not affect disabled and nondisabled individuals differently in any respect.⁶ Thus, the district court did not err in determining that Jones was not excluded from parking benefits offered by Monroe.

The dissent repeatedly states that Jones is excluded from the benefit of free downtown parking. However, the dissent fails to explain how Jones is denied this benefit. Jones has equal access to the free downtown parking, and she can park there if she chooses. While the dissent claims to define the benefit at issue as “free downtown parking,” the dissent later identifies the benefit as the ability “to park for free all-day in spaces that allow them meaningful access to their destination.” The dissent thus conflates meaningful access to downtown parking with meaningful access to an individual’s destination of choice. When applied to the facts of the instant case, it is apparent that the dissent is defining the benefit at issue as the latter and not the former. Jones has equal access to free downtown parking. She does not have free downtown parking accessible to any destination she selects or, unfortunately, her workplace. The benefit that Monroe is providing to all of its citizens, including Jones, is free downtown parking at specific locations; it is not free downtown parking that is accessible to wherever a citizen, disabled or non-disabled, chooses to go or work.⁷

Contrary to the dissent’s argument that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Choate supports a finding of discrimination, a proper application of Choate requires a finding that Jones has not been denied meaningful access to the parking benefit provided by Monroe. In Choate, Medicaid recipients sued the State of Tennessee for declaratory and injunctive relief when the state decided to reduce, from twenty to fourteen, the number of inpatient hospital days that state medicaid would pay hospitals on behalf of a medicaid recipient in each year. 469 U.S. at 289, 105 S.Ct. 712. The medicaid recipients argued that the fourteen-day rule denied them meaningful access to Medicaid services in Tennessee in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 301-02, 105 S.Ct. 712. The Court noted that the fourteen-day limitation would not deny the medicaid recipients meaningful access to Medicaid or exclude them from those services. Id. at 303, 105 S.Ct. 712. The Court held that the benefit provided was the “individual services offered” and not the amorphous objective of “adequate health care.” Id. The Court further stated that the State is not required to alter the definition of the benefit offered “simply to meet the reality that the handicapped have greater medical needs.” Id. According to the Court, “[t]he Act does not ... guarantee the handicapped equal results from the provision of state Medicaid, even assuming some measure of equality of health could be constructed.” Id. at 305, 105 S.Ct. 712.

Jones has access to the service offered by Monroe — free downtown parking in specific locations. She does not have a right to free downtown parking that allows her access to her destination of choice. The reality of Monroe’s free downtown parking system is that not every person is going to have access to his or her workplace or other destination of choice.⁸ Monroe provides the benefit of free downtown parking at specific locations, and these locations will necessarily be more accessible to some workplaces than others. As the Choate Court noted, however, equal results from the provision of the benefit, even assuming equal results could be achieved, are not guaranteed. Id. at 305, 105 S.Ct. 712. The dissent claims that “Jones has never taken the position that she should be able to park wherever she wants.” Yet, that is precisely the logical result of defining the benefit provided as meaningful access to one’s destination of choice.

The essence of Jones’s position is that the ADA requires Monroe to provide her an all-day parking place in the exact location she requires. Under the ADA, Jones’s individualized need for a particular spot is most appropriately considered in determining whether permitting her to park all day in a one-hour parking place adjacent to her office is a reasonable accommodation which Monroe must make. The district court did not specifically rule on this issue in determining that Jones had not established a likelihood of success on the merits. As noted previously, a “qualified person with a disability” is “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies or practices ... meets the essential requirements for receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a particular entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131. The applicable regulations interpreting Title II state as follows:

A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modification is necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program or activity.

28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).

Jones describes her requested accommodation as “allowing her to park in one of the 11 parking spaces” adjacent to her office. By contrast, Monroe describes Jones’s requested accommodation as “immunity from prosecution for her violations of Monroe’s neutral parking and enforcement ordinances.” Any accommodation on the part of the entity only needs to be “reasonable.” Johnson v. City of Saline, 151 F.3d 564, 571 (6th Cir.1998). An accommodation is not reasonable if it imposes a fundamental alteration in the nature of the program. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130. The public entity bears the burden of proving that the accommodation would fundamentally alter the program. Popovich v. Court of Common Pleas Domestic Relations Div., 227 F.3d 627, 639 (6th Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 276 F.3d 808 (6th Cir.2002) (en banc). In cases involving waiver of applicable rules and regulations, the overall focus should be on “whether waiver of the rule in the particular case would be so at odds with the purposes behind the rule that it would be a fundamental and unreasonable change.” Dadian v. Village of Wilmette, 269 F.3d 831, 838-39 (7th Cir.2001) (quoting Washington v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 181 F.3d 840, 850 (7th Cir.1999)).

The purpose of the one-hour limitation is to encourage patrons to shop at downtown businesses. Waiver of the ordinance limiting parking to one hour in the business district would be “at odds” with the fundamental purpose of the rule. By its very nature, the benefit of one-hour free public parking cannot be altered to permit disabled individuals to park all day without jeopardizing the availability of spaces to other disabled and nondisabled individuals. Such a waiver would also require Monroe to cease enforcement of an otherwise valid ordinance, which by its very nature requires a fundamental alteration of the rule itself.⁹

In addition, the record contains evidence of alternative accommodations available to Jones such as a service which will pick her up at any Monroe parking lot, based on a schedule constructed personally for Jones, and take her to the door of her office building. Accordingly, Jones’s requested modification, whether characterized as assignment of a particular parking location or immunity from prosecution, is not a reasonable accommodation required under the ADA. The district court’s failure to discuss this issue therefore does not render its denial of the preliminary injunction an abuse of discretion.

Because the district court did not rely upon clearly erroneous findings of fact, improperly apply the governing law, or use an erroneous legal standard, it did not err in denying Jones’s request for a preliminary injunction.

III.

For all the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief.

1 . The original complaint contained three counts. Count one sought individual relief for Jones relating to Monroe’s failure to modify its downtown parking program to allow Jones to participate. Counts two and three related to class-wide claims under federal law and Michigan law respectively. Counts two and three of the original complaint were abandoned in an amended complaint filed by Jones on November 27, 2001. Count one remains.

2 . Jones also argues that the district court’s order fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Despite the somewhat cursory nature of the district court’s legal analysis, we find that the district court's order complies with the requirements of Rule 52. Moreover, the district court's opinion is adequate to allow this court to review the denial of the preliminary injunction. Even if this court concluded that the district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are inadequate under Rule 52, it would be unnecessary to remand the case because the record is exceptionally clear. See Urbain v. Knapp Bros. Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 810, 816 (6th Cir.1954); see also Davis v. New York City Hous. Auth., 166 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir.1999); White v. Carlucci, 862 F.2d 1209, 1211 fn. 1 (5th Cir.1989). In addition, both parties agree that the record is complete and that this court can address the issue of the injunction without remand for further proceedings.

3 . For purposes of this case, there are no relevant differences between Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Therefore, a separate analysis of Jones's Section 504 claim is unnecessary. See McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 119 F.3d 453, 459, 460 (6th Cir.1997) (en banc).

4 . We decline to reach any conclusions regarding whether Jones has a disability and whether she is otherwise qualified. Instead, we assume for the sake of this opinion that she meets the first two elements of her prima facie case and address only the third element: whether she was excluded from participation in or denied a benefit on the basis of her disability. See Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 276-78 (2d Cir.2003) (noting that "[a]n ADA plaintiff must demonstrate that a denial of benefits occurs 'by reason of ... disability.' " (quotation omitted)).

5 . Jones argues on appeal that she lacks meaningful access to the free all-day parking spaces because the spaces for the disabled are not in compliance with the ADA minimum construction and design standards. These standards address issues such as proper signage, width of parking spaces, and slope of parking spaces. Jones's claim of denial of a benefit, however, does not arise from any design and construction flaws in the all-day parking, because Jones admits that she would not use any of the free all-day parking spaces regardless of the alleged design flaws due to the distance of the parking spaces from her place of employment. The district court’s opinion is limited to Jones’s request, for herself only, that the court "force the City of Monroe to return to its former policy of not ticketing the Plaintiff when she leaves her car in a one hour parking space for the entire work day.... Or have the City of Monroe reserve a free accessible parking space on the street next to her office.” Jones did not seek injunctive relief for other disabled individuals based on lack of meaningful access. In addition, Jones did not request injunctive relief in the form of forcing Monroe to bring the free all-day parking spaces into compliance with the applicable construction and design standards. For purposes of this appeal, therefore, any noncompliance with standards in constructing these spaces is immaterial.

6 . Recently, in Henrietta D., the Second Circuit noted that under the ADA "there must be something different about the way the plaintiff is treated 'by reason of ... disability.’ ” 331 F.3d at 276 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132). In the instant case, Jones has not been treated differently from non-disabled individuals or denied any benefit.

7 . The dissent sets forth a lengthy hypothetical purporting to illustrate the distinction between what the dissent perceives to be the essence of Jones’s claim (that she is being denied the benefit of free all-day parking), and what the majority perceives to be the essence of Jones’s claim (that the ADA requires Monroe to provide Jones with an all-day parking space in the location she requests). The hypothetical is distinguishable because it involves a case where the disabled individual has no access to the service or benefit by reason of his or her disability, and the only available accommodation is the waiver of the city's rule. In the present case, Jones is not denied access to the benefit, and there are alternative accommodations available to Jones.

8 . The dissent would create a rule under which, if Monroe provides free parking anywhere > in the city, it could arguably be required to provide free parking to disabled individuals anywhere in the city they choose to go. Under the dissent’s logic, access to free parking could arguably be extended to individuals other than those traveling to downtown locations.

9 . The dissent relies heavily on the Supreme Court’s opinion in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 121 S.Ct. 1879, 149 L.Ed.2d 904 (2001), in concluding that the modification requested by Jones is not a fundamental alteration. In Martin, the Court first determined that the requested modification, waiver of the walking requirement, might constitute a fundamental alteration by (1) altering an essential aspect of the game so that it would be unacceptable even if it affected all competitors equally, or (2) altering an aspect of the game that has only a peripheral impact, but nevertheless gives a disabled player an advantage over others thereby fundamentally altering the character of the competition. Id. at 682, 121 S.Ct. 1879. The Court concluded that the "use of carts is not itself inconsistent with the fundamental character of the game of golf,” because "the essence of the game has been shotmaking.'' Id. at 683, 121 S.Ct. 1879. Parking, however, is hardly analogous to the game of golf. Moreover, the essential element of a one-hour free public parking area is the time limitation on an individual’s ability to use a designated space to park his or her vehicle. Alteration of the time limit on spaces designated for one-hour parking is a fundamental alteration of the parking scheme.