OPINION OF THE COURT
NEWMAN, Justice.
John P. Golaschevsky (Appellant) appeals from an Order of the Commonwealth Court granting a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Resources (DER) in Appellant’s original action against DER pursuant to the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law, Act of 1986, P.L. 1559, No. 169, as amended, 43 P.S. § 1421 et seq. (Whistleblower Law). We granted allocatur to decide whether alleged copyright violations by DER employees constitute “wrongdoing” within the meaning of the Whistleblower Law, and whether Appellant has adequately established a causal connection between his report of such conduct and DER’s termination of his employment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant began his employment with DER on September 7, 1993 as a probationary employee. He was classified as a Computer Systems Analyst I and assigned to work in DER’s District Mining Operations (DMO) office in Harrisburg. Pursuant to a Job Description dated November 1, 1993, which Appellant signed, his duties included: assisting in the development of computer program applications; ensuring adherence to departmental standards for hardware, software, development, security and operations; conducting initial problem diagnoses and coordinating with vendors for hardware repairs; attending Systems Coordinator meetings; performing various training functions; and designing and installing LAN’s (local area networks).
On December 20, 1993, Appellant met with his supervisor Paul Linnan (Linnan), DER’s Director of District Mining Operations, and informed Linnan that he suspected other DMO employees were using certain computer software in violation of federal copyright laws. Linnan encouraged Appel[160]*160lant to make a detailed report regarding the alleged copyright violations.
Approximately three weeks later, on January 7, 1994, Appellant met with Linnan and Lynda Ronemus (Ronemus), another supervisor, to receive an interim performance evaluation. The evaluation report noted that Appellant’s performance was lacking in a number of ways, including failure to achieve established goals. Linnan and Ronemus discussed Appellant’s performance problems with him, particularly his failure to complete certain assignments. The following week, Appellant’s supervisors gave him a list of projects to complete during the first quarter of the year. With the assistance of Appellant’s union representative, Appellant and his supervisors established and agreed to a schedule for completion of the assigned work.
On April 15, 1994, Linnan and Ronemus gave Appellant a second performance evaluation. Appellant’s overall performance was rated “unsatisfactory”, and the report noted performance problems virtually identical to those noted in the first evaluation report, e.g., failure to complete assignments on time. By letter dated April 25, 1994, DER terminated Appellant’s employment, effective April 26, 1994, for failure to meet the minimum performance standards for his position.
Following his termination, Appellant filed a Complaint against DER in the Commonwealth Court,1 alleging that he was terminated in violation of the Whistleblower Law. Specifically, Appellant claimed that he was the victim of an improper retaliatory termination because of his reporting alleged copyright violations by DER employees.
After the parties took discovery, DER filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that Appellant had failed to state a cause of action pursuant to the Whistleblower Law. The Commonwealth Court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of DER. Appellant now appeals to this Court, arguing that the Commonwealth Court erred in holding that [161]*161he failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge pursuant to the Whistleblower Law.
DISCUSSION
This appeal involves two separate issues. The first is whether the conduct that Appellant reported to his supervisors — alleged violations of federal copyright laws — comes within the Whistleblower Law’s definition of “wrongdoing”. The second is whether Appellant established the requisite causal connection between his report of copyright violations and the subsequent termination of his employment. We discuss each in turn.
Issue One: Definition of “Wrongdoing”
Section 3 of the Whistleblower Law, 43 P.S. § 1423(a), provides as follows:
(a) Persons not to be discharged — No employer may discharge, threaten or otherwise discriminate or retaliate against an employee regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location or privileges of employment because the employee or a person acting on behalf of the employee makes a good faith report or is about to report, verbally or in writing, to the employer or appropriate authority an instance of wrongdoing or waste.
Pursuant to the definitional section of the Whistleblower Law, 43 P.S. § 1422, the statute applies to “public bodies”, including Commonwealth agencies like DER.
43 P.S. § 1422 also defines “wrongdoing” as:
A violation which is not of a merely technical or minimal nature of a Federal or State statute or regulation, of a political subdivision ordinance or regulation or of a code of conduct or ethics designed to protect the interest of the public or the employer.
This definition was at issue in Gray v. Hafer, 168 Pa.Cmwlth. 613, 651 A.2d 221 (Pa.Cmwlth.1994), affirmed per curiam, 542 Pa. 607, 669 A.2d 335 (1995), in which an employee of the Department of the Auditor General reported to his superiors [162]*162instances of allegedly improper conduct perpetrated by employees of another governmental unit. In that context, the Commonwealth Court interpreted the statutory definition of “wrongdoing” as follows:
“In determining whether “wrongdoing” is established by reporting violations not only of crimes of the employer but of third parties, we must look to the definition of “wrongdoing.” Within the definition of “wrongdoing”, there is a requirement that the violation of the law or regulation be one that is designed to protect the interest of the public or employer. While the definition uses the phrase “to protect the interest of the public”, and that could be interpreted to apply to any statute or ordinance as used in the context of retaliation taken by an employer because of an employee’s work performance, that requirement means that a statute or regulation is of the type that the employer is charged to enforce for the good of the public or is one dealing with the internal administration of the governmental employer in question.”
Gray, 651 A.2d at 224. In so limiting the definition of “wrongdoing”, Gray was principally concerned with preventing employees from invoking the Whistleblower Law in cases where there could be no rational relation between the alleged illegal activity and the employer’s conduct.
However, Gray’s limitation of the definition of “wrongdoing” plainly does not apply where, as here, the employee alleges that there has been illegal activity within his own agency. Under these circumstances, pursuant to the plain language of 43 P.S.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
NEWMAN, Justice.
John P. Golaschevsky (Appellant) appeals from an Order of the Commonwealth Court granting a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Resources (DER) in Appellant’s original action against DER pursuant to the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law, Act of 1986, P.L. 1559, No. 169, as amended, 43 P.S. § 1421 et seq. (Whistleblower Law). We granted allocatur to decide whether alleged copyright violations by DER employees constitute “wrongdoing” within the meaning of the Whistleblower Law, and whether Appellant has adequately established a causal connection between his report of such conduct and DER’s termination of his employment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant began his employment with DER on September 7, 1993 as a probationary employee. He was classified as a Computer Systems Analyst I and assigned to work in DER’s District Mining Operations (DMO) office in Harrisburg. Pursuant to a Job Description dated November 1, 1993, which Appellant signed, his duties included: assisting in the development of computer program applications; ensuring adherence to departmental standards for hardware, software, development, security and operations; conducting initial problem diagnoses and coordinating with vendors for hardware repairs; attending Systems Coordinator meetings; performing various training functions; and designing and installing LAN’s (local area networks).
On December 20, 1993, Appellant met with his supervisor Paul Linnan (Linnan), DER’s Director of District Mining Operations, and informed Linnan that he suspected other DMO employees were using certain computer software in violation of federal copyright laws. Linnan encouraged Appel[160]*160lant to make a detailed report regarding the alleged copyright violations.
Approximately three weeks later, on January 7, 1994, Appellant met with Linnan and Lynda Ronemus (Ronemus), another supervisor, to receive an interim performance evaluation. The evaluation report noted that Appellant’s performance was lacking in a number of ways, including failure to achieve established goals. Linnan and Ronemus discussed Appellant’s performance problems with him, particularly his failure to complete certain assignments. The following week, Appellant’s supervisors gave him a list of projects to complete during the first quarter of the year. With the assistance of Appellant’s union representative, Appellant and his supervisors established and agreed to a schedule for completion of the assigned work.
On April 15, 1994, Linnan and Ronemus gave Appellant a second performance evaluation. Appellant’s overall performance was rated “unsatisfactory”, and the report noted performance problems virtually identical to those noted in the first evaluation report, e.g., failure to complete assignments on time. By letter dated April 25, 1994, DER terminated Appellant’s employment, effective April 26, 1994, for failure to meet the minimum performance standards for his position.
Following his termination, Appellant filed a Complaint against DER in the Commonwealth Court,1 alleging that he was terminated in violation of the Whistleblower Law. Specifically, Appellant claimed that he was the victim of an improper retaliatory termination because of his reporting alleged copyright violations by DER employees.
After the parties took discovery, DER filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that Appellant had failed to state a cause of action pursuant to the Whistleblower Law. The Commonwealth Court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of DER. Appellant now appeals to this Court, arguing that the Commonwealth Court erred in holding that [161]*161he failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge pursuant to the Whistleblower Law.
DISCUSSION
This appeal involves two separate issues. The first is whether the conduct that Appellant reported to his supervisors — alleged violations of federal copyright laws — comes within the Whistleblower Law’s definition of “wrongdoing”. The second is whether Appellant established the requisite causal connection between his report of copyright violations and the subsequent termination of his employment. We discuss each in turn.
Issue One: Definition of “Wrongdoing”
Section 3 of the Whistleblower Law, 43 P.S. § 1423(a), provides as follows:
(a) Persons not to be discharged — No employer may discharge, threaten or otherwise discriminate or retaliate against an employee regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location or privileges of employment because the employee or a person acting on behalf of the employee makes a good faith report or is about to report, verbally or in writing, to the employer or appropriate authority an instance of wrongdoing or waste.
Pursuant to the definitional section of the Whistleblower Law, 43 P.S. § 1422, the statute applies to “public bodies”, including Commonwealth agencies like DER.
43 P.S. § 1422 also defines “wrongdoing” as:
A violation which is not of a merely technical or minimal nature of a Federal or State statute or regulation, of a political subdivision ordinance or regulation or of a code of conduct or ethics designed to protect the interest of the public or the employer.
This definition was at issue in Gray v. Hafer, 168 Pa.Cmwlth. 613, 651 A.2d 221 (Pa.Cmwlth.1994), affirmed per curiam, 542 Pa. 607, 669 A.2d 335 (1995), in which an employee of the Department of the Auditor General reported to his superiors [162]*162instances of allegedly improper conduct perpetrated by employees of another governmental unit. In that context, the Commonwealth Court interpreted the statutory definition of “wrongdoing” as follows:
“In determining whether “wrongdoing” is established by reporting violations not only of crimes of the employer but of third parties, we must look to the definition of “wrongdoing.” Within the definition of “wrongdoing”, there is a requirement that the violation of the law or regulation be one that is designed to protect the interest of the public or employer. While the definition uses the phrase “to protect the interest of the public”, and that could be interpreted to apply to any statute or ordinance as used in the context of retaliation taken by an employer because of an employee’s work performance, that requirement means that a statute or regulation is of the type that the employer is charged to enforce for the good of the public or is one dealing with the internal administration of the governmental employer in question.”
Gray, 651 A.2d at 224. In so limiting the definition of “wrongdoing”, Gray was principally concerned with preventing employees from invoking the Whistleblower Law in cases where there could be no rational relation between the alleged illegal activity and the employer’s conduct.
However, Gray’s limitation of the definition of “wrongdoing” plainly does not apply where, as here, the employee alleges that there has been illegal activity within his own agency. Under these circumstances, pursuant to the plain language of 43 P.S. § 1422, “wrongdoing” includes not only violations of statutes or regulations that are “of the type that the employer is charged to enforce,” but violations of any federal or state statute or regulation, other than violations that are “of a merely technical or minimal nature.”2 Although here there is some question whether the alleged copyright [163]*163violations Appellant reported to his supervisors would come within the “technical or minimal” exception, we need not reach that issue, because Appellant clearly has not met his burden of demonstrating a causal connection between his report and the subsequent termination of his employment.
Issue Two: Causal Connection
While Gray’s analysis of the definition of “wrongdoing” is inapplicable to the present case, its discussion of the causal connection issue is germane. Gray correctly held that, to make out a prima facie case of retaliatory termination pursuant to the Whistleblower Law, a plaintiff must “show by concrete facts or surrounding circumstances that the report [of wrongdoing or waste] led to [the plaintiffs] dismissal, such as that there was specific direction or information received not to file the report or [that] there would be adverse consequences because the report was filed.” Gray, 651 A.2d at 225.
Here, Appellant does not present sufficient evidence to establish a causal connection between his report and his termination. He does not allege that his supervisors threatened to fire him or to impose any other adverse consequences because of his report, nor does he establish any other “concrete facts” to connect the report with the dismissal. Instead, in attempting to show a causal connection, Appellant relies solely on vague and inconclusive circumstantial evidence.
For example, Appellant alleges that, prior to his December 20, 1993 meeting with Linnan regarding the alleged copyright violations, his supervisors had not indicated any dissatisfaction with his work. Appellant claims that his report of alleged wrongdoing touched off a series of retaliatory actions, including negative performance evaluations, lack of cooperation from fellow employees and supervisors, withholding of information regarding computer software, and, ultimately, termination of Appellant’s employment. However, this “evidence” constitutes nothing more than Appellant’s perception of how others treated him after he made the December 20, 1993 report — a [164]*164perception that is obviously colored by Appellant’s interest in proving that he is a victim of retaliatory discharge.
Viewing the evidence objectively, Appellant’s termination apparently was the result of his unsatisfactory work performance, and had nothing to do with his report of alleged copyright violations. Indeed, rather than punishing him for making an oral report of alleged wrongdoing, Appellant’s supervisors encouraged him to follow up on the matter and produce a written report, though he apparently never did so.
Appellant offers no concrete evidence tending to show a causal connection between his report of alleged copyright violations and his subsequent termination, and, therefore, he cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge pursuant to the Whistleblower Law. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the Commonwealth Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of DER.
NIGRO, J., files a concurring opinion.
ZAPPALA, J., concurs in the result.