Adams, A., Aplt. v. AG

Opinion

[J-46-2026] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA WESTERN DISTRICT

TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ.

ALBERT ADAMS, JR., : No. 4 WAP 2025 : Appellant : Appeal from the Order entered : December 27, 2024, of the : Commonwealth Court at No. 563 v. : MD 2017. : : SUBMITTED: March 26, 2026 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, : : Appellee :

OPINION

JUSTICE McCAFFERY DECIDED: JULY 21, 2026 In this direct appeal, we consider whether the Commonwealth Court erred by

granting summary relief in favor of Appellee, the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney

General (the OAG), regarding Appellant’s, Albert Adams, Jr.’s, claim under

Pennsylvania’s Whistleblower Law (the Whistleblower Law).1 The Commonwealth Court

determined that Adams failed to place evidence in the record capable of establishing that

any adverse employment action taken by the OAG was caused by his good faith report

of sexual and racial harassment of an intern by a coworker. We conclude the

Commonwealth Court erred. Specifically, we hold that Adams provided sufficient

evidence demonstrating a causal link between the OAG’s adverse employment actions

and his good faith report. We therefore vacate the Commonwealth Court’s order and

1 Act of December 12, 1986, P.L. 1559, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1421-1428. remand for further proceedings to consider whether Adams established the remaining

requirements for a prima facie case under our Court’s precedent.

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 6, 2017, Adams, a Narcotics Agent II, filed a complaint in the

Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction against his employer, the OAG, alleging a

violation of the Whistleblower Law. Eventually, on December 6, 2021, Adams filed a third

amended complaint (Complaint). In this Complaint, Adams argued that, after he

submitted a good faith report of sexual and racial harassment, the OAG violated Section

3(a) of the Whistleblower Law by denying him multiple promotions and employment

opportunities.2

The Complaint, except when noted, advanced the following allegations. On March

28, 2017, Adams witnessed Agent Tom Moore (Agent Moore), a fellow narcotics agent,

sexually and racially harass a white female intern over the course of eight hours, as they

executed search warrants. See Complaint, 12/6/2021, at ¶¶ 18-20; Brief in Support of

Adams’ Opposition to the OAG’s Application for Summary Relief, 3/15/2024, at 3-4.

Agent Moore harassed the intern by directing sexually explicit language at her, suggesting

she would like to have a sexual relationship with a Black perpetrator, and asking what her

2 Section 3(a) of the Whistleblower Law provides:

(a) Persons not to be discharged.--No employer may discharge, threaten or otherwise discriminate or retaliate against an employee regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location or privileges of employment because the employee or a person acting on behalf of the employee makes a good faith report or is about to report, verbally or in writing, to the employer or appropriate authority an instance of wrongdoing or waste by a public body or an instance of waste by any other employer as defined in this act. 43 P.S. § 1423(a).

[J-46-2026] - 2 parents would think of such a relationship. Two other narcotics agents with the OAG —

Agent Matthew Massaro (Agent Massaro) and Agent Mark Sinisi (Agent Sinisi) — were

also present and witnessed this harassment. A few days later, Adams reported this

incident (the 2017 Report) to Agent Barry Howe, then Acting Regional Director. The OAG

investigated this incident, obtaining statements from Adams, Agent Massaro, and Agent

Sinisi. On July 17, 2017, the OAG issued a written reprimand to Agent Moore for

“unbecoming conduct.” See R.R. 462a (Moore Written Reprimand). Despite this

reprimand, Agent Moore continued to work in a supervisory role at the OAG.

On April 19, 2017, Adams interviewed for a promotion to Narcotics Agent III. In

July 2017, he learned he did not receive this promotion and Agent Dave Jordan (Agent

Jordan) was promoted instead. One month later, Adams requested an assignment with

the Safe Streets program operated out of Johnstown, Pennsylvania. Individuals in the

Safe Streets program are eligible to earn approximately $18,000 per year in overtime.

Adams’ request was denied, and Agent Howe informed him that the Safe Street positions

were assigned to two Cambria County sheriff’s deputies. In actuality, the positions were

assigned to Agent Moore and Agent Thomas Brandt (Agent Brandt). In Fall 2017, Adams

applied for two vacant Narcotics Agent III positions. Adams was not hired for either

opening, and Agent Moore and Agent Brandt were promoted instead.

Subsequently, at a staff meeting, the OAG announced that in order to be eligible

for a promotion to Narcotics Agent III, any Narcotics Agent II must be a Field Training

Agent. An agent interested in becoming a Field Training Agent was asked to notify Agent

Howe. Adams sent Agent Howe a memorandum expressing his interest in becoming a

Field Training Agent. Around November 30, 2017, Adams learned that four other agents,

including Agent Moore and Agent Sinisi, were selected to become Field Training Agents

and were booked for a Field Training Agent course on December 4, 2017. According to

[J-46-2026] - 3 Adams, he was the only agent who applied for the two vacant Narcotic Agent III positions

in Fall 2017 that was not selected to attend the Field Training Agent course.

In November 2018, Adams applied for a Narcotics Agent III Gun Violence Unit

position. Adams did not receive this promotion, and the promotion went to Agent Sinisi

instead. In July 2021, Adams applied for the Regional Director position in the State

College Regional Office in the Bureau of Narcotics Investigation and Drug Control. Again,

Adams did not receive this position, and the position went to Agent Brandt. Adams claims

he was the most qualified and experienced applicant for each of these positions, but he

was denied these opportunities in retaliation for submitting the 2017 Report concerning

Agent Moore’s alleged sexual and racial harassment.

The Complaint also alleged that Agent Moore and Agent Howe belonged to a

clique of employees inside the OAG. According to Adams, employees within this clique

would do personal favors for other members of the group and assist each other in

employment decisions and promotions. In Adams’ pretrial statement, he expounded on

this theory and explained that a “boys’ club” existed in the OAG, and it included several

employees, such as Agent Moore, Agent Howe, and Agent Brandt. See R.R. 93a (Adams’

Pretrial Statement). He claimed that members of this “boys’ club” would “exchange[]

favors and gifts, and assist[] one another in obtaining promotions within the OAG.” Id.

On March 1, 2024, following the close of discovery, the OAG filed an application

with the Commonwealth Court seeking summary relief in its favor and alleging Adams

failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Section 3(a) of the Whistleblower

[J-46-2026] - 4 Law.3 Specifically, the OAG asserted Adams was unable to establish a “causal

connection” between the 2017 Report and any adverse employment actions.4

Adams vehemently rejected the OAG’s arguments concerning the purported lack

of causal connection. See Brief in Support of Adams’ Opposition to the OAG’s Application

for Summary Relief at 27-37. He highlighted evidence in the record that was capable of

establishing a causal connection. First, Adams noted that, after filing his report, he was

denied four separate promotions, an opportunity to earn overtime in the Safe Streets

program, and the opportunity to advance his career by participating in the Field Training

Agent course. See id. at 33. Second, Adams pointed to an incident in February 2022

involving Agent Michael Page (Agent Page), his direct supervisor. Agent Page reduced

Adams’ overall performance rating from “outstanding” to “commendable” purportedly

3 To prove a violation of the Whistleblower Law, an employee “must show by a preponderance of the evidence that, prior to the alleged reprisal, the employee or a person acting on behalf of the employee had reported or was about to report in good faith, verbally or in writing, an instance of wrongdoing or waste to the employer or an appropriate authority.” 43 P.S. § 1424(b). As pertinent here, “wrongdoing” refers to “[a] violation which is not of a merely technical or minimal nature of a Federal or State statute or regulation, of a political subdivision ordinance or regulation or of a code of conduct or ethics designed to protect the interest of the public or the employer.” 43 P.S. § 1422. In a case concerning purported retaliation, an employee must show a “causal connection” between their good faith report of wrongdoing and an adverse employment action. Golaschevsky v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 720 A.2d 757, 759 (Pa. 1998). 4 The OAG also argued the 2017 Report was not a good faith report of wrongdoing

because Adams and Agent Moore were competing for the same Narcotics Agent III position, and Adams was “self-interested in taking actions that could materially improve his position vis-à-vis other candidates for his desired promotion.” Adams v. Off. of Att’y Gen., 563 M.D. 2017, 8 (Pa. Cmwlth. filed Dec. 27, 2024) (unreported). In addition, the OAG claimed the 2017 Report was not made in “good faith” because Adams reported Agent Moore’s harassment due to his feelings of “malice” and “ill will towards Agent Moore.” Id. at 9. The OAG further argued the 2017 Report did not concern any “wrongdoing” encompassed by the Whistleblower Law. Brief in Support of the OAG’s Application for Relief in the Nature of a Motion for Summary Judgment, 3/1/2024, at 7-9 (citing 43 P.S. § 1422). The OAG maintained that Adams’ report of sexual harassment was “[o]bjectively … nothing more than a peccadillo report about one of his fellow employees.” Id. at 9 (citation omitted).

[J-46-2026] - 5 “because Agent Brandt would not accept the evaluation with the overall rating of

‘outstanding’ and Agent Brandt had [the] final say.”5 Id. at 14-15 (italics and citation

omitted). Third, Adams relied upon Agent Jordan’s deposition, where he testified to the

following: (1) Agent Howe did not want to assign Adams to the Safe Streets program, and

he said he would “give up” the Safe Streets positions rather than “give it to [Adams;]” (2)

an OAG prosecutor called Adams a “rat fuck” for submitting the 2017 Report; and (3) the

2017 Report was “certainly a factor” as to why Adams was not promoted to one of the two

Narcotics Agent III positions in the Fall 2017.6 Id. at 30, 33 (citations and emphasis

omitted). Fourth, Adams cited Agent Duane Musser’s (Agent Musser) deposition, where

he testified that Agent Brandt should not have been promoted over Adams and that

Adams was a better candidate. See id. at 34. Lastly, Adams claimed “the record

establishe[d] that [he] was the most qualified and experienced applicant for the

promotions and career opportunities at issue, and more qualified than the successful

5 By way of background, in February 2022, Agent Page completed the standard annual performance evaluation form for Adams, and in his original evaluation, Agent Page’s overall performance rating for Adams was “outstanding.” See Michael Page Deposition, 9/13/2022, at 36-37 (italics omitted). After receiving Agent Page’s initial evaluation, Agent Brandt told him that he disagreed with Adams’ overall rating of “outstanding” and asked Agent Page to talk with two OAG attorneys who worked with Adams. See id. at 37-39 (italics omitted). Agent Page met with the two attorneys, and neither objected to his assessment of Adams. Furthermore, the two attorneys said nothing that changed Agent Page’s opinion as to Adams’ performance. According to Adams, Agent Page eventually dropped his overall rating to “commendable” only “because Agent Brandt would not accept the evaluation with the overall rating of ‘outstanding’ and Agent Brandt had [the] final say.” Brief in Support of Adams’ Opposition to the OAG’s Application for Summary Relief at 14-15 (italics and citation omitted). Lastly, Adams observed that Agent Page testified he had “prepared approximately forty or fifty performance evaluations and this [was] the only time a supervisor ha[d] ever refused to accept his evaluation.” Id. at 16 (emphasis and citation omitted). 6 Agent Jordan also testified that the 2017 Report “played a role” in Adams not being

promoted to Narcotics Agent III position in Fall 2017 and “contributed” to Agent Howe’s decision to not assign Adams to one of the Safe Streets positions. See David Jordan Deposition, 8/10/2021, at 33, 40.

[J-46-2026] - 6 applications,” and in support, attached his resume along with the resumes of Agents

Jordan, Moore, Brandt, and Sinisi. Id. at 34-35 (citations omitted).

In a single-judge, unreported decision, the Commonwealth Court agreed with the

OAG and found that Adams failed to establish a causal connection between the 2017

Report and any adverse employment actions. See Adams, 563 M.D. 2017, at 12-22. As

a result, the Court granted the OAG’s application for summary relief and dismissed

Adams’ Complaint.7 See id. at 23. To reach this conclusion, the Court reviewed “all facts

of record and reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to [Adams], the

non-moving party.” Id. at 2 n.2 (citation omitted). Setting forth its standard of review, the

Court explained: In ruling on a motion for summary relief, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and the court may enter judgment only if: (1) there are no genuine issues of material fact; and (2) the right to relief is clear as a matter of law. This right to relief may be granted only in cases where the right is clear and free from doubt. Id. at 6 (citations, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court then reviewed recent precedent interpreting the Whistleblower Law. To

establish a violation of the Law for retaliatory employment actions, an “employee must

show a causal connection between the report of wrongdoing and the [adverse

employment actions].” Adams, 563 M.D. 2017, at 7 (emphasis in original) (citing Javitz

v. Luzerne Cnty., 293 A.3d 570, 579 (Pa. 2023)). Unsupported conclusions about a post-

report hostile work environment are insufficient to demonstrate the required causal

connection. See id. (citing Javitz, 293 A.3d at 583 n.16). Instead, an employee must

allege “concrete facts” from which the factfinder can reasonably infer that the employer’s

7 The Commonwealth Court rejected the OAG’s arguments that the 2017 Report was not

a “good faith” report because Adams was motivated by personal interest or malice towards Agent Moore. See Adams, 563 M.D. 2017, at 8-12. That issue is not part of this appeal. Notably, the Court did not address the OAG’s argument that, under the Whistleblower Law, the 2017 Report did not concern a “wrongdoing.”

[J-46-2026] - 7 conduct was antagonistic. Id. at 14 (emphasis omitted) (citing Javitz, 293 A.3d at 582).

Neither “temporal proximity” nor direct “evidence of antagonism” is required — “proximity

or antagonism merely provides an evidentiary basis from which an inference [of

retaliation] can be drawn.” Id. at 7 (citing McAndrew v. Bucks Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 982

F. Supp. 2d 491, 505 (E.D. Pa. 2013)).

Turning to the facts, the Court recognized that Adams’ Complaint alleged multiple

instances of denied promotions after he submitted the 2017 Report. However, relying on

the above-mentioned case law, the Court found these allegations “standing alone, [were]

insufficient to establish a causal connection[.]” Adams, 563 M.D. 2017, at 16 (citation

omitted). The temporal proximity between the 2017 Report and the numerous instances

of Adams not being promoted were not sufficient to prove a causal connection. See id.

at 16-17. The Court also determined that the Complaint’s allegations were nothing more

than Adams’ “perception of how others treated him after he made the … report.” Id.

(citation and brackets omitted). As to Adams’ assertions concerning Agent Page and his

performance evaluation, the Court determined that Agent Brandt did not accept Agent

Page’s original evaluation because Agent Page had not been Adams’ supervisor for the

entire year. See id. at 12 n.10. As such, the Court implied that this incident could not be

considered an adverse employment action because there was a benign explanation for

Agent Brandt’s conduct.

The Court placed great significance on Adams’ assertion regarding a “boys’ club”

in the OAG and found this claim “undermine[d] his” arguments concerning causation.8

Adams, 563 M.D. 2017, at 17. The Court observed that “the various positions [Adams]

claims he did not achieve due to retaliation for the [2017] Report were given to members

8 The OAG’s Application for Summary Relief did not claim a boys’ club existed or that

such a boys’ club explains all the adverse employment actions against Adams.

[J-46-2026] - 8 of what [Adams] referred to as the boys’ club.” Id. (italics omitted). In the Court’s view,

the existence of the boys’ club provided the complete explanation for why Adams had not

been promoted. In support, the Court cited Agent Jordan’s deposition, where he claimed:

(1) the 2017 Report was not the “specific reason” why Adams was not assigned to the

Safe Street program; and (2) it was “known for years” that certain agents, including Agent

Howe, “didn’t like [Adams], so they weren’t really going to help him out.” Id. at 18-19

(citation and emphasis omitted). Considering Agent Jordan left the OAG in September

2017, the Court concluded his statement — that it was “known for years” Agent Howe did

not like Adams — referred to years prior to the 2017 Report. See id. In further support

of its interpretation, the Court cited Agent Musser’s testimony that “people from Blair

County got hired over others consistently” and that “Blair County was their own little

clique, they all knew each other, did favors for each other, took care of each other.” Id.

at 19-20 (citation and emphasis omitted).

The Court concluded that Adams’ own evidence indicates he was passed over for

desired promotions because of the preferential treatment given to members of the boys’

club, not because of the 2017 Report. See Adams, 563 M.D. 2017, at 20. All of Adams’

evidence of antagonism following the 2017 Report had no bearing on causation because,

in the Court’s view, “the antagonistic behavior was the same before and after the [2017]

Report[.]” Id. at 21 (citation omitted). Thus, the facts, as put forth by Adams, supported

a finding that favoritism and the boys’ club were the true reasons behind his inability to

be promoted, and his Complaint could not establish a causal connection between the

2017 Report and any adverse employment actions. See id. at 20.

The Court also noted the contradictory allegations in the Complaint concerning

Agent Sinisi. In the Court’s view, Adams’ Complaint averred that OAG agents “directed

derogatory comments and hostility” at Agent Sinisi, due to his “good faith report of

[J-46-2026] - 9 harassment.” Adams, 563 M.D. 2017, at 20 (citation omitted). However, the Complaint

also alleged Agent Sinisi was one of the agents contacted by the OAG about becoming

a Field Training Agent, and the Complaint noted that Agent Sinisi eventually was

promoted to the Narcotics Agent III Gun Violence Unit position. See id. The Court viewed

the fact that one of the agents involved in the underlying incident detailed in the 2017

Report, was promoted made it “less likely that retaliation for the [2017] Report was the

reason [Adams] was not himself selected for any of the various positions[.]” Id. at 20-21

(emphasis added).

The Court also found it significant Adams testified that Agent Howe encouraged

him to file the March 2017 report, and Agent Moore was disciplined as a result. See

Adams, 563 M.D. 2017, at 21. In its view, the “concrete facts and surrounding

circumstances” alleged in the Complaint “merely reflect the OAG’s agreement that Agent

Moore’s conduct should have been reported and required discipline, which the OAG

issued.” Id. at 22 (italics omitted).

Having assessed the Complaint’s allegations, the Court determined that, even

considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, Adams could

not prove causation between the 2017 Report and the OAG’s repeated decisions not to

promote him. Instead, his “objective evidence” showed that his lack of promotion was a

consequence of him not being a member of the boys’ club. Adams, 563 M.D. 2017, at

22. As such, the Court concluded that Adams failed to establish a prima facie case of

causation as required by the Whistleblower Law. See id.

Adams appealed to this Court for review of the Commonwealth Court’s

determination, and we ordered his appeal to be submitted on the briefs, without oral

argument. See Order, 4 WAP 2025.

[J-46-2026] - 10 II. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

From the outset, Adams emphasizes that the Whistleblower Law only asks an

employee to “come forward with some evidence of a connection between the report of

wrongdoing and the alleged retaliatory acts.” Adams’ Brief at 22 (emphasis in original)

(citing Javitz, 293 A.3d at 584). “[E]stablishing a prima facie case in this context is not

intended to be onerous.” Id. at 22-23 (italics added) (citing Golaschevsky, 720 A.2d at

761 (Nigro, J., concurring)). According to Adams, the Commonwealth Court misapplied

the law, utilized a heightened standard, and selectively underscored certain facts while

inexplicably ignoring other evidence of probative value.

Adams does not dispute that an employee’s “subjective perception” is insufficient

for a prima facie case of causation. Adams’ Brief at 29 (citing Javitz, 293 A.3d at 585).

But here, Adams contends the Commonwealth Court erred by dismissing the entirety of

his evidence as being his “subjective perception.” Id. Adams emphasizes that he

presented “evidence of fact, not perception” and highlights the following: (1) an attorney

at the OAG called him a “rat fuck,” (2) Agent Brandt pressured Agent Page to lower his

performance evaluation, and (3) he was the only agent who applied for the Narcotics

Agent III positions who was not selected to attend the Field Training Agent course. Id.

Adams also notes he provided the Court with the resumes of the individuals who were

promoted over him, showing they objectively had far less experience, training, and

certifications. See id. at 30. Relying on Carpenter v. William Penn School District, 295

A.3d 22 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023), Adams argues that resumes are objective evidence

concerning the relative experience of candidates, and the Court should have considered

this objective evidence instead of disregarding it. Id.

Adams asserts the Commonwealth Court improperly applied a heightened

standard by requiring him to provide direct evidence demonstrating the OAG threatened

[J-46-2026] - 11 him with adverse employment actions after he submitted the 2017 Report. See Adams’

Brief at 32. He argues these errors are “directly analogous” to the missteps in Javitz,

which this Court overturned on appeal. Id. at 33. He claims the Commonwealth Court,

in both cases, “mischaracterized evidence of fact as ‘subjective perception,’ neglected to

include additional evidence of post-reporting antagonism, and seemingly required nothing

less than evidence in the form of the proverbial ‘smoking gun’ to establish causation.” Id.

at 37.

Adams argues the Commonwealth Court strayed by not viewing the record in the

light most favorable to him, the non-moving party. See Adams’ Brief at 38. In particular,

he challenges its “improper inference” that any adverse employment actions against him

were the result of him not being a member of the boys’ club, as opposed to the 2017

Report. Id. at 39. Adams insists that, even if his Complaint supports the existence of a

boys’ club at the OAG, this finding does not refute his arguments linking the 2017 Report

to the adverse employment actions. See id. He faults the Commonwealth Court for

“ignor[ing] the potential for, if not likelihood of, retaliation against [him] filing a report of

sexual and racial harassment against a member of the ‘boys’ club.’” Id. Furthermore,

Adams argues that any evidence proving the existence of a boys’ club can be read in his

favor because his evidence also established “the threat of retaliation for filing a complaint

against one of its members.” Id. at 40. In support, he highlights Agent Musser’s testimony

describing “a fear [or] concern of retaliation in the office.” Id. (citation omitted).

Adams rejects the Commonwealth Court’s position that there is a “reasonable,

non-retaliatory explanation” for why Agent Page ultimately lowered his assessment of

Adams. Adams’ Brief at 25. He argues the record does not support the Court’s

conclusion that Agent Brandt refused to accept Agent Page’s initial rating of “outstanding”

because Agent Page only had been Adams’ supervisor for seven months. See id.

[J-46-2026] - 12 (emphasis omitted). To counter the Commonwealth Court’s finding, Adams points to

Agent Page’s testimony that he changed Adams’ performance rating to “commendable”

only so that Agent Brandt would accept it. See id. at 27 (emphasis omitted).

Adams also challenges the Commonwealth Court’s finding that the OAG

encouraged him to submit the 2017 Report, which the Court used as “evidence of the lack

of a causal connection.” Adams’ Brief at 45-46, 48 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). In support, he points to testimony that purportedly indicates the OAG tried to

prevent the victim of Agent Moore’s harassment from submitting a fully accurate report.

See id. at 46-47. Likewise, Adams disputes the Court’s reasoning that the OAG’s alleged

discipline of Agent Moore undermines Adams’ assertion of a causal connection. See id.

at 48. Adams emphasizes that Agent Moore was never suspended or demoted due to

the 2017 Report, so the OAG’s “discipline” of Agent Moore was a “farce” and “in name

only.” Id. at 48, 50. He argues the Court incorrectly viewed the above facts in a light

most favorable to the OAG, which is improper at the summary relief stage. See id. at 49-

50.

In response to Adams’ arguments, the OAG claims the Commonwealth Court

correctly applied the governing legal standards, and this case is distinguishable from

Javitz. The OAG notes that, in Javitz, the employee advanced concrete facts indicating

that after her good faith report: (1) her performance evaluations started to decline; (2) her

employer relocated her to a new office; and (3) her employer started diminishing her

responsibilities and involvement within the office. See OAG’s Brief at 16-17. By contrast,

Adams fails to aver any tangible changes in his employment. Instead, his Complaint is

grounded in his “belief that he was the most qualified candidate for” promotion. Id. at 17

(citations omitted). According to the OAG, this “belief” is merely “a subjective assessment

[J-46-2026] - 13 of himself and other employees” and insufficient for a prima facie case. Id. (citations

omitted).

The OAG also challenges the import of Adams’ evidence. For example, it claims

the “stray comment” of an OAG employee calling him a “rat fuck” is “hearsay” and should

have no bearing on the motion for summary relief.9 OAG’s Brief at 18 (citation omitted).

Likewise, the OAG agrees with the Commonwealth Court that Adams’ evidence shows

antagonistic behavior from his colleagues before and after the 2017 Report, which

undermines his causation argument. See id. at 13. The OAG also points out that he did

not assert “he was excluded from [the boys’ club] because of his whistleblowing.” Id.

(emphasis in original; citation omitted). Therefore, the OAG posits, even if Adams was

intentionally not promoted, his evidence only indicates “friendship” or “cronyism” was the

underlying basis for these decisions, which is not a basis for relief in whistleblower

retaliation cases. Id. at 14 (citations omitted).

III. CASE LAW

“[I]n evaluating the Commonwealth Court’s decision to grant summary relief, we

examine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party

is entitled to relief as a matter of law.” Pa. Med. Soc’y v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 39 A.3d

267, 276-277 (Pa. 2012). To this end, “we must view the record in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material

9 In response, Adams argues that the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure “expressly

permit the use of hearsay, including affidavits, expert reports, depositions, and answers to interrogatories, by the non-moving party to create an issue of material fact to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Adams’ Reply Brief at 3 (citations omitted). The OAG did not challenge the admissibility of Agent Jordan’s testimony concerning the “rat fuck” comment before the Commonwealth Court. Furthermore, the Commonwealth Court did not explicitly exclude the statement. As such, the statement still constitutes evidence of record in this appeal.

[J-46-2026] - 14 fact must be resolved against the moving party.” Id. at 277 (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). “The summary relief standard … is similar to the summary judgment

standard under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id. at 276 n.11 (citation

Here, we are tasked with determining whether Adams satisfied the causal

connection element, which concerns “a question of law, over which our scope of review

is plenary.” Javitz, 293 A.3d at 578 (citation omitted). Neither party has argued this Court

should alter or amend our precedent concerning the Whistleblower Law. Instead, the

question is whether the Commonwealth Court correctly applied the law in concluding that

Adams failed to establish a causal connection between the 2017 Report and any adverse

employment consequences.

The Whistleblower Law is a “remedial measure intended to enhance openness in

government and compel the government’s compliance with the law by protecting those

who inform authorities of wrongdoing.” O’Rourke v. Commonwealth, 778 A.2d 1194,

1202 (Pa. 2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). It is not intended to

punish employers, but instead, it is a safeguard for employees who have reported

wrongdoings, defying risk and harm to their careers. See id. at 1203. “[T]he purpose of

whistleblower statutes is to protect employees who risk their own job security by going

above and beyond the call of duty by reporting infractions of law that are hidden.” Rohner

v. Atkinson, 118 A.3d 486, 492 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Sea v. Seif, 831 A.2d 1288, 1292 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (“[T]he overall

purpose of the Whistleblower Law [is] to encourage government employees to come

forward with information necessary to protect the public interest even where that

information is damaging to the agency which employs them.”). Section 3(a) of the

Whistleblower Law outlines the protections for employees who expose wrongdoing:

[J-46-2026] - 15 (a) Persons not to be discharged.--No employer may discharge, threaten or otherwise discriminate or retaliate against an employee regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location or privileges of employment because the employee or a person acting on behalf of the employee makes a good faith report or is about to report, verbally or in writing, to the employer or appropriate authority an instance of wrongdoing or waste by a public body or an instance of waste by any other employer as defined in this act. 43 P.S. § 1423(a). As pertinent in the appeal sub judice, a prima facie case of a violation

of Section 3(a) requires a showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that an employee

submitted a “good faith” report of “wrongdoing.” 43 P.S. § 1424. If it is a case of

retaliation, the employee must also show a “causal connection” between their good faith

report of wrongdoing and an adverse employment action.10 See Golaschevsky, 720 A.2d

at 759.

Once an employee satisfies these requirements, the burden shifts to the employer

to prove that its actions were lawful pursuant to Section 4(c) of the Law, which states: (c) Defense.-- It shall be a defense to an action under this section if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the action by the employer occurred for separate and legitimate reasons, which are not merely pretextual. 43 P.S. § 1424(c). In O’Rourke, this Court explained that the “subjective motivation[s] of

the employer” are immaterial to whether an action is “separate” under Section 4(c).

O’Rourke, 778 A.2d at 1203. O’Rourke explicitly held that to rebut a prima facie case of

retaliation “the employer must prove that it would have taken the same adverse

employment action absent the employee’s good-faith report of wrongdoing.” Id. at 1204

(citation omitted). Therefore, O’Rourke stands for the proposition that, “to encourage

good faith reporting of illicit activities and for the protection of those who actually make

10 The causation standard was first expressed by the Commonwealth Court in Gray v.

Hafer, 651 A.2d 221 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994), aff’d, 669 A.2d 335 (Pa. 1995) (per curiam). See Javitz, 293 A.3d at 579. Four years later, in Golaschevsky, this Court explicitly adopted the causation standard. See id. at 580 (citing Golaschevsky, 720 A.2d at 759).

[J-46-2026] - 16 good faith reports[,]” employers must bear the burden of proving that their actions

occurred for reasons “separate from the report of wrongdoing.” Id. at 1205. Once an

employer satisfies this burden, then “the burden shifts back to the employee to prove that

the reasons offered are merely pretextual.” Javitz, 293 A.3d at 579 n.10 (citation omitted).

Adams and the OAG quarrel over whether the Commonwealth Court’s decision

aligns with Javitz. In that case, this Court reaffirmed language from Golaschevsky

indicating that employees must show “concrete facts or surrounding circumstances” in

order to “establish a causal connection.” Javitz, 293 A.3d at 582. However, Javitz

clarified that direct evidence is not required to satisfy this “concrete facts” requirement.

See id. at 582 n.13 (finding that Golaschevsky “does not mandate direct evidence to

establish the causal connection”). We determined that “concrete facts” can include

circumstantial evidence, as long as it is “evidence of a fact or set of facts from which the

existence of the fact to be determined may reasonably be inferred.” Id. (citation omitted);

see also Carpenter, 295 A.3d at 33 (“A causal connection between the report of alleged

wrongdoings and negative employment acts can be demonstrated by circumstantial

evidence.” (citing Golaschevsky, 720 A.2d at 759)).

This Court also reiterated that an employee’s own “perception of the facts

[indicating] that the employer engaged in antagonistic conduct after the report” is not a

“concrete fact.” Javitz, 293 A.3d at 582 (stating that an “employee’s conclusory

perception of how others treated him after making a report of alleged wrongdoing” cannot

establish a prima facie case of causation (citation omitted)). This holding echoed the

Golaschevsky Court’s determination that an employee’s perception is insufficient for

establishing causation because such perceptions are “obviously colored by [the

employee’s] interest in proving that [they are] a victim of retaliatory discharge.” Id. at 581

(citing Golaschevsky, 720 A.2d at 760). The Javitz Court explained that the employee in

[J-46-2026] - 17 Golaschevsky11 failed to make a prima facie showing of causation because his evidence

rested solely on “self-serving conclusions of an antagonistic post-report workplace and

[his] subsequent discharge[.]” Id. at 583. However, while the Javitz Court faulted the

employee in Golaschevsky for not “offer[ing] evidence of pre-report positive performance

evaluations that were followed by post-report negative reviews,” it did not hold that such

evidence is required for a prima facie case. Id. Rather, Javitz held that an employee

“cannot rely on self-serving conclusions of an antagonistic post-report workplace[.]” Id.

at 583. Instead, to satisfy their burden, the employee needs to proffer “evidence of facts

supporting an inference of a pattern of post-reporting antagonism[.]” Id. at 585.

Traditionally, precedent interpreting the Whistleblower Law has indicated that

temporal proximity between the report and the adverse employment action is insufficient

to prove causation. See Gray, 651 A.2d at 225 (“To make out a cause of action under

the Whistleblower Law … that person must make more than a general statement that a

report was filed and, within a given amount of time, the employee was fired as a result.”);

Evans v. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 81 A.3d 1062, 1070-1071 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (“[T]he

mere fact that the discharge occurred a few months after a report of wrongdoing and that

11 Also, in Golaschevsky, this Court found the fact that the employer encouraged the

employee to submit a report relevant to its causation analysis. See Golaschevsky, 720 A.2d at 760. The Javitz Court, in a footnote, pointed out this aspect of the Golaschevsky decision, while not espousing an opinion on whether this was proper. See Javitz, 293 A.3d at 582 n.12. Thus, our precedent suggests that whether the employer encourages the employee to blow the whistle is material to the causation analysis, but it is not dispositive on its own. Here, the Commonwealth Court, like this Court in Golaschevsky, considered evidence that the OAG purportedly encouraged Adams to file a report. See Adams, 563 M.D. 2017, at 21-22. Adams disputes the Commonwealth Court’s characterization of this evidence and argues the OAG instead discouraged a thorough investigation. While our precedent indicates that an employer’s response to its employee’s report is material, whether the OAG actually encouraged Adams’ report here is in dispute. Therefore, at this stage of proceedings, we must view this evidence in the light most favorable to Adams as the non-moving party. See Pa. Med. Soc’y, 39 A.3d at 277.

[J-46-2026] - 18 the first formal negative actions by the employer occurred after the report are not enough

to show a causal connection.” (citations omitted)).

But despite this historic skepticism, more recent case law implies that temporal

proximity can be sufficient in narrow circumstances. The Javitz Court, in a footnote,

recognized how retaliation cases under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA),12

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the First Amendment utilize similar frameworks

to assess whether a plaintiff sufficiently established a causal connection. See Javitz, 293

A.3d at 585 n.20. In support, this Court acknowledged, but did not adopt, a two-factor

test from Ferraro v. Temple University, 185 A.3d 396 (Pa. Super. 2018), a PHRA

retaliation case, holding that a plaintiff can prove causation through “either (1) an

unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the alleged

retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to establish a causal

link.” Javitz, 293 A.3d at 585 n.20 (citing Ferraro, 185 A.3d at 405). Citing Rosati v.

Colello, 94 F. Supp. 3d 704 (E.D. Pa. 2015), we also implied that, when considering

whether proximity between the report and the purported retaliation implies causation,

“[d]ays are suggestive; months are not[.]” Javitz, 293 A.3d at 585 n.20 (citing Rosati, 94

F. Supp. 3d at 717). Since Javitz, one Commonwealth Court panel has applied the two-

factor Ferraro test to a Whistleblower Law case. See Doyle v. Monroe Cnty. Transp.

Auth., 325 A.3d 1045, *8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024) (unreported). Therefore, temporal proximity

between a report and the alleged retaliation is indeed relevant to this Court’s inquiry, but

it is seldom sufficient for a prima facie case.13

12 Act of Oct. 27, 1955, P.L. 744, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 951-963.

13 Likewise, a gap between the report and the retaliation, in isolation, is not a sufficient

basis for an employer to defeat a prima facie case of causation. See Farneth v. Pa. State Police, 347 A.3d 1150, *5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025) (unreported) (finding the employer had “not pointed to any authority which would bar a Whistleblower Law claim after a specific period of time”). While timing is a relevant consideration, an employer cannot evade the Law’s (continued…)

[J-46-2026] - 19 IV. APPLICATION

Applying this case law to the facts, we agree with Adams that the Commonwealth

Court’s decision is erroneous. As will be discussed, the Court erred by ignoring “concrete”

evidence, improperly weighing the evidence, disregarding issues of material fact, and not

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

From the outset, the Commonwealth Court noted that “the fact that [Adams] was

denied available promotions and/or positions after the [2017] Report, standing alone, is

insufficient to establish a causal connection between the [2017] Report and the adverse

employment actions.” Adams, 563 M.D. 2017, at 16 (citations omitted). This initial

observation of the Commonwealth Court is plainly correct under our case law. The first

adverse employment action alleged by Adams is his non-promotion to the Narcotic Agent

III position, which he interviewed for on April 19, 2017, and months later, on July 13, 2017,

the OAG promoted another agent to this position. See id. Our courts have found temporal

proximity insufficient, unless the adverse employment action occurs mere days after the

report. See Evans, 81 A.3d at 1070-1071; Doyle, 325 A.3d at *8 (“[D]ays are suggestive;

months are not[.]” (citing Rosati, 94 F. Supp. 3d at 717)). The adverse employment

actions alleged by Adams are simply not within the narrow zone of immediacy for courts

to find causation on timing alone.

However, Adams’ arguments on causation do not rely only on temporal proximity.

He cites concrete facts indicating that he was not promoted, in part, because of the 2017

Report. For example, Agent Jordan testified that: (1) an attorney at the OAG referred to

protections by simply biding its time to retaliate. See McAndrew, 982 F. Supp. 2d at 506- 507 (“Although a temporal gap between whistleblowing and adverse employment action often rebuts an inference of causation, in this case the time gap equally permits an inference that defendants waited for an opportune moment to retaliate[.]”).

[J-46-2026] - 20 Adams as a “rat fuck”14 and refused to prosecute one of his cases; (2) the 2017 Report

“played a role” in Adams not being promoted to Narcotics Agent III position in Fall 2017;

and (3) the 2017 Report “contributed” to Agent Howe’s decision to not assign Adams to

one of the Safe Streets positions. Jordan Deposition at 23, 33, 40. This evidence, viewed

in the light most favorable to Adams, is capable of establishing that the 2017 Report

affected the OAG’s process in filling these positions. An employee’s burden to establish

a prima facie case is not an “onerous” one. Golaschevsky, 720 A.2d at 761 (Nigro, J.,

concurring) (citation omitted). All this Court requires is “some evidence of a connection

between the report of wrongdoing and the alleged retaliatory acts.” Javitz, 293 A.3d at

584 (emphasis in original; citation omitted).

The above facts and testimony are more than “vague and inconclusive

circumstantial evidence[.]” Evans, 81 A.3d at 1070 (citations and brackets omitted). To

establish a prima facie case, “concrete facts” must “connect the report with the dismissal.”

Golaschevsky, 720 A.2d at 759. Adams’ evidence demonstrates that the 2017 Report

contributed to the OAG’s decisions regarding promotion and opportunity for overtime pay,

explicitly connecting the report to the alleged retaliatory acts. A prima facie case of

causation requires nothing more. This case is distinguishable from other situations where

“there is not even an innuendo of any nexus between an employee’s report … and his

termination[.]” Bailets v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 123 A.3d 300, 309 (Pa. 2015) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).

Moreover, the Commonwealth Court improperly dismissed this evidence by

framing it as proof of a boys’ club, not of retaliation. Adams, 563 M.D. 2017, at 20 (“While

giving preferential treatment to members of the boys’ club may be unfair, it does not

14 Agent Jordan confirmed that he interpreted the OAG’s comment to be calling Adams a

“rat” because of the 2017 Report. See Jordan Deposition at 24.

[J-46-2026] - 21 establish a causal connection between the [2017] Report and the adverse employment

actions.” (italics and citation omitted)). It is true that Adams’ evidence suggests there is

a clique of agents and attorneys associated with Blair County in the OAG, who help each

other in hiring decisions and have received preferential treatment for promotions. His

evidence also implies that other reasons, beyond the 2017 Report, may have motivated

the OAG’s decision to not promote him. For example, Agent Jordan readily

acknowledged that “other factors” contributed to Adams not being promoted to Narcotics

Agent III, and that the 2017 Report was not the “specific reason” for why Adams was not

assigned to Safe Streets. See Jordan Deposition at 36, 40.

However, our precedent has never required an employee to prove the absence of

non-retaliatory reasons for the employer’s conduct, in order to establish a prima facie

case of causation. To wield the protections of the Whistleblower Law, an employee need

not show that retaliation is the only explanation for the employer’s conduct. Rather, an

employee only needs to demonstrate “some evidence of a connection between the

report of wrongdoing and the alleged retaliatory acts.” O’Rourke, 778 A.2d at 1200

(emphases added; citation omitted). Once an employee satisfies this burden, linking the

report to a retaliation action, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that its actions

“occurred for separate and legitimate reasons[.]” 43 P.S. § 1424(c); see also O’Rourke,

778 A.2d at 1204 (holding that an employer, in order to rebut a prima facie case of

retaliation, must “prove that it would have taken the same adverse employment action

absent the employee’s good-faith report of wrongdoing” (citation omitted)). Therefore, it

is the employer’s burden to prove that other separate and legitimate reasons rationalize

its actions. Requiring employees to illustrate that retaliation is the only justification for

their employers’ conduct is inconsistent with our case law and undermines the principles

behind the Whistleblower Law.

[J-46-2026] - 22 Here, the Commonwealth Court’s sole task was to determine whether Adams

established a prima facie case, not to assess whether the OAG could rebut Adams’ prima

facie case.15 Adams cited evidence explicitly linking the 2017 Report to adverse

employment actions. For example, Agent Jordan testified that the 2017 Report “played

a role” in Adams not being promoted and “contributed” to Agent Howe’s decision to not

assign Adams to one of the Safe Streets positions. See Jordan Deposition at 33, 40.

When considering whether the employee has advanced a prima facie case of causation,

it is outside the trial court’s role to independently weigh the evidence to consider whether

there are non-retaliatory reasons for the employer’s conduct.16 Once a link is made, it is

the employer’s burden to demonstrate that “separate and legitimate” reasons justify its

actions. See 43 P.S. § 1424(c). At that point, the court can consider whether the

employer met its burden by a preponderance of the evidence. See id.

By interpreting Adams’ evidence as not supporting an inference of retaliation, but

instead evidence of a boys’ club, the Commonwealth Court also failed to view the record

in the light most favorable to Adams. His evidence, on its face, indicates the 2017 Report

“was certainly a factor” in the OAG’s hiring decisions, although “other factors” (not being

part of the boys’ club) may have played a role as well. See Jordan Deposition at 36. It

15 In its application for summary relief, the OAG argued that “legitimate business reasons”

justified its actions. See OAG’s Application for Summary Relief, 3/1/2024, at 2. However, in its briefing to the Commonwealth Court, the OAG did not develop this argument or otherwise elaborate how “separate and legitimate reasons” explained its conduct. 43 P.S. § 1424(c). 16 Once a plaintiff satisfies their burden of proving a prima facie case, the defendant, to

succeed at the summary relief stage, must adduce evidence that, if believed, is sufficient to establish a separate and legitimate reason for the adverse employment action and the plaintiff must fail to adduce evidence, if believed, sufficient to show that the separate and legitimate reason is pretextual. Of course, at this stage, the trial court “must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party.” Pa. Med. Soc’y, 39 A.3d at 277 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

[J-46-2026] - 23 is the OAG’s burden to demonstrate that any adverse employment decision would have

been the same in the absence of the 2017 Report. See O’Rourke, 778 A.2d at 1204.

Thus, contrary to the Commonwealth Court’s decision, Adams is only required to

establish that the 2017 Report contributed to the subsequent adverse decisions made by

the OAG.

Further, the Commonwealth Court considered the fact that the OAG contacted

Agent Sinisi for the Field Training Agent course and promoted him to the Narcotics Agent

III Gun Violence Unit position, despite his involvement in the “good faith report of

harassment.” Adams, 563 M.D. 2017, at 20 (citation omitted). The Court determined this

fact made “it less likely” that retaliation was the reason why the OAG did not promote

Adams. Id. at 20-21. This analysis is improper. When a party’s facts support “conflicting

inferences,” courts are not to assess whether certain inferences are more or less likely at

the summary relief stage. Washington v. Baxter, 719 A.2d 733, 740 n.10 (Pa. 1998)

(“Where the facts can support conflicting inferences, it cannot be said that the case is free

and clear from doubt and thus ripe for summary judgment.” (citation omitted)). The

appropriate standard is whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists. Here, the

Commonwealth Court improperly weighed the evidence instead of assessing whether

there was a genuine issue of fact.

The Commonwealth Court also erred by disregarding Adams’ allegations as

merely “self-serving conclusions of antagonistic behavior.” Adams, 563 M.D. 2017, at 21.

As noted above, we have repeatedly held that an employee’s “conclusory perception” of

antagonism is insufficient. Javitz, 293 A.3d at 582 (citing Golaschevsky, 720 A.2d at 759-

760). However, if an employee proves “concrete facts or surrounding circumstances from

which the factfinder can draw the inference that the employer’s conduct was

[J-46-2026] - 24 antagonistic[,]” then an employee can link this antagonism to the filing of the report. Id.

at 582-583 (footnote omitted).

Here, Adams advanced the following concrete facts, demonstrating antagonistic

behavior: (1) an attorney at the OAG referred to him as a “rat fuck”; (2) Agent Howe would

rather “give up” the Safe Street positions than give one to Adams; and (3) Agent Brandt

refused to accept Agent Page’s evaluation of Adams’ performance as “outstanding.”17

Jordan Deposition at 23, 39; Adams’ Brief at 27. This evidence is distinguishable from

evidence which this Court found insufficient and nothing more than “perception” in Javitz

and Golaschevsky. See Javitz, 293 A.3d at 585 (finding the employee’s claim of the “rude

behavior of her supervisors” to be her “subjective perception”); Golaschevsky, 720 A.2d

at 759-760 (finding the employee’s claims of “retaliatory actions, including negative

performance evaluations, lack of cooperation from fellow employees and supervisors,

withholding of information regarding computer software” to be “nothing more than [the

employee’s] perception” and insufficient to prove causation). Adams has advanced

concrete facts, linking his report to adverse employment outcomes. The Commonwealth

Court erred by dismissing it, “wholesale,” as mere “perception.” Javitz, 293 A.3d at 585.

The Commonwealth Court also erroneously determined Adams could not prove a

causal link because the OAG’s antagonistic behavior was “the same before and after” the

2017 Report. Adams, 563 M.D. 2017, at 21. This conclusion disregards evidence of

record. While some evidence suggested certain coworkers may have disliked Adams

before his report, Adams also presented ample evidence drawing an explicit link between

17 As mentioned supra, Adams also relies upon Agent Musser’s testimony that Agent

Brandt should not have been promoted because Adams is a superior candidate. See Adams’ Brief at 40. While this testimony is “perception,” it is the perception of another individual, not Adams’ own perception. Since it is not “self-serving,” Agent Musser’s testimony remains relevant to the causation inquiry. See Javitz, 293 A.3d at 583.

[J-46-2026] - 25 the 2017 Report and his failure to be promoted.18 Furthermore, the presence of

antagonism prior to the 2017 Report does not vitiate Adams’ case. Unpopular and

ostracized employees are still afforded protection under the Whistleblower Law.19

Evidence pre-dating and post-dating an employee’s report, showing a marked shift in the

employer’s treatment, is arguably the most persuasive evidence to prove causation

because it is heavily suggestive of retaliatory motives. See Javitz, 293 A.3d at 585. But

while this evidence is compelling, employees seeking protection under the Whistleblower

Law are not required to show sterling performance evaluations before the report of

wrongdoing, and abysmal evaluations after the report. All that is required is a causal link

between the employee’s report and the employer’s antagonism. See id. at 582-583

(stating that an employee needs to provide “concrete facts … from which the factfinder

can draw the inference that the employer’s conduct was antagonistic” (footnote omitted)).

Here, Adams has articulated concrete facts linking the 2017 Report to adverse

employment actions. He attached his resume along with the resumes of other individuals

who were promoted over him. The experience of candidates can be “objectively

established in their resumes.” Carpenter, 295 A.3d at 35. “This is not mere ‘personal

perception.’” Id. Adams’ evidence indicates the 2017 Report “played a role” in the

decision not to promote him to Narcotics Agent III position and that the 2017 Report

“contributed” to a supervisor’s decision not to assign Adams to one of the Safe Streets

positions. See Jordan Deposition at 33, 40. He presented deposition testimony showing

that individuals within the OAG considered him to be a “rat,” refused to prosecute his

18 For example, the “rat” remark is evidence, outside of Adams’ own perceptions, capable

of establishing that at least some antagonism directed towards Adams resulted from his 2017 Report. 19 In fact, an employee’s alienation from his or her coworkers could be a result of the

employee’s refusal to countenance or participate in inappropriate or illegal behavior, which occurred before the good faith report of wrongdoing.

[J-46-2026] - 26 cases, and would rather “give up” employment opportunities than provide them to Adams.

Id. at 23, 39. Moreover, Adams’ evidence suggests he was not selected for training

opportunities, and a supervisor interfered with his annual performance evaluation rating.

Once Adams demonstrated a link between his protected conduct and adverse

employment actions, the burden shifted to the OAG to prove those actions were wholly

separate from his protected conduct. Therefore, the Commonwealth Court erred and

misapplied our Court’s precedent interpreting the Whistleblower Law.

V. Conclusion

“Some evidence of a connection between the report of wrongdoing and the alleged

retaliatory acts” is all the Whistleblower Law demands. Javitz, 293 A.3d at 584 (emphasis

and citation omitted). We vacate the Commonwealth Court’s order and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.20

Chief Justice Todd and Justices Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht, Mundy and Brobson

join the opinion.

20 As noted supra at 7 n.7, the Commonwealth Court rejected the OAG’s arguments that

the 2017 Report was not a “good faith” report. See Adams, 563 M.D. 2017, at 8-12. However, the Court did not respond to the OAG’s argument that, under the Whistleblower Law, the 2017 Report did not concern a “wrongdoing.” See id. at 22 n.12. On remand, the Commonwealth Court should address the OAG’s remaining issue as to whether Adams established a prima facie case that his good faith report pertained to a “wrongdoing.”

[J-46-2026] - 27