ORDER
Petition for rehearing filed in this cause is granted and this Court’s opinion promulgated herein on September 25, 1990 and reported at 61 OBJ 2516 is withdrawn and replaced by the opinion filed this date.
OPALA, C.J., HODGES, V.C.J., and LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, ALMA WILSON, SUMMERS and WATT, JJ., concur.
KAUGER, J., concurs in part, dissents in part.
SUMMERS, Justice.
The plaintiffs were members of the St. Andrew Baptist Church in Tulsa who became concerned over the way their pastor was conducting the business of the church. They filed an action in the District Court against pastor Bailey, the deacons, and the trustees, requesting among other things, an injunction against excommunication, access to the financial records of the church and an accounting. They were immediately expelled from the church by unanimous vote of the congregation at a hastily called business meeting following a Wednesday night prayer service. After a hearing the trial court dismissed the suit because neither civil nor property rights of the plaintiffs were affected. The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed. On certiorari the plaintiffs re-urge their case and seek church reinstatement.1
The Courts will not interfere with the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the protection of civil or property rights. Wolozyn v. Begarek, 378 P.2d 1007, 1011 (Okl.1963); Cage v. Cansler, 119 Okl. 36, 248 P. 612, 613 (1926). There can, however, be no doubt but that the civil courts do have authority to resolve property disputes between rival factions of a church. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 3024, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979). On appeal the plaintiffs seek relief on two fronts. They ask that we (1) permit the District Court to hear their claims for reinstatement into the church, and (2) direct the lower court to hear and resolve their objection to the alleged misuse of church property (which would include, of course, access to the church financial records.) [144]*144For reasons to be explained, we can afford the plaintiffs no relief.
I.
The plaintiffs argue that their expulsion was void, and request relief in the form of a civil judicial order reinstating them as members of the church. Such ecclesiastical relief is beyond the power of a civil court. A “civil or property right” that justifies the exercise of civil judicial power has long been distinguished from ecclesiastical or “spiritual” rights that civil courts do not adjudicate. Civil courts in this country recognize that they have no ecclesiastical jurisdiction,2 and church disciplinary decisions cannot be reviewed for the purpose of reinstating expelled church members. In Shannon v. Frost, 42 Ky. (3 B.Mon.) 253 (1842) the court said:
We cannot decide who ought to be members of the church, nor whether the excommunicated have been justly or unjustly, regularly or irregularly cut off from the body of the church.
We must take the fact of expulsion as conclusive proof that the persons expelled are not now members of the repudiating church; for, whether right or wrong, the act of excommunication must, as to the fact of membership, be law to this court.
Id. 42 Ky. at 258.
This case has been frequently cited and its language used in other cases.3
The issue of whether the church proceeding complied with church rules or custom in expelling members presents no question for our review on a claim for reinstatement. In Ramsey v. Hicks, supra, the court said:
It cannot concern the civil authorities whether one accused of a spiritual offense be tried by an unconstitutional tribunal, or be denied merely religious rights and privileges without trial or without cause, since membership in an unincorporated religious society does not constitute a civil or valuable right within the meaning of the law.
Id. 91 N.E. at 351.
We agreed with this rule in First English Lutheran Church v. Bloch, 195 Okl. 579, 159 P.2d 1006 (1945), where we said: “Civil courts will not review acts of religious organizations relating solely to internal ecclesiastical affairs for the sole purpose of ascertaining whether they are in accord with policy, discipline, or usages of the organization.” Id. 159 P.2d at 1008. A more recent exposition of this principle in the context of “due process” is found in Nunn v. Black, 506 F.Supp. 444 (W.D.Va.1981), aff'd. 661 F.2d 925 (4th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1146, 102 S.Ct. 1008, 71 L.Ed.2d 299 (1982).
In Nunn the court said: “Specifically, the present inquiry is whether the plaintiffs had a right in Church membership protected by the Constitution or Federal law that was abridged when they were expelled by the congregation.” Id. 506 F.Supp. at 447. The court answered this inquiry with the following:
Finally, it is clear that the fact that the local church may have departed arbitrari[145]*145ly from its established expulsion procedures in removing the plaintiffs is of no constitutional consequence, whether one appeals the First, Fifth, or Fourteenth Amendments. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 714, 96 S.Ct. 2372 [2382], 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976). It is the very nature of religious matters that ecclesiastical decisions are accepted as articles of faith, as opposed to the rational, objective mode of analysis and procedure used in secular decision-making. Therefore, in the present case, constitutional concepts of due process, involving secular notions of “fundamental fairness” or impermissible objectives, are therefore hardly relevant to such matters of ecclesiastical cognizance. 426 U.S. at 715, 96 S.Ct. at 2383. Thus, the plaintiffs’ contentions that their due process rights were violated in that their contributions to the church were expropriated by the expulsion is of no merit. Similarly, the above conclusion is not varied by the fact that the Church of God of Prophecy has no structured decision-making process.
Id. 506 F.Supp. at 448.
We now accept as fundamental the position that a church’s decision as to the status of a person’s church membership must be considered as binding and beyond the reviewing power of courts such as ours. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976); Hadnot v. Shaw, 826 P.2d 978, 986 (Okl.1992); First Presbyterian Church of Perry v. Myers, 5 Okl. 809, 50 P. 70, 74 (1897); Shannon v. Frost, supra. Church membership, by itself, is not a civil or property right subject to civil judicial regulation, and we will not compel a church to reinstate a member.
There is, to be sure, a line of cases from a minority of jurisdictions holding otherwise. In Kennedy v. Gray, 248 Kan.
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ORDER
Petition for rehearing filed in this cause is granted and this Court’s opinion promulgated herein on September 25, 1990 and reported at 61 OBJ 2516 is withdrawn and replaced by the opinion filed this date.
OPALA, C.J., HODGES, V.C.J., and LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, ALMA WILSON, SUMMERS and WATT, JJ., concur.
KAUGER, J., concurs in part, dissents in part.
SUMMERS, Justice.
The plaintiffs were members of the St. Andrew Baptist Church in Tulsa who became concerned over the way their pastor was conducting the business of the church. They filed an action in the District Court against pastor Bailey, the deacons, and the trustees, requesting among other things, an injunction against excommunication, access to the financial records of the church and an accounting. They were immediately expelled from the church by unanimous vote of the congregation at a hastily called business meeting following a Wednesday night prayer service. After a hearing the trial court dismissed the suit because neither civil nor property rights of the plaintiffs were affected. The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed. On certiorari the plaintiffs re-urge their case and seek church reinstatement.1
The Courts will not interfere with the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the protection of civil or property rights. Wolozyn v. Begarek, 378 P.2d 1007, 1011 (Okl.1963); Cage v. Cansler, 119 Okl. 36, 248 P. 612, 613 (1926). There can, however, be no doubt but that the civil courts do have authority to resolve property disputes between rival factions of a church. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 3024, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979). On appeal the plaintiffs seek relief on two fronts. They ask that we (1) permit the District Court to hear their claims for reinstatement into the church, and (2) direct the lower court to hear and resolve their objection to the alleged misuse of church property (which would include, of course, access to the church financial records.) [144]*144For reasons to be explained, we can afford the plaintiffs no relief.
I.
The plaintiffs argue that their expulsion was void, and request relief in the form of a civil judicial order reinstating them as members of the church. Such ecclesiastical relief is beyond the power of a civil court. A “civil or property right” that justifies the exercise of civil judicial power has long been distinguished from ecclesiastical or “spiritual” rights that civil courts do not adjudicate. Civil courts in this country recognize that they have no ecclesiastical jurisdiction,2 and church disciplinary decisions cannot be reviewed for the purpose of reinstating expelled church members. In Shannon v. Frost, 42 Ky. (3 B.Mon.) 253 (1842) the court said:
We cannot decide who ought to be members of the church, nor whether the excommunicated have been justly or unjustly, regularly or irregularly cut off from the body of the church.
We must take the fact of expulsion as conclusive proof that the persons expelled are not now members of the repudiating church; for, whether right or wrong, the act of excommunication must, as to the fact of membership, be law to this court.
Id. 42 Ky. at 258.
This case has been frequently cited and its language used in other cases.3
The issue of whether the church proceeding complied with church rules or custom in expelling members presents no question for our review on a claim for reinstatement. In Ramsey v. Hicks, supra, the court said:
It cannot concern the civil authorities whether one accused of a spiritual offense be tried by an unconstitutional tribunal, or be denied merely religious rights and privileges without trial or without cause, since membership in an unincorporated religious society does not constitute a civil or valuable right within the meaning of the law.
Id. 91 N.E. at 351.
We agreed with this rule in First English Lutheran Church v. Bloch, 195 Okl. 579, 159 P.2d 1006 (1945), where we said: “Civil courts will not review acts of religious organizations relating solely to internal ecclesiastical affairs for the sole purpose of ascertaining whether they are in accord with policy, discipline, or usages of the organization.” Id. 159 P.2d at 1008. A more recent exposition of this principle in the context of “due process” is found in Nunn v. Black, 506 F.Supp. 444 (W.D.Va.1981), aff'd. 661 F.2d 925 (4th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1146, 102 S.Ct. 1008, 71 L.Ed.2d 299 (1982).
In Nunn the court said: “Specifically, the present inquiry is whether the plaintiffs had a right in Church membership protected by the Constitution or Federal law that was abridged when they were expelled by the congregation.” Id. 506 F.Supp. at 447. The court answered this inquiry with the following:
Finally, it is clear that the fact that the local church may have departed arbitrari[145]*145ly from its established expulsion procedures in removing the plaintiffs is of no constitutional consequence, whether one appeals the First, Fifth, or Fourteenth Amendments. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 714, 96 S.Ct. 2372 [2382], 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976). It is the very nature of religious matters that ecclesiastical decisions are accepted as articles of faith, as opposed to the rational, objective mode of analysis and procedure used in secular decision-making. Therefore, in the present case, constitutional concepts of due process, involving secular notions of “fundamental fairness” or impermissible objectives, are therefore hardly relevant to such matters of ecclesiastical cognizance. 426 U.S. at 715, 96 S.Ct. at 2383. Thus, the plaintiffs’ contentions that their due process rights were violated in that their contributions to the church were expropriated by the expulsion is of no merit. Similarly, the above conclusion is not varied by the fact that the Church of God of Prophecy has no structured decision-making process.
Id. 506 F.Supp. at 448.
We now accept as fundamental the position that a church’s decision as to the status of a person’s church membership must be considered as binding and beyond the reviewing power of courts such as ours. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976); Hadnot v. Shaw, 826 P.2d 978, 986 (Okl.1992); First Presbyterian Church of Perry v. Myers, 5 Okl. 809, 50 P. 70, 74 (1897); Shannon v. Frost, supra. Church membership, by itself, is not a civil or property right subject to civil judicial regulation, and we will not compel a church to reinstate a member.
There is, to be sure, a line of cases from a minority of jurisdictions holding otherwise. In Kennedy v. Gray, 248 Kan. 486, 807 P.2d 670 (1991) the court determined that membership in a church was sufficiently similar to membership in a voluntary association that legal principles governing the latter could be applied to the former. The Kansas court observed that its cases on voluntary associations “give members rudimentary due process rights because a member has some equitable property rights in the assets of the association.” Id. 807 P.2d at 676. That- court then explained that where the church was a congregational church courts may not only inquire as to whether the rules of the organization were followed in expelling a member but whether the expulsion was the result of a “fairly-conducted meeting in the first place.” Id. The court explained that the expelled member possessed “the right to reasonable notice, the right to attend and advocate one’s views, and the right to an honest count of the votes.” Id.
This “due process” language of the Kansas opinion appears to be in accord with Abyssinia Missionary Baptist Church v. Nixon, 340 So.2d 746, 748 (Ala.1977). In this regard see also Bagley v. Carter, 235 Ga. 624, 220 S.E.2d 919, 920-921 (1975); and Moustakis v. Hellenic Orthodox Society, 261 Mass. 462, 159 N.E. 453, 456 (1928), (reasonable notice of charges and opportunity for hearing are required in the absence of authority for arbitrary expulsion from membership).
We prefer, however, to maintain our jurisprudential distance from those jurisdictions. We are strongly committed to the correctness of the decisions holding that church membership is within the ambit of ecclesiastical jurisdiction and outside that of the civil courts. We therefore find a compelling reason not to apply legal principles governing incorporated voluntary associations to church discipline proceedings that expel members of a congregation. Such holding does not apply to church property disputes. See Oklahoma Dist. Council v. New Hope Assembly of God, 597 P.2d 1211, 1215 (Okl.1979); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 20 L.Ed. 666, 675 (1872), where the Court discussed resolution of a congregational church property dispute by application of the ordinary principles that govern voluntary associations.
We recognize that Saint Andrew Baptist Church was incorporated in 1945 [146]*146under authority of 18 O.S.1941 § 541.4 In Oklahoma Association of Insurance Agents v. Hudson, 385 P.2d 453 (Okl.1963) we observed that 18 O.S.1961 §§ 541-550 governed a benevolent corporation. Id. 385 P.2d at 453. Two of those sections dealt with the expulsion of a member5 and we commented on the application of one of them. Id. Church bylaws, articles, or constitutions specifying how membership is acquired, maintained, or lost have an obvious and important public value for civil courts in adjudicating church property disputes. But a legislature, like a civil court, has no ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the discipline and expulsion of church members. In West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1187, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) the Court said that no governmental official can prescribe what shall be orthodox in religion. Thus, in a church discipline proceeding a church may irregularly, i.e., contrary even to church procedure, discipline or expel a member and still be free of review for correctness by a civil court in this jurisdiction.
A civil court may determine the regularity of a church meeting and who is a member of a church for the purpose of determining the identity of those individuals who collectively represent the church and are entitled to control church property. Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. at 140; First Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Cumberland Presbyterian Church, 34 Okl. 503, 126 P. 197, 202 (1912); Hendryx v. People’s United Church of Spokane, 42 Wash. 336, 84 P. 1123 (1906). Similarly, civil courts have examined the regularity of church procedure when property rights are subject to deprivation. Reid v. Gholson, 229 Va. 179, 327 S.E.2d 107, 113 (1985) cert. denied, 474 U.S. 824, 106 S.Ct. 80, 88 L.Ed.2d 65 (1985). However, as we are about to explain, the case before us is not a property dispute subject to civil authority.
II.
The plaintiffs were members of the congregation when they filed suit, presenting to the District Court grievances including the following:
(A) The Defendants have listed church real estate for sale without consent or approval of the members of the church.
(B) Employees including the defendant Bailey, have received increases in salary without approval of the membership of the church.
(C) The defendant Bailey has abused his telephone and gasoline credit cards furnished and paid for by the church by permitting unauthorized individuals to use the same and having the charges paid for by the church.
(D) Purchasing of equipment using church funds including automobiles, without approval of the church.
(E) Disposing of church property for less than fair market value.
(F) Using church funds for excessive travel, entertainment and personal or family purposes.
(G) Charging members of the church for use of church facilities for weddings and funerals.
[147]*147(H) Submitting incorrect insurance claims and failing or refusing to account for the proceeds thereof.
The plaintiffs thus allege that a faction of the church had engaged in dissipating the assets of the church by diverting church funds to uses that were unauthorized by the church. Some of their claims alleging the diversion of church property to non-church uses may have been capable of invoking civil judicial relief, and some may not have been. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602, 99 S.Ct. at 3024, where the Court said that “the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice.” We need not, however, address the extent to which their claims were cognizable when they filed suit, because their expulsion mooted any claims they had as to the diversion of church property to non-church uses.
It is true that membership is not always required to show standing to prosecute a church property dispute. In Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. at 140, the court explained that a trustee of property would not necessarily lose that status by expulsion from church membership. However, the justiciability of property disputes is generally dependent upon a plaintiffs church membership. The Supreme Court of Missouri, for example, held that a plaintiff must be a member of the church when he or she brings an action for the benefit of the members of the church, because membership shows standing to bring the action. Edgmond v. Brixey, 450 S.W.2d 166, 167-168 (Mo.1970).
The plaintiffs failed to show that the church property they complained about was no longer in the custody of Saint Andrew Baptist Church. In the trial court the plaintiffs took the position that they had not brought any legal proceeding against the church, but rather against certain individuals. Their reason for doing so is not clear from the record.6 To the extent that title to any church property in dispute was held by the church then plaintiffs’ position is that of a claimant requesting a civil court to exercise control over the property of a non-party, and must fail. See Cage v. Cansler, 119 Okl. 36, 248 P. 612, 613 (1926) where neither the trustees holding title to church property nor the beneficiary of the trust were made parties, and the trial court was thus without authority to dispose of the church property.
Nor did the plaintiff show that a majority of the church had been deprived of the property. See Cape v. Moore, 122 Okl. 229, 253 P. 506 (1927), holding that the faction containing a majority of members was entitled to property where church rule and use of property was based upon the will of the majority. Further, the plaintiffs did not show at trial that they, rather than a majority of the church, were entitled to control of the property, or that they represented the majority of the church and, as such, were entitled to control the property to the exclusion of the defendants. Never did the plaintiffs claim at trial that control of the church property should be exercised on some basis other than by the majority of the church. The plaintiffs at trial simply showed no standing upon which to pursue their claims.
In Application of State ex rel. Department of Transportation, 646 P.2d 605, 609 (Okl.1982) we said that standing is determined by whether the party has a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of the controversy. The requested relief herein was in the nature of an attempt to benefit members of the church. Since the plaintiffs were no longer members their civil lawsuit could give them no effectual relief. See Lawrence v. Cleveland County Home Loan Auth., 626 P.2d 314, 316 (Okl.1981). A plaintiff may lose standing and a controversy become moot during the [148]*148course of litigation. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192, 97 S.Ct. 451, 454, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976); See also Northeast Okl. Elec. v. Corporation Commission, 808 P.2d 680 (Okl.1991). Here the plaintiffs were expelled from the church and lost standing to prosecute the action for the benefit of the members of the church. We conclude that this controversy is not a property dispute requiring a civil adjudication of who is entitled to control church property.
III.
The plaintiffs argue that they were the equivalent to stockholders in a business corporation filing a lawsuit to obtain access to the financial records of a corporation. The statutory authority relied on by plaintiffs appeared in the Oklahoma Business Corporation Act at 18 O.S.1981 § 1.71.,7 which stated in part:
b. All records specified in Section 16 of this act [1.16], whether required to be kept in the registered office or in lieu of which a statement may be there kept, shall be kept by every corporation open to inspection or examination, and to the taking of extracts or the making of abstracts therefrom, by each shareholder or voting trust certificate holder, in person or by agent or attorney, at any reasonable time, for any proper purpose, at the place where such records are usually kept. (Emphasis added)
The language of the statute specifically refers to a shareholder or voting trust certificate holder.
The plaintiffs were members of the Saint Andrew Baptist Church, a nonprofit church incorporated without stock under 18 O.S.1941 § 541. The plaintiffs were members of the church but not shareholders nor trust certificate holders. The plain language of the statute does not include the plaintiffs within the class of individuals having a right of access to the financial records of a corporation.
In Wolozyn v. Begarek, supra, we assumed for the purposes of that opinion, without deciding, that the rights of inspection under § 1.71 would apply to a controversy among church members. Id. 378 P.2d at 1010. We hold today that the right of inspection provided by § 1.71 did not apply to a nonprofit, non-stock church. The plaintiffs had no statutory right under § 1.71 to inspect the financial records of the church either before or after their expulsion from the church.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
OPALA, C.J., HODGES, V.C.J., and LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, ALMA WILSON and WATT, JJ., concur.
KAUGER, J., concurs in part, dissents in part.