CLIFF HOOFMAN, Justice.
| Appellant Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) appeals from the judgment entered against it following a jury trial in Jefferson County Circuit Court. Ford presents five points of error on appeal: (1) whether the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to admit evidence of seat belt noncompliance pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-37-703 (Repl. 2008); (2) whether the circuit court erred as a matter of law in determining that the defective-glass claim was not preempted by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 205 (“FMVSS 205”), 49 C.F.R. § 571.205 (2001); (3) whether the circuit court erred in denying Ford’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of punitive damages; (4) whether the circuit court erred in failing to reduce the jury’s compensatory-damages award, pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated sections 16-61-204 and-205 (Repl.2005), before entering | ¿judgment for Washington; and (5) whether the nunc pro tunc designation included in the circuit court’s judgment is contrary to Arkansas law. We simultaneously consider with the submission of this case a motion filed by Washington during the pendency of the appeal to strike a portion of Ford’s reply brief. We affirm in part, reverse and remand in part, and rule that the motion is denied.
At approximately 10:30 a.m. on August 23, 2000, Johnny Ray Washington and his eleven-year-old son, Terian, were traveling in their 1994 Ford Explorer on Linden Street in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, when the vehicle was struck on the driver’s side by Karah Allen Williams, who had run a stop sign. The Explorer rolled over twice and landed right-side up. Terian walked away from the accident, but Johnny suffered a fatal head injury when his head exited the vehicle during the rollover and was crushed. When emergency-medical technicians arrived on the scene, Johnny was in severe distress but still had a pulse and slow respirations. Johnny was transported to Jefferson County Regional Medical Center, where he was pronounced dead at 11:39 a.m.
On August 14, 2003, appellee Paulette R. Washington, the decedent’s wife, individually and as administratrix of her husband’s estate, and as parent and legal guardian of Terian Washington, filed a complaint in the Jefferson County Circuit Court against Ford Motor Company (“Ford”), Freeway Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc., and Karah Allen Williams.1 | .-Washington asserted several claims against Ford, including negligence, strict liability, failure to warn, and breach of warranties. She asked for past and future medical expenses; past and future lost earnings; future loss of earning capacity; past and future pain and suffering; past and future mental anguish and mental harm; loss of services, society, and companionship; permanent injuries; properly damage; the reasonable value of the loss of Johnny’s life; and the reasonable value of funeral expenses. She also asserted a claim for punitive damages against Ford.
The case proceeded to trial on August 16, 2010, solely against Ford, and Washington alleged that the Explorer had two defects: (1) the propensity to roll over and (2) the use of tempered, rather than laminated glass, in the side windows that made ejection or partial ejection in a rollover more likely. Although Williams had been previously dismissed, the circuit court allowed her to be placed on the verdict form for apportionment purposes. After a two-week trial, the jury returned a verdict finding that both Ford and Williams, equally, had been the proximate cause of Johnny’s death. The jury awarded Washington $4,652,125 in compensatory damages and $2.5 million in punitive damages, and a judgment was entered on October 6, 2010, in which the circuit court merely reproduced the jury’s answers to the special interrogatories without setting forth a specific dollar amount owed by Ford.
On October 20, 2010, Ford filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or alternatively, for a new trial, which was denied. Ford filed a timely notice of appeal, and ^Washington filed a notice of cross-appeal. This court dismissed Ford’s first appeal without prejudice due to the lack of a final order because no written order had been entered dismissing Freeway Ford. See Ford Motor Co. v. Washington, 2012 Ark. 325, 2012 WL 4017383 (“Ford I”). We then dismissed the second appeal for lack of finality because the judgment did not set forth a specific dollar amount owed by Ford. See Ford Motor Co. v. Washington, 2013 Ark. 88, 2013 WL 776233 (“Ford II”). Following a second remand, the circuit court entered an order on April 8, 2013, awarding judgment against Ford in the amount of $7,152,125. The court also included a nunc pro tunc provision in the order, making the judgment retroactive to October 6, 2010, the date of the original judgment, for post-judgment-interest purposes.
Ford filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, arguing that the nunc pro tunc designation was improper; a motion for JNOV; and a motion for remittitur, arguing that the award of compensatory damages should be reduced in accordance with the jury’s 50-50 allocation of fault between Ford and Williams. These motions were denied by the circuit court on April 29, 2013, and Ford filed a timely notice of appeal on May 3, 2013.
I. Section 27-37-703
For its first point on appeal, Ford contends that the circuit court abused its discretion when it found that Ford had not met the requirements of Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-37-703 and prohibited Ford from introducing evidence that Johnny was not wearing a seat belt at the time of the accident. Ford maintains that it put forth sufficient proof to meet its burden under the statute. Ford also asserts that the circuit court abused its discretion in allowing Washington to present testimony that Johnny was wearing his seat belt because once 1 ¿Washington “opened the door,” it was error not to allow Ford to rebut that evidence, even where such evidence was otherwise inadmissible.
In response, Washington argues that Ford did not meet its statutory burden and that the circuit court was correct to reject Ford’s evidence suggesting that Johnny was not wearing a seat belt because it was “conjecture,” “lack[ed] foundation,” and was “merely conclusionary.” Further, Washington asserts that Ford’s “opening the door” argument is not preserved.
According to Ark.Code Ann. § 27-37-703 (Repl.2008), which governs the admissibility of such evidence,
(a)(1) The failure of an occupant to wear a properly adjusted and fastened seat belt shall not be admissible into evidence in a civil action.
(2) Provided, that evidence of such failure may be admitted in a civil action as to the causal relationship between noncompliance'and the injuries alleged, if the following conditions have been satisfied:
(A) The plaintiff has filed a products liability claim other than a claim related to an alleged failure of a seat belt;
(B) The defendant alleging noncompliance with this subchapter shall raise this defense in its answer or timely amendment thereto in accordance with the rules of civil procedure; and
(C) Each defendant seeking to offer evidence alleging noncompliance has the burden of proving:
(i) Noncompliance;
(ii) That compliance would have reduced injuries; and
(iii)The extent of the reduction of such injuries.
(b)(1) Upon request of any party, the trial judge shall hold a hearing out of the presence of the jury as to the admissibility of such evidence in accordance with the provisions of this section and the rules of evidence.
(2) The finding of the trial judge shall not constitute a finding of fact, and the finding shall be limited to the issue of admissibility of such evidence.
On the second day of trial, Ford filed a motion for admission of evidence of the 1 (¡decedent’s failure to wear a seat belt, asserting that it had met the prerequisites of section 27-37-703. Specifically, Ford put forth the deposition testimony of Dr. Robert Piziali, a mechanical-engineering and accident-reconstruction expert, who testified that there were no marks on the vehicle’s restraint system consistent with belt use; that there were no marks on the decedent that were consistent with belt use; that the position of the decedent’s head at the time of the injury was inconsistent with restraint use; that if the decedent had been properly restrained, his head would not have been able to exit the vehicle; and that had he been properly restrained, the decedent would not have been in a position to be killed.
To rebut Ford’s evidence of seat belt nonuse, Washington presented the deposition testimony of Timothy Clowers,2 a paramedic who had arrived on the scene of the accident and attended to Johnny. Clowers testified that “from the best of my recollection,” he remembered having to undo the decedent’s seat belt before tending to his injuries. When he was referred to a notation contained in the decedent’s emergency-room records stating, “motor vehicle accident, unrestrained driver,” Clowers stated that he did not recall telling emergency-room personnel that the decedent was or was not restrained. Clowers further stated that he could not disagree with the notation without knowing the basis for it, but that, in his experience, emergency-room personnel generally assume that a person was not restrained when the person is ejected from the vehicle. On cross-examination, Clowers said that he did not have a specific recollection of unfastening the decedent’s seat belt. He also 17did not specifically recall whether the shoulder harness was positioned across the decedent’s torso.
After holding a hearing on the motion out of the presence of the jury and considering this proffered testimony, as well as the parties’ arguments, the circuit court ruled that Ford had not met its burden under the statute and that evidence of nonuse of the seat belt would be excluded. Thereafter, when Washington attempted to introduce the portions of Clowers’s deposition testimony set out above into evidence, Ford objected “on the grounds it goes to the issue of whether Johnny Washington was belted or not.” Ford argued,
Ford: Well, plaintiff was allowed to put in proof that Johnny Washington was allowed to wear his belt. We’re saying in this particular case, what the Court has indicated that Ford is not allowed to rebut that proof at this time. The plaintiff is opening the door, allowing Ford to do so. But, if the Court does not allow Ford to do so, it would be unfairly prejudiced by this evidence coming in at this time.
COURT:—given on this very point. The reason why Ford is prohibited is Ford did not comply with the statute, and if you complied this morning with it, that’s the problem. It’s simple. You didn’t follow the law. And the law said the defendant. It doesn’t talk about-it’s talking about belted. It doesn’t give you any fairness argument because of that. You already know it. You’re wasting my time raising this objection. Don’t do it again. Objection overruled. Proceed. This point has been decided.
Our standard of review for evidentiary rulings dictates that circuit courts have broad discretion and that a circuit court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Green v. Alpharma, Inc., 373 Ark. 378, 284 S.W.3d 29 (2008). A circuit court abuses its discretion when it makes a decision that is arbitrary or capricious. See Phelan v. Discover Bank, 361 Ark. 138, 205 S.W.3d 145 (2005).
IsThere is no dispute in this case that Ford complied with section 27-37-703(a)(2)(A) and (B) of the statute, as this is a products-liability action involving a claim not related to an alleged failure of a seat belt, and the issue was raised by Ford in its answer. Instead, the issue on appeal is whether the elements relating to noncompliance, reduction in injury, and the extent of any reduction in injury, which are listed in subsection (c) of the statute, were adequately proved by Ford.
With regard to noncompliance, Ford argues that Clowers’s testimony as to whether Johnny was wearing a seat belt was equivocal and that Washington did not submit any other evidence, expert or otherwise, on the issue. Ford thus argues that substantial evidence was presented of noncompliance. As to its proof of a reduction in injuries, and the extent of any such reduction, had a seat belt been worn, Ford contends that it presented sufficient evidence of these statutory elements through Dr. Piziali’s deposition testimony that the vast majority of rollover accidents do not result in fatal injuries and that had Johnny been belted, he would not have been in a position to have suffered the head injury that killed him. Ford again argues that Washington failed to present any evidence to the contrary and that the circuit court abused its discretion by ruling that the evidence of seat belt nonuse was inadmissible, given Dr. Piziali’s “unrefuted testimony.”
In concluding that Ford had failed to meet its burden of proving that this evidence was admissible under section 27-37-703, the circuit court stated that it was troubled by the following: that many of Dr. Piziali’s statements were generalizations; that while Dr. Piziali ^commented about a lack of blood splatter on the seat belt, he did not indicate that there were in fact blood-splatter patterns present in the vehicle that would indicate that there could have been splatter present on the belt as well; that no evidence was presented regarding what a seat belt-restraint system should have done in a rollover scenario; that Dr. Piziali did not specify the extent of the reduction of the injuries that wearing a seat belt would have resulted in other than survival; that the court was unsure about Dr. Piziali’s expertise and how it related to what normally happens to a body in a rollover accident; that Dr. Piziali seemed to rely heavily on an ER document that the injured person was not belted and disregarded the testimony of Clowers, who was an eyewitness; that there was no evidence presented on what the injuries would have been had Washington been belted; and that much of the evidence presented to the court had been statistics and generalizations rather than specific facts relevant to this case.
As noted above, this court may not overturn the circuit court’s decision absent an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is a high threshold that does not simply require error in the circuit court’s decision, but requires that the court act improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. See Coker v. Coker, 2012 Ark. 383, 423 S.W.3d 599. The circuit court in this case held a hearing on the issue, considered the evidence presented, allowed argument from both parties, and announced a fairly lengthy ruling before issuing its written order denying Ford’s motion. While Ford disagrees with the weight that was given to its evidence and opines that it was sufficient to meet the statutory requirements, it was for the circuit court to determine whether the requisite showing had been made. Further, the plain wording of the statute requires that the defendant “prove” the required | toelements to the satisfaction of the circuit court, not merely that “sufficient” or “substantial” evidence be shown, as Ford argues in its brief. Under these circumstances, we cannot find that the circuit court acted improvidently, thoughtlessly, arbitrarily, capriciously, or without due consideration in finding that Ford did not meet its burden under the statute.
Ford also argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of seat belt nonuse when Washington “opened the door” to the admission of such evidence by introducing evidence that Johnny was, in fact, wearing his seat belt at the time of the accident. Although Washington asserts that Ford failed to properly preserve this argument for appeal, we disagree. As set out above, Ford objected on this basis when Washington sought to introduce Clowers’s deposition testimony into evidence, and the objection was overruled by the circuit court.
In any event, we find no merit to Ford’s contention that it was entitled to rebut Washington’s evidence of seat belt usage once the door had been opened, regardless of whether the evidence of non-use was inadmissible under the statute. We have recognized the propriety of “fighting fire with fire” when a party-opens the door with an untruthful statement, introduces inadmissible evidence, or makes an improper closing argument. See, e.g., King v. State, 338 Ark. 591, 999 S.W.2d 183 (1999); Larimore v. State, 317 Ark. 111 , 877 S.W.2d 570 (1994). Also, in Pursley v. Price, 283 Ark. 33, 670 S.W.2d 448 (1984), a case cited by Ford in its argument, we held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting character evidence that was otherwise inadmissible under Ark. R. Evid. 404, where the plaintiff had opened the door to the rebuttal evidence by testifying to his past exemplary |nconduct. In this case, the circuit court overruled Ford’s objection that Washington had opened the door to the admission of evidence of seat belt nonuse, noting that Ford had not complied with the requirements in the statute and that the statute does not provide for such an exception. Because there is a statute that expressly prohibits the admission of this evidence, this case can be distinguished from other cases in which we have held that otherwise inadmissible character evidence pursuant to our rules of evidence may be admitted to “fight fire with fire.” See Pursley, supra. We cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion in this ease, and we therefore affirm the circuit court’s ruling excluding evidence of Johnny’s nonuse of a seat belt.
II. Preemption
For its second point on appeal, Ford argues that the circuit court erred in permitting Washington to proceed on her glazing claim because it is preempted by FMVSS 205, which expressly allows vehicle manufacturers to use tempered glass in the side windows of vehicles. Ford contends that the failure of the circuit court to dismiss this claim was legal error that warrants a new trial. Washington responds that Ford’s preemption argument is waived because the jury reached its verdict on a general-verdict form. She claims that, without any indication of how the jury reached its verdict, this court must affirm the jury’s findings. Alternatively, Washington contends that the federal regulation does not preempt state common-law causes of action and argues that the circuit court was correct in allowing her to present the glazing claim as a factual question for resolution by the jury.
The following facts are pertinent to this particular point on appeal. According to the |12record, vehicle manufacturers typically use one of two types of glass glazing in their vehicle windows. Tempered glazing consists of a sheet of glazing that is designed to shatter on impact into small, granular pieces. American National Standards Institute Standard Z26.1 (“ANSI Z26”) at Forward. Laminated glazing consists of two or more sheets of glass held together by a layer of plastic so that, when the glass cracks or breaks, the broken glass adheres to the sheet of plastic. Id. FMVSS 205, which was promulgated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration under the authority of the Federal Safety Act, expressly provides vehicle manufacturers with a choice of installing tempered glazing or laminated glazing in side windows.
Washington’s complaint alleged negligence, strict liability, failure to warn, and breach of warranty based on Ford’s use of tempered glass in the Explorer. In response, Ford filed an amended answer alleging that federal law preempted Arkansas tort law or warranty law that allows for design-defect liability based on Ford’s choice to use the tempered-glass option under FMVSS 205. Washington then filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the glass-glazing claim and requested that the circuit court find that the claim was not preempted by FMVSS 205. Subsequently, Ford filed its response and cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that FMVSS 205 preempted state-law design-defect claims regarding a manufacturer’s decision to use the tempered-glass option granted by federal law.
Prior to trial, the circuit court conducted a pretrial-motion hearing and heard arguments on whether FMVSS 205 preempted Washington’s state-law claims. At the hearing, the court orally granted Ford’s motion, ruling that FMVSS 205 preempted Arkansas law. | ^Washington then filed a motion for reconsideration, and the circuit court entered an order vacating its prior ruling and finding that Washington’s “glass/glazing and containment claims were not preempted by FMVSS 205, nor do these claims expressly or impliedly conflict with the underlying purposes of FMVSS 205 or its enabling act, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safely Act.”
The case proceeded to trial where Washington’s expert, Dr. Steven Batzer, testified that the tempered glazing used in the Ford Explorer was unreasonably dangerous because it failed to keep the decedent inside the vehicle. Dr. Batzer stated that Ford should have used laminated glazing, and that if laminated glazing had been used in the vehicle, the decedent would have survived the accident. Dr. Batzer did concede that “virtually everybody” manufacturing vehicles in 1994 used tempered glazing in the side windows and that the tempered glazing used by Ford complied with the applicable federal safety standard. The jury also heard evidence that during the vehicle’s rollover, the tempered glass in the driver-side window shattered, allowing the decedent’s head to become trapped between the ground and the door frame. The jury was instructed on negligence and strict liability. Both Ford and Washington accepted general-verdict forms assigning fault without special interrogatories specifying the bases for that finding. At the trial’s conclusion, the jury found by a preponderance of the evidence that both Ford and Williams were at fault and had proximately caused the decedent’s death.
On appeal, Ford argues that a new trial is warranted because Washington’s tort claims based on the use of defective glazing are preempted by FMVSS 205. In support of its 114argument, Ford primarily relies on the South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision in Priester v. Cromer, 401 S.C. 38, 736 S.E.2d 249 (2012). See also Noel v. Ford Motor Co., No. 6:11-cv-370-orl-28DAB, 2013 WL 1786637 (M.D.Fla. Apr. 26, 2013); Morgan v. Ford Motor Co., 224 W.Va. 62, 680 S.E.2d 77 (2009). Aside from her waiver argument, Washington asserts that her claim is not preempted, and she refers us to a number of decisions where courts have determined that a glazing claim is not preempted by federal law. See O’Hara v. General Motors Corp., 508 F.3d 753 (5th Cir.2007); Bernal v. Daewoo Motor Am., Inc., No. CV09-1502 PHX-DGC, 2011 WL 2174890 (D.Ariz. June 2, 2011); Raley v. Hyundai Motor Co., No. CIV-08-0376-HE, 2010 WL 528420 (W.D.Okla. Feb. 11, 2010); Spruell v. Ford Motor Co., Civ. No. 07-2058, 2008 WL 906648 (W.D.Ark. Apr. 1, 2008); Burns v. Ford Motor Co., Civ. No. 06-5201, 2008 WL 222711 (W.D.Ark. Jan. 24, 2008); Lake v. Memphis Landsmen, LLC, 405 S.W.3d 47 (Tenn.2013); MCI Sales and Serv., Inc. v. Hinton, 329 S.W.3d 475 (Tex.2010). In these decisions cited by the parties, the courts have considered the preemption issue in the wake of the Supreme Court’s opinion of Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000). See also Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1131, 179 L.Ed.2d 75 (2011); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 123 S.Ct. 518, 154 L.Ed.2d 466 (2002).
As a threshold matter, we first address Washington’s contention that Ford waived the preemption argument for purposes of appeal because the case was presented to the jury on a general-verdict form. On this point, the record reflects that the jury was instructed that it could find Ford liable based on either negligence or strict liability. In support of both claims, Washington asserted that the vehicle was defective (1) because it had an unreasonable 11 ¿propensity to roll over, or (2) because the side window was made of tempered glass. It is only the latter theory of recovery that Ford asserts should have been dismissed.
We are persuaded by Washington’s waiver argument. Where the jury’s verdict is rendered on a general-verdict form, it is an indivisible entity or, in other words, a finding upon the whole case. S. Cent. Ark. Elec. Coop. v. Buck, 354 Ark. 11, 117 S.W.3d 591 (2003). This court will not speculate on what the jury found where a general jury verdict is used. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Davis, 347 Ark. 566, 66 S.W.3d 568 (2002); Primm v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Corp., 324 Ark. 409, 922 S.W.2d 319 (1996). When special interrogatories concerning liability or damages are not requested, this court is left in the position of not knowing the basis for the jury’s verdict, and this court will not question or theorize about the jury’s findings. Hyden v. Highcouch, Inc., 353 Ark. 609, 110 S.W.3d 760 (2003); Esry v. Carden, 328 Ark. 153, 942 S.W.2d 846 (1997).
Our previous opinion in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Barber, 356 Ark. 268, 149 S.W.3d 325 (2004), is pertinent to our decision here. In that case, the Barbers premised their claim of negligence on five different theories, and the jury was given a general-verdict form on which to impose liability. On appeal, Union Pacific contested the jury’s findings with respect to only two of the theories supporting the claim of negligence. Applying the above-mentioned rules of law, this court declined to address Union Pacific’s arguments because the jury could have fixed liability on another theory that was advanced at trial.
Similarly, in Tyson, supra, the jury was instructed on negligence, fraud, and promissory estoppel but the verdict form did not differentiate between the different types of damages 11Bthat could be awarded. The verdict form in that case stated, “We the jury find for Don Davis on his claim for damages and award damages against Tyson Foods, Inc. in the amount of $891,660.” Tyson, 347 Ark. at 576, 66 S.W.3d at 579. In Tyson, we affirmed the damage award, holding as follows:
The evidence was presented to the jury, and the general verdict casts no light on what decision the jury reached other than liability and an amount of damages. No further analysis may be undertaken. Special interrogatories concerning damages were not requested. We are left in the position of not knowing the basis for the jury’s verdict and we will not question or theorize about the jury’s findings. Esry [v. Carden, 328 Ark. 153, 942 S.W.2d 846 (1997).]
Id. at 585, 66 S.W.3d at 581.
In the instant case, the jury could have found in favor of Washington based on the Explorer’s propensity to roll over, or it could have found that the window glazing was defective. The jury might also have found a combination of both defects. However, because the jury could have based its verdict solely on the rollover theory, we must affirm on this point. This court simply cannot speculate as to how the jury arrived at its decision; thus, Ford has failed to demonstrate prejudice resulting from the jury’s consideration of the glazing claim.3
117III. Punitive Damages
In its third point on appeal, Ford argues that the circuit court erred in denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of punitive damages. Ford does not argue that the punitive-damages award was excessive; rather, it argues that there was insufficient evidence in this case that it was malicious or indifferent to the consequences of its actions. It contends that mere negligence, even gross negligence, does not suffice to justify an award of punitive damages.
Our standard of review of the denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is the same as that for a denial of a direeted-verdict motion. Carter v. Cline, 2011 Ark. 474, 385 S.W.3d 745. Thus, a circuit court may enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict only if there is no substantial evidence to support the verdict and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
This court has held that an award of punitive damages is justified only where the evidence indicates that the defendant acted wantonly or with such a conscious indifference to the consequences that malice may be inferred. Stein v. Lukas, 308 Ark. 74, 823 S.W.2d 832 (1992). An instruction for punitive damages may be given when there is evidence that a party likely knew or ought to have known, in light of the surrounding circumstances, that his conduct would naturally or probably result in injury, and that he continued such conduct in reckless disregard of the consequences from which malice could be inferred. D’Arbonne Constr. Co. v. Foster, 354 Ark. 304, 123 S.W.3d 894 (2003). When this court reviews an award of punitive damages, we consider the extent and enormity of the wrong, the intent of the party committing the wrong, all the circumstances, and the financial and social condition and standing of the erring party. Id.
Washington argues that she presented substantial evidence of Ford’s knowledge of the 1994 Explorer’s rollover tendencies. We agree. She introduced evidence that Ford’s engineers had recommended four solutions to the Explorer’s rollover issues but that only two changes were made in order not to delay the vehicle’s production date. One of Washington’s experts demonstrated to the jury the effectiveness of the previously recommended modifications of widening the track width of the vehicle and installing smaller tires, both of which were technically feasible and neither of which was implemented by Ford in the 1994 model despite the recommendations of its engineers. Further, there was evidence that Ford had inadequately tested the vehicle, that it had tested the Explorer under unrealistic conditions, such as by placing sand bags on the floor instead of in the seats to lower the center of gravity, and that it had consciously disregarded the risk of rollover when it chose to sell the Explorer with the larger tires that Johnny’s vehicle had installed, despite management’s awareness of the risk associated with the larger tires. With regard to the glazing issue, Washington presented evidence as to the feasibility of installing properly framed laminated side windows, the minimal cost of such windows, the fact that Johnny would not have suffered fatal injuries had such glazing been installed, and the knowledge by Ford engineers as to the superiority of laminated glazing in cases of rollover.
|19Given this proof, we find that there was substantial evidence to support the jury’s award of punitive damages in this case. While Ford presented evidence to refute many of Washington’s allegations, that was an issue of credibility for the jury to determine. Chavers v. Epsco, Inc., 352 Ark. 65, 98 S.W.3d 421 (2003). Thus, we affirm on this point.
IV. Compensatory Damages
Ford argues in its fourth point on appeal that the compensatory-damages award should be reduced by 50%, pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 16-61-204 and -205. This case was controlled by the law governing joint and several liability, as the accident occurred prior to the passage of the Civil Justice Reform Act in 2003. When Washington settled with Williams, the other tortfeasor in this case, they signed a “Release and Settlement Agreement,” which provided that any damages recoverable by Washington would be reduced to the extent of Williams’s pro rata share of fault. Ford was not a party to this agreement, but it argues that pursuant to this agreement and to Ark.Code Ann. § 16-61-204, the compensatory damages awarded should have been reduced by 50%, which is the amount of fault found by the jury to be attributable to Williams.
The version of section 16-61-204 (1987) in effect at the time of this ease provided that
[a] release by the injured person of one (1) joint tortfeasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tortfeasors unless the release so provides; but reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors in the amount of the consideration paid for the release, or in any amount or proportion by which the release provides that the total claim shall be reduced, if greater than the consideration paid.
The release and settlement agreement in this case also stated that it was the intent of the parties to the agreement to comply with the provisions of the Uniform Contribution Among fin Joint Tortfeasors Act (§ 16-61-201 et seq.), so as to provide for a reduction to the extent of the pro rata share of the released tortfeasor of the injured person’s damages recoverable against all other tortfeasors.
While Ford correctly recites the law on this issue, there are other factors present here that prevent this court from ordering such a reduction in the award of compensatory damages. As Washington contends in her brief, the instructions submitted to the jury on compensatory damages stated, “If an interrogatory requires you to assess the damages of Mrs. Washington, you must then fix the amount of money which will reasonably and fairly compensate Paulette R. Washington, Teri-an Washington, Quinton Swygart, and the Estate for those elements of damage which you find were proximately caused by the negligence and/or manufacture, assembly, and/or sale of a defective vehicle by Ford Motor Company.” (Emphasis added.) Although the interrogatories themselves did not limit the damages to those caused solely by Ford, Ford at no time objected to this instruction or argued that the jury instructions were inconsistent with the interrogatories. Absent evidence to the contrary, the jury is presumed to obey the instructions. Pearson v. Henrickson, 336 Ark. 12, 983 S.W.2d 419 (1999). There is no evidence that the jury in this case failed to follow the instructions; thus, the damages it awarded represented only those proximately caused by Ford, and no reduction of the compensatory-damages award is warranted. We therefore affirm on this point on appeal.
V. Postjudgment Interest
In its final point on appeal, Ford argues that the circuit court erred in its judgment entered on April 8, 2013, subsequent to this court’s second dismissal of the appeal for lack of |21a final judgment, because it included a provision entering the judgment nunc pro tunc to October 6, 2010, for postjudgment-interest purposes. As Ford asserts, nunc pro tunc orders are intended to make the record speak the truth, but not to make it speak what it did not speak but ought to have spoken. Lord v. Mazzanti, 339 Ark. 25, 2 S.W.3d 76 (1999). A court entering a nunc pro tunc order can only correct the record to make it conform to action that was actually taken, such as for clerical errors, and the court cannot modify a decree to provide action that the court, in retrospect, should have taken but did not. Id.
The circuit court explained in its order denying Ford’s posttrial motions that it had intended to enter a final judgment on October 6, 2010, and that it intended for postjudgment interest to run from that date. However, Ford contends that this explanation fails to justify the nunc pro tunc order because the October 6, 2010 judgment was not final, regardless of what the circuit court intended, and because the matter of postjudgment interest was not a clerical error but an action that should have been taken but which the court did not in fact take.
While Washington responds by arguing that a circuit court has discretion to enter a judgment nunc pro tunc for post-judgment interest, citing Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 238 Ark. 159, 379 S.W.2d 8 (1964), an important distinction here is that the original judgment entered on October 6, 2010, was held by this court not to be a final judgment. See Ford I, supra. Postjudgment interest is not designed to begin accruing prior to the entry of a final judgment, as prejudgment interest may also be awarded where appropriate. The purpose of awarding postjudgment interest is to compensate judgment creditors for the |22loss of money adjudged to be due them. Glover v. Woodhaven Homes, Inc., 346 Ark. 397, 57 S.W.3d 211 (2001).
In Glover, we discussed whether the trial court’s award of postjudgment interest should have been calculated from the date of the original judgment, which we had reversed and remanded in an earlier appeal for the judgment amount to be modified. We concluded in that case that the interest was properly awarded from the entry of the original judgment because the reversal amounted to nothing more than a remand for clarification on the method the trial court used to determine the damages it awarded. Id. We held that when a judgment is affirmed in a modified amount, the new amount draws interest from the date of the original judgment; however, when the original judgment is reversed on appeal, any new award subsequently entered by the trial court may bear interest only from the date the new judgment is entered. Id. We also noted in reaching our decision in Glover that our opinion reversing and remanding for clarification of the original judgment did not instruct the trial court to decide any new issues or hear any additional evidence. Id.
In the present case, we dismissed Ford’s appeals in Ford I and Ford II because there remained issues to be decided by the circuit court and thus, the original judgment was not final. Because a final judgment in this case was not entered until April 8, 2013, we find that postjudgment interest should only have been awarded from that date forward. We therefore reverse and remand on this point.
One final issue that must be addressed is Washington’s motion to strike a portion of Ford’s argument in its reply brief, where Ford argued that Washington had waived any | ^objection to including Williams, as a nonparty, on the verdict form. Washington argues that this “new” argument by Ford in its reply brief is improper because it ignores and misrepresents statements by counsel at the trial and because an appellee cannot be found to have waived an argument on appeal. We agree with Ford that it was entitled to raise this argument in its reply brief in response to Washington’s arguments in her brief, regardless of whether Ford’s response was meritorious, and we therefore deny the motion to strike.
Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part; motion to strike reply argument denied.
BAKER, GOODSON, and HART, JJ„ dissent.