Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 538 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CV-24-576
Opinion Delivered November 5, 2025 PRISCILA PODLESKI APPEAL FROM THE BENTON COUNTY APPELLANT CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 04DR-23-152] V. HONORABLE DOUG SCHRANTZ, JUDGE JACOB PODLESKI AFFIRMED APPELLEE
WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge
Appellant Priscila Podleski appeals from the decree of divorce entered by the Benton County
Circuit Court on January 23, 2024. In that order, the circuit court awarded Priscila and her now ex-
husband, appellee Jacob Podleski, joint custody of their young son. On appeal, Priscila argues that
the circuit court erred in (1) finding that she failed to overcome the statutory presumption in favor
of joint custody; and (2) excluding the testimony of the parties’ marriage counselor, Dr. Diana
Haberman. We affirm.
The parties were married for nine years and share one child, MC. Priscila filed a complaint
for divorce on February 1, 2023. A temporary custody hearing was held on March 15. Priscila
sought temporary primary custody, expressing safety concerns and claiming that Jacob, a practicing
anesthesiologist, lacks the ability to care for MC on his own. She alleged that Jacob has an alcohol problem that makes him aggressive and “easily angry.” She further alleged that Jacob physically
attacked her on multiple occasions and verbally abused her regularly.
Priscila testified that in 2008, during an argument, Jacob “hit [her] so hard in the stomach it
knocked the wind out of [her].” She stated that “there was always punching, hitting, shoving,
pinching.” In 2016, while in Cleveland for an anesthesiology conference, Jacob, in a drunken state,
pinned her down on the bed and choked her to the point that she thought she was going to die. She
claimed that in 2017, while in Mexico, Jacob punched her arm, leaving cuts and bruises.
Priscila admitted that Jacob had never been physically abusive to MC; however, she stated
that there were occasions when Jacob consumed alcohol to such excess that he was unable to care for
MC. She described an incident when Jacob was “stumbling drunk” while in the swimming pool with
MC, resulting in MC’s mouth being submerged in the water, which caused him to cough. Priscila
also alleged that during a car ride, Jacob endangered MC’s life by unbuckling his car seat while the
vehicle was traveling on the highway. She additionally claimed there were other incidents during
which Jacob failed to appropriately care for MC because he was “passed out” from drinking. Priscila
requested to be MC’s primary caregiver, with Jacob having supervised visitation and no overnights.
Priscila testified that, since separating, she and Jacob have communicated effectively regarding MC
and can continue to do so. Photographs of Priscila’s alleged injuries were admitted into evidence
along with photographs of Jacob allegedly passed out from drinking and documents signed by Jacob
after the abuse incidents in which he agreed to “seek help for his anger.”
On cross-examination, Priscila admitted that, despite her allegations of domestic abuse and
Jacob’s issue with alcohol, she left MC in Jacob’s care for two days while she traveled for work.
Furthermore, she acknowledged that she also drinks alcohol and had praised Jacob’s parenting and
2 bond with MC via posts on social media. Priscila admitted that since the divorce complaint was filed,
Jacob voluntarily took and passed twice weekly urinalysis tests and a hair-follicle test and was
determined to be low risk on a substance-abuse assessment.
Jacob also testified at the temporary hearing. He denied having a drug or alcohol problem
and stated that his urinalysis and hair-follicle tests were all negative, and the result of a substance-
abuse assessment showed that he had no risk of substance abuse. Jacob requested joint custody of
MC. On cross-examination, he denied passing out due to overconsumption of alcohol and testified
that he had never consumed alcohol while acting as MC’s sole caregiver. Jacob further denied
Priscila’s claims of physical abuse, aside from a 2017 incident during which he hit her arm, “but she
also hit [him] and threw things at [him] multiple times.”
At the conclusion of the temporary hearing, citing Jacob’s negative drug and alcohol test
results and evidence that Priscila voluntarily left MC in Jacob’s care when she traveled for work, the
circuit court ruled that the allegations of alcohol and drug abuse were not supported by the evidence.
The circuit court found that Priscila failed to defeat the presumption in favor of joint custody and
awarded the parties temporary joint custody of MC with an equal division of parenting time.
A two-day final divorce hearing was held on October 10 and January 2, 2024. Custody of
MC was the predominant issue before the court. Kaitlyn Lamonte, the parties’ former neighbor,
testified first. She stated that Jacob was “extremely condescending” and demeaning toward Priscila
in both public and private settings. Jacob talked down to Priscila and called her names, such as idiot
and stupid; however, Priscila “brush[ed] it off” or changed the subject. Kaitlyn stated that other
neighbors expressed that it was uncomfortable to be around the parties because of the way Jacob
treated Priscila. She further said that Priscila was MC’s primary caregiver, and she could not recall
3 a time when she witnessed Jacob actively parenting. On cross-examination, Kaitlyn stated that she
did not think Jacob was incapable of parenting.
Brian Reed, a physician assistant at a local hospital, testified next. He stated that Jacob had
called Priscila stupid or dumb on “every occasion” they were together socially. Brian described
Jacob’s tone toward Priscila as aggressive, berating, belittling, and assertive, yet Priscila never fought
back. Brian acknowledged that he never witnessed Jacob threaten or physically abuse Priscila and did
not see Jacob direct ill behavior toward MC.
Pablo Nunez, Priscila’s older brother, testified. He stated that he has known Jacob
approximately seventeen years—since the parties began dating in high school. He said that, since
MC’s birth, he visited the parties three to five times a year. Pablo stated that he heard Jacob call
Priscila “idiot” and “fucking idiot.” During the last family Thanksgiving gathering, he called her
stupid. Pablo testified that before he left to return home, he found Priscila crying in the kitchen, and
he confronted Jacob about how he treated his sister. Jacob admitted that he shoved and slapped
Priscila in Mexico a few years prior.
Pablo also stated that he told Jacob he needed to work on his relationship with MC. Jacob
blamed Priscila and claimed that she was keeping MC from him. Jacob told Pablo that Priscila “has a
tumor in the head,” she is “screwed up,” and he refused counseling because Priscila needed therapy,
not him. He claimed that Priscila is at fault for how he speaks to her. Pablo testified that he never
witnessed Jacob threaten or hit Priscila or MC, but he believes that Jacob is incapable of parenting
MC because he is violent and aggressive.
Phillip Nunez, another of Priscila’s brothers, also testified. He recounted an incident that
occurred when he was visiting the parties’ home. He stated that Jacob was upstairs with MC when
4 he heard MC begin screaming, “Papa, no. Papa, no.” Phillip and Priscila went upstairs and saw Jacob
“sprawled out on the floor” at the top of the stairs, holding onto MC’s left leg, preventing him from
moving. Jacob called Priscila a “fucking bitch” and “autistic” as she picked MC up and took him
downstairs. Phillip stated that “stupid” and “autistic” are the names that Jacob most often called
Priscila. He testified that Priscila never tried to defend herself.
Priscila was next to testify. She stated that she and Jacob were high school sweethearts. She
claimed that Jacob first hit her in 2008, and the name-calling began in 2009, both well before the
parties married in 2014. She described a 2009 incident during which Jacob punched the side of her
head while she was driving and instances in 2015 while living in Cleveland when he choked, pushed,
shoved, and kicked her.
Priscila testified that during a 2016 incident, she threw a lamp at Jacob when he was choking
her. She stated that she was punching him to get him off of her, and once he let go, she grabbed a
nearby lamp and threw it. Priscila said that her usual reaction to Jacob’s attacks was to push him off.
She also alleged other domestic-violence incidents, including a 2015 instance in Saint Kitts, during a
New Year’s Eve celebration that same year, and a 2016 episode that occurred when she asked for his
help to book a flight. She stated that Jacob “has no restraint” with words when he is sober and even
less so when he is drunk.
Priscila’s continued to testify about documents she prepared and had Jacob sign. In June
2016, in response to Jacob’s hitting her in the head, she typed an agreement defining abuse and
requiring Jacob to attend anger-management and/or domestic-abuse therapy if he physically abused
her again. Priscila testified that she and Jacob got into an argument in 2017; she threw a peanut
butter jar at him when “he started coming at [her].” She described Jacob getting drunk at a friend’s
5 wedding and urinating on the nightstand, telephone, and desk in a hotel room. Then in Mexico in
July 2017 during an argument, Jacob punched Priscila’s arm, resulting in bruises. In response, Jacob
signed another agreement promising to go to professional therapy in September “to fix our marriage
problems.” Numerous similar incidents involving alcohol and abuse were described by Priscila.
Notwithstanding her claims, she admitted that she never contacted the authorities. Priscila filed for
divorce following Jacob’s proclamation during a therapy session that alcohol was more important to
him than Priscila.
Priscila testified that communication about MC and custody exchanges had gotten better, and
they are able to “act like adults.” Both parties have been permitted to FaceTime MC every night at
bedtime. MC has a full-time nanny; the parties reached a mutual decision to hire the nanny to be
shared between the homes. Priscila stated that she supports MC having a relationship with Jacob.
On cross-examination, Priscila admitted she has hit, punched, and thrown items at Jacob.
She further acknowledged drinking around MC and calling Jacob names and saying regretful things
while intoxicated. Priscila confirmed that since the divorce process began, there had been no
violence or name-calling between the parties and that they communicate on a level necessary for
coparenting. She conceded that Jacob’s alcohol assessment and urinalysis tests indicated that he does
not have an alcohol-abuse issue.
Priscilla agreed that MC is a happy, healthy child. Communication with Jacob has been civil
and respectful. She stated that Jacob is a good dad and a bad husband. She testified that Jacob is
patient with MC, is teaching him to be bilingual, sets a good example for working hard and
accomplishing dreams, and is supportive of MC’s needs.
6 Jacob testified that custody exchanges had been normal, and he believes Priscila wants what
is best for MC. He agreed that he and Priscila called each other names and were physically aggressive
toward one another throughout their relationship. Jacob stated that Priscila had thrown things at
him, including a peanut butter jar, lamp, pillows, laptop, and other household items. He has been a
practicing physician in northwest Arkansas since May 2020 and has never had alcohol-related issues,
allegations, complaints, or investigations at work.
Dr. Diana Haberman, a licensed counselor, was next to testify. At the outset of her
testimony, Jacob declared that “he is absolutely not waiving privilege” for the counseling sessions held
jointly with Priscila. Priscila responded that statements made during the marriage-counseling
sessions were made while seeking medical treatment and that “privilege was waived by the joint
counseling sessions.” The court ruled that Jacob had not waived privilege.
Dr. Haberman testified that on September 7, 2022, Priscila and Jacob came to her office
together for couples counseling, although Priscila was the designated client. 1 She stated that she kept
therapy notes of her counseling sessions. Priscila moved to introduce the notes into evidence;
however, Jacob again objected on the basis of doctor-patient privilege. He argued that he attended
sessions through February 2, 2023, and anything prior to that date was privileged information.
Priscila agreed and proposed redaction of the medical records “to excise any reference to [Jacob].”
Jacob responded that it would be impossible to make sense of the therapy notes with the proposed
redaction. Priscila again agreed that it would “be difficult.” The circuit court sustained the objection,
1Dr. Haberman indicated that, for licensing reasons, one party of a couple is identified as the designated client.
7 ruling that it would be difficult to separate the privileged portions of the notes from the notes
pertaining only to Priscila. Dr. Haberman’s therapy notes were proffered for the record.
Jacob, once again, raised the same objection to Dr. Haberman’s testimony in conjunction
with his joint sessions with Priscila. The circuit court again sustained the objection and permitted
only testimony from sessions occurring after February 2, 2023, when Jacob stopped attending
counseling.
Kevin Bonner, the attorney ad litem, stated that MC is a healthy, happy, stable child and that
Jacob is a good dad. He stated that the parties were horrible spouses for each other but could be
excellent parents. Bonner stated that the parties had been able to work together on decisions
regarding MC and recommended that the court follow the preference for joint custody.
The circuit court ruled from the bench that no issues were raised during the final hearing
indicating that the parties should not share joint custody. The court stated that the parties’
communication regarding MC is “not too bad.” The court noted that there were things that were
not agreed on and questions sometimes went unanswered, but the communication “is not just
terrible.” In an order entered on January 23, 2024, the court awarded the parties joint custody of
MC. Priscila appealed.
This court reviews matters of child custody de novo on appeal, but the circuit court’s findings
are not reversed unless they are clearly erroneous.2 A finding is clearly erroneous when, although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and
2 Janjam v. Rajeshwari, 2020 Ark. App. 448, 611 S.W.3d 202.
8 firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. 3 Whether a circuit court’s findings are clearly
erroneous turns in large part on the credibility of the witnesses, and special deference is given to the
circuit court’s superior position to evaluate the witnesses, their testimony, and the child’s best
interest.4 There are no cases in which the circuit court’s superior position, ability, and opportunity
to observe the parties carry as great a weight as those involving minor children. 5
The primary consideration in child-custody cases is the welfare and best interest of the child,
with all other considerations being secondary.6 Although joint custody is favored in Arkansas,7 it is
not mandatory.8 The statutory preference for joint custody does not override the ultimate guiding
principle that the best interest of the child is the polestar factor for custody determination.9
On appeal, Priscila first challenges the circuit court’s award of joint custody. She argues that
the circuit court clearly erred in awarding the parties joint custody given Jacob’s pattern of domestic
abuse.
3 Id. 4 Id. 5 Id. 6 Id. 7 See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. 2023). 8 Wilhelm v. Wilhelm, 2018 Ark. App. 47, 539 S.W.3d 619. 9 Carrillo v. Morales Ibarra, 2019 Ark. App. 189, 575 S.W.3d 151.
9 In an original child-custody determination in a divorce, there is a rebuttable presumption that
joint custody is in the child’s best interest. 10 An award of joint custody is rebutted if the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that joint custody is not in the child’s best interest.11 Another way
to rebut the joint-custody presumption is found in Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-13-101(c)(1)
and (2), which provides:
(c)(1) If a party to an action concerning custody of or a right to visitation with a child has committed an act of domestic violence against the party making the allegation or a family or household member of either party and such allegations are proven by a preponderance of the evidence, the circuit court must consider the effect of such domestic violence upon the best interests of the child, whether or not the child was physically injured or personally witnessed the abuse, together with such facts and circumstances as the circuit court deems relevant in making a directive pursuant to this section.
(2) There is a rebuttable presumption that it is not in the best interest of the child to be placed in the custody of an abusive parent in cases in which there is a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the parent has engaged in a pattern of domestic abuse.
Priscila argues that the circuit court disregarded proof establishing Jacob’s pattern of domestic
abuse and ignored Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-13-101(c)(1)’s requirement that the court
consider the effect of domestic violence on a child regardless of whether the child was physically
injured or witnessed the abuse and the provisions of subdivision (c)(2)—the rebuttable presumption
against joint custody if a pattern of domestic abuse is found. She contends there was ample testimony
from neighbors, friends, and family as to the “abhorrent” manner in which Jacob treated her, both in
public and private. Priscila asserts that the evidence established a pattern of physical and emotional
abuse by Jacob all the way “up until the day the parties separated.” Priscila argues that, as a result,
10 Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(iv)(a). 11 Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(iv)(b)(1).
10 the circuit court erred in failing to find a pattern of domestic abuse sufficient to rebut the presumption
in favor of joint custody.
Priscila’s argument for primary custody is based entirely on her allegations that Jacob engaged
in a pattern of domestic abuse that serves to rebut the joint-custody presumption. Notably, the
circuit court’s order did not make a specific finding of a “pattern of domestic abuse” but did find that
Priscila failed to overcome the statutory presumption of joint custody.
There was testimony that both parties engaged in acts of violence and name-calling during
the marriage. Accordingly, in the divorce decree, the circuit court found that the parties dislike each
other intensely, are bad spouses to one another, and rude and negative comments were made by both
parties to each other as well as acts of physical aggression against each other: “No party [was] found
to be better, or worse, than the other as it relates to such conduct between them.” The court further
found that MC is a good child who loves both parents, the parties communicated well regarding MC’s
care, and are able to provide him great opportunities and “the best of everything” if they continued
to work together. Clearly, the circuit court, following the mandates of Arkansas Code Annotated
section 9-13-101(c)(1), considered the effects of the domestic violence on the best interest of MC.
On appeal, aside from the allegations of domestic abuse, Priscila failed to argue that joint custody
was not in MC’s best interest.
Priscila also challenges the circuit court’s decision to exclude Dr. Haberman’s therapy notes
and testimony during the final hearing. Priscila argues that she was Dr. Haberman’s designated
patient and could release her treatment records, “which contained information provided by [Jacob].”
Our standard of review for evidentiary rulings dictates that circuit courts have broad
discretion and that a circuit court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be reversed absent
11 an abuse of that discretion.12 An abuse of discretion is a high threshold that does not simply require
error in the circuit court’s decision but requires that the court act improvidently, thoughtlessly, or
without due consideration.13 We also note that an evidentiary error is harmless if the same or similar
evidence is otherwise introduced at the trial.14
Specifically, as to the exclusion of Dr. Haberman’s records and treatment notes, the issue is
not preserved for appeal. Before the circuit court, Priscila conceded that the doctor-patient privilege
applied and offered to redact the privileged parts of the records. She further conceded that redaction
to exclude the privileged portions of the notes would be difficult without affecting the substance of
the notes.
Relating to the circuit court’s exclusion of Dr. Haberman’s testimony about the joint therapy
sessions with Jacob, Priscila fails to craft a convincing argument why the doctor-patient privilege
should not apply or how the circuit court erred in the ruling. We will not consider arguments not
supported by convincing argument or citation to authority. 15 Nor will we make an appellant’s
argument for her or consider an argument that is not properly developed. 16 The most that can be
gleaned from Priscila’s vague argument on this point is that Jacob claims he is not an abuser; however,
photographs and “his own written statements prove that his assertion is not true.” At the hearing,
12 Green v. Alpharma, Inc., 373 Ark. 378, 284 S.W.3d 29 (2008). 13 Ford Motor Co. v. Washington, 2013 Ark. 510, 431 S.W.3d 210. 14 Eft v. Rogers, 2012 Ark. App. 632, 425 S.W.3d 1. 15 Sanders v. JLP, LLC, 2024 Ark. App. 65, 683 S.W.3d 607. 16 Id.
12 Priscila, as well as multiple other witnesses, testified to Jacob’s treatment of Priscila. As stated
above, an evidentiary error is harmless if the same or similar evidence is otherwise introduced at the
trial.17 Therefore, for multiple reasons, this point provides no grounds for reversal.
Affirmed.
KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and HARRISON, J., agree.
Rhoads & Armstrong, PLLC, by: Johnnie Emberton Rhoads, for appellant.
Tim Cullen, for appellee.
17 Eft, 2012 Ark. App. 632, 425 S.W.3d 1.