Ena Jones v. the Mattress Firm Holding Corp., the Mattress Firm Holding Corp., D/B/A Mattress Firm

558 S.W.3d 732
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedAugust 7, 2018
Docket14-17-00091-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 558 S.W.3d 732 (Ena Jones v. the Mattress Firm Holding Corp., the Mattress Firm Holding Corp., D/B/A Mattress Firm) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ena Jones v. the Mattress Firm Holding Corp., the Mattress Firm Holding Corp., D/B/A Mattress Firm, 558 S.W.3d 732 (Tex. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

Affirmed and Opinion filed August 7, 2018.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-17-00091-CV

ENA JONES, Appellant V. THE MATTRESS FIRM HOLDING CORP., THE MATTRESS FIRM HOLDING CORP., D/B/A MATTRESS FIRM, Appellees

On Appeal from the 270th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2014-34051

OPINION

This appeal concerns the admissibility of dated photographs obtained from the Google Earth computer program. Ena Jones appeals from a final judgment following a jury trial in favor of appellees, the Mattress Firm Holding Corp. and the Mattress Firm Holding Corp., d/b/a Mattress Firm. Jones contends Mattress Firm’s inflatable advertising “tube man” caused her to fall and suffer serious injury as she left a Mattress Firm store. The trial court excluded three satellite photographs from Google Earth, which purportedly showed the location of the device on particular dates before and after the incident, based on objections including lack of authentication and relevance.

Jones argues the photos are authentic and relevant to rebut Mattress Firm’s evidence regarding where it generally placed the device. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the photos because Jones did not authenticate the dates on each photo, and without those dates the photos are not relevant. In addition, even if error had been shown, the error was harmless because ample photographic and testimonial evidence was admitted bearing on the device’s location at the time of the incident and thereafter. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment. BACKGROUND

On April 2, 2014, Ena Jones went to a Mattress Firm in Houston, Texas to purchase a mattress. The store utilized an inflatable moving “tube man,” also called a “wind dancer,” to attract customers. An employee placed the tube man and its attached electrical fan at ground level in front of the store’s entrance each business day and put away the device when the store closed for the day.

Jones testified she was startled by the tube man when she entered the store via a ramp and told the store manager, Edwin Reyes, about her experience. Upon exiting the store, Jones took an alternate route that involved the use of stairs. Jones testified the tube man again startled her, resulting in her missing a step and falling down, severely injuring herself.

At trial, the parties disputed how close the tube man was to the parking space Jones had used. Jones sought to introduce deposition testimony of Samuel Sanchez, the district manager for Mattress Firm, identifying the store and the tube man and discussing the device’s location as shown in three different Google Earth 2 photographs. The photos purported to show the tube man in a particular location six and eighteen months before the incident as well as in a different location further from the parking space six days after the incident. Mattress Firm objected on multiple grounds: lack of authentication, relevance, and reliability; hearsay; and unfair prejudice. The trial court sustained the objection and excluded this portion of Sanchez’s deposition testimony as well as the Google Earth photos.

At trial, several witnesses testified about where they had seen the tube man on the day of the incident and where the tube man generally was placed. The jury was shown other photos of the tube man in front of the store on different dates and in different locations. Reyes agreed that the official incident report stated Jones fell in an attempt to avoid the tube man. Jones’s daughter testified she told Reyes that the tube man was not in a good spot and could obstruct handicapped people attempting to enter the store.

After a three-day trial, the jury returned a verdict finding neither party negligent. The trial court signed a take-nothing judgment based on the jury’s finding. ANALYSIS

In two issues, Jones argues that the Google Earth photos were admissible, the trial court abused its discretion in excluding them, and this error was harmful, requiring a new trial. In particular, Jones addresses each of Mattress Firm’s objections to the photos in her brief. Mattress Firm responds, in part, that Jones did not preserve her claim of error for our review. We begin our analysis there and, having concluded that Jones did preserve her claim, proceed to consider whether the trial court abused its discretion and whether any error was harmful.

3 I. Jones preserved her challenge to the exclusion of the photos.

Mattress Firm contends that Jones failed to preserve her claim of error in excluding the Google Earth photos by not offering the photos separately from Sanchez’s deposition and not making a formal offer of proof. We hold that her challenge to the trial court’s ruling is preserved for our review.

A party seeking admission of evidence must inform the court of the substance of the evidence by an offer of proof, unless the substance is apparent from the context. Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(2); Garden Ridge, L.P. v. Clear Lake Ctr., L.P., 504 S.W.3d 428, 438 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). Making an offer of proof enables an appellate court to determine whether the exclusion of the evidence was erroneous and harmful, and it allows the trial court to reconsider its ruling in light of the actual evidence. Ludlow v. DeBerry, 959 S.W.2d 265, 270 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ.). The rules of evidence do not mandate a formal offer; they require only a “short, factual recitation of what the [evidence] would show” to preserve the issue for appeal. In re N.R.C., 94 S.W.3d 799, 806 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (citing Cathleen C. Herasmichuk, TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE HANDBOOK 96 (4th ed. 2001)). Counsel should reasonably and specifically summarize the evidence and state its relevance unless already apparent. Id.

In responding to Mattress Firm’s objections and the trial judge’s questioning, Jones’s counsel described the photos as showing the store, the tube man, and its location. Counsel further stated that the location of the tube man in the photos directly contradicted Mattress Firm’s asserted location. The trial court understood that counsel was “try[ing] to admit [some]thing . . . printed off of Google Earth.” The court also focused on authentication of the photos, stating: “let’s talk about Google Earth. . . . [H]ow can you authenticate this?” The court understood the

4 admissibility of the photos to be preserved for appeal, stating that “if I’m wrong about [my ruling] I’ll get it right the next time we try the case.” The photos are included in the record, enabling appellate review.

Jones offered a short, factual recitation of what the photos showed and why she intended to introduce them. Further, it is clear from the context that the trial court excluded the photos and understood that the issue was preserved for appeal. Despite not presenting a formal offer of proof, Jones made the substance of the evidence apparent to the trial court and included it in the record. Thus, Jones properly preserved the issue for appeal. See In re N.R.C., 94 S.W.3d at 806.

II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the dated Google Earth photos. Jones challenges the trial court’s ruling sustaining Mattress Firm’s objection to the Google Earth photos by attacking each ground of objection in turn. She begins by arguing that the photos “are authenticated by judicial notice and because there is no way to reasonably dispute their scientific reliability.” Although Mattress Firm’s counsel conceded that the photos depicted the store, the dates on each photo were not authenticated.

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Bluebook (online)
558 S.W.3d 732, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ena-jones-v-the-mattress-firm-holding-corp-the-mattress-firm-holding-texapp-2018.