Opinion by Judge FERGUSON; Dissent by Judge KLEINFELD.
OPINION
FERGUSON, Circuit Judge.
Emmanuel Senyo Agyeman (“Agye-man”), a native and citizen of Ghana, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision, affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his request for suspension of deportation pursuant to Section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (repealed 1996) (“Section 244”), and adjustment of status pursuant to Section 245 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (“Section 245”). Agyeman claims that he was denied a full and fair hearing because he was not given adequate instructions as to how to proceed with his applications for relief. Specifically, he alleges, among other errors, that the denial of adjustment of status was predicated on his inability to procure his wife’s attendance at the deportation hearing to testify on his behalf. Given that his wife suffers from bipolar disorder and resides thousands of miles from the site of the proceedings, we agree. Accordingly, we grant the petition and now remand for a new hearing. In addition, we hold that the filing fees provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) do not apply to INS detainees.
I. BACKGROUND
Agyeman entered the United States on a B-l visitor visa in 1988. In 1991, he married a United States citizen, Barbara Levy (“Levy”), and the couple established a home together in Elizabeth, New Jersey. Levy subsequently filed an Form 1-130 immediate relative visa petition, which was approved in 1992. However, Agyeman’s application for adjustment of status was denied because the couple failed to attend the scheduled interview and submit Agye-man’s medical examination. As reflected in the record, Levy was unable to attend the interview because she was hospitalized for bipolar disorder at the time.
In 1993, Agyeman relocated to Carson City, Nevada, for business purposes, and resided there until being detained by the INS for overstaying his visa in early 1997. INS officials transported Agyeman to a detention facility in Eloy, Arizona, where he remained during the course of the proceedings.
On July 28, 1997, the IJ found Agyeman deportable under Section 241(a)(1)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B), and denied his request for suspension of deportation under Section 244. Reviewing Agye-man’s application for adjustment of status based on his marriage to a United States citizen pursuant to Section 216 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a (“Section 216”), the IJ instructed Agyeman that his wife’s testimony was mandatory to determine the bona fides of their marriage. Upon questioning about his wife, Agyeman informed the IJ that Levy suffered from bipolar disorder and had been hospitalized for two or three months at a time. The IJ asked whether Levy was still hospitalized, to which Agyeman responded: “I don’t know.” At the close of the hearing, the [876]*876IJ stated that “y°u need to contact and have available at the next hearing, your spouse. She must be physically present at that hearing, otherwise, I can’t grant your application for adjustment of status.” (emphasis added). The IJ granted a continuance for Agyeman to procure her attendance. On November 5, the IJ denied Agyeman’s application for adjustment of status because Levy did not appear and testify on his behalf and because his medical examination was not on file. The IJ granted his application for voluntary departure to Ghana pursuant to Section 244(e) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e).
On appeal, the BIA affirmed in all respects. It denied Agyeman’s application for an adjustment of status pursuant to Section 245 on the basis that he had failed to establish the validity of his marriage to Levy, affirming the IJ’s rationale that she failed to testify at the deportation hearing.1 It also refused to grant the application on discretionary grounds. As to the denial of suspension for deportation, the BIA affirmed on the basis that Agyeman had failed to demonstrate an “extreme hardship” to himself or to his wife.
This timely petition for review followed. We granted Agyeman’s request for leave to proceed informa pauperis and instructed the parties to brief the issue whether the PLRA filing fee provisions apply to INS detainees.
II.JURISDICTION
This petition is governed by the transitional rules of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”). Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir.1997). We have jurisdiction to hear Agyeman’s due process claims pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a), as amended by IIRIRA section 309(c)(4). Antonio-Cruz v. INS, 147 F.3d 1129, 1130 (9th Cir.1998).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review claims of due process violations in deportation proceedings de novo. Sanchez-Cruz v. INS, 255 F.3d 775, 779 (9th Cir.2001). We also review de novo legal interpretations of the INA’s requirements. Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477, 482 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc). Because our standard of review is de novo, we conduct an independent examination of the entire record. Perez-Lastor v. INS, 208 F.3d 773, 777 (9th Cir.2000). When the BIA reviews the IJ’s decision de novo, our review is limited to the BIA’s decision, except to the extent that the BIA adopted the IJ’s opinion. Cordon-Garcia v. INS, 204 F.3d 985, 990 (9th Cir.2000) (citing Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1430 (9th Cir.1995)).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Due Process Rights in Deportation Proceedings
The Fifth Amendment guarantees individuals who are subject to deportation due process in INS proceedings. Jacinto v. INS, 208 F.3d 725, 727 (9th Cir.2000) (citing Campos-Sanchez v. INS, [877]*877164 F.3d 448, 450 (9th Cir.1999)). “An alien who faces deportation is entitled to a full and fair hearing of his claims and a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on his behalf.” Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir.2000). In addition, aliens in deportation proceedings are entitled by statute and regulation to certain procedural protections. Barraza Rivera v. INS, 913 F.2d 1443, 1447 (9th Cir.1990); Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89, 91 (9th Cir.1988). For example, an alien must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on his behalf. INA § 240(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4); 8 C.F.R. § 240.10(4) (2001); see also INA § 240(b)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(l) (providing that the immigration judge must receive evidence); 8 C.F.R. § 240.1(c) (2001) (same). If an alien is prejudiced by a denial of any of the applicable procedural protections, he is denied his constitutional guarantee of due process. Campos-Sanchez, 164 F.3d at 450.
One of the components of a full and fair hearing is that the IJ must adequately explain the hearing procedures to the alien, including what he must prove to establish his basis for relief. Jacinto, 208 F.3d at 728. In addition, when the alien appears pro se, it is the IJ’s duty to “fully develop the record.” Id. at 733-34. Because aliens appearing pro se often lack the legal knowledge to navigate their way successfully through the morass of immigration law, and because their failure to do so successfully might result in their expulsion from this country, it is critical that the IJ “scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all the relevant facts.” Id. at 733 (quoting Key v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 1545, 1551 (9th Cir.1985)).
B. Full and Fair Hearing
Agyeman claims that he was denied a full and fair hearing because, among other errors, the IJ failed to provide an adequate explanation of the procedures and thereby denied him a full and fair hearing. At his deportation hearing, the IJ ruled that Levy’s testimony was the only means by which Agyeman could successfully prosecute his application for adjustment of status, despite the fact that she suffered from a bipolar disorder and lived thousands of miles away. On appeal, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of Agye-man’s applications for relief on the basis that Agyeman had failed to establish his marriage to a United States citizen. Under the circumstances, we find that Agye-man did not receive an adequate explanation as to what he had to prove to support his application for adjustment of status and was thereby denied a full and fair hearing.
1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
As a threshold matter, we find that Agyeman’s due process claim was properly exhausted below. While we retain jurisdiction to review due process challenges to immigration decisions, Antonio-Cruz, 147 F.3d at 1130, we may not entertain due process claims based on correctable procedural errors unless the alien raised them below. Sanchez-Cruz, 255 F.3d at 780; Cortez-Acosta v. INS, 234 F.3d 476, 480 (9th Cir.2000). The exhaustion requirement applies to claims that an alien was denied a “full and fair hearing.” Sanchez-Cruz, 255 F.3d at 780.
Albeit inartfully, Agyeman raised pro se his due process claims in his notice of appeal to the BIA. Although he did not use the specific phrase ‘due process violation,’ he did protest the requirement that his wife testify at the hearing, explaining that she was in poor health and advised by her doctor not to make the trip. He also [878]*878requested that she be permitted to appear “at a convenient location for the required interview.”
Because Agyeman raised his claims pro se, we construe them liberally. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). Under this scrutiny, Agyeman satisfies the exhaustion requirement for his due process claim that he was denied a full and fan-hearing, due to the IJ’s insistence that his wife appear and testify at the hearing. Further, because the BIA conducted a de novo review of the IJ’s decision, “it had a full opportunity to resolve [the] controversy or correct its own errors before judicial intervention.” Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 903 (9th Cir.2000). Thus, even to the extent that Agyeman’s pro se appeal did not contain the exact legalese, the BIA had adequate opportunity to correct any errors occurring in the proceedings below. Accordingly, we hold that Agyeman’s due process claim was properly exhausted before the BIA.
2. Requirement of Spouse’s Testimony
At the deportation hearing, the IJ instructed Agyeman that his wife must appear and testify on his behalf, granting a continuance for him to produce her as a witness. When she did not appear, the IJ denied the application for adjustment of status, reasoning that his spouse was “unable or unwilling to appear and testify in his behalf.” Matter of Agyeman, No. A-29-765-590, slip op. at 3 (IJ Nov. 5, 1997). The BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of Agye-man’s application, observing that Agyeman “was on notice of the need for his wife to testify,” but failed to produce her or any other witnesses at the deportation hearing. Matter of Agyeman, No. A29-765-590-Eloy, slip op. at 2 (BIA Mar. 16, 1999). Therefore, the BIA ruled, Agyeman “failed to establish his marriage to a United States citizen for purposes of adjustment of status.” Id.
At the outset, we note that Levy’s attendance and testimony at the deportation hearing was not a statutory prerequisite for adjustment of status. On the face of the statute and accompanying regulations, Agyeman was only required to provide sufficient evidence of his bona fide marriage to a United States citizen. Yet, this was never explained to him. He was simply told that she must be there or his application would be denied. For a full understanding of what was legally required, we turn to a discussion of the statutory and regulatory framework governing the adjudication of adjustment of status applications based on marriage to a United States citizen.
a. Statutory and Regulatory Framework
Section 245 is the proper statutory framework for adjudicating an application for adjustment of status filed by an alien in deportation proceedings. 8 C.F.R. §§ 240.1(a)(1)(h), 240.11(a)(1) (2001). The IJ has exclusive jurisdiction to decide the adjustment of status application. 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(1) (2001). However, only the INS may adjudicate the underlying I 130 visa petition. 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(e) (2001); Dielmann v. INS, 34 F.3d 851, 854 (9th Cir.1994).
Under Section 245, an alien may be eligible for adjustment of status if, among other prerequisites, an immigrant visa is immediately available. INA § 245(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). One of the ways by which- an alien may become eligible to receive an immigrant visa is through marriage to a United States citizen. INA § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b). An approved I 130 filed by the spouse satisfies the requirement that a visa is immediately available. INS, v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, [879]*87915, 103 S.Ct. 281, 74 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982). Once approved, the I 130 remains valid for the legal duration of the marriage. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(h)(1) (2001).
However, approval of the I 130 petition does not automatically entitle the alien to adjustment of status as an immediate relative of a United States citizen. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 937, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) (citing Menezes v. INS, 601 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir.1979)). While an I 130 establishes eligibility for status, the Attorney General- — or in the context of deportation proceedings, the IJ — must still decide to accord the status.2 Amarante v. Rosenberg, 326 F.2d 58, 62 (9th Cir.1964).
As part of the investigative process for adjustment of status, the alien must attend an interview with an immigration officer. 8 C.F.R. § 245.6 (2001). While the regulations do not explicitly require the spouse to appear or testify on the alien’s behalf, as a practical matter, the INS often requests the attendance of both the alien and the spouse at the initial adjustment interview. See SARAH IGNATIUS, IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE FAMILY § 8.04[5] at 8-60 (2001). Its authority to do so is found in its general regulatory power to request the appearance of an applicant, petitioner, sponsor, or beneficiary. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(9) (2001). This authority to request an appearance does not generally extend to the IJ in deportation proceedings; however, he may “issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and presentation of evidence.” INA § 240(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1).
If the alien’s marriage is less than two years old, adjustment of status is granted on a conditional basis pursuant to Section 216.3 INA § 216(g)(1), 8 U.S.C. [880]*880§ 1186a(g)(1). The conditional status remains in effect for a two-year period, after which the alien must satisfy additional requirements under Section 216 to remove the conditionality of his legal residency. 8 C.F.R. § 240.11(a)(1) (2001). These requirements include a joint petition and interview with his spouse. INA § 216, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a. However, if the spouse refuses to participate in this process, the alien may file the petition alone and request a hardship waiver of the joint filing requirement. 8 C.F.R. §§ 216.4(a)(1), 216.5 (2001). In addition, while both the alien and the spouse must ordinarily appear for an interview at a local INS office, this requirement may be waived for good cause. INA §§ 216(c)(1)(B), (c)(2)(A)(i), (d)(3), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1186a(c)(1)(B), (c)(2)(A)(i), (d)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 216.4(b)(3) (2001). Whether or not the alien fulfills these additional requirements is left to the exclusive jurisdiction of the INS District Director. Id.
In this case; Levy filed an 1-130 visa petition on Agyeman’s behalf, and the INS approved it in 1992. Agyeman filed an application for adjustment of status,, and the INS requested an interview with both spouses. However, Levy could not attend the interview because she was hospitalized for bipolar disorder at the time. Consequently, the INS denied Agyeman's application for adjustment of status for lack of prosecution.
Q: [Wjhen we conduct this adjustment of status application ... I will set it up for a hearing date on which I want your, your wife must appear and testify and indicate that she still wants to support you or to .petition for you as a relative of hers. Okay. It is her petition, not really yours, okay. So, she ... must be present for me to ask questions of and the Government can cross examine, too, as the validity of the marriage and her willingness to basically support your application for residency here.
In the deportation proceedings, the IJ analyzed Agyeman’s application for adjustment of status under Section 216, even though his marriage was more than two years old, presumably because the petition upon which he relied was filed within two years of his marriage to Levy. One of the requirements that the IJ specified for the application was that Agyeman’s wife must appear and testify at the hearing. It is unclear under what authority the IJ undertook this request. We decline to interpret the IJ’s request as an attempt to enact a statutory requirement that the spouse must attend and testify at the deportation hearing in every case in which an application for adjustment relies on a marriage to a United States citizen. We also decline to interpret this as an improper attempt to either readjudicate Levy’s original petition or to enforce Section 216’s joint interview requirement.4 Nevertheless, the IJ’s demand was fundamentally unfair under the circumstances. The IJ and the BIA, on appeal, should have acknowledged the role that Levy’s illness played in her inability to attend the original interview, and this hearing as well.
b. Good Cause Waiver
Under the statutory and regulatory scheme governing INS interviews, a good cause waiver may apply. For example, if the INS requests an appearance by an applicant or petitioner, the interview may [881]*881be rescheduled upon a showing of good cause.5 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(9) (2001). In addition, the regulations pertaining to Section 216’s joint interview requirement provide for good cause waivers in cases in which the alien and/or the spouse cannot attend the INS interview preceding the removal of the conditional status of their legal residency based on the marriage. INA § 216(c)(2)(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(2)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 216.4(b)(3) (2001). A documented serious illness may constitute good cause for a spouse’s absence at the interview. See generally IGNATIUS, supra, at § 5.08[3][e] (advising that “good cause” to waive the spouse’s attendance at an INS interview prior to removal of the conditional basis of residency must be “legitimate and well documented, such as extreme illness.... ”).
In this case, the IJ or the BIA, on appeal, should have recognized that good cause excused Levy’s absence at the original INS interview, and at the deportation hearing, as well. Levy suffers from bipolar disorder, which is a “chronic condition that has potentially devastating effects on many aspects of the patient’s life and that carries with it a high risk of suicide.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR THE TREATMENT OF PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS 531 (2000); William Coryell, M.D., et al., The Enduring Psychosocial Consequences of Mania and Depression, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 720-27 (1993) (explaining that bipolar disorder diminishes one’s ability to function on nearly all levels and persists despite medication and treatment). Bipolar disorder is a severe psychiatric illness marked by episodes of mania and depression, impairment of functioning — both cognitive and behavioral, and is frequently complicated by psychotic symptoms (e.g., delusions, hallucinations, and disorganized thinking). Paul E. Keck, Jr., et al., Bipolar Disorder, 85 THE MEDICAL CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA 645 (2001). Persons suffering from bipolar disorder “are prone to rapid mood fluctuations” and thus pose a particular risk of suicide or other harmful behavior. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra, at 530.
As explained to the IJ at the July 28th hearing, Levy had been hospitalized for periods of two to three months at a time, due to her mental illness. Upon the IJ’s questioning, Agyeman did not know whether she was hospitalized at the time.6 However, given Levy’s history of serious mental illness, it would be understandable if she was unable to travel to Arizona to testify at the deportation hearing. Indeed, one of the most critical aspects of treating bipolar disorder is establishing and maintaining a stable routine to avoid recurrence of manic and depressive episodes. CLINICIAN’S GUIDE TO MENTAL ILLNESS 111 (Dennis C. Daley, ed., 2001). Agyeman attempted to explain the difficulty of having Levy attend, specifically mentioning concerns about placing undue pres[882]*882sure on her and the fact that his detention prevented him from traveling to New Jersey to accompany her on her trip.7
Notwithstanding these indicators, the IJ instructed Agyeman to arrange for Levy’s appearance. Agyeman complied and asked Levy to travel to Eloy, Arizona, in order to testify at the November 5th hearing. However, she did not appear, and Agyeman was unable to confirm that she had arrived in Phoenix, where she was to stay with his friend. Thus, contrary to the dissent’s assertion, it is unclear from the record whether Levy did, in fact, travel from her home in New Jersey to appear at the deportation hearing.8 The lack of clarity in the record regarding whether Levy actually attempted to attend the hearing is further demonstrated by Agyeman’s explanation of her absence in his notice of appeal to the BIA, wherein he stated that she was unable to be there because of her “poor health and [because] her doctor has recommended against making the trip.” Thus, the record is not established as to whether Levy was in Arizona at the time of the hearing.
For our purposes, it is sufficient that, despite the IJ’s awareness of Levy’s serious illness and possible hospitalization, he still required Agyeman to procure her attendance and interpreted her subsequent absence as dispositive in his determination that Agyeman’s marriage to Levy was not bona fide. Moreover, although Agyeman argued on appeal to the BIA that his wife was ill and had been unable to make the trip across country to testify, the BIA simply acknowledged that the situation was “regrettable” and affirmed the IJ’s denial. Matter of Agyeman, slip op. at 2.
3. Inadequate Explanation of Procedures
As the bona fides of Agye-man’s marriage were in question, the IJ had a duty to apprise Agyeman of reasonable means of proving them. Jacinto, 208 F.3d at 728. Although Levy’s testimony would clearly be the most persuasive form of evidence, other types of evidence could very well have demonstrated the validity of Agyeman’s marriage. Evidence of the marriage’s bona fides may include: jointly-filed tax returns; shared bank accounts or credit cards; insurance policies covering both spouses; property leases or mortgages in both names; documents reflecting joint ownership of a car or other property; medical records showing the other spouse as the person to contact; telephone bills [883]*883showing frequent communication between the spouses; and testimony or other evidence regarding the couple’s courtship, wedding ceremony, honeymoon, correspondences, and shared experiences. Matter of Soriano, 19 I & N Dec. 764, 766 (BIA 1988); see also 8 C.F.R. § 216.4(a)(5) (2001) (listing similar types of evidence as proof that marriage was not entered into to evade immigration laws of the United States). Yet, the IJ failed to suggest these sources of evidence, which would have supported his application for adjustment of status.
To the extent that Levy’s testimony was essential to Agyeman’s adjustment application, the IJ should have explained to Agyeman that she could participate telephonically. Beltran-Tirado v. INS, 213 F.3d 1179, 1185-86 (9th Cir.2000). Otherwise, because Levy resided in New Jersey — thousands of miles from the deportation proceedings — she could have appeared at the INS office nearest to her residence and submitted to a deposition. 8 C.F.R. § 3.35(a) (2001); see also 8 C.F.R. § 287.4(a)(2)(ii)(D) (2001) (providing that witness who is more than 100 miles from place of proceeding may be subpoenaed to appear at the nearest INS office and respond to oral or written interrogatories). However, the IJ did not explore these options, and the BIA similarly failed to suggest these alternatives on appeal.9
Moreover, the IJ represented to Agyeman that he was ineligible for adjustment of status if his wife was no longer in love with him.10 However, our case law has long held to the contrary. Thus, the IJ failed to explain that Agyeman could submit evidence showing that he entered into the marriage in good faith, even if it was’ the case that they were no longer in love. On remand, Agyeman’s marriage to Levy must be found bone fide for purposes of adjustment of status if it was “not sham or fraudulent from its inception.” Dabaghian v. Civiletti, 607 F.2d 868, 869 (9th Cir.1979). The key issue is: “Did the petitioner and his wife intend to establish a life together at the time of their marriage?” Bark, 511 F.2d at 1202. As we held in Bark, “[e]vidence that the parties separated after their wedding is relevant to ascertaining whether they intended to establish a life together when they exchanged marriage vows. But evidence of separation, standing alone, cannot support a finding that a marriage was not bona fide when it was entered.” Id.; see also Matter of McKee, 17 I & N Dec. 332, 333 (BIA 1980) (distinguishing between nonviable and sham marriages).
We have previously emphasized the importance of explaining to an alien what evidence will demonstrate their eligibility for relief from deportation. Jacinto, 208 F.3d at 728. Moreover, it is critical [884]*884when the alien appears pro se that the IJ develop the record by eliciting all relevant facts. Id. at 734. The IJ must be responsive to the particular circumstances of the case, including what types of evidence the alien can and cannot reasonably be expected to produce in support of his applications for relief from deportation. Cf. Gomez-Saballos v. INS, 79 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir.1996) (rejecting BIA’s requirement that asylum applicant must produce independent evidence of threat on his life or others because “evidentiary burden would be too great” for an alien who has fled his home country). Sensitivity to what evidence the alien can reasonably be expected to produce is especially critical when the alien is in the INS’s custody. In such cases, the alien may have limited access to relevant documents and will, therefore, depend even more heavily on the IJ for assistance in identifying appropriate sources of evidence to support his claim.
Here, the IJ focused solely on the testimony of Agyeman’s wife, despite her illness, and neglected to explain how Agye-man could otherwise establish eligibility for adjustment of status. Further, the IJ failed to adequately explore with Agyeman what evidence he could produce, given his limited access to documents and restricted ability to place telephone calls in detention. Although the BIA was correct in noting that Agyeman bore the “responsibility to provide evidence supporting his applications,” Matter of Agyeman, slip op. at 2, the IJ also had an obligation to assist him, as a pro se applicant, in determining what evidence was relevant and by what means he could prove his claims. See Jacinto, 208 F.3d at 733-34. As in Jacinto, we are concerned here that Agyeman lacked the legal knowledge to discern what evidence was relevant and in what form that evidence could be presented. Id. Accordingly, it was critical that the IJ probed into all the relevant facts regarding Agyeman’s marriage and provided sufficient guidance as to how Agyeman could prove the bona fides of the marriage. Because he failed to do so, instead representing that Levy’s attendance was the only possible means of demonstrating Agyeman’s bona fide marriage, and because the BIA affirmed rather than corrected this error, Agyeman was deprived of a full and fair hearing.
We emphasize that our holding today will not transform IJs into attorneys for aliens appearing pro se in deportation proceedings, as the dissent attempts to argue. However, consistent with our holding in Jacinto, the IJ has a duty to fully develop the record when an alien proceeds pro se by probing into relevant facts and by providing appropriate guidance as to how the alien may prove his application for relief. A pro se alien is deprived of a full and fair hearing when the IJ mis-informs him about the forms of evidence that are permissible to prove his eligibility for relief. Here, the IJ led Agyeman to believe that he could not prove the bona fides of his marriage, short of producing a wife who testified that she was still in love with him. Thus, Agyeman was not only uninformed, but he was also misinformed about how to prosecute his application for adjustment of status. Therefore, Agye-man was deprived of a full and fair hearing.
C. Prejudice
To merit relief, Agyeman must also show prejudice. Prejudice is shown if the violation “potentially ... affects the outcome of the proceedings.” Perez-Lastor, 208 F.3d at 780 (quoting Hartooni v. INS, 21 F.3d 336, 340 (9th Cir.1994)) (emphasis in original); accord Colmenar, 210 F.3d at 972. We have held that prejudice may be shown where the IJ’s inadequate explanation of the hearing procedures and [885]*885failure to elicit pertinent facts prevented the alien from presenting evidence relevant to their claim. Jacinto, 208 F.3d at 734-35.
Here, the IJ represented that the testimony of Agyeman’s wife was the sole means of proving that his marriage was bona fide and cited her absence as one of the primary reasons for denying the application for adjustment of status. On appeal, the BIA expressly adopted the IJ’s reasoning and affirmed. Had the IJ suggested other ways for Agyeman to prove the bona fides of his marriage, Agyeman might have proffered such evidence. Singh v. INS, 213 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir.2000) (finding prejudice when BIA applied new evidentiary requirements to alien’s appeal because, if petitioner had been given notice, he might have secured the necessary documents). Moreover, the IJ’s statements that adjustment depended on Levy’s testimony that she still “wanted” and loved Agyeman deprived him of the notice and opportunity to pursue other forms of evidence demonstrating the couple’s bona fide intent to establish a life together, even if they were no longer in love. Id.
Further, the IJ denied Agyeman’s application out of hand at the November 5th hearing upon being informed that -Levy was not present to testify. Thus, while the absence of a medical examination would also prevent -adjustment of status, it was rendered moot by the IJ’s ruling that Agyeman had withdrawn his application, due to his failure to produce his wife for testimony at the deportation hearing.11
The INS argues that no prejudice may be found because Agyeman fails to cite record evidence establishing that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. However, contrary to the INS’ contention, Agyeman need not “explain exactly what evidence he would have presented” in support of his applications for relief. Colmenar, 210 F.3d at 972. Rather, we may infer prejudice in the absence of any specific allegation as to what evidence Agyeman would have presented had the TJ adequately explained what he needed to prove to demonstrate his eligibility for relief and had he been provided the opportunity to present that evidence. Perez-Lastor, 208 F.3d at 782.
We do not require Agyeman to “produce a record that does not exist.” Perez-Lastor, 208 F.3d at 782. It is sufficient that the record reflects Agyeman was not provided an adequate explanation of how to prove-the existence of his marriage to a United States citizen, short of producing her in front of the IJ, and that his failure to produce her resulted in the denial of his application for relief. Had the IJ provided an adequate explanation or sufficiently developed the record, Agyeman may have provided sufficient evidence to support his application for adjustment of status. Fundamental fairness requires that he have the opportunity to do so. Because the error potentially affected the outcome of the proceedings, we hold that Agyeman was prejudiced by the lack of a full and fair hearing.
V. PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT
We also hold that the filing fee provisions of the PLRA, Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), do not apply to [886]*886an alien detainee who proceeds in forma pauperis to petition for review from a BIA decision, so long as he does not also face criminal charges.
Unlike other indigent litigants, prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis must pay the full amount of the filing fees in civil actions and appeals pursuant to the PLRA. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir.2002). If the prisoner lacks the means to pay the fee at the time of filing, the PLRA provides for assessment and subsequent collection of the fees as funds become available to him. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 847.
As defined in the PLRA, a “prisoner” is “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal'law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). We have held that the statutory term “prisoner” is limited to an individual who is “currently detained as a result of accusation, conviction, or sentence for a criminal offense.” Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1139-40 (9th Cir.2000) (emphasis added). Thus, the term “prisoner” does not encompass a civil detainee for purposes of the PLRA. Id. We must now determine whether an alien detained by the INS pending deportation falls within the term “prisoner,” or is a civil detainee falling outside the ambit of the PLRA.
It is well established that deportation proceedings are civil, rather than criminal, in nature. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778, (1984); Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523, 530 (9th Cir.2002). As early as 1893, the Supreme Court held: “The order of deportation is not a punishment for crime.” Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730, 13 S.Ct. 1016, 37 L.Ed. 905 (1893). By means of explanation, Justice Holmes later stated: “Congress has power to order the deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful. The determination by facts that might constitute a crime under local law is not a conviction of crime, nor is the deportation a punishment; it is simply a refusal by the Government. to harbor persons whom it does not want.” Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591, 33 S.Ct. 607, 57 L.Ed. 978 (1913). In accordance with these earlier pronouncements, “[d]eportation, however severe its consequences, has been consistently classified as a civil rather than a criminal procedure.” Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594, 72 S.Ct. 512, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952); see also United States v. Yacoubian, 24 F.3d 1, 10 (9th Cir.1994) (dismissing an ex post facto challenge to deportation because the ex post facto clause is only applicable to “criminal laws”).
Consistent with the principle that deportation is a civil rather than a criminal procedure, we hold that an alien detained by the INS pending deportation is not a “prisoner” within the meaning of the PLRA. Thus, we join two of our sister circuits in holding that the filing fee requirements of the PLRA do not apply to an alien detainee proceeding in forma pauperis to petition for review of a BIA decision. See LaFontant v. INS, 135 F.3d 158, 165 (D.C.Cir.1998); Ojo v. INS, 106 F.3d 680, 682-83 (5th Cir.1997).
In the case at bar, Agyeman was detained by the INS as deportable under INA § 241(a)(1)(B) for overstaying his visa. He was not accused or convicted of, sentenced or adjudicated delinquent for, a violation of criminal law. Thus, Agyeman is riot a “prisoner” within the meaning of the statute, and the PLRA’s filing fee provisions do not, therefore, apply.
[887]*887VI. CONCLUSION
We do not decide the merits of Agye-man’s applications for relief from deportation. We hold only that he did not receive a full and fair hearing, that he suffered prejudice, and thus was denied his constitutional right to due process. Accordingly, we VACATE the Board’s decision, and we REMAND the case to the Board with instructions to remand to the Immigration Judge for a new hearing to determine whether Agyeman is eligible for an adjustment of status in accordance with this opinion.
Petition GRANTED.