Odanga v. Jordar

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedMay 8, 2023
Docket3:23-cv-00723
StatusUnknown

This text of Odanga v. Jordar (Odanga v. Jordar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Odanga v. Jordar, (S.D. Cal. 2023).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 FREDDY ZAVALA ODANGA, Case No.: 23-CV-0723-RSH-DEB Patient #1769488, 13 ORDER (1) DENYING MOTION TO Plaintiff, 14 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS v. WITHOUT PREJUDICE; 15 (2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION SAN DIEGO POLICE OFFICERS 16 WITHOUT PREJUDICE; AND JODAR, CABRALES and JOHN DOE, (3) DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO 17 Defendants. NOTIFY THE COURT OF 18 CURRENT ADDRESS 19 20 Plaintiff Freddy Zavala Odanga, currently committed to Patton State Hospital 21 (“PSH”) in Patton, California, proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant 22 to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF Nos. 1–2. 23 Plaintiff alleges that on May 6 and 7, 2022, he was tortured by three San Diego police 24 officers. ECF No. 1 at 3, 5. 25 I. Motion to Proceed IFP 26 All parties instituting any civil action in a district court of the United States, except 27 a petition for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a civil filing fee of $402, and the action may 28 proceed despite a failure to prepay the entire fee only if leave to proceed IFP is granted 1 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 2 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that “28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) allows the district court to 3 waive the fee, for most individuals unable to afford it, by granting IFP status”). 4 Plaintiffs who wish to proceed IFP must establish their inability to pay the civil filing 5 fee by filing an affidavit attesting to their income and assets. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 6 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). Prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP are also 7 required to submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional 8 equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 9 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the 10 certified trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20 percent of (a) 11 the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average 12 monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the 13 prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (4). The institution collects 14 subsequent payments, assessed at 20 percent of the preceding month’s income, in any 15 month in which the account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court until 16 the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). A plaintiff remains obligated to 17 pay the entire fee in monthly installments regardless of whether the action is ultimately 18 dismissed. Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 84 (2016). 19 Here, Plaintiff states in his IFP motion: “I-have-no-money-they-will-not-give-me- 20 reciept-of-6-months-no-money.” ECF No. 2 at 1. If Plaintiff is a “prisoner” within the 21 meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court cannot grant his IFP application without the trust 22 fund account statement for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of his 23 Complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See King, 398 F.3d at 1119 (“[P]risoners 24 must demonstrate that they are not able to pay the filing fee with an affidavit and 25

26 27 1 In addition to a $350 fee, civil litigants, other than those granted leave to proceed IFP, must pay an additional administrative fee of $52. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial 28 1 submission of their prison trust account records.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)–(2)). A 2 “prisoner means any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, 3 convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the 4 terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 28 5 U.S.C. § 1915(h). Although Plaintiff is currently committed to PSH, he has not shown that 6 he is not a “prisoner” as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). Therefore, Plaintiff has not shown 7 that he is exempt from submitting a trust fund account statement for the 6-month period 8 immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint.2 9 This Court and others have found that the definition of “prisoner” under 28 U.S.C. 10 § 1915(h) does not apply to plaintiffs who have been committed to a state hospital after 11 being adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGI”) pursuant to California Penal 12 Code § 1026. See e.g., Smith v. California, No. 13cv2809-WQH (JLB), 2014 WL 2180532, 13 at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2014) (finding civil detainee at PSH was not required to comply 14 with filing fee provisions under the Prison Litigation Reform Act); accord Miesegaes v. 15 Allenby, No. 15cv1574-CJC (JC), 2015 WL 13763858, at *1 n.2 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2015); 16 Mullen v. Surtshin, 590 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1240 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (finding plaintiff 17 involuntarily committed to state hospital based on NGI adjudication need not comply with 18 the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s exhaustion requirement). However, persons charged 19 with a criminal offense but found to be incompetent “during the pendency of an action and 20 prior to judgment,” may have their criminal prosecution suspended until mental 21 competence has been restored. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 1368–69. If an individual is found 22 23 2 PSH is a forensic psychiatric hospital located in San Bernardino County, California. 24 See Department of State Hospitals – Patton, California Department of State Hospitals, 25 https://www.dsh.ca.gov/Patton/index.html (last visited May 2, 2023). PSH houses, among others, persons who are found incompetent to stand trial under California Penal Code 26 § 1370; “[p]arolees who committed one of a specified list of crimes and who were treated 27 for a severe mental disorder connected to their original crime” under California Penal Code §§ 2962 and 2972; and “[p]ersons judged by the court to be guilty of a crime, but not guilty 28 1 competent at the trial regarding mental competence under California Penal Code § 1369, 2 the criminal process resumes, i.e., the individual can be tried and judgment pronounced. 3 See Cal. Penal Code § 1370(a)(1)(A). If found incompetent, the criminal trial proceeding 4 or judgment remains suspended until competency is restored.

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Mullen v. Surtshin
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Andrews v. King
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Bruce v. Samuels
577 U.S. 82 (Supreme Court, 2016)
Page v. Torrey
201 F.3d 1136 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)

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Odanga v. Jordar, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/odanga-v-jordar-casd-2023.