(PS) Gamboa v. Greyhound Bus Lines, Corp.

District Court, E.D. California·Decided January 16, 2025·No. 2:23-cv-01411·Unknown

Opinion

ELVIRA GARCIA GAMBOA, No. 2:23-cv-01411-DC-SCR Plaintiffs, v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS GREYHOUND BUS LINES, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this matter pro se, which is referred to the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 302(c)(21). Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 27 & 29). Plaintiff has filed four miscellaneous motions (ECF Nos. 30, 32, 33, & 39). The Court heard oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss on October 10, 2024. The Court recommends that the Motion to Dismiss be granted in part and denied in part. I. Procedural History and Background Plaintiff Elvira Garcia Gamboa originally filed this action in Sacramento County Superior Court on June 2, 2023. ECF No. 1, Notice of Removal. The complaint named as Defendants: 1) Greyhound Bus Lines; 2) Dave Leach, CEO; 3) Eric Wickman, Founder; and 4) Mr. Milan, a supervisor in Salt Lake City, Utah. ECF No. 1 at 5. Plaintiff claims that Defendants lost ten bags of her important personal and business belongings and that those items had a value of $78,000. Id. at 6-7. Defendants removed the action on the basis of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss. ECF No. 4. Magistrate Judge Barnes took that motion under submission without oral argument on August 28, 2023. ECF No. 16. On January 5, 2024, Judge Barnes issued an order dismissing the original complaint with leave to amend. ECF No. 20. Judge Barnes found that Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim was preempted by the federal Carmack Amendment which provides the exclusive remedy for interstate shipping contract claims. Id. at 4-5. Judge Barnes did not specifically rule on the arguments concerning the individual Defendants, although they were discussed in a footnote and Judge Barnes stated they “appear to be well taken.” Id. at 5 n. 3. On May 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). ECF No. 26. Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss (ECF No. 27) and requested a hearing in front of Judge Drozd. Defendants were told the motion was improperly noticed, and to set it before Magistrate Judge Barnes. ECF No. 28. Defendants then re-filed the motion to dismiss. ECF No. 29.1 Plaintiff has also filed several motions, including: 1) a motion to appear in person (ECF No. 30); 2) a motion “to be paid first” (ECF No. 32); 3) a motion to appear in person and request for mediation (ECF No. 33); and 4) an “urgent motion for case management statement” (ECF No. 39). Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss seeks dismissal pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), (5), and (6). ECF No. 29 at 1. II. Applicable Legal Standards A. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) provides that “[a] defendant may move, prior to trial, to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.” Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates, Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977). “Where a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction is appropriate.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004). However, “in the absence of an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts.” Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1 Although Defendants filed the motion to dismiss twice, the Court will refer to it hereafter as a singular motion and cite to ECF No. 29. 1361 (9th Cir. 1990). B. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5) Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5), a defendant may move to dismiss the action where the plaintiff has failed to effect proper service of process in compliance with the requirements set forth under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). If the court determines that the plaintiff has not properly served the defendant in accordance with Rule 4, the court has discretion to either dismiss the action for failure to effect proper service, or instead merely quash the ineffective service that has been made on the defendant in order to provide the plaintiff with the opportunity to properly serve the defendant. See Marshall v. Warwick, 155 F.3d 1027, 1032 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[D]ismissal [is not] invariably required where service is ineffective: under such circumstances, the [district] court has discretion to either dismiss the action, or quash service but retain the case.”). C. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff is required to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). In general, pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, the court need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. See Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff “can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,

(PS) Gamboa v. Greyhound Bus Lines, Corp., (E.D. Cal. 2025).

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