Quevedo-Moscoso v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 6, 2026
• Docket: 25-2008
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 6 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JEFFERZON ALEXANDER QUEVEDO- No. 25-2008 MOSCOSO and S. S. Q.S., Agency Nos. A201-905-285 Petitioners, A201-905-287 v.

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 4, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, District Judge. ***

Jefferzon Alexander Quevedo-Moscoso and his minor daughter (collectively,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Jeffrey Vincent Brown, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation. “Petitioners”),1 natives and citizens of Guatemala, petition for review of the Board

of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying their motion to terminate removal

proceedings and dismissing their appeal from the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial

of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against

Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the

petition.

Where, as here, the BIA adopts the IJ’s reasoning and supplements it with its

own analysis, we review both decisions. See Bhattarai v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1037,

1042 (9th Cir. 2016). We review legal questions de novo and review a denial of a

motion to terminate for abuse of discretion. See Dominguez v. Barr, 975 F.3d 725,

734 (9th Cir. 2020).

1. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to

terminate removal proceedings. See Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 581 (9th Cir.

2016). Petitioners sought termination on four grounds: (1) Petitioner’s intent to

pursue adjustment of status as the unmarried son of a lawful permanent resident; (2)

his intent to apply for a U nonimmigrant visa; (3) alleged defects in the Notices to

Appear (“NTAs”); and (4) failure to provide a list of free legal services with the

NTAs.

Petitioner failed to establish prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status.

1 References to “Petitioner” in the singular refer to the adult male petitioner.

2 25-2008 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(m)(1)(ii)(B). He asserted that he would qualify through an

I-130 visa petition to be filed by his mother. Notwithstanding, an I-130 petition has

not been filed, and Petitioner remains married. Because adjustment under this

category requires an approved visa petition and qualifying status, he is not currently

eligible for adjustment. Eligibility contingent on future filing, approval, and marital

changes does not establish prima facie eligibility. Agyeman v. I.N.S., 296 F.3d 871,

879 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The approved I-130 provides prima facie evidence that the

alien is eligible for adjustment as an immediate relative of a United States citizen . . . .”)

(citation omitted) (emphasis added).

Similarly, Petitioner asserted that he was eligible to seek a U visa based on

being a victim of assault with a deadly weapon. But no U-visa petition has been

filed. His asserted eligibility therefore rests on speculative future approval and does

not warrant termination.

Petitioners’ challenge to the NTAs’ lack of date and time information was

untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). An objection to a noncompliant NTA is generally

timely only if raised before the close of pleadings before the IJ. Matter of Fernandes,

28 I. & N. Dec. 605, 610–11 (BIA 2022). Because § 1229 is not jurisdictional,

objections may be forfeited if not timely raised. Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d

1158, 1160 (9th Cir. 2019); Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 15 (2005).

Petitioners raised their objection nearly six years after the agency entered a final

3 25-2008 order. The BIA did not err in concluding that the objection was forfeited.

The BIA also properly rejected Petitioner’s argument that he was not provided

with a list of free legal services providers. Petitioner was represented by counsel

throughout the proceedings and does not explain how the alleged omission affected

the outcome. See Rodriguez-Jimenez v. Garland, 20 F.4th 434, 440 (9th Cir. 2021)

(noting that for any due process claims “we will not simply presume prejudice”).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in rejecting this claim.2

2. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of asylum and withholding

of removal because Petitioner failed to establish any nexus between the feared

persecution and his proposed PSG. Petitioner proposed “vulnerable family units”

and “small business owners” as his PSGs before the IJ. The record reflects a single

incident in which three masked men threatened Petitioner for money. There is no

evidence, however, that the men targeted him because of membership in either

proposed group. A desire to be free from crime or extortion, without more, does not

establish nexus to a protected ground. Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th

Cir. 2010).

Because Petitioner failed to establish any nexus for asylum, he necessarily

2 Petitioners’ argument that the requirements under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) are mandatory is unexhausted, as it was not raised to the BIA. Because the Government asserts non-exhaustion, we may not consider this argument. See Suate-Orellana v. Garland, 101 F.4th 624, 629 (9th Cir. 2024) (holding that a court must enforce an exhaustion argument if a party properly raises it).

4 25-2008 failed to meet the standard for withholding of removal. See Barajas-Romero v.

Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017).

Substantial evidence also supports the denial of CAT protection. The record

does not show past torture or that Petitioner faces a particularized risk of torture upon

return. Generalized evidence of violence or governmental corruption in Guatemala

is insufficient to establish eligibility for CAT relief. See Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder,

600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Petitioners’ generalized evidence of violence

and crime . . . is not particular to Petitioners and is insufficient [for protection under

the CAT].” (emphasis added)).

PETITION DENIED.3

3 Petitioner’s motion to stay removal (Dkt. No. 6) is DENIED.

5 25-2008