Dethmers Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Automatic Equipment Mfg Co.

293 F.3d 1364, 63 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1317, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 11748, 2002 WL 1305992

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
• Decided: June 13, 2002
• Docket: 00-1114, 00-1130
• Status: Published

Opinions

DYK, Circuit Judge,

with whom NEWMAN, LOURIE, GAJARSA, LINN, and PROST, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting from the order denying rehearing en banc.

The court’s decision declining to hear this case en banc perpetuates a serious anomaly in the patent law. The central issue is whether the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), in interpreting and applying its own regulations, earns the same deference as other administrative agencies. The panel decision holds that the PTO’s interpretation earns no deference, following our earlier decisions in In re Constant, 827 F.2d 728, 729, 3 USPQ2d 1479, 1480 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 894, 108 S.Ct. 251, 98 L.Ed.2d 209 (1987), and Nupla Corp. v. IXL Manufacturing Co., 114 F.3d 191, 193, 42 USPQ2d 1711, 1713 (Fed.Cir.1997).

Although this issue arises in the context of a reissue regulation that has been changed, 37 C.F.R. § 1.175 (1996), the significance of this case is unaffected. The issue is not how the regulation should be construed, but rather the standard of deference due the PTO’s interpretation of the regulation. Our decision on that deference issue, declining to give deference to the PTO interpretation, is directly inconsistent with Supreme Court decisions concerning other agencies¹ and with our own decisions concerning other agencies, see, e.g., American Express Co. v. United States, 262 F.3d 1376, 1382-83 (Fed.Cir.2001), and direct review cases involving the PTO itself, see, e.g., Kubota v. Shibuya, 999 F.2d 517, 521, 27 USPQ2d 1418, 1421 (Fed.Cir.1993); Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1355-56, 47 USPQ2d 1128, 1133 (Fed.Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1141, 119 S.Ct. 1032, 143 L.Ed.2d 41 (1999). There is no reason to deny deference here. Indeed, if anything, more deference should be afforded the PTO in this particular area because we are ill equipped to determine whether the PTO has received the information that it deems necessary for an examination.

Resolution of the deference issue, as the PTO has urged, is of “exceptional importance.” I respectfully dissent from the decision to deny en banc rehearing.

1 . United. States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 220, 121 S.Ct. 1433, 149 L.Ed.2d 401 (2001); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381, 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945); see also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326, 333-34, 96 S.Ct. 579, 46 L.Ed.2d 533 (1976).