Dellmuth v. Muth

491 U.S. 223, 109 S. Ct. 2397, 105 L. Ed. 2d 181, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 2972, 57 U.S.L.W. 4720

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: June 15, 1989
• Docket: 87-1855
• Status: Published

Opinions

Justice Kennedy

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question before us is whether the Education of the Handicapped Act abrogates the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in the federal courts.

I

The Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA), 84 Stat. 175, as amended, 20 U. S. C. §1400 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. V.), enacts a comprehensive scheme to assure that handicapped children may receive a free public education appropriate to their needs. To achieve these ends, the Act mandates certain procedural requirements for participating state and local educational agencies. In particular, the Act guarantees to parents the right to participate in the development of an “individualized education program” (IEP) for their handicapped child, and to challenge the appropriateness of their child’s IEP in an administrative hearing with subsequent judicial review. See 20 U. S. C. § 1415 (1982 ed. and Supp. V); School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 359, 361 (1985).

Alex Muth, the son of respondent Russell Muth (hereinafter respondent), is a bright child, but one handicapped within the meaning of the EHA by a language learning disability and associated emotional problems. Alex was enrolled in public school in the Central Bucks School District of Pennsylvania from 1980 to 1983. In the summer of 1983, respondent requested a statutory administrative hearing to challenge the district’s IEP for Alex. In September, shortly before the hearing convened, respondent enrolled Alex in a private school for learning disabled children for the coming school year.

The hearing examiner found that Alex’s original IEP was inappropriate and made a number of recommendations. Both respondent and the school district then appealed.the decision to the secretary of education, as provided under Pennsylvania law, see 22 Pa. Code § 13.32(24) (1988). The secretary remanded the case to the hearing examiner with instructions to the school district to revise Alex’s IEP (1988). After the district did so, the hearing examiner issued a decision declaring the revised IEP appropriate, and the secretary-affirmed that decision on October 24, 1984, more than a year after the original due process hearing.

While the administrative proceedings were underway, respondent brought this suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the school district and the state secretary of education, whose successor is petitioner here. As amended, respondent’s complaint alleged that the district’s IEP for Alex was inappropriate and that the Commonwealth’s administrative proceedings had violated the procedural requirements of the EHA in two respects: the assignment of review to the secretary, an allegedly partial officer; and the delays occasioned by the secretary’s remand to the hearing examiner. Respondent requested declaratory and injunctive relief, reimbursement for Alex’s private-school tuition in 1983-1984, and attorney’s fees.

The District Court found various procedural infirmities in Pennsylvania’s administrative scheme and entered summary judgment on respondent’s procedural claims. The court held a hearing to resolve the remaining issues in the case and to determine the proper remedy for the procedural violations. The court concluded that, while the district’s proposed IEP for 1983-1984 had been appropriate within the meaning of the EHA, respondent was entitled to reimbursement for Alex’s tuition that year because the procedural flaws had delayed the administrative process. The District Court further determined that the school district and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania were jointly and severally liable, agreeing with respondent that the EHA abrogated Pennsylvania’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. The court also awarded attorney’s fees, assessed jointly and severally against the school district and the Commonwealth.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. Muth v. Central Bucks School Dist., 839 F. 2d (1988). Most pertinent for this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the reimbursement award against the Commonwealth. The court concluded that “the text of EHA and its legislative history leave no doubt that Congress intended to abrogate the 11th amendment immunity of the states.” Id., at 128.

To resolve a conflict among the Circuits, we granted certio-rari sub nom. Gilhool v. Muth, 488 U. S. 815 (1988), on the question whether the EHA abrogates the States’ sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Compare David D. v. Dartmouth School Committee, 775 F. 2d 411 (CA1 1985) (finding abrogation), with Gary A. v. New Trier High School Dist. No. 203, 796 F. 2d 940 (CA7 1986); Doe v. Maher, 793 F. 2d 1470 (CA9 1986); and Miener v. Missouri, 673 F. 2d 969 (CA8 1982) (finding no abrogation). We now reverse.

II

We have recognized that Congress, acting in the exercise of its enforcement authority under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,¹ may abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 456 (1976). We have stressed, however, that abrogation of sovereign immunity upsets “the fundamental constitutional balance between the Federal Government and the States,” Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 238 (1985), placing a considerable strain on “‘[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine,’” Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 100 (1984), quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 691 (1978). To temper Congress’ acknowledged powers of abrogation with due concern for the Eleventh Amendment’s role as an essential component of our constitutional structure, we have applied a simple but stringent test: “Congress may abrogate the States’ constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” Atascadero, supra, at 242.

In concluding that the EHA contains the requisite clear statement of congressional intent, the Court of Appeals rested principally on three textual provisions. The court first cited the Act’s preamble, which states Congress’ finding that “it is in the national interest that the Federal government assist State and local efforts to provide programs to meet the education needs of handicapped children in order to assure equal protection of the law.” 20 U. S. C. § 1400(b)(9). Second, and most important for the Court of Appeals, was the Act’s judicial review provision, which permits parties aggrieved by the administrative process to “bring a civil action ... in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States without regard to the amount in controversy.” 20 U. S. C. § 1415(e)(2). Finally, the Court of Appeals pointed to a 1986 amendment to the EHA, which states that the Act’s provision for a reduction of attorney’s fees shall not apply “if the court finds that the State or local educational agency unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the action or proceeding or there was a violation of this section.” 20 U. S. C. § 1415(e)(4)(G) (1982 ed., Supp. V). In the view of the Court of Appeals, this amendment represented an express statement of Congress’ understanding that States can be parties in civil actions brought under the EHA.

Respondent supplements these points with some non-textual arguments. Most notably, respondent argues that abrogation is “necessary ... to achieve the EHA’s goals,” Brief for Respondent Muth 37; and that the 1986 amendments to another statute, the Rehabilitation Act, 100 Stat. , 42 U. S. C. §2000d-7 (1982 ed., Supp. IV), expressly abrogate state immunity from suits brought under the EHA, Brief for Respondent Muth 30. In connection with the latter argument, respondent recognizes that the Rehabilitation Act amendments expressly apply only to “violations that occur in whole or in part after October 21, 1986.” 42 U. S. C. §2000d-7(b) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). Respondent contends, however, that “[a]lthough the amendment became effective after Muth initially filed suit, . . . the overwhelming support for the amendment shows that it reflects Congress’ intent in originally enacting the EHA [in 1975].” Brief for Respondent Muth 32, n. 48.²

We turn first to respondent’s nontextual arguments, because they are the easier to dismiss. It is far from certain that the EHA cannot function if the States retain immunity, or that the 1986 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act are a useful guide to congressional intent in 1975. Indeed, the language of the 1986 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act appears to cut against respondent. Without intending in any way to prejudge the Rehabilitation Act amendments, we note that a comparison of the language in the amendments with the language of the EHA serves only to underscore the difference in the two statutes, and the absence of any clear statement of abrogation in the EHA. The amendments to the Rehabilitation Act read in pertinent part:

“A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of [several enumerated provisions] or the provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance.” 42 U. S. C. §2000d-7(a) (1) (1982 ed., Supp. IV).

When measured against such explicit consideration of' abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment, the EHA’s treatment of the question appears ambiguous at best.

More importantly, however, respondent’s contentions are beside the point. Our opinion in Atascadero should have left no doubt that we will conclude Congress intended to abrogate sovereign immunity only if its intention is “unmistakably clear in the language of the statute. ” Atascadero, 473 U. S., at 242. Lest Atascadero be thought to contain any ambiguity, we reaffirm today that in this area of the law, evidence of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual. Respondent’s evidence is neither. In particular, we reject the approach of the Court of Appeals, according to which, “[w]hile the text of the federal legislation must bear evidence of such an intention, the legislative history may still be used as a resource in determining whether Congress’ intention to lift the bar has been made sufficiently manifest.” 839 F. 2d, at 128. Legislative history generally will be irrelevant to a judicial inquiry into whether Congress intended to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. If Congress’ intention is “unmistakably clear in the language of the statute,” recourse to legislative history will be unnecessary; if Congress’ intention is not unmistakably clear, recourse to legislative history will be futile, because by definition the rule of Atascadero will not be met.

The gist of Justice Brennan’s dissent’s argument appears to be that application of the governing law in Atascadero is unfair in this case. The dissent complains that we “resor[t] to an interpretative standard that Congress could have anticipated only with the aid of a particularly effective crystal ball.” Post, at 241. This complaint appears to be premised on an unrealistic and cynical view of the legislative process. We find it difficult to believe that the 94th Congress, taking careful stock of the state of Eleventh Amendment law, decided it would drop coy hints but stop short of making its intention manifest. Rather, the salient point in our view is that it cannot be said with perfect confidence that Congress in fact intended in 1975 to abrogate sovereign immunity, and imperfect confidence will not suffice given the special constitutional concerns in this area. Cf. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 373-374 (1974) (federal statute will not be construed to preclude judicial review of constitutional challenges absent clear and convincing evidence of congressional intent).

We now turn our attention to the proper focus of an inquiry into congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity, the language of the statute. We cannot agree that the textual provisions on which the Court of Appeals relied, or any other provisions of the EHA, demonstrate with unmistakable clarity that Congress intended to abrogate the States’ immunity from suit. The EHA makes no reference whatsoever to either the Eleventh Amendment or the States’ sovereign immunity. Cf. supra, at 228. Nor does any provision cited by the Court of Appeals address abrogation in even oblique terms, much less with the clarity Atascadero requires. The general statement of legislative purpose in the Act’s preamble simply has nothing to do with the States’ sovereign immunity. The 1986 amendment to the EHA deals only with attorney’s fees, and does not alter or speak to what parties are subject to suit. Respondent conceded as much at oral argument, acknowledging that “the 1986 EHA Amendments . . . are not directly relevant [here] because they concerned only attorney’s fees.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 28. Finally, 20 U. S. C. § 1415(e)(2), the centerpiece of the Court of Appeals’ textual analysis, provides judicial review for aggrieved parties, but in no way intimates that the States’ sovereign immunity is abrogated. As we made plain in Atascadero: “A general authorization for suit in federal court is not the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.” 473 U. S., at 246.

At its core, respondent’s attempt to distinguish this case from Atascadero appears to reduce to the proposition that the EHA “is replete with references to the states,” whereas in “Atascadero . . . the statutory language at issue did not include mention of states.” Brief for Respondent Muth 32-33. We recognize that the EHA’s frequent reference to the States, and its delineation of the States’ important role in securing an appropriate education for handicapped children, make the States, along with local agencies, logical defendants in suits alleging violations of the EHA. This statutory structure lends force to the inference that the States were intended to be subject to damages actions for violations of the EHA. But such a permissible inference, whatever its logical force, would remain just that: a permissible inference. It would not be the unequivocal declaration which, we reaffirm today, is necessary before we will determine that Congress intended to exercise its powers of abrogation.

I — I hH H

We hold that the statutory language of the EHA does not evince an unmistakably clear intention to abrogate the States’ constitutionally secured immunity from suit.³ The Eleventh Amendment bars respondent’s attempt to collect tuition reimbursement from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

1 Petitioner concedes that the EHA was enacted pursuant to Congress’ authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that Congress has the power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment with respect to the Act. Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-15; see Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 244-245, n. 4 (1985). We decide the case on these assumptions.

2 Respondent also offers us another avenue to affirm the result below, which is to overrule the longstanding holding of Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), that an unconsenting State is immune from liability for damages in a suit brought in federal court by one of its own citizens. We decline this most recent invitation to overrule our opinion in Hans.

3 Our grant of certiorari also embraced the question whether the EHA precluded petitioner from hearing administrative appeals. Since we conclude that the Commonwealth is not subject to suit under the EHA, and since the school district did not petition for review of the Court of Appeals decision, we have no occasion to reach this question.

After oral argument, respondent filed a motion to remand this suit to the District Court for consolidation with another related action. In light of our disposition today, respondent’s motion is denied.