Davis-Molinia v. Port Authority of N.Y. and N.J.
This text of 488 F. App'x 530 (Davis-Molinia v. Port Authority of N.Y. and N.J.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
SUMMARY ORDER
Plaintiffs-Appellants Elaine B. Davis-Molinia and Ralph A. Molinia, a married interracial couple, brought this discrimination action against their former employer, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (the “Port Authority”), and several of its individual employees 1 (collectively, the “Port Authority Defendants”). Plaintiffs asserted claims against the Port Authority Defendants for disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Plaintiffs also asserted claims for race discrimination and unfair representation against the United Service Workers Union-International Union of Journeymen and Allied Trades, Local Union 111 S, Port Authority Operations Supervisors Association (the “Union”), and James Kemble, a Port Authority employee and the former chairman of the Union (collectively, the “Union Defendants”). In an August 19, 2011 Memorandum Decision and Order, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Daniels, J.) granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint in its entirety. Plaintiffs now appeal from that portion of the district court’s Memorandum Decision and Order dismissing plaintiffs’ claims against the Union Defendants and their claims against the Port Authority for racial discrimination and hostile work environment. 2 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history of this case, as well as the issues on appeal.
We review an award of summary judgment de novo, see El Sayed v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 627 F.3d 931, 933 (2d Cir.2010), and we will affirm only where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Having reviewed the record de novo, we affirm for substantially the reasons stated in the district court’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion. See Davis-Molinia v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., No. 08 CV 7584, 2011 WL 4000997, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93868 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2011). Briefly stated, summary judgment was appropriate because, among other reasons, plaintiffs failed to adduce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether (1) the Port Authority’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for denying plaintiffs “shift differential” pay were a pretext for discrimination, see Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487, 499 (2d Cir.2009); (2) the Port Authority’s purported conduct created an environment that a *532 reasonable person would find hostile or abusive because of plaintiffs’ membership in a protected class, see Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir.2007); or (3) the Union breached its duty of fair representation, see Cruz v. Local Union No. 3 of Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 34 F.3d 1148, 1153-54 (2d Cir.1994).
Having considered all of plaintiffs’ arguments and finding them to be without merit, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
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488 F. App'x 530, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davis-molinia-v-port-authority-of-ny-and-nj-ca2-2012.