Justice LaVECCHIA
delivered the opinion of the Court.
New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8, protects workers who blow the whistle on their employers’ illegal, fraudulent, or otherwise improper activities that implicate the health, safety, and welfare of the public. The statute extends to “any individual who performs services for and under the control and direction of an employer for wages or other remuneration.” N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(b) (defining “[ejmployee[s]” entitled to CEPA protection). The question here is who is included in that definition. We have recognized previously that that definition is not limited to a narrow band of traditional employees. In this appeal, we reaffirm the appropriateness of the Pukowsky1 test for assessing the status of an alleged “independent contractor” claiming protection as an “employee” under CEPA.
[115]*115I.
The appeal comes to us on a summary judgment record that focused solely on the “independent contractor” versus “employee” issue. Because the defendants claimed an entitlement to judgment based on that record, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing that motion and, therefore, accord to plaintiff all favorable inferences that support his claim to CEPA’s protection. See R. 4:46-2(e); Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540, 666 A.2d 146 (1995).
In February 2000, defendant Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company (Prudential) hired plaintiff George D’Annunzio as a chiropractic medical director in its Personal Injury Protection (PIP) Department. Prudential’s PIP Department reviews and pre-approves treatment plans submitted by the doctors who treat Prudential’s insureds and other covered claimants injured in automobile accidents. It is the responsibility of the medical directors and nurse case managers to determine whether the proposed treatments are medically necessary, consistent with the PIP reforms authorized by the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA), N.J.S.A 39:6A-1.1 to -35. Insurers engage licensed medical professionals to provide independent medical judgments as to the medical necessity of treatment plans submitted for approval. See N.J.S.A 39:6A-3.1(a); N.J.AC. 11:3— 4.7(c)(4).2 Prudential opted to meet that requirement by having a [116]*116cadre of licensed professionals in-house to perform the review function, but it designated those professionals as “independent contractors.” Indeed, Prudential required every licensed medical director to maintain an active private professional practice and to agree that their hours billed to Prudential would not exceed fifty percent of their total professional practice.
Prudential sent D’Annunzio a one-year “Medical Director Consultant Agreement” that was described as “standard” for the position. For tax purposes, D’Annunzio executed the agreement in the name of his professional association (George D’Annunzio D.C.P.A.) rather than as a licensed individual, although the parties apparently agree that only a licensed individual could perform the tasks for which D’Annunzio was retained. Pursuant to the agreement, D’Annunzio was paid $125 per hour for twenty hours of work per week. D’Annunzio agreed to perform his services at a designated Prudential PIP claims office, Monday through Friday, from 8:00 a.m. until noon.
In respect of the relationship between the parties, the agreement stated that
[t]he relationship between Prudential and the Medical Director is that of independent contractor. The Medical Director will maintain his own private practice and provide Medical Director services on a part time basis____None of the provisions of this agreement are intended to create or be construed as creating any agency, partnership, joint venture or employer-employee relationship.
As an independent contractor, [t]he Medical Director will have the sole responsibility for the payment of all self employment and applicable federal state and local taxes.
Both parties had the right to terminate the relationship without cause on sixty-days notice. Prudential also had the option of terminating the agreement immediately if D’Annunzio committed a material breach.
According to D’Annunzio, when he signed the agreement he expected to be permitted to perform his review function in an [117]*117independent manner, as one might expect from a contractor of professional services. Instead, from his first day in Prudential’s PIP Department, D’Annunzio found that Prudential sought to exert extensive control over him. D’Annunzio received a list of duties, workflow instructions, and a time sheet. The list of duties required that D’Annunzio (1) provide leadership and education to the staff; (2) review claims for medical appropriateness; (3) discuss treatment alternatives with doctors; (4) help to develop Prudential’s care guidelines; (5) participate in peer reviews of colleagues; (6) participate in data analysis; and (7) provide in-house coverage through his physical presence or by being telephonically accessible during required hours. The workflow instructions included step-by-step directions for D’Annunzio to use in his review of PIP claims. In addition to requiring D’Annunzio to record his billable hours on Prudential’s time sheet forms, other accouterments of the job appeared to D’Annunzio to be designed to make him essentially a cog in the machinery of Prudential’s PIP Department.3
As it turned out, D’Annunzio’s tenure with Prudential was short-lived. During the summer of 2000 he informed supervisors of his objection to insurance violations that he perceived were being perpetrated by Prudential and its employees. D’Annunzio allegedly expressed concern about Prudential’s failure to pay MRI bills, its hiring of non-medical vendors to perform independent medical evaluations, and the improper use of nurse case managers in the approval of medical care. In August and early September, [118]*118D’Annunzio’s supervisors Kathy Savvas, Linda Fraistat, Frank Hruska, and Anthony LoCastro informed him that his performance was not meeting expectations. D’Annunzio was advised to speed up his review of treatment files, to limit his reviews to claims involving chiropractic evaluations, and to reduce the number of treatment plans that he was denying. On September 11, 2000, Prudential gave D’Annunzio written notice that it was terminating its agreement with him based on the sixty-day notice provision.
D’Annunzio4 filed this action against Prudential, its parent company, as well as several officers and employees of Prudential. He alleged that he was fired because he had complained about Prudential’s “lack of regulatory and contractual compliance” and that therefore his termination was in violation of CEPA. In addition, D’Annunzio asserted common law claims for breach of contract and wrongful discharge.5
Limited discovery was conducted, focusing on whether D’Annunzio qualified as an “employee” for CEPA purposes. On the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court held in favor of the Prudential defendants. Applying the “Pukowsky test,” the court concluded that D’Annunzio was an independent contractor not entitled to advance a claim under CEPA. D’Annunzio’s other claims were dismissed also.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Justice LaVECCHIA
delivered the opinion of the Court.
New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8, protects workers who blow the whistle on their employers’ illegal, fraudulent, or otherwise improper activities that implicate the health, safety, and welfare of the public. The statute extends to “any individual who performs services for and under the control and direction of an employer for wages or other remuneration.” N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(b) (defining “[ejmployee[s]” entitled to CEPA protection). The question here is who is included in that definition. We have recognized previously that that definition is not limited to a narrow band of traditional employees. In this appeal, we reaffirm the appropriateness of the Pukowsky1 test for assessing the status of an alleged “independent contractor” claiming protection as an “employee” under CEPA.
[115]*115I.
The appeal comes to us on a summary judgment record that focused solely on the “independent contractor” versus “employee” issue. Because the defendants claimed an entitlement to judgment based on that record, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing that motion and, therefore, accord to plaintiff all favorable inferences that support his claim to CEPA’s protection. See R. 4:46-2(e); Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540, 666 A.2d 146 (1995).
In February 2000, defendant Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company (Prudential) hired plaintiff George D’Annunzio as a chiropractic medical director in its Personal Injury Protection (PIP) Department. Prudential’s PIP Department reviews and pre-approves treatment plans submitted by the doctors who treat Prudential’s insureds and other covered claimants injured in automobile accidents. It is the responsibility of the medical directors and nurse case managers to determine whether the proposed treatments are medically necessary, consistent with the PIP reforms authorized by the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA), N.J.S.A 39:6A-1.1 to -35. Insurers engage licensed medical professionals to provide independent medical judgments as to the medical necessity of treatment plans submitted for approval. See N.J.S.A 39:6A-3.1(a); N.J.AC. 11:3— 4.7(c)(4).2 Prudential opted to meet that requirement by having a [116]*116cadre of licensed professionals in-house to perform the review function, but it designated those professionals as “independent contractors.” Indeed, Prudential required every licensed medical director to maintain an active private professional practice and to agree that their hours billed to Prudential would not exceed fifty percent of their total professional practice.
Prudential sent D’Annunzio a one-year “Medical Director Consultant Agreement” that was described as “standard” for the position. For tax purposes, D’Annunzio executed the agreement in the name of his professional association (George D’Annunzio D.C.P.A.) rather than as a licensed individual, although the parties apparently agree that only a licensed individual could perform the tasks for which D’Annunzio was retained. Pursuant to the agreement, D’Annunzio was paid $125 per hour for twenty hours of work per week. D’Annunzio agreed to perform his services at a designated Prudential PIP claims office, Monday through Friday, from 8:00 a.m. until noon.
In respect of the relationship between the parties, the agreement stated that
[t]he relationship between Prudential and the Medical Director is that of independent contractor. The Medical Director will maintain his own private practice and provide Medical Director services on a part time basis____None of the provisions of this agreement are intended to create or be construed as creating any agency, partnership, joint venture or employer-employee relationship.
As an independent contractor, [t]he Medical Director will have the sole responsibility for the payment of all self employment and applicable federal state and local taxes.
Both parties had the right to terminate the relationship without cause on sixty-days notice. Prudential also had the option of terminating the agreement immediately if D’Annunzio committed a material breach.
According to D’Annunzio, when he signed the agreement he expected to be permitted to perform his review function in an [117]*117independent manner, as one might expect from a contractor of professional services. Instead, from his first day in Prudential’s PIP Department, D’Annunzio found that Prudential sought to exert extensive control over him. D’Annunzio received a list of duties, workflow instructions, and a time sheet. The list of duties required that D’Annunzio (1) provide leadership and education to the staff; (2) review claims for medical appropriateness; (3) discuss treatment alternatives with doctors; (4) help to develop Prudential’s care guidelines; (5) participate in peer reviews of colleagues; (6) participate in data analysis; and (7) provide in-house coverage through his physical presence or by being telephonically accessible during required hours. The workflow instructions included step-by-step directions for D’Annunzio to use in his review of PIP claims. In addition to requiring D’Annunzio to record his billable hours on Prudential’s time sheet forms, other accouterments of the job appeared to D’Annunzio to be designed to make him essentially a cog in the machinery of Prudential’s PIP Department.3
As it turned out, D’Annunzio’s tenure with Prudential was short-lived. During the summer of 2000 he informed supervisors of his objection to insurance violations that he perceived were being perpetrated by Prudential and its employees. D’Annunzio allegedly expressed concern about Prudential’s failure to pay MRI bills, its hiring of non-medical vendors to perform independent medical evaluations, and the improper use of nurse case managers in the approval of medical care. In August and early September, [118]*118D’Annunzio’s supervisors Kathy Savvas, Linda Fraistat, Frank Hruska, and Anthony LoCastro informed him that his performance was not meeting expectations. D’Annunzio was advised to speed up his review of treatment files, to limit his reviews to claims involving chiropractic evaluations, and to reduce the number of treatment plans that he was denying. On September 11, 2000, Prudential gave D’Annunzio written notice that it was terminating its agreement with him based on the sixty-day notice provision.
D’Annunzio4 filed this action against Prudential, its parent company, as well as several officers and employees of Prudential. He alleged that he was fired because he had complained about Prudential’s “lack of regulatory and contractual compliance” and that therefore his termination was in violation of CEPA. In addition, D’Annunzio asserted common law claims for breach of contract and wrongful discharge.5
Limited discovery was conducted, focusing on whether D’Annunzio qualified as an “employee” for CEPA purposes. On the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court held in favor of the Prudential defendants. Applying the “Pukowsky test,” the court concluded that D’Annunzio was an independent contractor not entitled to advance a claim under CEPA. D’Annunzio’s other claims were dismissed also.
D’Annunzio appealed and the Appellate Division reversed. D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 383 N.J.Super. 270, 276, 891 A.2d 673 (App.Div.2006). Also using the Pukowsky test as the paradigm for its analysis, the panel held that whether a professional person is an “employee” under CEPA’s definition [119]*119must hinge more on the degree of “control and direction” exercised by the employer over the professional worker under the circumstances, and less on the lack of financial arrangements indicative of a traditional employee. Id. at 277, 891 A.2d 673. It found that the record was replete with evidence suggesting that Prudential controlled and directed D’Annunzio, id. at 290-94, 891 A.2d 673, and concluded therefore that the entry of summary judgment for defendants was in error, id. at 298, 891 A.2d 673. The matter was remanded to the trial court. Ibid.
We granted Prudential’s petition for certification, 186 N.J. 608, 897 A.2d 1062 (2006), and now affirm the panel’s judgment.
II.
New Jersey’s “conscientious employee” protection policy has as its genesis the decision of this Court in Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72, 417 A.2d 505 (1980), where we held that an at-will employee, wrongfully discharged in violation of “a clear mandate of public policy,” has a common law cause of action against an employer. Following Pierce, the Legislature enacted CEPA, codified at N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8. CEPA is remedial social legislation designed to promote two complementary public purposes: “ ‘to protect and [thereby] encourage employees to report illegal or unethical workplace activities and to discourage public and private sector employers from engaging in such conduct.’ ” Yurick v. State, 184 N.J. 70, 77, 875 A.2d 898 (2005) (quoting Abbamont v. Piscataway Twp. Bd. of Educ., 138 N.J. 405, 431, 650 A.2d 958 (1994)). Specifically, in this dispute we are called on to address the scope of CEPA’s protection of “employees” from retaliatory employment action.
Our goal in the interpretation of a statute is always to determine the Legislature’s intent. Wollen v. Borough of Fort Lee, 27 N.J. 408, 418, 142 A.2d 881 (1958). To decipher that intent, we look first to the plain language of the statute, Lane v. Holderman, 23 N.J. 304, 313, 129 A.2d 8 (1957), and we ascribe to the statutory language its ordinary meaning, DiProspero v. Penn, [120]*120183 N.J. 477, 492, 874 A.2d 1039 (2005). “It is not the function of this Court to ‘rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature [ ]or presume that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language.’ ” Ibid, (quoting O’Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 488, 795 A.2d 857 (2002)). When the plain language of a statute is susceptible to multiple interpretations, however, then recognized principles of statutory construction allow resort to extrinsic tools to determine the Legislature’s likely intent. See Aponte-Correa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 N.J. 318, 323, 744 A.2d 175 (2000).
CEPA prohibits an employer from taking adverse employment action against any “employee” who exposes an employer’s criminal, fraudulent, or corrupt activities. N.J.S.A. 34:19-3. It authorizes an aggrieved employee to bring a civil suit against an employer who retaliates in violation of the statute. N.J.S.A 34:19-5. Workers are thus protected from retaliation and employers are deterred from activities that are illegal or fraudulent, or otherwise contrary to a clear mandate of public policy concerning the safety, health, and welfare of the public. See N.J.S.A 34:19-3; Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 153 N.J. 163, 179, 707 A.2d 1000 (1998). When enacted, CEPA was “the most far reaching ‘whistle-blower statute’ in the nation.” Mehlman, supra, 153 N.J. at 179, 707 A.2d 1000. A single guiding principle has instructed our interpretation of CEPA in the decades since its enactment. As broad, remedial legislation, the statute must be construed liberally. See generally Feldman v. Hunterdon Radiological Assocs., 187 N.J. 228, 239, 901 A.2d 322 (2006); Yurick, supra, 184 N.J. at 77, 875 A.2d 898; Higgins v. Pascack Valley Hosp., 158 N.J. 404, 420, 730 A.2d 327 (1999); Abbamont, supra, 138 N.J. at 417, 650 A.2d 958.
CEPA defines an “employee” as [121]*121The question is who is included in that definition. As the Appellate Division noted, the definition does not exclude, explicitly, persons who are designated as independent contractors performing services for an employer for remuneration.6 D’Annunzio, supra, 383 N.J.Super. at 279, 891 A.2d 673. It is beyond cavil that it includes more than the narrow band of traditional employees. In Feldman, supra, 187 N.J. at 241, 901 A.2d 322, when we considered the term’s application in the context of a shareholder-director of a professional corporation, we specifically instructed courts to “look to the goals underlying CEPA and focus not on labels but on the reality of plaintiffs relationship with the party against whom the CEPA claim is advanced.” See also MacDougall v. Weichert, 144 N.J. 380, 388, 677 A.2d 162 (1996) (emphasizing same for Pierce wrongful discharge claim).
[120]*120any individual who performs services for and under the control and direction of an employer for wages or other remuneration.
[ 2V./.S.A 34:19-2(b).]
[121]*121Our courts have long recognized that, in certain settings, exclusive reliance on a traditional right-to-control test to identify who is an “employee” does not necessarily result in the identification of all those workers that social legislation seeks to reach. As was aptly described by former Judge Conford in a dissent that later was relied on by this Court,
while some measure of control is essential to a finding of an employer-employee relationship, there are various situations in which the control test does not emerge as the dispositive factor. For example, where it is not in the nature of the work for the manner of its performance to be within the hiring party’s direct control, the factor of control can obviously not be the critical one in the resolution of the case, but takes its place as only one of the various potential indicia of the relationship which must be balanced and weighed in determining what, under the totality of the circumstances, the character of that relationship really is. Thus, the requirement of control is sufficiently met where its extent is commensurate with that degree of supervision which is necessary and appropriate, considering the type of work to be [122]*122done and the capabilities of the particular person doing it. Patently, where the type of work requires little supervision over details for its proper prosecution and the person performing it is so experienced that instructions concerning such details would be superfluous, a degree of supervision no greater than that which is held to be normally consistent with an independent contractor status might be equally consistent with an employment relationship. In such a situation the factor of control becomes inconclusive, and reorientation toward a correct legal conclusion must be sought by resort to more realistically significant criteria.
[Marcus v. E. Agric. Ass’n, Inc., 58 N.J.Super. 584, 597, 157 A.2d 3 (App.Div.1959) (Conford, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted), rev’g on dissent, 32 N.J. 460, 161 A.2d 247 (1960).]
Taken out of context, labels can be illusory as opposed to illuminating.7 When CEPA or other social legislation must be applied in the setting of a professional person or an individual otherwise providing specialized services allegedly as an independent contractor, we must look beyond the label attached to the relationship. The considerations that must come into play are three: (1) employer control; (2) the worker’s economic dependence on the work relationship; and (3) the degree to which there has been a functional integration of the employer’s business with that of the person doing the work at issue. See Lowe v. Zarghami, 158 N.J. 606, 615-18, 731 A.2d 14 (1999). The test for determining those aspects of a non-traditional work relationship was set out in Pukowsky and we have already indicated our acceptance of that test as appropriate for CEPA purposes. In Feldman, supra, in which our dissenting colleague joined, we referenced Pukowsky as the standard for determining the inde[123]*123pendent-contractor status of an individual claiming entitlement to bring a CEPA action. 187 N.J. at 242, 901 A.2d 322.
In Pukowsky, the Appellate Division identified twelve factors to be considered when determining whether a plaintiff qualifies as an employee for purposes of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD):
(1) the employer’s right to control the means and manner of the worker’s performance; (2) the kind of occupation — supervised or unsupervised; (3) skill; (4) who furnishes the equipment and workplace; (5) the length of time in which the individual has worked; (6) the method of payment; (7) the manner of termination of the work relationship; (8) whether there is annual leave; (9) whether the work is an integral part of the business of the “employer;” (10) whether the worker accrues retirement benefits; (11) whether the “employer” pays social security taxes; and (12) the intention of the parties.
[ 312 N.J.Super. at 182-83, 711 A.2d 398 (quoting Franz v. Raymond Eisenhardt & Sons, Inc., 732 F.Supp. 521, 528 (D.N.J.1990)).]
The Pukowsky test is a hybrid that reflects the common law right-to-control test, see Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 (1957) (setting forth control test for assessing whether master-servant relationship is established under common law agency principles creating liability obligations), and an economic realities test, Pukowsky, supra, 312 N.J.Super. at 182-83, 711 A.2d 398. The Pukowsky test focuses heavily on work-relationship features that relate to the employer’s right to control the non-traditional employee, and allows for recognition that the requisite “control” over a professional or skilled person claiming protection under social legislation may be different from the control that is exerted over a traditional employee. An employer cannot be expected to exert control over the provision of specialized services that are beyond the employer’s ability. Yet, the work may be an essential aspect of the employer’s regular business.
Therefore, the test further allows for examination of the extent to which there has been a functional integration of the employer’s business with that of the person doing the work. Several questions elicit the type of facts that would demonstrate a functional integration: Has the worker become one of the “cogs” in the employer’s enterprise? Is the work continuous and directly re[124]*124quired for the employer’s business to be carried out, as opposed to intermittent and peripheral? Is the professional routinely or regularly at the disposal of the employer to perform a portion of the employer’s work, as opposed to being available to the public for professional services on his or her own terms? Do the “professional” services include a duty to perform routine or administrative activities? If so, an employer-employee relationship more likely has been established.
Finally, the test includes consideration of the worker’s economic dependence on the employer’s work, but does not insist on the same financial indicia one might expect to be present in the case of a traditional employee, such as the payment of wages, income tax deductions, or provision of benefits and leave time. Workers who perform their duties independently may nevertheless require CEPA’s protection against retaliatory action when they speak against or refuse to participate in illegal or otherwise wrongful actions by their employer. Such individuals should benefit from CEPA’s remedies. Moreover, CEPA’s deterrent function would be undermined if such individuals were declared ineligible for its protection. The public at large benefits from a less restricted approach to who may sue under CEPA as an employee of a business enterprise. It is unlikely to us that the Legislature meant to sanction a restricted approach to CEPA’s reach.
III.
A reasonable application of CEPA’s definition of “employee” should include adjustment for the modern reality of a business world in which professionals and other workers perform regular or recurrent tasks that further the business interests of the employer’s enterprise, notwithstanding that they may receive remuneration through contracts instead of through the provision of wages and benefits. Therefore, in order that CEPA’s scope fulfill its remedial promise, the test for an “employee” under CEPA’s coverage must adjust to the specialized and non-traditional worker who is nonetheless integral to the business interests of [125]*125the employer. We reaffirm that the Pukowsky test fulfills that purpose. The test is familiar and addresses most routine questions in respect of the status of an individual as either an independent contractor or employee. It also offers consistency because the test is known and has been subject to general application. See, e.g., Kounelis v. Sherrer, 396 F.Supp.2d 525, 532-33 (D.N.J.2005) (applying Pukowsky’s factors in CEPA action by inmate claiming “employee” status).
In this matter, the trial court and Appellate Division resorted to the Pukowsky criteria when addressing D’Annunzio’s status under CEPA with differing outcomes. D’Annunzio, supra, 383 N.J.Super. at 294-97, 891 A.2d 673. The Appellate Division concluded that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to defendants because the court did not properly weigh the factors in the light of a professional services work relationship. The panel emphasized the importance of “the employer’s ‘control and direction’ of the worker’s performance of services for the employer____” Id. at 277, 283, 891 A.2d 673 (highlighting Pukowsky factors one, two, four, and seven). Accordingly, it focused on factors that examine the nature of the employer’s right to control the work of a licensed professional, such as D’Annunzio — not the right to control the outcome, but rather to manage how that work is performed for the purposes of the employer’s business operations. Id. at 283, 891 A.2d 673. The panel also attributed less weight than did the trial court to those factors that would produce evidence of traditional employee status, when applicable, such as payment of wages and benefits. Ibid.
We agree with the emphasis in the Appellate Division’s analysis and add that the Pukowsky test also appropriately examines the relationship to determine whether the professional’s services have been incorporated into the work of the business (factor nine), and looks at the impact of that work relationship on the professional’s ability to offer his or her services to the public (the overall economic realities of the relationship beyond method of payment and provision, or not, of benefits and leave). As to the former, one [126]*126cannot help but note that D’Annunzio’s treatment plan review function was an integral, indeed essential, aspect of Prudential’s PIP Department’s operations. Although Prudential may not have told him whether to approve or disapprove individual claims, the whole overlay of expectations placed on D’Annunzio made him a necessary part in its day-to-day operations. We glean that from the demand for his physical presence for half of the entire business workweek, spread over every business day, ensuring not only his professional discretionary judgment on individual cases, but also his ready availability to other professionals performing tasks for Prudential for consultation and educational purposes.
Moreover, D’Annunzio presented evidence that, although designated an independent contractor in his agreement with Prudential (a matter that we view as informative but not dispositive because the designation was stated by the parties to be for a purpose unrelated to CEPA’s interests), his day-to-day activities were controlled in minute detail. The step-by-step instructions provided to him set forth every single particular as to how to review a claim, including direction on how much information to provide in his written reviews. Although that is not to say that a professional cannot be told to be succinct without converting him to the status of an employee under CEPA, D’Annunzio certainly can argue that he was essentially under the control of Prudential and that he was a veritable “cog” in the PIP Department’s operations.
D’Annunzio’s time spent at Prudential’s operations was continuous, week to week, and daily, for a substantial period of time during business hours. That Prudential exacted a not-inconsequential amount of time from him, on its premises, caused D’Annunzio to be away from attending to his private practice. The impact on D’Annunzio cannot be said to be minor. Moreover, his duties included numerous administrative tasks, all to be performed in accordance with protocols devised by Prudential to meet their business plan for the review and approval of PIP treatment plans. In fact, all of the detailed requirements expected of D’Annunzio were in furtherance of Prudential’s operation.
[127]*127In sum, D’Annunzio pointed to many facts that support the creation of an employment relationship for CEPA purposes, notwithstanding that his agreement described him as an independent contractor. Therefore, and in view of the premature stage of these proceedings and the truncation of discovery, we agree with the Appellate Division panel that reversed the entry of summary judgment for Prudential and remanded the matter to the Law Division. In affirming the panel’s judgment, we intend to express no opinion whatsoever on the merits of the substance of D’Annunzio’s claimed CEPA violations.
IV.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed as modified and the matter is remanded to the trial court.