319 Ga. 89 FINAL COPY
S24A0599. COBB COUNTY v. FLOAM et al.
PETERSON, Presiding Justice.
“Courts are not vehicles for engaging in merely academic
debates or deciding purely theoretical questions. We ‘say what the
law is’ only as needed to resolve an actual controversy.” Sons of
Confederate Veterans v. Henry County Bd. of Commrs., 315 Ga. 39,
39 (880 SE2d 168) (2022) (“SCV”). This case presents an actual
controversy; the Cobb County Commission has asserted an
unprecedented power to change acts of the General Assembly, and
members of the Cobb community have made serious arguments that
the County’s action was unconstitutional. But we are not empowered
to decide those arguments merely because an actual controversy
exists; the plaintiffs before us must also seek relief of the right kind.
And the relief sought here is not relief that the plaintiffs can receive
even if they are right about the unconstitutionality of the County’s
action. Accordingly, their claim must be dismissed. David and Catherine Floam sought a declaratory judgment
that the Cobb County Board of Commissioners acted
unconstitutionally when it passed an amendment (“BOC
Amendment”) changing commission district boundaries that had
been enacted by the General Assembly in 2022. The trial court ruled
for the Floams, concluding that the BOC Amendment exceeded the
County’s Home Rule powers under Article IX, Section II, Paragraph
I of the Georgia Constitution (the “Home Rule Paragraph”). Cobb
County appeals, arguing three grounds for reversal: (1) the Floams
lacked constitutional standing because they did not allege an
individualized injury; (2) the Floams could not pursue declaratory
relief because they did not show they faced uncertainty as to their
future conduct; and (3) the trial court erred on the merits in
concluding that the BOC Amendment was barred by provisions of
the Home Rule Paragraph. We conclude that although the Floams
had constitutional standing, they did not show any uncertainty as
to their future conduct that warranted declaratory relief. Therefore,
the trial court erred in granting such relief, and we reverse. We do
2 not reach the merits of the constitutional arguments.
The record shows the following.1 In early 2022, the General
Assembly passed, and the Governor signed, Act 562, which revised
district boundaries for Cobb County commission districts. Act 562
was supported by less than a majority of the County’s legislative
delegation and departed from the usual “local courtesy” tradition in
which a majority of a county’s legislative delegation determines
which local redistricting maps are enacted through local legislation.
Unhappy with this, the Cobb County Board of Commissioners
(“BOC”) in October 2022 passed the BOC Amendment to amend Act
562 and create new maps identical to those unsuccessfully proposed
by the majority legislative delegation. The BOC Amendment
provided that it was effective January 1, 2023, so the November
2022 elections were conducted using the General Assembly’s maps.
1 Although this case comes before us on a grant of summary judgment to
the Floams, the parties do not dispute the relevant facts. Compare Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622, 624 (1) (a) (697 SE2d 779) (2010) (“In our de novo review of the grant of a motion for summary judgment, we must view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). 3 In the summer of 2023, David and Catherine Floam joined an
existing lawsuit seeking declaratory relief against Cobb County.2
They sought a declaratory judgment that the BOC Amendment was
unconstitutional under the Home Rule Paragraph and that Act 562
as passed by the General Assembly is legal and binding; they also
sought an order declaring that, until the validity of the BOC
Amendment was determined, the County must not hold any
elections using the County Map and that the County should compel
the Board of Elections to act accordingly. In their complaint, the
Floams alleged that the General Assembly’s map placed them in
District 1, they voted in that district in the November 2022 general
elections, and the BOC Amendment placed them in District 3. The
Floams argued that the BOC Amendment affected them in the
following ways: their commissioner is different from the one they
voted for; their legal districts are unknown to them; they have voted
and intended to vote in future elections; they have an interest in
2 The lawsuit was initially filed by Cobb County Commissioner Keli Gambrill, the trial court dismissed her claims for lack of standing, and she ultimately did not appeal that dismissal. 4 voting in a legal district; and they have an interest in having the
laws of this State properly executed and the public duty in question
enforced. The Floams alleged that the County had a public duty to
follow the rule of law and to enforce and implement a legal district
map so the Cobb County Board of Elections could conduct a lawful
election, and that voters had a public right to “free and fair elections”
and a public right to vote in an election based on “lawfully created
and lawfully implemented district maps.”
The County filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, among other
things, that the Floams lacked standing. The trial court denied the
motion, concluding that the Floams had standing because they
alleged an individualized injury flowing from the constitutionality
of the BOC Amendment. The trial court concluded that because the
BOC Amendment changed the Floams’ district after they voted in
another one, “if the [BOC Amendment] is determined to be
unconstitutional, . . . then the Floams have identified a harm that is
concrete, actual and particular to them.” The court also concluded
that the lawsuit was consistent with the purpose of a declaratory
5 judgment, because “the Floams’ suit seeks relief from the
uncertainty and insecurity of their voting rights and voter status in
light of the disputed districts.”
The trial court later granted the Floams’ motion for summary
judgment and denied the County’s cross-motion for summary
judgment. At issue in this appeal, the parties disputed whether the
BOC Amendment was within the County’s authority under the
Home Rule Paragraph.
The trial court concluded that Cobb County’s BOC Amendment
was barred by two exceptions to the Home Rule Paragraph and was,
therefore, an unconstitutional exercise of authority under the
County’s constitutional Home Rule powers.
The County appealed. In response, the Floams filed motions to
expedite the appeal and to lift the supersedeas stay imposed by
OCGA § 5-6-46 (a). The County opposed both motions. We granted
the Floams’ motion to expedite the appeal but held in abeyance their
motion to lift the stay. We held oral arguments on April 17, 2024.
1. On appeal, the County argues that the Floams do not have
6 constitutional standing to challenge the constitutionality of the BOC
Amendment because they were required to establish an
individualized injury. The County argues that their claims are based
only on generalized grievances and not on particularized harms. We
disagree; to challenge county legislative action, the Floams needed
only to establish standing as community stakeholders interested in
their local government following the law, and they have done that.
Standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite necessary to invoke a
court’s judicial power under the Georgia Constitution. See Ga.
Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. I (“Judicial Power Paragraph”);
SCV, 315 Ga. at 44-45 (2) (a). As we recently explained in SCV, it
has long been the law that “[w]here a public duty is at stake, a
plaintiff’s membership in the community provides the necessary
standing to bring a cause of action to ensure a local government
follows the law.” Id. at 61 (2) (c) (iii). We arrived at that conclusion
based on precedent showing that for nearly 100 years prior to the
adoption of the 1983 Georgia Constitution, Georgia had allowed
citizen, taxpayer, resident, or voter suits to challenge various county
7 and city actions without demonstrating a particularized injury
because those community stakeholders had a cognizable interest in
having their government follow the law. See id. at 53-61 (2) (c)
(collecting cases).
The County argues that this standing rule does not apply
because the Floams are challenging the constitutionality of the BOC
Amendment. In support, the County relies on long-standing
precedent that, in order to challenge the constitutionality of state
statutes, the Georgia Constitution requires a more particularized
injury similar to the federal Article III injury-in-fact requirement.
See SCV, 315 Ga. at 54 (2) (c) n.13 (citing cases). This Court early
on recognized that our judicial review was sometimes precluded in
a way that is akin to the Article III injury-in-fact requirement. We
first held in 1884 that
[c]omity to a co-ordinate department of the government requires, according to many decisions of this and other courts, that causes shall not be disposed of upon constitutional grounds when it is possible to avoid such questions, without a sacrifice of the rights of parties[.]
Bd. of Ed. of Glynn County v. Mayor of Brunswick, 72 Ga. 353, 354-
8 355 (1884) (involving challenge to state legislation that created
board of education and changed funding procedure). Two years later,
we again emphasized that separation of powers precluded our
review of a challenge to a state statute regarding a liquor law,
concluding that it is only when “the law operates upon the private
property of an individual, and that is seized or destroyed or
confiscated, or the individual is arrested and indicted thereunder for
its violation” can the “portion of the law thus affecting his private
property and personal liberty . . . be assailed by him as
unconstitutional or illegal[.]” Scoville v. Calhoun, 76 Ga. 263, 269
(1886). It soon became well settled that a court “will not listen to an
objection made to the constitutionality of an act by a party whose
rights it does not affect, and who has, therefore, no interest in
defeating it.” Reid v. Mayor, etc. of Eatonton, 80 Ga. 755, 757 (6 SE
602) (1888) (citation and punctuation omitted). These cases show the
particularized injury requirement for challenges to state statutes
has long been rooted in principles of separation of powers. See Ga.
Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. III (“The legislative, judicial, and
9 executive powers shall forever remain separate and distinct; and no
person discharging the duties of one shall at the same time exercise
the functions of either of the others except as herein provided.”).
But a county commission is not a part of State government,
much less a branch co-equal with the State’s judicial branch. For
that matter, the constitutional separation of powers principle does
not even apply to counties or municipalities. See Bldg. Auth. of
Fulton County v. State of Ga., 253 Ga. 242, 247 (5) (321 SE2d 97)
(1984) (adhering to cases decided prior to adoption of 1983
Constitution that held “that the constitutional provision applies only
to the state” and concluding that just as the Separation of Powers
Provision did not apply to municipalities, it also did not apply to
county governments because “a county commission is both the
executive and legislative branch”). Consequently, the animating
reason to require a particularized injury to challenge state
legislative actions is not present for challenges to county or
municipality legislative actions.
Cobb County correctly argues that there is recent case law
10 from this Court seemingly imposing a particularized injury
requirement for challenges to county ordinances. But a closer review
of those cases shows that they are analytically unsound and cannot
be squared with SCV. Even so, in only one case did our holding align
with the County’s argument, and we overrule that case today.
First, some of those cases uncritically imported without
analysis the particularized injury required to challenge state
actions. See, e.g., Manlove v. Unified Govt. of Athens-Clarke County,
285 Ga. 637, 638 (680 SE2d 405) (2009) (in evaluating challenge to
county noise ordinance, citing Feminist Women’s Health Center v.
Burgess, 282 Ga. 433 (651 SE2d 36) (2007), which involved a
constitutional challenge to state regulations governing Georgia’s
Medicaid program). But, as discussed above, the reason for requiring
a particularized injury for state actions does not carry over to local
governments.
Other cases imposing the particularized injury requirement to
county ordinances did so on the basis of federal standing
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Polo Golf and Country Club Homeowners
11 Assn. v. Cunard, 306 Ga. 788, 791 (1) (b) (833 SE2d 505) (2019)
(citing case law that cited United States Supreme Court precedent
and holding that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue declaratory
relief against enforcement of county’s stormwater ordinance where
the “threat of an injury in fact” was “actual and imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical” (citation and punctuation omitted));3
Granite State Outdoor Advertising v. City of Roswell, 283 Ga. 417,
418 (1) (658 SE2d 587) (2008) (applying federal standing
jurisprudence to challenge of city sign ordinance);4 see also Grady v.
3 Polo Golf cited Women’s Surgical Center v. Berry, 302 Ga. 349 (806
SE2d 606) (2017), which in addition to directly citing United States Supreme Court precedent on standing, also contained a “see also” citation to GeorgiaCarry.Org v. Atlanta Botanical Garden, 299 Ga. 26 (785 SE2d 874) (2016), but that case addressed whether a plaintiff could pursue declaratory relief (i.e., had statutory standing), not whether a plaintiff had standing under the Georgia Constitution. See GeorgiaCarry.Org, 299 Ga. at 28-31 (1). 4 Granite State cited Bo Fancy Productions v. Rabun County Bd. of
Commrs., 267 Ga. 341, 344-345 (2) (a) (478 SE2d 373) (1996), as showing that “Georgia jurisprudence” was consistent with the federal case law cited in Granite State. See Granite State, 283 Ga. at 420 (1). It is unsurprising that Bo Fancy was consistent with federal case law because (1) it involved an appellant’s attempt to block a county’s enforcement of a state statute, which requires a particularized injury, and (2) it was a challenge based on First Amendment grounds. Bo Fancy, 267 Ga. at 344-345 (2) (a). Neither Bo Fancy, nor the case cited therein (Stewart v. Davidson, 218 Ga. 760, 764 (1) (130 SE2d 822) (1963)), is relevant here because neither involved constitutional challenges to county legislation. See Bo Fancy, 267 Ga. at 344-345 (2) (a).
12 Unified Govt. of Athens-Clarke County, 289 Ga. 726, 727 (1) n.1 (715
SE2d 148) (2011) (relying on Granite State and case law that relied
on Granite State to conclude that appellant had “unquestioned
standing to lodge a facial challenge to the provision of the [county]
ordinance under which he was convicted, as he clearly suffered an
‘injury in fact’ when he was penalized”). None of these cases
considered standing under the Georgia Constitution, and they were
wrong to rely on federal standing jurisprudence to consider
challenges to county ordinances, because “federal standing doctrine
does not control” the nature of the state judicial power. See SCV, 315
Ga. at 46 (2) (a).
Moreover, these cases all post-date the adoption of the 1983
Constitution. As described above and discussed more fully in SCV,
the Judicial Power Paragraph had a fixed meaning based on
consistent and definitive precedent that allowed community
Moreover, Granite State was the only one of these cases to conclude that standing was lacking; the others all either failed to address standing or found standing was present, and so have little precedential force on this point. And there was no indication in Granite State that the plaintiff would have cleared SCV’s community stakeholder standing threshold, either. 13 stakeholders to sue to challenge county action. The cases post-dating
the 1983 Constitution cannot change the meaning of the Judicial
Power Paragraph. See Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 235 (2) (c) (i) (806
SE2d 505) (2017) (“[T]here are few principles of Georgia law more
venerable than the fundamental principle that a constitutional
provision means today what it meant at the time that it was
enacted.”).5
5 Because Granite State is the only case that held that the plaintiffs
lacked a particularized injury to challenge a county ordinance, it is the only case we need consider whether to overrule. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, we consider whether to retain incorrect precedent by balancing “the importance of having the question decided against the importance of having it decided right.” State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 123 (2) (829 SE2d 367) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original). In making this determination, we often consider, among other things, “the age of precedent, the reliance interests at stake, the workability of the decision, and, most importantly, the soundness of its reasoning.” Olevik, 302 Ga. at 244-245 (2) (c) (iv) (citation and punctuation omitted). Also relevant is the extent to which the decision was the result of actual legal reasoning. See Johnson v. State, 315 Ga. 876, 887-888 (885 SE2d 725) (2023) (stare decisis did not require retaining a decision that was “unreasoned (bordering on accidental)” and “in conflict with our own decisions”); Ammons v. State, 315 Ga. 149, 171-172 (1) (880 SE2d 544) (2022) (Pinson, J., concurring) (“If the past decision in question is unreasoned, or if it disregards the basic legal principles that courts use to do law, the argument for overruling is easier to make.”). We have already explained that Granite State did not offer any reasoning for importing the particularized injury requirement applicable to challenges to statutes. And we have typically applied stare decisis with less force to constitutional decisions, meaning that there is “less room . . . for the other
14 Here, the Floams’ standing is firmly established. Because the
Floams are residents of Cobb County, they are community
stakeholders in that government. As we made clear in SCV,
community stakeholders have standing to enforce a public duty.
SCV, 315 Ga. at 60 (2) (c) (iii). The entire dispute in this case is about
that public duty. In enacting Act 562, the General Assembly set the
electoral district lines for Cobb County. Although the parties dispute
factors to preserve [incorrect precedent].” Olevik, 302 Ga. at 245 (2) (c) (iv). None of the remaining factors support retaining Granite State’s rule. It was decided 16 years ago, and we have overruled decisions much older than that. See, e.g., Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 468 (1) (796 SE2d 261) (2017) (overruling 45-year-old precedent); State v. Hudson, 293 Ga. 656, 661-662 (748 SE2d 910) (2013) (overruling 38-year-old precedent). There are no reliance interests at stake, and Granite State has not become “deeply entrenched in our jurisprudence.” See, e.g., Frett v. State Farm Employee Workers’ Compensation, 309 Ga. 44, 60 (3) (c) (844 SE2d 749) (2020) (in considering age of precedent and reliance interests, noting that the precedent at issue had not “become deeply entrenched in our jurisprudence”); Savage v. State of Ga., 297 Ga. 627, 641 (5) (b) (774 SE2d 624) (2015) (substantial reliance interests are most common in contract and property cases where parties may have acted in conformance with existing legal rules in order to conduct transactions). Finally, the rule articulated in SCV is much more workable than the particularized-injury rule similar to the injury-in-fact rule that is part of federal standing jurisprudence. See, e.g., Sierra v. City of Hallandale Beach, 996 F3d 1110, 1115-1117 (11th Cir. 2021) (Newsom, J., concurring) (noting difficulty and inconsistency in applying the injury-in-fact requirement). Because none of the stare decisis factors weigh in favor of retaining Granite State, we overrule it. And we likewise disapprove any other cases to the extent that they could be read to impose a particularized injury requirement to challenge the constitutionality of county actions, legislative or otherwise. 15 whether Cobb County had the authority to revise those district lines,
it could only do so if the Home Rule Paragraph allowed. Whether
this case is framed as a duty to follow Act 562 or a requirement to
follow the Home Rule Paragraph, in either case, the heart of the case
concerns Cobb County’s duty to follow the law. This is sufficient to
confer standing for the Floams’ challenge to the BOC Amendment.
See SCV, 315 Ga. at 61 (2) (c) (iii) (“Where a public duty is at stake,
a plaintiff’s membership in the community provides the necessary
standing to bring a cause of action to ensure a local government
follows the law.”); see also Williams v. DeKalb County, 308 Ga. 265,
272 (3) (b) (i) (840 SE2d 423) (2020) (“Williams, as a citizen of
DeKalb County, generally has standing pursuant to OCGA § 9-6-24
to bring a claim seeking to require a public official to perform the
public duties that the General Assembly has conferred upon that
official.”); League of Women Voters of Atlanta-Fulton County v. City
of Atlanta, 245 Ga. 301, 303-304 (1) (264 SE2d 859) (1980) (“We hold
that the plaintiffs have standing to bring this suit. In this state, it is
established that a citizen and taxpayer of a municipality, without
16 the necessity for showing any special injury, has standing” to
challenge city council committee appointments as ultra vires actions
by municipal officer.).6
2. The County next argues that even if the Floams have
constitutional standing, they cannot obtain a declaratory judgment
because they do not face the requisite uncertainty about future
decisions they may face. We agree.
Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, the courts of this State
are authorized “to declare rights and other legal relations of any
interested party petitioning for such declaration” “[i]n cases of
actual controversy” and “in any civil case in which . . . the ends of
justice [so] require[.]” OCGA § 9-4-2 (a), (b). Although the Act is to
6 The County also argues that the Floams could not assert taxpayer standing because redistricting legislation does “not create an illegal debt, cause illegal expenses to be incurred, result in increased taxes, or misappropriate funds.” The County cites SCV for this proposition, but SCV did not hold that a plaintiff’s interest in having their local government follow the law was dependent on illegal expenditures; indeed it recognized that one’s membership in the community sometimes is sufficient to confer standing to sue a local government “even in cases where no tax dollars [are] directly implicated.” SCV, 315 Ga. at 59 (2) (c) (ii). In any case, the County’s argument ignores the fact that there are expenses incurred by preparing for and conducting elections, which are predicated upon electoral district lines; if the redistricting is illegal, taxpayers face a substantial risk of injury as a result. 17 be “liberally construed and administered[,]” the text of the Act also
plainly states that its purpose “is to settle and afford relief from
uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other
legal relations[.]” OCGA § 9-4-1. This language has been part of the
Act since it was first enacted in 1945. See Ga. L. 1945, pp. 137, 139,
§ 13. In one of the first cases interpreting the Act, this Court made
the following observation:
Doubtless [the Act] was designed to afford security and relief against uncertainty and to guide parties to a contract or occupying other legal or jural relations as to their future conduct with a view to avoid litigation, rather than in aid of it, and to settle and fix rights at a time before there had been breaches of contracts, violation and disregard of rights of others, and thus promote peace, quiet, and justice, with the ultimate end always constantly in view that one of the chief purposes is to declare rights rather than to execute them.
Shippen v. Folsom, 200 Ga. 58, 67 (1) (35 SE2d 915) (1945) (citation
omitted). We explained the Act was designed to “give additional
protection to persons who may become involved in an actual
justiciable controversy, in that they differ between themselves as to
what their rights are, and who wish to find them out before taking
18 some dangerous step which might or might not be authorized.” Id.
at 68 (1).
Since that initial observation about the Act’s design, this Court
has consistently and repeatedly focused on whether an adjudication
of rights was necessary in order to help or protect the petitioner or
plaintiff. Early on, we said that a petition for declaratory relief will
lie only
when there be some fact or circumstances which necessitate a determination of disputes, not merely for the purpose of enforcing accrued rights, but in order to guide and protect the petitioner from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to the propriety of some future act or conduct which is properly incident to his alleged rights, and which future action without such direction might reasonably jeopardize his interest.
Aldridge v. Fed. Land Bank of Columbia, 203 Ga. 285, 291 (3) (46
SE2d 578) (1948) (citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis
added); see also City of Atlanta v. Hotels.com, 285 Ga. 231, 234-235
(674 SE2d 898) (2009) (“[T]o state a claim for declaratory judgment,
a party need only allege the existence of a justiciable controversy in
which future conduct depends on resolution of uncertain legal
19 relations.”).
Since that early construction of the Act, our holdings have
repeatedly rejected claims for declaratory judgment when a
declaration of rights would not direct the plaintiff’s future conduct
or involved only a determination of rights that had already accrued.
See, e.g., Clein v. Kaplan, 201 Ga. 396, 406 (1) (40 SE2d 133) (1946)
(“petition did not state a proper cause for declaratory relief” because
it was “nothing more than a simple creditor’s action, asking the
distribution of a corporation’s assets in equity”); Gibbs v. Forrester,
204 Ga. 545, 549 (2) (50 SE2d 318) (1948) (action to declare that the
plaintiff and the defendant were not husband and wife failed
because the only issue was one of fact known to the parties and the
petitioner was “not asking the court for any light before taking a
step in the dark”); Sumner v. Davis, 211 Ga. 702, 703 (2) (88 SE2d
392) (1955) (declaratory judgment action should have been
dismissed because the petitioner alleged no facts showing that an
“adjudication of their rights [was] necessary in order to relieve them
from the risk of taking any future undirected action incident to their
20 rights, which action without direction would jeopardize their
interest”); Ga. Southern & Florida Ry. Co. v. State Highway Dept.,
216 Ga. 812 (120 SE2d 122) (1961) (declaratory judgment did not lie
where the rights of the parties had already accrued and where the
petitioner alleged with certainty and definiteness that it owned the
land being allegedly appropriated by the highway department);
Henderson v. Alverson, 217 Ga. 541 (123 SE2d 721) (1962)
(declaratory judgment action could not be maintained where
plaintiff failed to allege need for guidance as to his future conduct
but rather merely sought declaration that constitutional
amendment was void); Milton Frank Allen Publications v. Ga. Assn.
of Petroleum Retailers, 219 Ga. 665, 670 (1) (a) (135 SE2d 330) (1964)
(declaratory action seeking to invalidate a contract was improper
where the petitioner was not uncertain as to any rights under
contract, had already “elected its course” by taking certain actions
to renounce the contract as invalid and unenforceable, “and hence
ha[d] no need for guidance as to what step to take”); Salomon v.
Cent. of Ga. Ry. Co., 220 Ga. 671, 672 (1) (141 SE2d 424) (1965)
21 (“[w]hatever rights the plaintiffs may have been denied . . . [or]
acquired” by the stockholders’ meeting, there was no cause of action
for declaratory relief because the plaintiffs’ rights had already
accrued and there were no factual allegations showing that an
adjudication was “necessary in order to relieve the plaintiffs from
the risk of taking any future undirected action incident to their
rights, which action without direction would jeopardize their
interests”); Womble v. State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 221 Ga.
457, 459-460 (1) (145 SE2d 485) (1965) (State Board’s claim that
declaratory judgment was “necessary to relieve the parties ‘from the
risk of taking any future undirected action incident thereto,’” was
conclusory and totally unsupported by any allegations of facts or
circumstances showing any risk or uncertainty); Fourth Street
Baptist Church of Columbus v. Bd. of Registrars, 253 Ga. 368, 369
(1) (320 SE2d 543) (1984) (claims for declaratory relief were properly
dismissed where plaintiffs “face[d] no uncertainty or insecurity with
respect to their voting rights, nor any risk stemming from
undirected future action”); Morgan v. Guar. Nat. Cos., 268 Ga. 343,
22 346 (489 SE2d 803) (1997) (“Because [the petitioner] has not
demonstrated a need for a legal judgment that would control its
future action, in that its defenses to any claim under the policy can
be presented when suit is entered . . . , a declaratory judgment action
was inappropriate.”); Baker v. City of Marietta, 271 Ga. 210, 214 (1)
(518 SE2d 879) (1999) (trial court erred in ruling on declaratory
judgment action where plaintiff did not assert that it faced a risk of
taking future undirected action and defendant argued that only the
plaintiff sought declaratory relief); Gwinnett County v. Blaney, 275
Ga. 696, 703-704 (1) (572 SE2d 553) (2002) (petition seeking
declaration that petitioner was entitled to payment of incurred legal
fees under a county indemnification plan was not authorized
because the petitioner sought a determination after legal expenses
had already been incurred and a finding that plan would have
covered the petitioner in the lawsuit would not “portend, much less
determine, any questions of [petitioner’s] coverage” in future legal
actions against him); SJN Props. v. Fulton County Bd. of Assessors,
296 Ga. 793, 803 (2) (b) (iii) (770 SE2d 832) (2015) (declaratory relief
23 properly denied where claimant failed to show that it faced any
uncertainty or insecurity as to any of its own future conduct, but
rather sought an adjudication that would impact the future conduct
of the defendant); Love v. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 311
Ga. 682, 695-696 (3) (c) (859 SE2d 33) (2021) (appellants’ claim for
declaratory relief was properly dismissed because, even if the
agency’s decision was wrong, the appellants faced no uncertainty as
to an alleged right), disapproved of in part on other grounds by Bray
v. Watkins, 317 Ga. 703, 704-705 (895 SE2d 282) (2023).
Applying that framework here, the Floams’ allegations are
insufficient to support declaratory relief. The thrust of the Floams’
“uncertainty” is that they do not know in which district they reside,
but this is not the kind of uncertainty required by our case law. A
request for declaratory relief is a request for “prospective relief—
relief from the threat of wrongful acts and injuries yet to come.”
Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 434 (III) (C) (801 SE2d 867) (2017).
The Floams allege several past injuries resulting from the BOC
Amendment, but they have not alleged threatened future injury that
24 a declaration would prevent them from suffering.
The Floams alleged in their complaint that they should belong
in District 1 per the General Assembly’s redistricting, they voted in
that district in November 2022, and as a result of the allegedly
illegal BOC Amendment, they are represented by a commissioner
different from the one for whom they voted. The Floams also assert
on appeal that they are uncertain whether their November 2022
votes “functionally counted.”
It is not clear what the Floams mean by the uncertainty as to
whether their votes “functionally counted.” Regardless, their past
votes have no relation to any uncertainty as to their future conduct.
The Floams frame their right as the right to be represented by the
person for whom they voted. But any violation of such a right
occurred once the BOC Amendment took effect, and the Floams have
not alleged how that past violation creates uncertainty as to their
future conduct. They merely argue on appeal that they cannot
“confidently participate in their government or rely on their
commissioner to represent their interests because they would not
25 know who their lawful commissioner is for the next [two] years.” No
doubt, everyone has a right to participate in their government,
contact their representative, and even campaign or support a
candidate, but the Floams do not point to any authority for the
proposition that they have a right to do so “confidently.” And nothing
about the BOC Amendment infringes on their right to political
participation. The Floams may be uncertain about which county
commissioner should represent them, but they do not show any
future action they risk taking based on this uncertainty.
Their uncertainty regarding whether their 2022 votes
“functionally counted” or whether they can participate in their local
government affairs “confidently” is simply insufficient to warrant
declaratory relief. See City of Atlanta v. Atlanta Independent School
System, 307 Ga. 877, 880 (838 SE2d 834) (2020) (“[T]he relief sought
by a plaintiff must have some immediate legal effect on the parties’
conduct, rather than simply burning off an abstract fog of
uncertainty.” (emphasis added)).
With respect to future elections, no declaratory relief lies here
26 either. The Floams may be uncertain as to whether they lawfully
reside in District 1 or District 3, but this uncertainty, without more,
is insufficient to support a declaration. The Floams must allege that
they are at risk of taking some undirected future action incident to
their rights and that such action might jeopardize their interests.
They have failed to do so.
The Floams alleged in their complaint that they will vote in
future elections, including those for the BOC, and there is no
allegation that they will not be allowed to vote in such elections. The
Floams allege that they might vote in the “wrong” district, but they
know what district they are assigned under the BOC Amendment;
they have no decision to make about where to vote.
By seeking a determination on the validity of the BOC
Amendment, the Floams are not asking for guidance with respect to
actions they might take or alleging that they risk taking some
dangerous step that may or may not be authorized. The Floams’
uncertainty, then, does not concern their own future conduct.
Instead, by asking for a declaration that the BOC Amendment was
27 illegal, the Floams are merely attempting to enforce rights that had
already accrued and attempting to direct the future actions of the
County, which is insufficient to state a claim for declaratory relief.
See Williams, 308 Ga. at 271 (3) (a) (citizen could not pursue
declaratory relief to challenge legality of county ordinances because
he did not “allege or argue that he face[d] any uncertainty or
insecurity as to his own future conduct”); SJN Props., 296 Ga. at 803
(2) (b) (iii) (claimant failed to show that it faced any uncertainty or
insecurity as to any of its own future conduct and instead sought an
adjudication that would impact the future conduct of the defendant);
Sapp v. ABC Credit & Inv. Co., 243 Ga. 151, 159 (5) (253 SE2d 82)
(1979) (petitioner did not show that a declaratory judgment was
“necessary to relieve her of the risk of taking some future undirected
action incident to her rights which might jeopardize her interest”
when she had already acted when her petition was filed); see also
Drawdy v. Direct Gen. Ins. Co., 277 Ga. 107, 109 (586 SE2d 228)
(2003) (“The law is well established that declaratory judgment is not
available where a judgment cannot guide and protect the petitioner
28 with regard to some future act[.]” (citation and punctuation
omitted)); Venable v. Dallas, 212 Ga. 595, 595 (94 SE2d 416) (1956)
(“[O]ne walking in full daylight, who knows where he is going and is
confident of the course he is pursuing, has no need either of artificial
light or judicial advice.”); Shippen, 200 Ga. at 68 (1) (the Act is
intended to “give additional protection to persons who may . . . wish
to find [their rights] out before taking some dangerous step which
might or might not be authorized”).
To be clear, the fact that there are two competing maps does
create significant uncertainty for many.7 But the Floams have not
shown that this uncertainty affects their future conduct. They have
not established that they are insecure about some future action they
plan to take, and they have not shown a need to declare rights upon
which their future conduct depends. See Sexual Offender
7 In its amicus brief, the Cobb County Board of Elections and Registration (“BOER”) pointed to its own uncertainty as to whether the BOC Amendment was valid and asked for some resolution in time for it to implement a redistricting map before the qualifying period that began on March 2, 2024. Given BOER’s duties in administering elections, that is the kind of uncertainty that would support a declaratory judgment. But BOER is not a party to this case, and the Floams cannot use a nonparty’s uncertainty to establish their own standing. 29 Registration Review Bd. v. Berzett, 301 Ga. 391, 393 (801 SE2d 821)
(2017) (“The proper scope of declaratory judgment is to adjudge
those rights among parties upon which their future conduct
depends.” (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis added)).
Instead, the Floams’ claims boil down to an attempt to enforce
accrued rights and guide the future conduct of the defendants or the
BOER. Because the Floams have not shown that they qualify for
declaratory relief, we reverse. We express no view about the correct
resolution of the very serious constitutional issues with the BOC
Amendment.8
Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.
BETHEL, Justice, concurring.
I agree with the opinion of the Court and join it in full. I write
separately to note my concern about the possible effect of further
8 Although we do not reach the issue, we are thankful for the amicus
brief filed by the Attorney General, which addressed the issue of Cobb County’s authority under the Home Rule Paragraph to pass the BOC Amendment. The Attorney General took no position on the Floams’ standing. 30 delay in reaching the merits of the Cobb County Commission’s effort
to redistrict itself, which it seems will inevitably be reached. A
delayed loss by Cobb could give rise to calamitous consequences
inflicting serious expense and practical hardship on its citizens.
Accordingly, I urge Cobb to act with all dispatch in obtaining a final
answer on the legal merits of its chosen path.
I offer the following illustration not to suggest what will
happen, but only to show what might happen, assuming Cobb’s
merits argument ultimately fails.9 It is clear that Cobb has asserted
a novel application of the constitutional Home Rule powers that has
never been decided by this Court, though the only Georgia court to
reach the merits of Cobb’s argument found it untenable. We
concluded today that the present action is not the proper vehicle by
which to litigate this issue. But sooner or later, a proper party will
almost certainly bring a proper claim, and a court will decide the
9 While this hypothetical presumes that Cobb’s argument on the merits
ultimately fails, I do not suggest that will be the likely outcome, and I reiterate that is not a question we decide here. Given the merits arguments presented thus far, however, it seems fair to observe that Cobb has a substantial risk of losing and it seems unwise to ignore that risk. 31 novel issue raised in this case. A review of the record and the current
posture of the Cobb County Commission suggests that an adverse
merits decision for Cobb could feasibly result in at least one current
Commission member to be found to lack residency in his or her
district. And Cobb is currently conducting elections for two seats
under the contested maps. Litigation during and even after those
elections seems inevitable. But litigation takes time, and it is easily
within the realm of possibility that several months could pass before
such litigation is concluded, particularly if Cobb continues to pursue
what could be interpreted as a deliberately leisurely litigation
strategy.
Indeed, depending on the timeline of any future litigation, it
would not be inconceivable for Cobb to find itself with three vacant
Commission seats and the Commission unable to form a quorum,
leaving its citizens without duly elected representation. To avoid
these possibilities, it seems to me that Cobb has an interest in
reaching a merits-based resolution as quickly as possible. I urge
Cobb to act with all due haste in securing finality.
32 Decided May 9, 2024 — Reconsideration denied May 29, 2024.
Home rule; constitutional question. Cobb Superior Court.
Before Judge Harris.
H. William Rowling, Jr., Lauren S. Bruce, Elizabeth A.
Monyak, for appellant.
Smith & Liss, Ray S. Smith III, for appellees.
Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Logan B. Winkles,
Deputy Attorney General, Jonathan D. Loegel, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Zachary A. Mullinax, Assistant Attorney General;
Stephen J. Petrany, Solicitor-General, Justine T. Golart, Deputy
Solicitor-General; Haynie Litchfield Crane & White, Daniel W.
White, Elarbee Thompson Sapp & Wilson, William A. Pinto, Jr.,
amici curiae.