STATE OF GEORGIA v. DOVETEL COMMUNICATION, LLC

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: September 30, 2025
• Docket: S25A0635
• Status: Published

Opinion

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: September 30, 2025

S25A0635. STATE OF GEORGIA v. DOVETEL COMMUNICATION, LLC, et al.

PINSON, Justice.

The Georgia Department of Transportation revised one of its

rules that regulates the installation, relocation, and management of

utilities on public rights of way. After the rule went into effect, the

Department asked a group of broadband internet providers to revise

their contracts with the Department to account for the rule change,

which, among other things, changed the fee schedule for rights-of-

way permits that had been specified in those contracts. The provid-

ers declined and instead sued the State, seeking a declaratory judg-

ment that, among other things, their contracts with the Department

were enforceable and not terminable at will by the Department. The

State asked the trial court to dismiss the providers’ action, because, among other reasons, it was barred by sovereign immunity. But the

trial court determined that sovereign immunity was waived under

Article I, Section II, Paragraph V(b) of the Constitution of Georgia,

and it granted the providers declaratory and injunctive relief.

We agree with the trial court that sovereign immunity is

waived under Paragraph V for the providers’ action for declaratory

relief. As that provision requires, the providers have sought “declar-

atory relief” in the form of declaratory judgments that their con-

tracts are enforceable and may not be terminated at will by the De-

partment. And they seek that relief from acts of the Department

which, in their view, impaired the obligation of their contracts in

violation of the United States and Georgia Constitutions. Thus, in

the language of Paragraph V, “[s]overeign immunity is … waived

for” this “action[] in the superior court seeking declaratory relief

from acts of … a[] … department … of this state … in violation of …

the Constitution of this state [and] the Constitution of the United

States.” Id.

But, unlike the trial court, we conclude that the rights-of-way

2 contracts at issue here are terminable at will. More than a century

ago, this Court held that if a contract calls for continuous perfor-

mance but does not set a definite duration for the contract, and “no

time is fixed by law or usage,” the contract may be terminated at

will by either party with notice. Electric R. Co. v. Tenn. C., I. & R.

Co., 98 Ga. 189, 192 (1896). The contracts here do not specify a def-

inite duration by time (with either a fixed period or a fixed end date),

and the event they specify for when the contracts will no longer be

in effect — the parties entering a new agreement — effectively

leaves the duration of the contracts (both when and whether it could

end) subject to one party’s complete discretion. The result is that

these particular contracts are contracts of indefinite duration, ter-

minable at will by either party.

For these reasons, which are set out in more detail below, the

trial court’s determination that sovereign immunity is waived for

this declaratory judgment action is affirmed, but the court’s judg-

ment granting declaratory and injunctive relief is vacated, and the

3 case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this deci-

sion.

1. Background The telecommunications companies in this case provide broad-

band internet services across Georgia. To do so, these providers need

to build, maintain, and operate wires, cables, and equipment along

public rights of way. Their permission to do those things is granted

under right-of-way permits and related contracts that each provider

has entered into with the Georgia Department of Transportation.

These contracts also establish annual permit fees, prescribe rules

for how the providers’ work would be completed, and define the De-

partment’s rights and responsibilities related to the providers’ work.

And each contract explains that it “shall govern over any other rules

or policies that may conflict herewith and shall remain in full force

and effect until [the Department] and [the provider] enter into a sub-

sequent agreement regarding the [contract’s] subject matter.”

In 2021, the Department amended its own rule that regulates

the installation, relocation, and management of utilities on public

4 rights of way. See Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 672-11-.04 (adopted

Feb. 24, 1986; amended Sept. 13, 2021; amended Nov. 11, 2021). The

new rule provided for higher annual permit fees, but it also gave the

option for the Department to continue existing contracts with pro-

viders or enter into new ones. Id.

After the revised rule went into effect, the Department notified

the providers a number of times that it wanted them to enter into

new right-of-way contracts by September of 2023. The providers re-

fused to agree to the terms of the new contracts. The Department

then sent another notice informing them that “effective November

1, 2023, any communication utility provider that has not executed

or made arrangements to execute a new … agreement” would be re-

quired to “adhere to” the requirements of the new rules rather than

the old contracts.

The day before the Department’s November 1 deadline, the

providers sued the State in superior court. In that action, the pro-

viders sought declaratory judgments that (1) the “duration clause”

in their contracts is a “valid and enforceable contractual provision”;

5 (2) their contracts are “perpetual[,] vesting [the providers] with a

right that cannot be unilaterally terminated by [the Department]”;

and (3) their contracts “are a perpetual easement.” As the litigation

proceeded, the providers contended (among other things) that the

contracts are enforceable and are not terminable at the will of either

party, because the duration clause of their contracts specifies a suf-

ficiently definite duration and that the Department’s actions have

impaired the obligation of their contracts in violation of the United

States and Georgia Constitutions. See US Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1;

Ga. Const. of 1983 Art. I, Sec. I, Par. X.

The State moved to dismiss the lawsuit, and the providers

moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied the motion to

dismiss and granted summary judgment. As to sovereign immunity,

the trial court ruled that sovereign immunity was waived under Ar-

ticle I, Section II, Paragraph V(b) of the Georgia Constitution be-

cause the providers had sought declaratory relief and alleged that

the Department’s steps to implement the new contracts violated the

law. On the merits, the trial court concluded that the right-of-way

6 contracts were enforceable and could not be terminated at will by

the Department based on the contracts’ duration clauses.

The State appealed to the Court of Appeals, which transferred

the appeal to this Court because of this Court’s jurisdiction over

questions of constitutional construction. Ga. Const. of 1983 Art. VI,

Sec. VI, Par. II(1).

2. Sovereign Immunity We review de novo the trial court’s determination that sover-

eign immunity is waived for the providers’ action. 1 See McBrayer v.

Scarbrough, 317 Ga. 387, 388 (2023).

Under Article I, Section II, Paragraph V of the Constitution of

Georgia, sovereign immunity is waived for certain actions brought

against the State and local governments. That provision declares

that sovereign immunity is waived for “actions in the superior court

1 We note that, as a general matter, sovereign immunity is separately

“waived as to any action ex contractu for the breach of any written contract ... entered into by the state or its departments and agencies.” Ga. Const. of 1983 Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX(c). The providers have not contended that this separate waiver applies. 7 seeking declaratory relief from acts of” various state and local gov-

ernmental entities and their officers and employees “outside the

scope of lawful authority or in violation of the laws or the Constitu-

tion of this state or the Constitution of the United States.” Ga. Const.

of 1983 Art. I, Sec. II, Par. V(b)(1). Paragraph V then “further

waive[s]” sovereign immunity so that the court may, “only after

awarding declaratory relief, enjoin such acts to enforce its judg-

ment.” Id. Thus, whether sovereign immunity is waived for a given

action under this provision turns on whether the petitioners have

sought “declaratory relief” from “acts” of the relevant governmental

entity that are either “outside the scope of lawful authority or in vi-

olation of the laws or the Constitution of this state or the United

States.” Id. See also Kuhlman v. State, 317 Ga. 232, 235 (2023).

Applying that language here, we have little trouble concluding

that the providers have brought an action to which Paragraph V’s

waiver of sovereign immunity applies. The providers seek declara-

tory relief in the form of declaratory judgments that the duration

8 clauses of their contracts are “valid and enforceable,” that their con-

tracts cannot be terminated unilaterally by the Department, and

that the Department has acted in violation of the laws or Constitu-

tion of this state or the Constitution of the United States. Among

other things, they contend that, by taking the position that the pro-

viders must comply with the requirements of a new administrative

rule, even if those requirements conflict with the provisions of their

current contracts with the Department, and by indicating that the

Department would no longer abide by the terms of those current

contracts, see Coffee Butler Serv., Inc. v. Sacha, 258 Ga, 192, 193

(1988), the Department has impaired the obligation of their con-

tracts in violation of the United States and Georgia Constitutions.2

In short, tracking the language of Paragraph V, the providers’ action

2 The State contends that the providers abandoned any argument that

the Department’s actions violated the United States and Georgia Constitu- tions. Not so. The trial court’s order granting summary judgment says that, in response to the court asking if the providers were abandoning those claims, the providers merely stated that “if the [rights-of-way] Contracts were enforceable under their terms and not terminable at will . . . then the Court would not need to reach and rule on” the other claims. That statement does not reflect with- drawal or abandonment of the providers’ other arguments, only that resolving them would not be necessary if they prevailed on their claim about the enforce- ability of the contract. 9 “seeks declaratory relief from acts of … a[] department … of this

state … in violation of … the Constitution of this state [and] the

Constitution of the United States.” Ga. Const. of 1983 Art. I, Sec. II,

Par. V(b)(1). The State contends that sovereign immunity is not

waived under Paragraph V because the providers have not sought a

specific declaration that the Department exceeded its lawful author-

ity or violated the law. But the State misreads Paragraph V. Under

it, sovereign immunity is waived for actions seeking “declaratory re-

lief from acts of the state … outside the scope of lawful authority or

in violation of” state law or the Georgia or United States Constitu-

tion. Ga. Const. of 1983 Art. I, Sec. II, Par. V(b)(1) (emphasis added).

It does not require a declaration that acts of the state are outside the

scope of lawful authority or in violation of state law or the Georgia

or United States Constitution. In other words, although it must be

apparent from the pleadings that a petitioner seeks relief from the

kind of unlawful acts that Paragraph V describes, see Kuhlman, 317

Ga. at 235, this provision’s waiver is not contingent on a petitioner

10 seeking a specific determination that those alleged acts are unlaw-

ful. 3

3. Merits The trial court determined that the contracts in this case were

“enforceable and not terminable at will” by the Department, relying

on their language stating that they “shall remain in force and effect

until [the Department] and [the providers] enter into a subsequent

agreement regarding the subject matter hereof.” We review de novo

the trial court’s construction of the contracts. Unified Gov’t of Ath-

ens-Clarke County v. Stiles Apts., 295 Ga. 829, 832 (2014).

Under longstanding Georgia law, if a contract calls for contin-

uous performance but does not set a definite duration and “no time

is fixed by law or usage,” the contract may be terminated at will by

either party with notice. Electric R. Co. v. Tenn. C., I. & R. Co., 98

3 Of course, whether sovereign immunity is waived under Paragraph V

for an action seeking declaratory relief is a separate question from whether the petitioner’s claims in such an action meet the threshold conditions for main- taining a claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act. See OCGA § 9-4-2; Cobb County v. Floam, 319 Ga. 89, 96 (2024). That separate question is not before us here. 11 Ga. 189, 192 (1896). See also, e.g., Lederle v. Atlanta, 164 Ga. 440,

441 (1927); Blackstock v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 94 Ga. App. 313,

314 (1956); Ely v. Stratoflex, Inc., 132 Ga. App. 569, 571 (1974); At-

lanta Dairies Co-Op v. Grindle, 182 Ga. App. 409, 410 (1987); Voyles

v. Sasser, 221 Ga. App. 305, 305 (1996); Jones v. Destiny Indus., 226

Ga. App. 6, 8 (1997); Pickle Logging, Inc. v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 276 Ga.

App. 398, 400 (2005); Poole v. In Home Health, LLC, 321 Ga. App.

674, 675 (2013). See also John K. Larkins, Jr., Georgia Contracts:

Law and Litigation § 10:8 (2d ed. 2011) (2024 update) (“A contract

of indefinite duration (whether an employment contract or other-

wise) is terminable at will by either party.”).4

Given infinite possible variations of contracts and contractual

terms, we do not try here to identify the precise line that separates

4 The rule is different for contracts that call for a single performance.

When an otherwise enforceable contract is for, say, rendering a discrete ser- vice, or delivering goods once, a “reasonable time for performance will be im- plied” in the absence of a term setting such a time. Read v. GHDC, Inc., 254 Ga. 706, 706 (1985) (citing Whitley v. Patrick, 226 Ga. 87 (1970); Brown v. McInvale, 118 Ga. App. 375, 375 (1968); Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 204 (1979)). 12 contracts with a definite duration from those with an indefinite du-

ration in all cases. But based on our precedent and persuasive au-

thority from the Court of Appeals, we can say that a term of definite

duration may be expressed either by time (a set period for perfor-

mance, or an express end date), or by some other specified event that

supplies an end date. See, e.g., F & F Copiers, Inc. v. Kroger, Co.,

194 Ga. App. 737, 738 (1990) (contract provided for a three-year

term); Heritage of Lanier, Inc. v. Akins, 216 Ga. App. 280, 281–82

(1995) (employment contract of definite duration provided that em-

ployee would be paid $25,000 per year and that the contract would

expire either after eight years or after the employee had been paid

the full $200,000 under various contingencies of the contract). On

the other hand, precedent establishes that a contract’s duration may

be indefinite if the contract offers no conceivable basis for identifying

a potential end date. Such indefiniteness could arise because the

contract offers no basis at all for determining the end date. See, e.g.,

Moran v. NAV Serv., 189 Ga. App. 825, 826 (1989). Or a contract

may be indefinite because there is no assurance at all that the event

13 that would trigger termination will ever happen — much less that it

will happen at any particular time. See, e.g., Barker v. CTC Sales

Corp., 199 Ga. App. 742, 743 (1991) (contract providing for em-

ployee’s employment until the “insolvency” of the employer was for

an indefinite term). That is commonly true of contracts that leave

the happening of such a termination event subject to the complete

discretion of one party. See, e.g., Ga. Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga.

612, 613 (1978) (contract providing for employee’s employment “un-

til his retirement date” was of an indefinite duration). Thus, for ex-

ample, an exclusive dealership contract for “as long as [the dealer]

stayed committed to [a certain mobile home brand]” was for an “in-

definite duration” and therefore terminable at will. Jones, 226 Ga.

App. at 8. An agreement to pay for the supply of certain food prod-

ucts that ended when the provider decided to no longer provide those

products was terminable at will. CAG Food Servs. v. Shaver Foods,

LLC, 2019 WL 12762541 at *3 (NDGA 2019) (applying Georgia law).

And an agreement for “permanent” employment was terminable at

will because such agreements “continue indefinitely,” Bentley v.

14 Smith, 3 Ga. App 242, 247 (1907). See also Ely, 132 Ga. App. at 571

(same); Atlanta Dairies Co-Op, 182 Ga. App. at 410 (same); Pickle

Logging, Inc., 26 Ga. App. at 400 (same). 5

That brings us to the contracts here. Those contracts set an-

nual fees for the providers’ rights-of-way permits, and with respect

to duration, they say only that they “shall remain in full force and

5 As we said, the above description of definite and indefinite contracts

does not cover the field with respect to determining whether a contract that calls for continuous performance is terminable at will. Although conditioning the termination of a contract on an event that may never happen generally will be a sufficient basis for deeming the contract indefinite, we do not address pos- sible exceptions or caveats to the general rule here. For example, federal courts applying Georgia law have suggested that contracts of otherwise indefinite du- ration may not be terminable at will if they expressly list performance or de- fault conditions, on the theory that including such conditions expresses a clear intention that the contract would not be terminable merely at will, without any cause whatsoever. See Iraola & CIA, S.A. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 325 F3d 1274, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Coffee v. General Motors Acceptance, 5 FSupp2d 1365 (SDGa 1998)). Moreover, parties are free to contract around de- fault rules unless the law provides otherwise, although they generally must do so expressly. See King v. King, 354 Ga. App. 19, 27 (2020) (explaining that “parties are free to contact [sic] around [a] default rule, unless prohibited by statute or public policy,” and that the parties did that when they “chose to in- clude an express provision” contracting around the default rule); Mitsui Marine & Fire Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Hanjin Shipping Co., Ltd., 279 Ga. App. 689, 694 n. 16 (2006) (explaining that despite the “bright line default rule,” future parties could negotiate around this rule by “explicitly stating” that the parties were not bound by it). But the parties have not contended that these concepts apply to the contracts at issue here. 15 effect until [the Department] and the [provider] enter into a subse-

quent agreement regarding the subject matter hereof.” This lan-

guage does not specify a definite term by time (either a fixed period

or a fixed end date). And the event specified for when the contract

will no longer be in “full force and effect” — the parties entering a

“subsequent agreement regarding the [contract’s] subject matter” —

effectively leaves the duration of the contracts (both when and

whether the contract might end) subject to the complete discretion

of one party. The contracts thus offer no basis at all for determining

whether and when the contract might end. Such a contract is indef-

inite under Georgia law. See Jones, 226 Ga. App. at 8; Pickle Log-

ging, Inc., 26 Ga. App. at 400; Harris County v. Penton, 211 Ga. App.

498, 499–500 (1993); CAG Food Servs., 2019 WL 12762541 at *3.

The providers resist this conclusion, but the decisions they

marshal in support are not helpful to them. Those decisions, includ-

ing State of Georgia v. Federal Defender Program, Inc., 315 Ga. 319,

343–44 (2022), Mori Lee, LLC v. Just Scott Designs, Inc., 325 Ga.

App. 625, 630 (2014), and Alexis, Inc. v. Werbell, 209 Ga. 665, 670–

16 71 (1953), did not address claims that the contracts at issue were

terminable at will for lack of a definite duration, but rather claims

that the contracts were unenforceable because they were too vague.

That difference matters. A contract is not void or unenforceable for

lack of a duration term (or any other term, for that matter) unless

the “indefiniteness in subject matter” is “so extreme as not to pre-

sent anything upon which the contract may operate in a definite

manner.” Federal Defender Program, Inc., 315 Ga. at 344 (quotation

marks omitted). Indeed, a contract that is silent as to its duration is

not likely to be deemed unenforceable on that basis because the law

generally supplies default rules for duration when the contract fails

to specify one. See Read v. GHDC, Inc., 254 Ga. 706, 706 (1985)

(when a real estate sales contract was missing a term for “time for

performance,” a “reasonable time for performance” was “implied”);

Electric R. Co., 98 Ga. at 192 (“The rule is stated as follows: ‘If a

continuous contract fixes no time during which it is to last, and no

time is fixed by law or usage, it may be terminated at the will of

17 either party by notice.’”). In other words, even if a contract is indef-

inite in duration, it may still be enforceable as long as it “contains

matter which will enable the courts, under proper rules of construc-

tion, to ascertain the terms and conditions on which the parties in-

tended to bind themselves.” Federal Defender Program, Inc., 315 Ga.

at 344 (citation omitted). See also, e.g., Electric R. Co., 98 Ga. 189,

191–92 (explaining that although a contract to buy and sell a given

quantity of coal daily for an unspecified period was of indefinite du-

ration and thus terminable at will, it was still “legally established”

because its terms other than duration were “fully agreed upon,” so

the plaintiff could not abandon the agreement without notice to the

defendant). So, decisions holding that a contract is not enforceable

based on its duration term (or lack thereof) do not bear on how to

assess the different question whether a contract, although enforcea-

ble, is terminable at will because its duration is indefinite. 6

6 The providers also rely on GAPIII, Inc. v. Seal Indus., Inc., 338 Ga. App.

101 (2016), in which the Court of Appeals held that a company could not uni- laterally terminate a contract of indefinite duration. This decision of the Court

18 In sum, although the trial court was correct that the duration

clauses of the right-of-way contracts here did not render those con-

tracts unenforceable, those contracts were for an indefinite duration

and thus terminable at will with notice, and the trial court erred in

concluding otherwise.

4. Relief For the reasons set out above, the trial court’s determination

that sovereign immunity is waived for the providers’ action seeking

declaratory relief is affirmed. And because the trial court erred in

concluding that the rights-of-way contracts were not terminable at

will, its judgment granting declaratory and injunctive relief is va-

cated.7 Finally, because it is not clear from the parties’ briefing

of Appeals applying New York contract law is not binding authority with re- spect to a question of Georgia law in this Court. Indeed, this decision is not even binding on the Court of Appeals, given that it did not garner a majority of the judges on the panel. And as best we can tell, New York law may well be different from Georgia law with respect to the principles of contract law at is- sue here. Id. at 113–14. So GAPIII is not useful authority in this case, and we decline to consider it further. 7 We do not reach the State’s arguments that the trial court’s injunction

was also granted in error either because it was not entered “after” the court’s order granting declaratory relief, or because the injunction was not needed to “enforce its judgment,” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. V(b)(1). 19 whether or how the conclusion that these contracts are terminable

at will affects any of their alternative arguments, we leave any such

arguments to be raised and addressed as needed on remand.

Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded. All the Justices concur.