FIFTH DIVISION MCFADDEN, P. J., HODGES and PIPKIN, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
June 18, 2025
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A25A0484. HUGHES v. GWINNETT COUNTY et al.
MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge.
Stephen Hughes appeals from a dismissal order finding that he lacked standing
to challenge the constitutionality of a bill passed by the General Assembly and that he
had failed to allege a justiciable controversy under the Declaratory Judgment Act.
Because Hughes alleged no individualized injury and because Hughes seeks to
challenge the constitutionality of state legislative action, rather than the actions of a
local government, the trial court correctly found that he lacked standing. The court
also correctly found that Hughes had failed to allege a justiciable controversy required
for declaratory judgment action. So we affirm the dismissal order.
1. Facts and procedural posture The General Assembly passed Senate Bill 333 (“SB 333”), providing for the
creation of the city of Mulberry in unincorporated Gwinnett County. The bill was
signed the into law by the governor. Qualified voters approved the creation of the city
via referendum.
Hughes, who resides within the city limits of Mulberry and is a citizen, resident,
and taxpayer of Gwinnett County, filed a complaint against the county, alleging that
SB 333 is unconstitutional. Hughes sought a declaratory judgment that SB 333 is
unconstitutional and injunctive relief prohibiting Gwinnett County from taking
various actions related to the SB 333 transition for the city. Robert Coker, who also
resides within the Mulberry city limits, and Citizens for Mulberry, Inc., intervened in
the case.
Hughes and the intervenors filed opposing motions for summary judgment. The
intervenors asserted, among other things, that Hughes lacked standing to challenge
the constitutionality of SB 333 because he had not alleged an individualized injury.
Hughes countered that he had standing as a community stakeholder and thus did not
need an individualized injury to challenge the constitutionality of the senate bill.
2 Gwinnett County also moved for summary judgment, agreeing with Hughes that SB
333 is unconstitutional.1
The trial court denied summary judgment to Hughes and the county, but
granted the intervenors’ motion and dismissed the case. The court found that Hughes
lacked standing because he had not shown an individualized injury needed to
challenge the constitutionality of SB 333 and that he had failed to state a justiciable
controversy under the Declaratory Judgment Act. This appeal followed.
2. Standing
Hughes asserts that the trial court erred in finding that he did not allege an
individualized injury and so lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of SB
333 as a community stakeholder in Gwinnett County. The trial court did not err.
“Standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite necessary to invoke a court’s judicial
power under the Georgia Constitution. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Par.
I[.]” Cobb County v. Floam, 319 Ga. 89, 91 (1) (901 SE2d 512) (2024). “[P]laintiffs
with a cognizable injury can bring a suit in Georgia courts. Unlike federal law,
however, that injury need not always be individualized; sometimes it can be a
1 The Attorney General of Georgia filed an amici curiae brief in the trial court, arguing that SB 333 is constitutional. 3 generalized grievance shared by community members, especially other residents,
taxpayers, voters, or citizens.” Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Henry County Bd. of
Commrs., 315 Ga. 39 (880 SE2d 168) (2022). For such community stakeholders,
“membership in the community provides the necessary standing to bring a cause of
action to ensure a local government follows the law.” Id. at 61 (2) (c) (iii) (emphasis
supplied).
But when it comes to state statutes, a higher standard obtains. “[I]n order to
challenge the constitutionality of state statutes, the Georgia Constitution requires a
more particularized injury similar to the federal Article III injury-in-fact
requirement.” Cobb County, supra at 92 (1) (emphasis omitted).
[T]he particularized injury requirement for challenges to state statutes has long been rooted in principles of separation of powers. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. III (“The legislative, judicial, and executive powers shall forever remain separate and distinct; and no person discharging the duties of one shall at the same time exercise the functions of either of the others except as herein provided.”). . . . [T]he constitutional separation of powers principle does not even apply to counties or municipalities. . . . Consequently, the animating reason to require a particularized injury to challenge state legislative actions is not present for challenges to county or municipality legislative actions.
Cobb County, supra at 92-93 (1) (citations and punctuation omitted, emphasis in
original). As recently reiterated by our Supreme Court, “the general requirement [is]
4 that a plaintiff must assert the violation of his own individual right, as opposed to a
community-stakeholder right, to challenge actions by the [s]tate.” Republican Nat.
Committee v. Eternal Vigilance Action, ___ Ga. ___ (2) (c) (Case No. S25A0362,
decided June 10, 2025).
In the instant case, Hughes challenges the constitutionality of state action in
passing SB 333. But in raising such a challenge to the constitutionality of that state
legislative action, Hughes has failed to show that he has suffered an individualized
injury. Rather, he claims that since he is a citizen stakeholder in Gwinnett County, like
the plaintiffs in Cobb County, he has standing without the need for an individualized
injury. But the plaintiffs in Cobb County, unlike Hughes, did not challenge the
constitutionality of state legislative action, and instead challenged the constitutionality
of local government action — an amendment passed by their county board of
commissioners. Cobb County, supra at 89. “[A]s discussed above, the reason for
requiring a particularized injury for state actions does not carry over to local
governments.” Id. at 93 (1). So the standing of the Cobb County plaintiffs to challenge
county legislative action was “firmly established” as “community stakeholders in that
[county] government.” Id. at 95 (1). See also Sons of Confederate Veterans, supra at 40
5 (citizen had standing to challenge local government’s removal of a monument in
violation of OCGA § 50-3-1);
Likewise, if Hughes were only challenging local legislative action and was “not
challenging the constitutionality of [state legislative action, he would] not need to have
alleged an individualized injury.” Sons of Confederate Veterans, supra at 63 (2) (d)
(citation omitted). But Hughes has challenged the constitutionality of state legislative
action by seeking to have SB 333 declared unconstitutional and void, so he must show
an individualized injury, rather than a community-stakeholder injury, in order to have
standing for such a challenge. See Republican Nat. Committee, supra; Cobb County,
supra at 92-93 (1). Compare Williams v. DeKalb County, 371 Ga. App.
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FIFTH DIVISION MCFADDEN, P. J., HODGES and PIPKIN, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
June 18, 2025
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A25A0484. HUGHES v. GWINNETT COUNTY et al.
MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge.
Stephen Hughes appeals from a dismissal order finding that he lacked standing
to challenge the constitutionality of a bill passed by the General Assembly and that he
had failed to allege a justiciable controversy under the Declaratory Judgment Act.
Because Hughes alleged no individualized injury and because Hughes seeks to
challenge the constitutionality of state legislative action, rather than the actions of a
local government, the trial court correctly found that he lacked standing. The court
also correctly found that Hughes had failed to allege a justiciable controversy required
for declaratory judgment action. So we affirm the dismissal order.
1. Facts and procedural posture The General Assembly passed Senate Bill 333 (“SB 333”), providing for the
creation of the city of Mulberry in unincorporated Gwinnett County. The bill was
signed the into law by the governor. Qualified voters approved the creation of the city
via referendum.
Hughes, who resides within the city limits of Mulberry and is a citizen, resident,
and taxpayer of Gwinnett County, filed a complaint against the county, alleging that
SB 333 is unconstitutional. Hughes sought a declaratory judgment that SB 333 is
unconstitutional and injunctive relief prohibiting Gwinnett County from taking
various actions related to the SB 333 transition for the city. Robert Coker, who also
resides within the Mulberry city limits, and Citizens for Mulberry, Inc., intervened in
the case.
Hughes and the intervenors filed opposing motions for summary judgment. The
intervenors asserted, among other things, that Hughes lacked standing to challenge
the constitutionality of SB 333 because he had not alleged an individualized injury.
Hughes countered that he had standing as a community stakeholder and thus did not
need an individualized injury to challenge the constitutionality of the senate bill.
2 Gwinnett County also moved for summary judgment, agreeing with Hughes that SB
333 is unconstitutional.1
The trial court denied summary judgment to Hughes and the county, but
granted the intervenors’ motion and dismissed the case. The court found that Hughes
lacked standing because he had not shown an individualized injury needed to
challenge the constitutionality of SB 333 and that he had failed to state a justiciable
controversy under the Declaratory Judgment Act. This appeal followed.
2. Standing
Hughes asserts that the trial court erred in finding that he did not allege an
individualized injury and so lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of SB
333 as a community stakeholder in Gwinnett County. The trial court did not err.
“Standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite necessary to invoke a court’s judicial
power under the Georgia Constitution. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Par.
I[.]” Cobb County v. Floam, 319 Ga. 89, 91 (1) (901 SE2d 512) (2024). “[P]laintiffs
with a cognizable injury can bring a suit in Georgia courts. Unlike federal law,
however, that injury need not always be individualized; sometimes it can be a
1 The Attorney General of Georgia filed an amici curiae brief in the trial court, arguing that SB 333 is constitutional. 3 generalized grievance shared by community members, especially other residents,
taxpayers, voters, or citizens.” Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Henry County Bd. of
Commrs., 315 Ga. 39 (880 SE2d 168) (2022). For such community stakeholders,
“membership in the community provides the necessary standing to bring a cause of
action to ensure a local government follows the law.” Id. at 61 (2) (c) (iii) (emphasis
supplied).
But when it comes to state statutes, a higher standard obtains. “[I]n order to
challenge the constitutionality of state statutes, the Georgia Constitution requires a
more particularized injury similar to the federal Article III injury-in-fact
requirement.” Cobb County, supra at 92 (1) (emphasis omitted).
[T]he particularized injury requirement for challenges to state statutes has long been rooted in principles of separation of powers. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. III (“The legislative, judicial, and executive powers shall forever remain separate and distinct; and no person discharging the duties of one shall at the same time exercise the functions of either of the others except as herein provided.”). . . . [T]he constitutional separation of powers principle does not even apply to counties or municipalities. . . . Consequently, the animating reason to require a particularized injury to challenge state legislative actions is not present for challenges to county or municipality legislative actions.
Cobb County, supra at 92-93 (1) (citations and punctuation omitted, emphasis in
original). As recently reiterated by our Supreme Court, “the general requirement [is]
4 that a plaintiff must assert the violation of his own individual right, as opposed to a
community-stakeholder right, to challenge actions by the [s]tate.” Republican Nat.
Committee v. Eternal Vigilance Action, ___ Ga. ___ (2) (c) (Case No. S25A0362,
decided June 10, 2025).
In the instant case, Hughes challenges the constitutionality of state action in
passing SB 333. But in raising such a challenge to the constitutionality of that state
legislative action, Hughes has failed to show that he has suffered an individualized
injury. Rather, he claims that since he is a citizen stakeholder in Gwinnett County, like
the plaintiffs in Cobb County, he has standing without the need for an individualized
injury. But the plaintiffs in Cobb County, unlike Hughes, did not challenge the
constitutionality of state legislative action, and instead challenged the constitutionality
of local government action — an amendment passed by their county board of
commissioners. Cobb County, supra at 89. “[A]s discussed above, the reason for
requiring a particularized injury for state actions does not carry over to local
governments.” Id. at 93 (1). So the standing of the Cobb County plaintiffs to challenge
county legislative action was “firmly established” as “community stakeholders in that
[county] government.” Id. at 95 (1). See also Sons of Confederate Veterans, supra at 40
5 (citizen had standing to challenge local government’s removal of a monument in
violation of OCGA § 50-3-1);
Likewise, if Hughes were only challenging local legislative action and was “not
challenging the constitutionality of [state legislative action, he would] not need to have
alleged an individualized injury.” Sons of Confederate Veterans, supra at 63 (2) (d)
(citation omitted). But Hughes has challenged the constitutionality of state legislative
action by seeking to have SB 333 declared unconstitutional and void, so he must show
an individualized injury, rather than a community-stakeholder injury, in order to have
standing for such a challenge. See Republican Nat. Committee, supra; Cobb County,
supra at 92-93 (1). Compare Williams v. DeKalb County, 371 Ga. App. 341 (899 SE2d
244) (2024) (citizen of county had standing to challenge county board of
commissioner’s decision passing a salary increase).
We are not persuaded by Hughes’ argument that he has standing as a
community stakeholder in Gwinnett County to contest the constitutionality of SB 333
because it is a local law with limited territorial impact, not a general statute. See
Gebrekidan v. City of Clarkston, 298 Ga. 651, 659 (3) (b) (784 SE2d 373) (2016) (city
charter enacted by General Assembly “is a local law, not a general law”); City of
6 Atlanta v. City of College Park, 311 Ga. App. 62, 66 (1) (a) n. 11 (715 SE2d 158) (2011)
(“city charter is a local law, not a general law”). The distinction between general and
local laws is pertinent for resolving issues of uniformity and state preemption. See
Gebrekidan, supra at 653 (2) (“State statutes generally control over local ordinances
on the same subject.”). See also Ga. Const. of 1983, Art III, Sec. VI., Par. IV (a)
(“Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout this state and no
local or special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by
an existing general law, except that the General Assembly may by general law
authorize local governments by local ordinance or resolution to exercise police powers
which do not conflict with general laws.”). But that is not the critical distinction for
determining whether an individualized injury is necessary for standing as explained
in Cobb County and reiterated in Republican National Committee. Instead, the critical
distinction for that determination is between state action and local action. As set out
above and as explained in Cobb County, “the animating reason to require a
particularized injury to challenge state legislative actions[, constitutional separation
of powers,] is not present for challenges to county or municipality legislative actions.”
Cobb County, supra at 93 (1) (emphasis in original). Because SB 333 is state legislative
7 action of the General Assembly, and not local legislative action, an individualized
injury is required to challenge its constitutionality. But Hughes has failed to allege any
such individualized injury.
Hughes nevertheless claims that older Supreme Court authority, unlike the
more recent authority in Cobb County and Republican Nat. Committee, supports his
position that, despite the lack of an individualized injury, he has standing to challenge
the constitutionality of SB 333. See, e.g., Bracewell v. Warnock, 208 Ga. 388, 390 (1)
(67 SE2d 114) (1951). But to the extent any such discord exists between older and
newer precedents of our Supreme Court, the more recent decisions controls and we
must follow them instead of older inconsistent holdings. Cook v. State, 313 Ga. 471,
478 (2) (a) (870 SE2d 758) (2022); Daly v. Berryhill, 308 Ga. 831, 835 n. 4 (843 SE2d
870) (2020); White v. State, 305 Ga. 111, 122 (3) n. 10 (823 SE2d 794) (2019).
Accordingly, under the recent Supreme Court authority on standing discussed
above, we conclude that because Hughes has failed to show an individualized injury,
he lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of SB 333. The trial court therefore
did not err in dismissing his complaint on that basis.
3. Declaratory judgment
8 Hughes also argues that the court erred in dismissing his complaint on the
additional basis that he failed to assert a justiciable controversy under the Declaratory
Judgment Act. The argument is without merit.
[T]he Declaratory Judgment Act . . . gives superior courts, “in cases of actual controversy,” the power “to declare rights and other legal relations of any interested party petitioning for such declaration.” OCGA § 9-4-2 (a). The purpose of the act “is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations.” OCGA § 9-4-1. Our Supreme Court has defined “actual controversy” as a justiciable controversy where there are interested parties asserting adverse claims on an accrued set of facts. For a controversy to justify the making of a declaration, it must include a right claimed by one party and denied by the other. Moreover, declaratory relief is proper only where the party seeking such relief faces some uncertainty or insecurity as to rights, status, or legal relations, upon which its future conduct depends.
Avery v. Paulding County Airport Auth., 343 Ga. App. 832, 844 (2) (808 SE2d 15)
(2017) (citations and punctuation omitted).
In his complaint, Hughes failed to allege a justiciable controversy between
himself and Gwinnett County creating uncertainty upon which his future conduct
depends. In support of his declaratory judgment claim, Hughes alleged that he is
uncertain about how he might challenge possible future regulation or taxation from the
City of Mulberry. Hughes did not allege that any such regulation or taxation exists, but
9 instead speculated about potential uncertainty of whether the City of Mulberry might
impose ad valorem taxes and whether bee-keeping would be allowed under possible
future city zoning ordinances.
Such speculative “uncertainty . . . is simply insufficient to warrant declaratory
relief.” Cobb County, supra at 100 (2). See also Heron Lake II Apts. v. Lowndes County
Bd. of Tax Assessors, 306 Ga. 816, 820 (2) (833 SE2d 528) (2019) (“controversy is
justiciable when it is definite and concrete, rather than being hypothetical”) (citation
and punctuation omitted). Not only are these purported controversies hypothetical,
they would be between Hughes and the City of Mulberry, not between Hughes and
the named defendant Gwinnett County. Indeed, Hughes did not seek a declaratory
judgment clarifying his future conduct regarding hypothetical city taxation or bee-
keeping regulation; rather, the only declaratory judgment he sought was for SB 333 to
be declared unconstitutional and void. See Henderson v. Alverson, 217 Ga. 541, 541-542
(123 SE2d 721) (1962) (declaratory judgment action dismissed where plaintiff failed
to show need for guidance as to his future conduct but merely sought declaration that
constitutional amendment was unconstitutional and void). Moreover, the only future
conduct Hughes sought to have adjudicated and enjoined were potentially ultra vires
10 acts by the county related to SB 333. See SJN Properties v. Fulton County Bd. of
Assessors, 296 Ga. 793, 803 (2) (b) (iii) (770 SE2d 832) (2015) (declaratory relief
properly denied where claimant failed to show that it faced uncertainty as to its own
future conduct, but instead sought an adjudication that would impact the future
conduct of the defendant); Avery, supra at 845 (2) (affirming dismissal of declaratory
judgment action because residents and taxpayers of county seeking to declare void an
ultra vires act of the county had “not allege[d] any uncertainty or insecurity as to their
rights, status, or legal relations”). Because Hughes failed to allege a justiciable
controversy between himself and the county under the Declaratory Judgment Act, the
trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint on this additional basis.
Judgment affirmed. Hodges and Pipkin, JJ., concur.