City of Wichita v. Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs

652 P.2d 717, 232 Kan. 149, 1982 Kan. LEXIS 342
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedOctober 22, 1982
Docket54,336
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 652 P.2d 717 (City of Wichita v. Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Wichita v. Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs, 652 P.2d 717, 232 Kan. 149, 1982 Kan. LEXIS 342 (kan 1982).

Opinions

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Holmes, J.:

This is an appeal from an order of the district court reversing an order of the Board of County Commissioners of Sedgwick County (the Board) which granted incorporation of the territory northeast of Wichita generally described as the Bel Aire Improvement District (Bel Aire).

The Board ordered incorporation of the area as a third class city to be known as the City of Bel Aire, Kansas. The incorporation was opposed by the City of Wichita and others on its behalf. The order of the Board was reversed on appeal to the district court based on the trial court’s conclusions of law that the record showed “no joint consideration or discussion by the Board of County Commissioners of any of the factors contained in K.S.A. 15-121,” that “the evidence against the advisability of the incorporation of Bel Aire and in favor of its annexation by the City of Wichita is substantial, convincing and compelling,” and that the action by the Board was “unsupported by substantial evidence and was therefore arbitrary.” The Board and the intervenors, residents of Bel Aire, appeal. The City of Wichita has filed a cross-appeal from an order of the trial court limiting certain expert testimony that the City of Wichita desired to present for the first time before the trial court.

At the outset the parties are not in agreement as to the proper scope of review to be applied by the trial court, and this court, to the proceedings and order of the Board. The scope of judicial review is dependent upon the statutes authorizing the appeal, and in the consideration of the legislative function of a board of county commissioners in granting or denying incorporation of a city, it is extremely narrow. The statutes authorizing the incorporation of cities are found at K.S.A. 15-115 through 15-126.

K.S.A. 15-126 provides:

“Any person who shall have an interest in and be aggrieved by the decision of the board of county commissioners under the provisions of K.S.A. 15-115, et seq., may appeal to the district court of the same county in the same manner and method provided for by K.S.A. 19-223. Upon appeal the district court shall have jurisdiction to affirm or, if the court is of the opinion that the decision of the board was arbitrary, unlawful, or capricious, to reverse the decision complained of or direct the county commissioners to take proper action.” (Emphasis added.)

[151]*151The City of Wichita contends that the usual three-pronged test, including the substantial evidence test, applied to 'appeals from quasi-judicial decisions of administrative agencies, applies equally to appeals from the purely legislative function performed by a board of county commissioners in a city incorporation matter. On the other hand, appellants contend that K.S.A. 15-126 establishes a narrower scope of review. We agree. K.S.A. 15-126 limits the scope of review of the trial court and this court to the sole determination of whether the order of the Board was “arbitrary, unlawful, or capricious.” If it was not, the order of the Board must be affirmed.

The district court, and a fortiori this court, on appeal is not at liberty to reweigh evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the Board. See Boswell, Inc., d/b/a Reno County Adult Care Home v. Harkins, 230 Kan. 610, 640 P.2d 1202 (1982). The power to create municipal corporations is a legislative power. City of Kansas City v. Board of County Commissioners, 213 Kan. 777, 518 P.2d 403 (1974); Town of Olsburg v. Pottawatomie County, 113 Kan. 501, 215 Pac. 451 (1923).

“The legislature placed such creative power with the board of county commissioners subject to certain statutory requirements. In reviewing the proceedings of the county commissioners this court cannot concern itself with the advisability of the incorporation. Our review must be restricted to judicial matters such as the construction of statutes and the application of the statutes to the facts 'of this case.” 213 Kan. at 779.

To determine whether the district court properly discharged its function, we make the same review of the agency decision in the first instance as the district court does. Kansas State Board of Healing Arts v. Foote, 200 Kan. 447, 451, 436 P.2d 828 (1968).

It is generally held that a finding of unlawfulness under the various administrative appeals statutes applies to the procedural aspects of the proceedings before the agency and the determination of whether the action taken was within the authority of the agency. In Kansas City, 213 Kan. 777, the court was faced with proceedings involving the incorporation of Piper City in Wyandotte County. The Wyandotte County Board of County Commissioners granted incorporation but failed to give the notice required by K.S.A. 15-119. On appeal this court held that the failure to give the required notice resulted in the proceedings being unlawful and the attempted incorporation was invalid. In the instant case there is no allegation by any party that there were any [152]*152procedural deficiencies in the action before the Board and hence there is no contention that the order of the Board was procedurally unlawful.

The appellants assert there is only one issue on appeal — that being whether the action of the Board in granting incorporation of Bel Aire was arbitrary, unlawful or capricious. The appellee, City of Wichita, states the issues differently and asserts numerous contentions in support of the trial court’s decision.

The Bel Aire Improvement District had been in existence for some twenty-five years when in August of 1980, a petition for incorporation was filed with the Sedgwick County Clerk pursuant to K.S.A. 15-115 et seq. The Bel Aire community is a residential area comprising over eight hundred acres of land located at the northeast corner of the City of Wichita. When the incorporation proceedings began, a narrow strip of agricultural land some one-fourth to one-half mile wide separated the Bel Aire area from the Wichita city limits. At the time of the argument of this appeal, we were advised Bel Aire and Wichita are now contiguous due to unilateral annexation proceedings by the City of Wichita under K.S.A.

Related

Umbehr v. Board of Wabaunsee County Comm'rs
843 P.2d 176 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1992)
In Re Incorporation as a City of the Third Class
736 P.2d 875 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1987)
Keller v. Board of Trustees
733 P.2d 830 (Court of Appeals of Kansas, 1987)
In Re Petition of City of Shawnee for Annexation of Land
687 P.2d 603 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1984)
Weinzirl v. the Wells Group, Inc.
677 P.2d 1004 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1984)
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. State Corp. Commission
664 P.2d 798 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1983)
City of Wichita v. Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs
652 P.2d 717 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1982)

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652 P.2d 717, 232 Kan. 149, 1982 Kan. LEXIS 342, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-wichita-v-board-of-sedgwick-county-commrs-kan-1982.