Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit

398 U.S. 74, 90 S. Ct. 1648, 26 L. Ed. 2d 100, 1970 U.S. LEXIS 99

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: June 29, 1970
• Docket: 2 M
• Status: Published

Opinions

Mr. Chief Justice Burger

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner, a United States District Judge, filed a motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus or alternatively a writ of prohibition addressed to the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit. His petition seeks resolution of questions of first impression concerning, inter alia, the scope and constitutionality of the powers of the Judicial Councils under 28 U. S. C. §§ 137 and 332.¹ The Judicial Council of each federal circuit is, under the present statute, composed of the active circuit judges of the circuit. Petitioner has asked this Court to issue an order under the All Writs Act² telling the Council to “cease acting [in] violation of its powers and in violation of Judge Chandler’s rights as a federal judge and an American citizen.” The background facts are of some importance.

On December 13, 1965, the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit convened in special session ³ and adopted an order which reflected a long history of controversy between petitioner and the Council concerning the conduct of the work of the District Court assigned to petitioner. The Order of December 13 purported to issue under the authority of 28 U. S. C. § 332, supra, n. 1, and recited that during

“the past four years the Judicial Council at many meetings has discussed and considered the business of the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma and has done so with particular regard to the effect thereon of the attitude and conduct of Judge Chandler who, as the Chief Judge of that District, is primarily responsible for the administration of such business. . . .”

The Order noted that during that period petitioner had been a party defendant in both civil and criminal litigation, as well as the subject of two applications to disqualify him in litigation in which on challenge petitioner had refused to disqualify himself.⁴ The Order continued with a finding that

“Judge Chandler is presently unable, or unwilling, to discharge efficiently the duties of his office; that a change must be made in the division of business and the assignment of cases in the Western District of Oklahoma; and that the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma requires the orders herein made.”

Expressly invoking the powers of the Judicial Council under 28 U. S. C. § 332, supra, n. 1, the Order directed that

"until the further order of the Judicial Council, the Honorable Stephen S. Chandler shall take no action whatsoever in any case or proceeding now or hereafter pending in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma; that all cases and proceedings now assigned to or pending before him shall be reassigned to and among the other judges of said court; and that until the further order of the Judicial Council no cases or proceedings filed or instituted in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma shall be assigned to him for any action whatsoever.

“It is further ORDERED that in the event the active judges of the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, including Judge Chandler, cannot agree among themselves upon the division of business and assignment of cases made necessary by this order, the Judicial Council, upon such disagreement being brought to its attention, will act under 28 U. S. C. § 137 and make such division and assignment as it deems proper.”

Copies of the above Order were filed in the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma on December 27 and 28, respectively. Another copy was served on Judge Chandler by a U. S. Marshal.

On January 6, 1966, as previously noted, Judge Chandler filed with this Court his motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of prohibition and/or mandamus directed to the Judicial Council. He also sought a stay of its Order. The Solicitor General, appearing on behalf of the Judicial Council, asked this Court to deny the stay application on the Council’s representation that the Order of December 13 was only temporary pending prompt further inquiry into Judge Chandler’s administration of the business of his court. The stay was denied on January 21, 1966, on the ground that the Order was “entirely interlocutory in character pending prompt further proceedings . . . and that at such proceedings Judge Chandler will be permitted to appear before the Council, with counsel . . . .” 382 U. S. 1003.

On January 24, 1966, Judge Chandler addressed a letter to his fellow district judges indicating that he objected to the removal and reassignment of cases previously assigned and pending before him on December 28, 1965, but that he was not in disagreement with them as to the assignment of all new cases to judges other than himself. Judge Chandler asserted continuing judicial authority, however, over the cases pending before him as of December 28. The following day the judges of the Western District of Oklahoma advised the Judicial Council that all judges of that District had agreed on the division of new business filed in that court, but that they could not agree on the assignment to other judges of cases then pending before Judge Chandler.

On January 27, 1966, the Judicial Council again convened in special session and ordered a hearing on February 10, 1966, in Oklahoma City at which Judge Chandler was invited to appear, with counsel if he desired. However, by February 4, when the Council met again, it had been advised that no judge of the Western District, including Judge Chandler, desired to be heard pursuant to the order for hearing. Accordingly, no hearing took place.

At this same meeting on February 4, 1966, the Council concluded that there was a disagreement among the District Judges of the Western District as to the division of business; it reached this conclusion on the basis of the disagreement between Judge Chandler and the other District Judges as to the reassignment of cases previously assigned to Judge Chandler as of December 28, 1965. The Council accordingly, acting under 28 U. S. C. §§ 137 and 332, entered an order authorizing Judge Chandler to continue to sit on cases filed and assigned to him prior to December 28, 1965; the Order assigned to the other judges of the Western District cases filed after that date. This Order of February 4 recited further that

“4. The division of business and assignment of cases made herein may be amended or modified by written order signed by all active judges of the Western District of Oklahoma, provided that nothing contained herein shall be construed as preventing Judge Chandler from surrendering any pending cases for re-assignment to another active judge or to prevent transfer between judges to whom new business is assigned pursuant to this order.

“5. This order supersedes the orders of the Council entered on December 13, 1965, and on January 27, 1966, entitled ‘In the Matter of the Honorable Stephen S. Chandler, United States District Judge for the Western District of Oklahoma’ and shall remain in effect until the further order of the Council.”

On February 9, 1966, the Solicitor General filed a memorandum on behalf of the Council suggesting that in light of the above developments, namely the confirmation of Judge Chandler’s authority to dispose of the case load then before him and the assignment of new business in accordance with an order previously agreed to by Judge Chandler, the case had become moot since there was nothing more to argue about. To this memorandum Judge Chandler filed a reply on February 25, 1966, contesting the suggestion that he had acquiesced in the Council’s actions. Judge Chandler argued that his acquiescence in the division of new business settled upon by his fellow district judges was given deliberately for reasons of “strategy” in order to prevent any possibility that the Council could find that “the district judges . . . are unable to agree upon the adoption of rules or orders” for the distribution of business and assignment of cases under 28 U. S. C. § 137.

A supplemental memorandum filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the Council expressed the latter’s position that Judge Chandler should dispose of his pending docket of pre-December 28, 1965, cases before seeking assignment of new cases. In view of Judge Chandler’s expressed disagreement with the February 4 Order the Solicitor General withdrew the suggestion of mootness. Later in March 1966 Judge Chandler submitted a reply to that supplemental memorandum asserting that the Council was continuing to act beyond its authority by purporting to require that he certify to it his subsequent willingness and ability to undertake new business. He contended that the supplemental memorandum setting forth the condition that he must apply for assignment was in effect a new order fixing still another condition on the exercise of his judicial office.

On July 12, 1967, the Judicial Council convened and, in light of a report from the District Judges of the Western District showing that Judge Chandler had only 12 cases then pending, concluded that a modification of the Order of February 4, 1966, might be in order. The Council transmitted a copy of the minutes of the meeting to the District Judges and asked them to consider anew and agree upon a division of business within the Western District. On August 28, 1967, Judge Chandler wrote his district judge colleagues claiming that the Council’s action of July 12 was but another “illegal effort” to create a situation in which the Council could assert its powers under 28 U. S. C. § 137 to assign and apportion cases.

On September 1, 1967, the Western District Judges, including Judge Chandler, advised the Judicial Council that “the current order for the division of business in this district is agreeable under the circumstances.” (Emphasis added.) When the Council convened two weeks later, it noted the letter expressing agreement and concluded that there need be no new order in the case; accordingly the Order of February 4 was left in effect. All of these developments were reported to the Clerk of this Court and are part of the record.

In essence petitioner challenges all orders of the Judicial Council relating to assignment of cases in the Western District of Oklahoma as fixing conditions on the exercise of his constitutional powers as a judge. Specifically, petitioner urges that the Council has usurped the impeachment power, committed by the Constitution to the Congress exclusively. While conceding that the statute here invoked confers some powers on the Judicial Council, petitioner contends that the legitimate administrative purposes to which it may be turned do not include stripping a judge of his judicial functions as he claims was done here.

The Judicial Council contends that petitioner seeks to invoke the original jurisdiction of this Court in a case to which such jurisdiction does not extend. The Council argues that the purely administrative action taken in this case has never been reviewed by any court and cannot now be reviewed in an original proceeding under the guise of a claim under the All Writs Act.

The Judicial Council also contends that the Order of December 13, 1965, has been altogether superseded by the Order of February 4, 1966. The latter, in accordance with petitioner's desire, gave back those cases that had been temporarily withdrawn from Judge Chandler. It also continued in force the assignment and division of judicial business agreed upon by the District Judges including Judge Chandler. Alternatively, the Council contends that even absent petitioner’s agreement on the division of cases, nonetheless the Council’s action is authorized by 28 U. S. C. §§ 137 and 332.

The Solicitor General, who has filed a brief as amicus curiae, contends that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition when a Judicial Council order is directed to a district judge because it acted as a judicial, not an administrative, tribunal for purposes of meeting the requirement that the case fall within this Court’s appellate jurisdiction. The Solicitor General suggests that the Council is nothing more nor less than the Court of Appeals sitting en banc, and that the proceedings in the present case may be analogized to a disbarment.⁵ From this the Solicitor General concludes that the case falls within the extraordinary relief available through the All Writs Act. That conclusion in turn rests on the further assumption that this Court’s supervisory authority over lower courts under §§13 and 14 of the first Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 80,81, was not withdrawn when the latter two sections were repealed in favor of the All Writs Act by the revision of the Judicial Code in 1948. The Solicitor General concludes, however, that even though there is appellate jurisdiction in this Court, nonetheless it ought not to be exercised since the Order of December 13 has been superseded for four years by the Order of February 4, the terms of which have been expressly approved by petitioner. The respondent Council also urges this point.

Whether the action taken by the Council with respect to the division of business in Judge Chandler’s district falls to one side or the other of the line defining the maximum permissible intervention consistent with the constitutional requirement of judicial independence is the ultimate question on which review is sought in the petition now before us. The dissenting view of this case seems to be that the action of the Judicial Council relating to assignment of cases is an impingement on judicial independence. There can, of course, be no disagreement among us as to the imperative need for total and absolute independence of judges in deciding cases or in any phase of the decisional function. But it is quite another matter to say that each judge in a complex system shall be the absolute ruler of his manner of conducting judicial business. The question is whether Congress can vest in the Judicial Council power to enforce reasonable standards as to when and where court shall be held, how long a case may be delayed in decision, whether a given case is to be tried, and many other routine matters. As to these things — and indeed an almost infinite variety of others of an administrative nature — can each judge be an absolute monarch and yet have a complex judicial system function efficiently?

The legislative history of 28 U. S. C. § 332 and related statutes is clear that some management power was both needed and granted.⁶ That is precisely what a group of distinguished chief judges and others seem to have had in mind when, in 1939, Congress was urged by Chief Justice Hughes, Chief Judge Groner, Judges Parker, Stephens and Biggs, and others to give judges a statutory framework and power whereby they might “put their own house in order.”

Many courts — including federal courts — have informal, unpublished rules which, for example, provide that when a judge has a given number of cases under submission, he will not be assigned more cases until opinions and orders issue on his “backlog.” These are reasonable, proper, and necessary rules, and the need for enforcement cannot reasonably be doubted. These internal rules do not come to public notice simply because reasonable judges acknowledge their necessity and abide by their intent. But if one judge in any system refuses to abide by such reasonable procedures it can hardly be that the extraordinary machinery of impeachment is the only recourse.

These questions have long been discussed and debated; they are not easy questions and the risks suggested by the dissents are not to be lightly cast aside. But for the reasons that follow we do not find it necessary to answer them because the threshold question in this case is whether we have jurisdiction to entertain the petition for extraordinary relief.

The authority of this Court to issue a writ of prohibition or mandamus “can be constitutionally exercised only insofar as such writs are in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 173-80.” Ex parte Peru, 318 U. S. 578, 582 (1943). If the challenged action of the Judicial Council was a judicial act or decision by a judicial tribunal,⁷ then perhaps it could be reviewed by this Court without doing violence to the constitutional requirement that such review be appellate. As the concurring and dissenting opinions amply demonstrate, finding the prerequisites to support a conclusion that we do have appellate jurisdiction in this case would be no mean feat. It is an exercise we decline to perform since we conclude that in the present posture of the case other avenues of relief on the merits may yet be open to Judge Chandler. See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549, 568-575 (1947).

Judge Chandler contends that his acquiescence in the division of business agreed upon by his fellow judges was given under some kind of duress flowing from the Council’s Order of December 13, and that it was also given as a matter of “strategy,” specifically in order to avoid the appearance of an absence of agreement among the District Judges as to a division of work. By so doing he sought to avoid creating a situation in which the Council would undoubtedly have had jurisdiction under § 137. The Council, however, noting that the judges had been unable to reach agreement as to those cases previously assigned to Judge Chandler, found nonetheless that a disagreement existed. Despite his apparent acquiescence, Judge Chandler contends that his actions since then belie his words; specifically that his subsequent attack in this Court established his disagreement.

Whatever the merits of this apparent attempt to have it both ways, one thing is clear: except for the effort to seek the aid of this Court, Judge Chandler has never once since giving his written acquiescence in the division of business sought any relief from either the Council or some other tribunal.⁸ Were he to disagree with the present division of business, the Judicial Council would thereupon be obliged to “make the necessary orders.” 28 U. S. C. § 137. He chose to avoid that course. As Mr. Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion points out, Judge Chandler apparently desires to have the status quo ante restored without the bother of either disagreeing with the present order of the Council or persuading his fellow district judges to enter another. To say the least this is a remarkable litigation posture for a lawyer to assert in his own behalf.

Instead, Judge Chandler brought an immediate challenge in this Court to the Order of December 13. As noted above, supra, at 79, we denied any relief on the ground that that Order was “entirely interlocutory in character pending prompt further proceedings . . . and that at such proceedings Judge Chandler will be permitted to appear before the Council, with counsel . . . He expressly refused to attend the hearing called by the Council for February 10, 1966, in response to this Court’s order; in his brief he gives as a reason that he was unwilling to “attend a hearing conducted by a body whose jurisdiction he challenged . . . .”⁹ As a result of that refusal we have no record, no petition for relief addressed to any agency, court or tribunal of any kind other than this Court, and a very knotty jurisdictional problem as well.¹⁰ Parenthetically it might be noted that Chandler could have appeared, in person or by counsel, and challenged the jurisdiction of the Council without impairing his claim that it had no power in the matter.

As noted above, and as conceded by the dissents, the Order of December 13, 1965, was terminated by the Order of February 4, 1966. Judge Chandler has twice expressed agreement with the disposition of judicial business effected by that latter Order. Nothing in this record suggests that, were he to express disagreement, relief would not be forthcoming. On the contrary, on July 12, 1967, the Council expressly invited the judges of Chandler’s district to agree among themselves upon a new rule or order for the division of business, and all the judges wrote back advising the Council that “the current order for the division of business in this district is agreeable under the circumstances.”

Whether the Council’s action was administrative action not reviewable in this Court, or whether it is reviewable here, plainly petitioner has not made a case for the extraordinary relief of mandamus or prohibition. The motion for leave to file the petition is therefore

Denied.

MR. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

1 28 U. S. C. § 137. “Division of business among district judges.

“The business of a court having more than one judge shall be divided among the judges as provided by the rules and orders of the court.

“The chief judge of the district court shall be responsible for the observance of such rules and orders, and shall divide the business and assign the cases so far as such rules and orders do not otherwise prescribe.

“If the district judges in any district are unable to agree upon the adoption of rules or orders for that purpose the judicial council of the circuit shall make the necessary orders.”

28 TJ. S. C. § 332. “Judicial Councils.

“The chief judge of each circuit shall call, at least twice in each year and at such places as he may designate, a council of the circuit judges for the circuit, in regular active service, at which he shall preside. Each circuit judge, unless excused by the chief judge, shall attend all sessions of the council.

“The council shall be known as the Judicial Council of the circuit.

“The chief judge shall submit to the council the quarterly reports of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. The council shall take such action thereon as may be necessary.

“Each judicial council shall make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts within its circuit. The district judges shall promptly carry into effect all orders of the judicial council.”

2 28 U. S. C. §1651. “(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”

3 Chief Judge Alfred P. Murrah took no part in the proceedings.

4 The civil suit was an action brought by one O’Bryan charging petitioner with malicious prosecution; the complaint was dismissed by the District Court, aff’d en banc, 352 F. 2d 987 (C. A. 10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U. S. 926 (1966). The criminal indictment charging conspiracy to cheat and defraud the State of Oklahoma was quashed.

In both eases seeking disqualification of petitioner, including one decided after the signing of the Order here challenged, writs of mandamus issued against petitioner. See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Chandler, 303 F. 2d 55 (C. A. 10th Cir. 1962) (en banc), cert. denied, 372 U. S. 915 (1963); and Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler, 354 F. 2d 655 (C. A. 10th Cir. 1965) (en banc), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 936 (1966).

5 We note that nothing in the statute or its legislative history indicates that Congress intended or anyone considered the Circuit Judicial Councils to be courts of appeals en banc. Moreover, it should be noted that proposals to include a district judge as a member of each Circuit Judicial Council have been made; obviously, a Council so constituted could hardly be equated to an en banc court.

6 Congress, by its use of the mandatory “shall” in § 332, appears to have intended that district judges carry out administrative directives of the judicial councils. Congress did not spell out procedures for giving coercive effect to council orders, and the legislative history sheds no light on whether Congress intended this statute to be implemented by regulations. Standing alone, § 332 is not a model of clarity in terms of the scope of the judicial councils’ powers or the procedures to give effect to the final sentence of § 332. Legislative clarification of enforcement provisions of this statute and definition of review of Council orders are called for.

7 We find nothing in the legislative history to suggest that the Judicial Council was intended to be anything other than an administrative body functioning in a very limited area in a narrow sense as a “board of directors” for the circuit. Whether that characterization is valid or not, we find no indication that Congress intended to or did vest traditional judicial powers in the Councils. We see no constitutional obstacle preventing Congress from vesting in the Circuit Judicial Councils, as administrative bodies, authority to make “all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts within [each] circuit.”

8 We express no opinion as to whether he could, for instance, ■ have brought an action in the nature of mandamus to compel “an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed . . .” to him, 28 U. S. C. § 1361, on the theory that this was agency action.

9 Petitioner’s Brief 7.

10 Although it is not necessary to reach or decide the issue, the action of the Judicial Council here complained of has few of the characteristics of traditional judicial action and much of what we think of as administrative action. Nor are we called upon to decide whether administrative action is reviewable when it deals only with the internal operation of a court. See nn. 6, 7, supra.