Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent brought this suit in the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana on behalf of the estate of her deceased son, Joseph Jones, Jr., alleging that he suffered personal injuries from which he died because the petitioners, federal prison officials, violated his due process, equal protection, and Eighth Amendment rights.1 Asserting jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (a), she claimed compensatory and punitive damages for the constitutional violations. Two questions are presented for decision: (1) Is a remedy available directly under the Constitution, given that respondent’s allegations could also support a suit against the United States [17]*17under the Federal Tort Claims Act?2 And (2) if so, is survival of the cause of action governed by federal common law or by state statutes?
I
The District Court held that under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97 (1976), the allegations set out in note 1, supra, pleaded a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against infliction of cruel and unusual punishment,3 giving rise to a cause of action for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). The court recognized that the decedent could have maintained this action if he had survived, but dismissed the complaint because in its view the damages remedy as a matter of federal law was limited to that provided by Indiana’s survivorship and wrongful-death laws and, as the court construed those laws, the damages available to Jones’ estate failed to meet § 1331 (a)’s $10,000 jurisdictional-amount requirement. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed that an Eighth Amendment violation was pleaded under Estelle and that a cause of action was stated under Bivens, but reversed the holding that § 1331 (a)’s jurisdictional-amount requirement was not met.4 Rather, the Court of Appeals held that [18]*18§ 1331 (a) was satisfied because “whenever the relevant State survival statute would abate a Bivens-type action brought against defendants whose conduct results in death, the federal common law allows survival of the action.” 581 F. 2d 669, 675 (1978). The court reasoned that the Indiana law, if applied, would “subvert” “the policy of allowing complete vindication of constitutional rights” by making it “more advantageous for a tortfeasor to kill rather than to injure.” Id., at 674. We granted certiorari. 442 U. S. 940 (1979). We affirm.
^
Bivens established that the victims of a constitutional violation by a federal agent have a right to recover damages against the official in federal court despite the absence of any statute conferring such a right. Such a cause of action may be defeated in a particular case, however, in two situations. The first is when defendants demonstrate “special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.” 403 U. S., at 396; Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228, 245 (1979). The second is when defendants show that Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly [19]*19under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective. Bivens, supra, at 397; Davis v. Passman, supra, at 245-247.
Neither situation obtains in this case. First, the case involves no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress. Petitioners do not enjoy such independent status in our constitutional scheme as to suggest that judicially created remedies against them might be inappropriate. Davis v. Passman, supra, at 246. Moreover, even if requiring them to defend respondent’s suit might inhibit their efforts to perform their official duties, the qualified immunity accorded them under Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), provides adequate protection. See Davis v. Passman, supra, at 246.
Second, we have here no explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by federal officers’ violations of the Eighth Amendment may not recover money damages from the agents but must be remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress. Petitioners point to nothing in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) or its legislative history to show that Congress meant to pre-empt a Bivens remedy or to create an equally effective remedy for constitutional violations.5 FTCA was enacted long before Bivens was decided, but when Congress amended FTCA in 1974 to create a cause of action against the United States for intentional torts committed by federal law enforcement officers, 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (h), the congressional comments accompanying [20]*20that amendment made it crystal clear that Congress views FTCA and Bivens as parallel, complementary causes of action:
“[AJfter the date of enactment of this measure, innocent individuals who are subjected to raids [like that in Bivens] will have a cause of action against the individual Federal agents and the Federal Government. Furthermore, this provision should be viewed as a counterpart to the Bivens case and its progenty [sic], in that it waives the defense of sovereign immunity so as to make the Government independently liable in damages for the same type of conduct that is alleged to have occurred in Bivens (and for which that case imposes liability upon the individual Government officials involved).” S. Rep. No. 93-588, p. 3 (1973) (emphasis supplied).
In the absence of a contrary expression from Congress, § 2680 (h) thus contemplates that victims of the kind of intentional wrongdoing alleged in this complaint shall have an action under FTCA against the United States as well as a Bivens action against the individual officials alleged to have infringed their constitutional rights.
This conclusion is buttressed by the significant fact that Congress follows the practice of explicitly stating when it means to make FTCA an exclusive remedy. See 38 U. S. C. §4116 (a), 42 U. S. C. §233 (a), 42 U. S. C. § 2458a, 10 U. S. C. § 1089 (a), and 22 U. S. C. §817 (a) (malpractice by certain Government, health personnel); 28 U. S. C. § 2679 (b) (operation of motor vehicles by federal employees); and 42 U. S. C. § 247b (k) (manufacturers of swine flu vaccine). Furthermore, Congress has not taken action on other bills that would expand the exclusivity of FTCA. See,
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Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent brought this suit in the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana on behalf of the estate of her deceased son, Joseph Jones, Jr., alleging that he suffered personal injuries from which he died because the petitioners, federal prison officials, violated his due process, equal protection, and Eighth Amendment rights.1 Asserting jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (a), she claimed compensatory and punitive damages for the constitutional violations. Two questions are presented for decision: (1) Is a remedy available directly under the Constitution, given that respondent’s allegations could also support a suit against the United States [17]*17under the Federal Tort Claims Act?2 And (2) if so, is survival of the cause of action governed by federal common law or by state statutes?
I
The District Court held that under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97 (1976), the allegations set out in note 1, supra, pleaded a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against infliction of cruel and unusual punishment,3 giving rise to a cause of action for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). The court recognized that the decedent could have maintained this action if he had survived, but dismissed the complaint because in its view the damages remedy as a matter of federal law was limited to that provided by Indiana’s survivorship and wrongful-death laws and, as the court construed those laws, the damages available to Jones’ estate failed to meet § 1331 (a)’s $10,000 jurisdictional-amount requirement. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed that an Eighth Amendment violation was pleaded under Estelle and that a cause of action was stated under Bivens, but reversed the holding that § 1331 (a)’s jurisdictional-amount requirement was not met.4 Rather, the Court of Appeals held that [18]*18§ 1331 (a) was satisfied because “whenever the relevant State survival statute would abate a Bivens-type action brought against defendants whose conduct results in death, the federal common law allows survival of the action.” 581 F. 2d 669, 675 (1978). The court reasoned that the Indiana law, if applied, would “subvert” “the policy of allowing complete vindication of constitutional rights” by making it “more advantageous for a tortfeasor to kill rather than to injure.” Id., at 674. We granted certiorari. 442 U. S. 940 (1979). We affirm.
^
Bivens established that the victims of a constitutional violation by a federal agent have a right to recover damages against the official in federal court despite the absence of any statute conferring such a right. Such a cause of action may be defeated in a particular case, however, in two situations. The first is when defendants demonstrate “special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.” 403 U. S., at 396; Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228, 245 (1979). The second is when defendants show that Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly [19]*19under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective. Bivens, supra, at 397; Davis v. Passman, supra, at 245-247.
Neither situation obtains in this case. First, the case involves no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress. Petitioners do not enjoy such independent status in our constitutional scheme as to suggest that judicially created remedies against them might be inappropriate. Davis v. Passman, supra, at 246. Moreover, even if requiring them to defend respondent’s suit might inhibit their efforts to perform their official duties, the qualified immunity accorded them under Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), provides adequate protection. See Davis v. Passman, supra, at 246.
Second, we have here no explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by federal officers’ violations of the Eighth Amendment may not recover money damages from the agents but must be remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress. Petitioners point to nothing in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) or its legislative history to show that Congress meant to pre-empt a Bivens remedy or to create an equally effective remedy for constitutional violations.5 FTCA was enacted long before Bivens was decided, but when Congress amended FTCA in 1974 to create a cause of action against the United States for intentional torts committed by federal law enforcement officers, 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (h), the congressional comments accompanying [20]*20that amendment made it crystal clear that Congress views FTCA and Bivens as parallel, complementary causes of action:
“[AJfter the date of enactment of this measure, innocent individuals who are subjected to raids [like that in Bivens] will have a cause of action against the individual Federal agents and the Federal Government. Furthermore, this provision should be viewed as a counterpart to the Bivens case and its progenty [sic], in that it waives the defense of sovereign immunity so as to make the Government independently liable in damages for the same type of conduct that is alleged to have occurred in Bivens (and for which that case imposes liability upon the individual Government officials involved).” S. Rep. No. 93-588, p. 3 (1973) (emphasis supplied).
In the absence of a contrary expression from Congress, § 2680 (h) thus contemplates that victims of the kind of intentional wrongdoing alleged in this complaint shall have an action under FTCA against the United States as well as a Bivens action against the individual officials alleged to have infringed their constitutional rights.
This conclusion is buttressed by the significant fact that Congress follows the practice of explicitly stating when it means to make FTCA an exclusive remedy. See 38 U. S. C. §4116 (a), 42 U. S. C. §233 (a), 42 U. S. C. § 2458a, 10 U. S. C. § 1089 (a), and 22 U. S. C. §817 (a) (malpractice by certain Government, health personnel); 28 U. S. C. § 2679 (b) (operation of motor vehicles by federal employees); and 42 U. S. C. § 247b (k) (manufacturers of swine flu vaccine). Furthermore, Congress has not taken action on other bills that would expand the exclusivity of FTCA. See, e. g., S. 695, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H. R. 2659, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 3314, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
Four additional factors, each suggesting that the Bivens remedy is more effective than the FTCA remedy, also support our conclusion that Congress did not intend to limit respond[21]*21ent to an FTCA action. First, the Bivens remedy, in addition to compensating victims, serves a deterrent purpose. See Butz v. Economou, supra, at 505.6 Because the Bivens remedy is recoverable against individuals, it is a more effective deterrent than the FTCA remedy against the United States. It is almost axiomatic that the threat of damages has a deterrent effect,7 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 442 (1976) (White, J., concurring in judgment), surely particularly so when the individual official faces personal financial liability.
Petitioners argue that FTCA liability is a more effective deterrent because the individual employees responsible for the Government’s liability would risk loss of employment8 and because the Government would be forced to promulgate corrective policies. That argument suggests, however, that the superiors would not take the same actions when an employee is found personally liable for violation of a citizen’s constitutional rights. The more reasonable assumption is that responsible superiors are motivated not only by concern for the public fisc but also by concern for the Government’s integrity.
Second, our decisions, although not expressly addressing [22]*22and deciding the question, indicate that punitive damages maybe awarded in a Bivens suit. Punitive damages are “a particular remedial mechanism normally available in the federal courts,” Bivens, 403 U. S., at 397, and are especially appropriate to redress the violation by a Government official of a citizen’s constitutional rights. Moreover, punitive damages are available in “a proper” § 1983 action, Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 257, n. 11 (1978) (punitive damages not awarded because District Court found defendants “did not act with a malicious intention to deprive respondents of their rights or to do them other injury”),9 and Butz v. Economou, suggests that the “constitutional design” would be stood on its head if federal officials did not face at least the same liability as state officials guilty of the same constitutional transgression. 438 U. S., at 504. But punitive damages in an FTCA suit are statutorily prohibited. 28 U. S. C. § 2674. Thus FTCA is that much less effective than a Bivens action as a deterrent to unconstitutional acts.
Third, a plaintiff cannot opt for a jury in an FTCA action, 28 U. S. C. § 2402, as he may in a Bivens suit.10 Petitioners argue that this is an irrelevant difference because juries have been biased against Bivens claimants. Reply Brief for Petitioners 7, and n. 6; Brief for Petitioners 30-31, n. 30. Significantly, however, they do not assert that judges trying the claims as FTCA actions would have been more receptive, and [23]*23they cannot explain why the plaintiff should not retain the choice.
Fourth, an action under FTCA exists only if the State in which the alleged misconduct occurred would permit a cause of action for that misconduct to go forward. 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (b) (United States liable “in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred”). Yet it is obvious that the liability of federal officials for violations of citizens’ constitutional rights should be governed by uniform rules. See Part III, infra. The question whether respondent’s action for violations by federal officials of federal constitutional rights should be left to the vagaries of the laws of the several States admits of only a negative answer in the absence of a contrary congressional resolution.
Plainly FTCA is not a sufficient protector of the citizens’ constitutional rights, and without a clear congressional mandate we cannot hold that Congress relegated respondent exclusively to the FTCA remedy.
Ill
Bivens actions are a creation of federal law and, therefore, the question whether respondent’s action survived Jones’ death is a question of federal law. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. 471, 476 (1979). Petitioners, however, would have us fashion a federal rule of survivorship that incorporates the survivorship laws of the forum State, at least where the state law is not inconsistent with federal law. Respondent argues, on the other hand, that only a uniform federal rule of sur-vivorship is compatible with the goal of deterring federal officials from infringing federal constitutional rights in the manner alleged in respondent’s complaint. We agree with respondent. Whatever difficulty we might have resolving the question were the federal involvement less clear, we hold that only a uniform federal rule of survivorship will suffice to redress the constitutional deprivation here alleged and to protect against repetition of such conduct.
[24]*24In short, we agree with and adopt the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, 581 F. 2d, at 674-675 (footnote omitted):
“The essentiality of the survival of civil rights claims for complete vindication of constitutional rights is buttressed by the need for uniform treatment of those claims, at least when they are against federal officials. As this very case illustrates, uniformity cannot be achieved if courts are limited to applicable state law. Here the relevant Indiana statute would not permit survival of the claim, while in Beard [v. Robinson, 563 F. 2d 331 (CA7 1977),] the Illinois statute permitted survival of the Bivens action. The liability of federal agents for violation of constitutional rights should not depend upon where the violation occurred. ... In sum, we hold that whenever the relevant state survival statute would abate a Bivens-type action brought against defendants whose conduct results in death, the federal common law allows survival of the action.”
Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U. S. 584 (1978), holding that a § 1983 action would abate in accordance with Louisiana survivorship law is not to the contrary. There the plaintiff’s death was not caused by the acts of the defendants upon which the suit was based.11 Moreover, Robertson expressly [25]*25recognized that to prevent frustrations of the deterrence goals of § 1983 (which in part also underlie Bivens actions, see Part II, supra) “[a] state official contemplating illegal activity must always be prepared to face the prospect of a i 1983 action being filed against him.” 436 U. S., at 592. A federal official contemplating unconstitutional conduct similarly must be prepared to face the prospect of a Bivens action. A uniform rule that claims such as respondent’s survive the decedent’s death is essential if we are not to “frustrate in [an] important way the achievement” of the goals of Bivens actions. Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U. S. 696, 702 (1966).12
Affirmed.