Ex Parte Young

209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714, 1908 U.S. LEXIS 1726

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: March 23, 1908
• Docket: 10, Original
• Status: Published

Opinions

Mr. Justice Peckham,

after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court..

We recognize and appreciate' to the fullest extent the very great importance of this case, not only to the parties now before the court, but also to the great mass of the citizens of this country^ all of whom are interested in the practical working of the courts of justice throughout the land, both Federal and state, and in the proper exercise of the jurisdiction of the Federal courts, as limited and controlled by the Federal Constitution and the laws of Congress.

That there has been room for difference of opinion with regard to such limitations the reported cases in this court bear conclusive testimony. It cannot be stated that the case before us is entirely free from any possible doubt nor that intelligent men may not differ as to the correct answer to the question we are called upon to decide.

The question of jurisdiction, whether of the Circuit Court' or of this court, is frequently a delicate matter to deal with, and it is especially so in this case, where the material and most important objection to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is the assertion that the suit is in effect against one of the States of the Union. It is a question, however, which we are called upon, and which it is our duty, to decide. Under these circumstances, the language of Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404, is most apposite. In that case he said:

“It is most true that this court will not take jurisdiction if it should not; but it is equally true that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the Constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp- that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid, but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously perform our duty.”

Coming to a consideration of the case, we find that the complainants in the suit commenced ip the Circuit Court were ' stockholders in the Northern Pacific Railway Company, and the reason for commencing it and making the railroad company one of the parties defendant is sufficiently set forth in the bill.- Davis &c. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U. S. 207, 220; Equity Rule 94, Supreme Court.

It is primarily asserted on the part of the petitioner that jurisdiction did not exist in the Circuit Court because there was not the requisite diversity of citizenship, and there was no question arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States to otherwise give jurisdiction to that court. There is no claim made here of jurisdiction on the ground of diversity of citizenship, and the claim, if made, would be unfounded in fact. ‘ If no other ground exists, then the order of the Circuit Court, assuming to punish petitioner for contempt, was an unlawful order, made by a court without’jurisdiction. In such case this court, upon proper application, will discharge the person from imprisonment. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651; Ex parte Fisk, 113 U. S. 713; In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 485. But an examination of the record before us shows that there are Federal questions in this case.

It is insisted by the petitioner that there is no Federal ques-jbion: presented under the. Fourteenth Amendment, because there is no dispute as to the meaning of the Constitution, where it provides that no State, shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal .protection'of the laws, and whatever , dispute there may be in this case is one of fact simply; whether the freight or passenger rates as fixed by the legislature1 or by the railroad commission are so low as to be confiscatory, and that is not a Federal question.

Jurisdiction is-given to the Circuit Court in suits involving the requisite amount, arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States (1 U. S. Comp. Stat. p. 508), and the ques-' tion really to be determined under this objection is whether rthe acts of the legislature and the orders of the railroad commission,- if enforced, would take property without due process . of- law, and although that question might incidentally involve a question of fact, its solution nevertheless is one which raises a Federal question. See Hastings v. Ames (C. C. A. 8th Circuit); 68 Fed. Rep. 726. The sufficiency of rates with reference to the Federal Constitution is a judicial question, and one oyer which Federal courts have, jurisdiction by reason of its Federal nature. Chicago &c. R. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418; Reagan v. Farmers’ &c. Co., 154 U. S. 369, 399; St. Louis &c. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649; Covington &c: Turnpike Road Company v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 522; Chicago &c. Railway Co. v. Tompkins, 176 U. S. 167, 172.

'ÁnothérjFederal question is the alleged unconstitutionality of these acts because' of the enormous penalties denounced for théir. violation, which prevent the railway company, as alleged, or any of- its servants or employés, from resorting to ±he courts for the purpose of determining the validity of such acts. The contention Is urged by the complainants in the suit that thq company is denied the equal protection of the ‘laws and its property is. liable to' be taken without due process of law, because -it is only allowed a hearing upon the claim of • the unconstitutionality of the acts and orders in question, at the risk, if mistaken, of being, subjected to such enormous penalties, resulting in the possible confiscation of its whole property, that rather than take such risks,the company would obey the laws, although such obedience might also result in the end (though by a slower process) in such confiscation.

Still another Federal question is urged, growing out of the assertion that the laws are, by their necessary effect, an interference with and a regulation of interstate commerce, the grounds for which assertion it is not now necessary to enlarge upon. The question is not, at any rate, frivolous.

We conclude that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction in the case before it, because it involved the decision of Federal questions arising under the Constitution of the United States.

Coming to the inquiry regarding the alleged invalidity of these acts, we take up the contention that they are invalid on their face on account of the penalties. For disobedience to the freight act the officers, directors, agents and employés of the company are made guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction each may be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a period not exceeding ninety days. Each violation would be a separate offense, and, therefore, might result in imprisonment of the various agents of the company who would dare disobey for a term of ninety days each for each offense. Disobedience to the passenger rate act renders the party guilty of a felony and subject to a fine'not exceeding' five thousand dollars or imprisonment in the state prison for a period not exceeding five years, or both fine and imprisonment. The sale of each ticket above the price permitted by the act would be a violation thereof. It would-be difficult, if not impossible, for the company to obtain officers, agents or employés willing to carry on its affairs except in obedience to the act and orders in question. The company itself would also, in case of disobedience, be liable to the immense fines provided for in violating orders of the Commission. The company, in order to test the validity of the acts, must find some agent or employé to-disobey them at the risk stated. The necessary effect and result of such legislation must be to preclude a resort to the courts (either state or Federal) for the purpose of testing its validity. The officers and employés could not be expected to disobey any of the provisions of the acts or orders at the risk of such fines and penalties being imposed upon them, in case the court should decide that the law was valid. The result would be a denial of any hearing to the company. The observations upon a similar question made by Mr. Justice Brewer in Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Company, 183 U. S. 79, 99, 100, 102, afe very apt. At page 100 he stated: “Do the' laws .secure to an individual an equal protection when' he is allowed to come into court and make his claim or defense subject to the condition that upon a failure to make good that claim or ^ defense the penalty for such failure either appropriates all his' property or subjects him to extravagant and unreasonable loss?” Again, at page 102, he says: “It is doubtless true that the State may impose penalties, such as will tend to compel obedience to its mandates by all, individuals or corporations, and if extreme and cumulative penalties are imposed only after there has been a final determination of the validity of the statute, the question would be very different from that here presented. But when the legislature, in aii' effort' to prevent any inquiry of the validity of a particular statute, so burdens any challenge thereof, in the courts that(',the party affected is necessarily constrained to submit rather than take the chances of the penalties imposed, then it becomes a serious question whether the party is not deprived of the equal protection of the laws.” The question was not decided in that case, as it went off on another ground. We have the same question now before us, only the penalties are more severe in the way of fines, to which is added, in the case of officers, agents or employés of the company, the risk of imprisonment for years as a common felon. See also Mercantile Trust Co. v. Texas &c. Ry. Co., 51 Fed. Rep. 529, 543; Louisville &c. R. R. Co. v. McChord, 103 Fed. Rep. 216, 223; Consolidated Gas Co. v. Mayer, 146 Fed. Rep. 150, 153. In McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662, 694, it was held that to provide a different remedy to enforce a contract, which is unreasonable, and which imposes conditions not existing when the contract was made, was to offer no remedy, and whgn the remedy is so onerous and impracticable as to substantially give hone at all the law is invalid, although what is termed a remedy is in fact "given. See also Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311, 317; Seibert v. Lewis, 122 U. S. 284. If the law be such as to make the decision of the legislature or of a commission conclusive as to the sufficiency of the rates,

. this court has held such a law to be unconstitutional. Chicago &c. Railway Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418. A law which indirectly accomplishes a like result by imposing such conditions upon the right to appeal for judicial relief as works an abandonment of the right rather than face the conditions .upon which it is offered or may be obtained, is also unconstitutional. It may. therefore be said that when the penalties for disobedience are by fines so enormous and imprisonment so severe as to intimidate the company and its officers from resorting to the courts to test the validity of the legislation,, the result is the same as if the law in terms prohibited the company from seeking judicial construction of laws w^ich deeply afféet» its rights.

It is urged that there is no principle upon which to base the claim that a person is entitled to disobey a statute at least once, for the purpose of testing its validity without subjecting himself to the penalties for disobedience provided by the statute in case it is valid. This is not.- an accurate statement of the case. Ordinarily a law creating offenses in the nature of misdemeanors or felonies relates to a subject over which the jurisdiction of the legislature is complete in any event.. In the case, however, of the establishment of certain rates -without any hearing, the validity of such rates necessarily depends upon whether they are high enough to permit at least some return upon, the investment (how much it is not now necessary to state), and an inquiry as to that fact is a proper subject of judicial investigation. If it turns out that the rates are too low for that purpose, then they are illegal. Now, to impose upon a party interested the burden of obtaining a judicial decision of such a question (no prior hearing having ever been given) only upon the condition that if unsuccessful he must suffer imprisonment and pay fines as provided in these acts, is, in effect, to close up all approaches to the courts, and thus prevent any hearing upon the question whether the rates as provided by the acts are not too low, and therefore invalid. The distinction is obvious between a case where the validity of the act depends upon the existence of a fact which can be determined only after investigation of a very compli-. cated and technical character, and the ordinary case of a statute upon a subject requiring no such investigation and over which the jurisdiction of the legislature is complete in any event.

We hold, therefore, that the provisions of the acts relating to the enforcement of the rates, either for freight or passengers, by imposing such enormous fines and possible imprisonment as a result of an unsuccessful effort to test the validity of the laws themselves, are unconstitutional on their face, without regard to the question of the insufficiency of those rates. We also hold that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction under the cases already cited (and it was therefore its duty) to inquire whether the rates permitted by these acts or orders were too low and therefore confiscatory, and if so held, that the court then had jurisdiction to permanently enjoin the railroad company from putting them in force, and that it also had power, while the inquiry was pending, to grant a temporary injunction to the same effect.

Various affidavits were received upon the hearing before the court prior to the granting of the temporary injunction, and the hearing itself was, as appears from the opinion, full and deliberate, and the fact was found that the rates fixed by the commodity act, ünder the circumstances .existing with reference to the passenger rate act and the orders of the Commission, were not sufficient' to be compensatory, and were in fact confiscatory, and the act was therefore unconstitutional. The injunction was thereupon granted with reference to the enforcement of the commodity act.

We have, therefore, upon this record the case of án unconstitutional act of the state legislature and an intention by the Attorney General of the State to endeavor to enforce its provisions, to the injury of the company, in compelling it, at great expense, to defend legal proceedings of a complicated and unusual character, and involving questions of vast importance to all employés and officers of the company, as well as to the company itself. The question that arises is whether there is a remedy that the parties interested may resort to, by going into a Federal court of equity, in a case involving a violation of the Federal Constitution, .and obtaining a judicial investigation of the -problem, and pending its solution obtain freedom from suits, civil or criminal, by a temporary injunction, and if the question be finally decided favorably to the contention of the company, a permanent injunction restraining all such actions or proceedings.

This inquiry necessitates an examination of the most material and important objection made to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, the objection being that the suit is, in effect, one against the State of Minnesota, and that the injunction issued against the Attorney General illegally prohibits state action, either criminal or civil, to enforce obedience to the. statutes of the State. This objection is to be considered with reference to the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits the commencement or prosecution of any suit against one of the United States by citizens of another State- or citizens or subj ects of any foreign State. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall it deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

The case before the, Circuit Court proceeded ‘upon the theory that the orders and acts heretofore mentioned would, if enforced, violate rights' df the complainants protected by the latter Amendment. We think that whatever the rights, of complainants may be., they are largely founded upon that. Amendment, but a decision of this case does not require an examination or decision.', of. the' question whether its adoption in any way altered or limited the effect of the earlier Amendment. We may assume that each exists in full force, and that we must give to the Eleventh Amendment all the. effect it naturally would have, without cutting it down or rendering its meaning any more narrow than the language, fairly interpreted, would warrant. It applies to a suit brought against a State by one of its own citizens as well as to a suit brought by a citizen of another State. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 14. It was- adopted after the decision of this court in Chisholm v. Georgia, (1793), 2 Dall. 419 where it . was held that a State might be sued by a citizen of another State. Since that time there have been many cases decided in this court involving the Eleventh Amendment, among them being Osborn v. United States Bank (1824), 9 Wheat. 738, 846, 857, which .held that the Amendment applied only to those suits in which the State was a party on the record. In the subsequent case of Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo (1828), 1 Pet. 110, 122, 123, that holding was somewhat enlarged, and Chief Justice Marshall, delivering the opinion of the court, while citing Osborn v. United States Bank, supra, said that where the claim was made, as in the case then before the court, against the Governor of Georgia as governor, and the demand was made upon him, not personally, but officially (for moneys in the treasury of the State and for slaves in possession of the state government), the State might be considered as the party on the record (page 123), and therefore the suit could not be maintained.

Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, 220, reiterates the rule of Osborn v. United States Bank, so far as concerns the right to enjoin a state officer from executing a state law in conflict with the Constitution or a statute of the United States, when such execution will violate the rights of the complainant.

In Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 270, 296 (Poindexter v. Greenhow), it was adjudged that a suit against a tax collector who had refused coupons in payment of taxes, and, undér color of a void law, was about to seize and sell the property of a taxpayer for non-payment of his taxes, was a suit against him personally as a wrongdoer and not against the Staté.

Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52, 67, decided that the bill was in substance a bill for the specific performance of a contract between the complainants and the State of South Carolina, and, although the State was not in name made a party defendant, yet being the actual party to the alleged contract the performance of which was sought and the only party by whom it could be performed, the State was, in, effect, a party to the suit, and it could not be maintained for that reason. The things required to be done by the actual defendants were the very things which when done would constitute a performance of the alleged contract by the State.

The cases upon the subject were reviewed, and it was held, In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, that a bill in equity brought against officers of a State, who, as individuals, have no personal interest in the subject-matter of the suit, and defend only as representing the State, where the relief prayed for, if done, would constitute a .performance by the State of the alleged contract of the State, was a suit against the State (page 504), following in this respect Hagood v. Southern, supra.

A suit of such a nature was simply an attempt to make the State itself, through its officers, perform its alleged contract, by directing those officers to do acts which constituted such performance. The State alone had any interest in the question, and a decree in favor of plaintiff would affect the treasury of the State.

On the other hand, United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, determined that an individual in possession of real estate under the. Government of the United States, which claimed to be its owner, was, nevertheless, properly sued by the plaintiff, as owner, to, recover possession,-and such suit was not one against the United States, although the individual in possession justified such possession under its authority. See also Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204, to the same effect.

In Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1, 9, a suit against land commissioners of the State was said not to be against the State, although the complainants sought to restrain the defendants, officials of the State, from violating, under an unconstitutional act, the complainants’ contract with the State, and thereby working irreparable damage to the property rights' of the complainants. Osborn v. United States Bank, supra, was cited, and it was stated: “But the general doctrine of Osborn v. Bank of the United States, that the Circuit Courts of the United States will restrain a state officer from executing an unconstitutional statute of the State, when to execute it would violate rights and privileges of the complainant which had .been guaranteed by the Constitution, and would work irreparable damage and injury to him, has never been departed from. ' The same principle is decided in Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 67. And see Missouri &c. v. Missouri Railroad Commissioners, 183 U. S. 53.

The cases above cited do not include one exactly like this under discussion. They serve to illustrate the principles upon which many cases have been decided. We have not cited all the cases,-as we have not thought it necessary. But the injunction asked for in the Ayers Case, 123 U. S. (supra),'was to restrain the state officers from commencing suits under the act of May 12, 1887 (alleged to be unconstitutional), in the ñame of the State- and brought to recover taxes for its use, on the ground that if such suits were commenced they would be a breach of a contract with the State. The injunction was declared illegal because the suit itself could not be entertained .as it was one against the State to enforce its alleged contract. It was said, however, that if the court had power to entertain such a suit, it would have power to grant the restraining order preventing the commencement of suits. (Page 487.) It was not stated that the suit or the injunction was necessarily confined to a case of a threatened direct trespass upon or injury to property.

Whether the commencement of a suit could ever be regarded as an actionable injury to another, equivalent in some cases to a trespass such as is set forth in some of the foregoing cases, has received attention in the rate cases, so called. Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362 (a rate case), was a suit against the members of a railroad commission (created under an act of the State of Texas) and the Attorney General, all of whom Were held suable, and that such suit was not one against the State. The Commission' was enjoined from enforcing the rates it had established under the act, and the Attorney General was enjoined from instituting suits to recover penalties for failing to conform to the rates fixed by the Commission under such act. ’ It is true the statute in that case creating the board provided that suit might be maintained by any dissatisfied railroad company, or other party in interest,, in a court of competent jurisdiction in Travis County, Texas, against the Commission as defendant. This court held that such language. permitted a suit in the United States Circuit Court for the Western District of Texas, which embraced Travis County, but it also held that, irrespective of that consent, the suit was not in effect a suit against the State (although the Attorney General was enjoined), and therefore not prohibited under the amendment. It was said in the opinion, which was delivered by Mr. Justice Brewer, that the suit could not in any fair sense be considered a suit against the State (page 392), and the conclusion of the court was that the objection to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court was not tenable, whether that jurisdiction was rested (page 393), “upon the provisions of the statute or upon the general jurisdiction of the court existing by virtue of the statutes of Congress and the sanction of the Constitution of the United States.” Each- of these grounds is effective and both are of equal force. Union Pacific &c. v. Mason City Company, 199 U. S. 160, 166.

In Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (another rate case), it was again held that a suit against individuals, for the purpose of preventing them, as officers of the State, from enforcing, by the commencement of suits or by indictment, an unconstitutional enactment to the injury of the rights of the plaintiff, was not' a suit against a State, within the meaning of the Amendment. At page 518, in answer to the objection that the suit was really against the State, it was said: “It is the settled doctrine of this court that a suit against individuals for the purpose of preventing them as officers of a State from enforcing an unconstitutional enactment .to the injury of the rights of the plaintiff, is not a suit against the State within the meaning of that Amendment.” The suit was to enjoin the enforcement of a statute of Nebraska because it was alleged to be unconstitutional, on account of the rates being too low to afford some compensation to the company, and contrary, therefore, to the Fourteenth Amendment.

There was no special provision in the' statute as to rates, making it the duty of the Attorney General to enforce it, but under his general powers he had authority to ask for a mandamus to enforce such or any other law. State of Nebraska ex rel. &c. v. The Fremont &c. Railroad Co., 22 Nebraska, 313.

The final decree enjoined the Attorney General from bringing any suit (page 477) by way of injunction, mandamus, civil action or indictment, for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the act. The fifth section of the act provided that an action might be brought by.a railroad company in the Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska; but this court did not base its decision on that section when it held that a suit of the nature of that before it was not a suit against a State, although brought against individual state officers for the purpose of enjoining -them from enforcing, either by civil proceeding or indictment, an unconstitutional enactment to the injury of the plaintiff’s right. (Page 518.)

This decision was reaffirmed in Prout v. Starr, 188 U. S. 537, 542.

Attention is also directed to the case of Missouri &c. Rwy. Co. v. Missouri R. R. &c. Commissioners, 183 U. S. 53. That was a suit brought in a state court of Missouri by the railroad commissioners of the State, who had the powers granted them by the statutes set forth in the report. Their suit was against the railway company to compel it to discontinue certain charges it Was making for crossing the Boonville bridge over the Missouri River. The defendant sought to remove the case to the Federal court, which the plaintiffs resisted, and the state court refused to remove on the ground that the real plaintiff was the State of Missouri, and it was proper to go behind the face of the record to determine that fact. In regular manner the case came here, and this court held that the State was not the real party plaintiff, and the case had therefore' been properly removed from the state court, whose judgment was thereupon reversed.

Applying the same principles of construction to the removal act which had been applied to the Eleventh Amendment, it was said by this court that the State might be. the real party plaintiff when the relief sought enures to it alone, and in. whose-favor the judgment or decree, if for the plaintiff, will effectively operate.

Although the case is one arising under the removal act and does not involve the Eleventh Amendment, it nevertheless illustrates the question now before us, and reiterates the doctrine that the State is not a party to a suit simply because the State Railroad Commission is such party.

The doctrine of Smyth v. Ames is also referred to and reiterated in Gunter, Attorney General, v. Atlantic &c. Railroad Co., 200 U. S. 273, 283. See also McNeill v. Southern Railway, 202 U. S. 543-559; Mississippi Railroad Commission v. Illinois &c. Railroad Co., 203 U. S. 335, 340.

The various authorities we have referred to furnish ample justification for the assertion that individuals, who, as officers of the State, are clothed with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws of the State, and who threaten and are about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to enforce against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution, may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such action.

It-is objected, however, that Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 516, has somewhat limited this principle, and that, upon the authority of that case, it must be held that the State was a party to the suit in the United States Circuit Court, and the bill should have been dismissed as to the Attorney General on that ground.

We do not think such contention is well founded. The doctrine of Smyth v. Ames was neither overruled nor doubted in the Fitts case. In that case the Alabama legislature, by the act of 1895, fixed the tolls to be charged for crossing the bridge. The penalties for disobeying that act, by demanding and re--ceiving-higher tolls, were to be collected by the persons pay- ' ing them. No officer of the State had any official connection with the recovery of such penalties. The indictments mentioned were found under another state statute, set forth at page '520 of the report of the case, which provided a fine against an officer of a company for taking any greater rate of toll than was authorized b¿t its charter, or, if the charter' did not specify the amount, then the fine was imposed for charging any unreasonable toll, to be determined by a jury. This act was not claimed to be unconstitutional, and the indictments found under it were not necessarily connected with the alleged unconstitutional act fixing the tolls. As no state officer who was made a party bore any close official connection with the act fixing the tolls, the making of such officer a party defendant was a simple effort to test the constitutioriality of such act in that way, and there is no principle upon which it could be done. A state superintendent of schools might as well have been made a party. In the light of this fact it was said in the opinion (page 530):

“In the present case, as we have said, neither of the State officers named held any special relation to the particular statute alleged to be unconstitutional. They were not expressly directed to see to its enforcement. If, because they were law officers of the State, a case could be made for the purpose of testing the constitutionality of the statute, by an injunction suit brought against them, then the constitutionality of every act passed by the legislature could be tested by a suit against the governor and the attorney general, based upon the theory that the former, as the executive of the State was, in a general sense, charged with the execution of all its laws, and the latter, as attorney general, might represent the State in litigation involving the enforcement of its statutes. That would be a very convenient way for obtaining a speedy judicial determination of questions of constitutional law which may be raised by individuals, but it is a mode which cannot be applied to the States of the Union consistently with, the fundamental principle that they cannot, without their assent, be brought into any court at the suit of private persons.”

In making an officer of the State a party defendant in a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an act alleged to be unconstitutional it is plain that such officer must have some connection with the enforcement of the a,ct, or else it is merely making him. a party as a representative of the State, and thereby attempting to make the State a party.

• It has not, however, been held that it was necessary that such duty should be declared in the same act which is to be enforced. In some cases, it is true, the duty of enforcement has been.so imposed (154 U. S. 362, 366, § 19 of the act), but that'may possibly make the duty more clear; if. it otherwise exist it is equally efficacious. The fact that the state officer by virtue of his office has some connection with' the enforcement of. the act is the important and material fact, and whether it - arises out of the general law, or is specially created by the act itself, is not material so long as it exists.

In the course of the opinion in the Fitts case the Reagan and Smyth cases were referred to (with others) as instances of state officers specially charged with the execution of a state enactment alleged to be unconstitutional, and who commit under its authority some specific wrong or trespass to the injury of plaintiff’s rights. In those cases the only wrong or injury or trespass involved was the threatened commencement of suits to enforce the statute as to rates, and the threat of such commencement was in each case regarded as sufficient to authorize the issuing of an injunction to prevent the same. The threat to commence those suits under such circumstances was therefore necessarily held to be equivalent to any other threatened wrong or injury to the property of a plaintiff which had theretofore been held sufficient to authorize the suit against the officer. The being specially charged with the duty to enforce the statute is sufficiently apparent when such duty exists under the general authority of some law, even though such authority is not to be found in the particular act. It might exist by reason of the general duties of the officer to enforce it as a law of the State.

The officers in the Fitts case occupied the position of having . no duty at all with regard to the act, and could not be properly made parties to the suit for the reason stated.

It is also objected that as the statute does not specifically make it the duty of the Attorney General (assuming he has that general right) to enforce it, he has under such circumstances a full general discretion whether to attempt its enforcement or not, and the court' cannot interfere to control him as • Attorney General in the exercise of his discretion.

In our view there is no interference with his discretion under the facts herein. There is no doubt that the court cannot control the exercise of the discretion of an officer. It can only direct affirmative action where the officer having some duty to perform not involving discretion, but merely ministerialin its nature, refuses or neglects to take such action. In that case the court can direct the defendant to perform this merely ministerial duty. Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U. S. 531, 541.

The general discretion regarding the enforcement of the laws when and as he deems appropriate is not interfered with by an injunction which restrains the state officer from taking any steps towards the enforcement of an unconstitutional enactment to the injury of complainant. In such case no affirmative action of any nature is directed, and the officer is simply prohibited from doing an act which ho had no legal right to do. An injunction to prevent him from doing that which he has no legal right to do is not an interference with the discretion of an officer.

It is'also argued that the only proceeding which the Attorney General could take to enforce the statute, so far as his office is concerned, was one by mandamus, which would be commenced by the State in its sovereign and governmental character, and that the right to bring such action is a necessary attribute of a sovereign government. It is contended that the complainants do not complain and they care nothing about any action which Mr. Young might take or bring as an ordinary individual, but that he was complained of as an officer, to whose discretion is confided the use of the name of the State-of Minnesota so far as litigation is concerned, and that when or how he shall use it is a matter resting in his discretion and cannot be controlled by any court.

The answer to all this is the same as made in every case where an official claims to be acting under the authority of the State. The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if.it be so, the use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and one which does not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state official in attempting by the use of the name of the State to enforce a legislative enactment which is void because unconstitutional. If. the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal. Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States. See In re Ayers, supra, page 507. It would be an injury to complainant to harass'it with a multiplicity of suits or litigation generally in an endeavor to enforce penalties under an unconstitutional enactment, and to prevent it ought to be within the jurisdiction of a court of equity. If the question of unconstitutionality with reference, at least, to the Federal Constitution be first raised in a Federal court that court, as we think is shown by the authorities cited hereafter, has the right to decide it to the exclusion of all other courts.

The question remains whether the Attorney General had, by the law of the State, so far as concerns these rate acts, any duty with regard to the enforcement of the same. By his official conduct it seems that he regarded it as a duty connected with his office to compel the company to obey the commodity act, for he commenced proceedings to enforce such obedience immediately- after the injunction issued, at the risk of being found guilty of contempt by so doing.

The duties of the Attorney General, as decided by the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota,- are created partly by statute and exist partly as at common law.- State ex rel. Young, Attorney General, v. Robinson (decided June 7, 1907), 112 N. W. Rep. 269. In the above-cited case^it was held that the Attorney General might institute, conduct and maintain all suits and proceedings he might deem necessary for the enforcement of the laws of the State, the preservation of order and the protection, of public rights, and that there were no statutory restrictions in that State limiting the duties of the. Attorney General in such case.

Section 3 .of chapter 227 of the General Laws of Minnesota, 1905 (same law, §58, Revised Laws of Minnesota., 1905), imposes the duty upon the Attorney General to cause proceedings to be instituted against any corporation whenever it shall have offended against the law's of the State. By § 1960 of the Revised Laws of 1905 it is also provided that the Attorney General shall be ex officio attorney for the railroad commission and it is made his duty to institute and prosecute all actions which the Commission shall order brought, and shall render the commissioners all counsel and advice necessary for the proper performance of their duties.

It is said that the Attorney General is only bound to act when the Commission orders action to be brought, and that § 5 of the commodity act (April 18, 1907) expressly provides that no duty shall rest upon the Commission to enforce the act, and hence no duty other than that which is discretionary rests upon the Attorney General in that matter. The provision is somewhat unusual, but' the reasons for its insertion in that act are not material, and neither require nor justify' comment by this court.

It would seem to be clear that the Attorney General, under his power existing at common law and by virtue of these various statutes, had a general duty imposed upon him, which includes the right and the power to enforce the statutes of the State, including, of course, the act in question, if it were constitutional. His power by virtue of his office sufficiently connected him with the duty of enforcement to make him a proper party to a. suit of the nature of the one now before the United States Circuit Court.

It is further objected' (and the objection really forms.part of the contention that the State cannot be sued) that -a court-of equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin criminal proceedings, by indictment or otherwise, under the state law. This, as' a . general rule, is true. But there are exceptions. When such indictment or proceeding is brought to enforce an alleged unconstitutional statute, which is the subject matter of inquiry in a suit already pending in a Federal court, the latter court having first obtained jurisdiction over the subject matter, has the right, in both civil and criminal cases, to hold and maintain such jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts, until its duty is fully performed. Front v. Starr, 188 U. S. 537, 544. But the Federal cpurt cannot, of course, interfere in a case where the proceedings were already pending in a -¡state court. Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366, 370; Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U. S. 148.

Where one commences a criminal proceeding who is already party to a suit then pending in a court of equity, if the criminal proceedings are brought to enforce the same'right that is in issue before that court, the latter may enjoin such criminal proceedings.' Davis &c. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U. S. 207. In Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223-241, it is remarked by Mr. Justice Day, in delivering the 'Opinion of the court, that “it is well settled that where property rights, will be destroyed, unlawful interference by criminal proceedings under a void law or ordinance may be reached and. controlled by a court of equity.”' Smyth v. Ames (supra) distinctly enjoined the proceedings by indictment to compel obedience to the rate act.

These cases show that a court of equity is not always precluded- from granting an injunction to stay proceedings in criminal cases, and we have no doubt the principle appliés in a case such as the present. In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 211,-is not to the contrary. That case holds that in general a court of equity has no jurisdiction of a bill to stay criminal proceedings, but it expressly states an exception, “unless they are instituted by a party to the suit already pending before it and to try the same right that is in issue there.” Various authorities are cited to sustain the exception. The criminal proceedings here that could be commenced by the state authorities would-be under the statutes relating to passenger or freight rates, and their validity is the very question involved in the. suit in the United States Circuit Court. The right to Restrain proceedings by mandamus is- based upon the same foundation and governed by the same principles.

It is proper to add that the right to enjoin an individual, even .though a state official, from commencing suits under circumstances already stated, does not include the power to restrain a- court from acting in any case brought before it, either of a civil or criminal nature, nor does it include power to prevent any investigation or action by a grand jury. The latter body is part of the machinery of a criminal court, and an injunction against a state court would bé a violation of the whole scheme of our Government. If an injunction against an individual is disobeyed, and he. commences proceedings before a grand jury or in a court, such disobedience is personal only, and the court or jury can proceed without incurring any penalty on that account.

The difference between the power to enjoin an individual from doing certain things, and the power to enjoin courts from proceeding in their own way to exercise jurisdiction is plain, and no power to do the latter exists because of a power to do ■the former.

It is further objected that there is a plain and adequate remedy at law open to the complainants and that a court of equity, therefore, has no jurisdiction in such case. It has been suggested that the proper way to test the constitutionality of the act is to disobey it, at least once, after which the company might obey the act pending subsequent proceedings to test its validity. But in the event of a single violation the prosecutor might not avail himself, of the opportunity to make the test, as obedience to the law was thereafter continued, and he might think it unnecessary to start an inquiry. If, however, he should do so while the company was' thereafter obeying the law, several years might elapse before there was a final determination of the question, and if it should be determined that the law was invalid the 'property of the company would have been taken during that time without due process of law, and there would be no possibility of its recovery.

Another obstacle to making the test on the part of the company might be to find an agent ór employé who would disobey the law, with a possible fine and imprisonment staring him in the face if the act .should be held valid. Take the passenger rate act, for instance: A sale of a single ticket above the price mentioned in that act might subject the ticket agent to a charge of felony, and upon conviction to a fine of five thousand dollars and imprisonment for five years. It:is true the company might pay the fine, but the imprisonment the agent, would , have to suffer personally. It would not be wonderful if, under such circumstances, there would not be a crowd of agents offering to disobey the law. The wonder would be that a single agent should be found ready to take the risk.

If, however, one should be found and the prosecutor should elect to proceed against him, the defense that the act was invalid, because the ratés established. by it were too low, would require a long and difficult examination of quite complicated facts upon which the validity of the act dépended.' Such investigation it would be almost impossible to make before a jury, as such body could not intelligently pass upon the matter. Questions of the cost of transportation of pas- • sengers and freight, the net earnings of the road, the separation of the cost and earnings, within the State from those arising beyond its boundaries, all depending upon the testimony of experts and the examination of figures relating to these subjects, as well, possibly, as the expenses attending the building and proper cost of the road, would necessarily form the chief matter of inquiry, and intelligent answers- could only be given after a careful and prolonged examination of the whole evidence, and the making of calculations based thereon. All material evidence having been taken upon these issues, it has been held that it ought to be referred to the most competent and reliable master to make all needed computations and to find therefrom the necessary facts upon which a judgment might be rendered that might be reviewed by this court. Chicago &c. Railway Co. v. Tompkins, 176 U. S. 167. Prom all these considerations it is plain that this is not a proper suit for investigation by a jury. Suits for penalties, or indictment or other criminal proceedings for a violation of the act, would therefore furnish no reasonable or adequate opportunity for the presentation of a defense founded upon the assertion that the rates were too low and therefore the act invalid.

We do not say the company could not interpose this defense in an action to recover penalties or upon the trial of an indictment (St. Louis &c. Ry. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649), but the facility of proving it in either case falls so far below that which would obtain in a court of equity that comparison is scarcely possible.

To await proceedings against the company in a state court grounded upon a disobedience of the act, and then, if necessary, obtain a review in this court by writ of error to the highest state court, would place the company in peril of large loss and its agents in great risk of fines and imprisonment if it should be finally determined that the act was valid. This risk the company ought not to be required to' take. Over eleven thousand millions of dollars, it is estimated, are invested in railroad property, owned by many thousands of people who are scattered over the whole country from océan to .ocean, and they are entitléd to equal protection from the laws and from the courts, with the owners of all other kinds of property, no more, no less. The courts having jurisdiction, ‘ Federal or state, should at all times be open to them as well as to others, for. the purpose of protecting their property and their legal rights.

All the objections to a remedy at law as being plainly.inadequate are obviated by a suit in equity, making all-who are directly interested parties to the suit, and. enjoining the enforcement of the act until the decision of the court upon the legal'question.

An act .of the legislature'1 fixing .rates, either for passengers. or freight, is to be regarded las prima facie valid, and the onus rests upon the company to provedts assertion to the contrary. Under such circumstances it was stated by Mr. Justice Miller, in his concurring opinion in Chicago &c. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 460, that the proper, if not the only, mode of judicial relief against the tariff of rates established by the legislature or by its Commission is by a bill in chancery, asserting its unreasonable character, and that until the decree of the court in such equity suit was obtained it was not competent for' each individual having dealings with a carrier, or for the carrier in regard to each individual who demands its services, to raise a contest in the courts over the questions which ought to be settled in this general and conclusive manner. This remedy by bill in equity is referred to and approved by Mr. Justice Shiras, in delivering the opinion of the court in St. Louis &c. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649, 659, 666, although that question was not then directly before the court. Such remedy is undoubtedly the most convenient, the most comprehensive and the most orderly way in which the rights of all parties can be properly, fairly and adequately passed upon. It cannot be to the real interest of anyone to injure or cripple the resources of the railroad companies of the country, because the prosperity of both the railroads and the country is most intimately connected. The question of sufficiency of rates is important and controlling, and being of a judicial nature it ought to be settled at the earliest moment by some court, and when a Federal court first obtains jurisdiction it ought, on general-principles of jurisprudence, to be permitted to finish the inquiry and make a conclusive judgment to the exclusion of all other courts.x This is all that is claimed, and this, we think, must be admitted.

Finally it is objected that the necessary result of upholding this suit in the Circuit Court will be to draw to the lower Federal courts a great flood of litigation of this character, where one Federal judge would have it in his power to enjoin proceedings by state officials to enforce the legislative acts of the State, either by criminal or civil actions. To this it may be answered, in the .first place, that no injunction ought to be granted unless in a case reasonably free from doubt. We think such rule is, and will be, followed by all the judges of the Federal courts.

And, again, it must be remembered that jurisdiction of this general character has, in fact, been exercised by Federal courts from the time of Osborn v. United States Bank up to the present; the only difference in regard to the case of Osborn and thé case in hand being that in this case the injury complained of is the threatened commencement of suits, civil or criminal, to enforce the act, instead of, as in the Osborn case, an actual and direct trespass upon or interference with tangible property. A bill filed to prevent the commencement of suits to enforce an unconstitutional act, under the circumstances already mentioned, is no new invention, as we have already seen. The difference between an actual and direct interference with tangible property and the enjoining of state officers from enforcing an unconstitutional act, is not of a radical nature, and does not extend, in truth, the jurisdiction of the courts over the subject matter. In the case of the interference with property the person enjoined is assuming to act in his capacity as an official of the State, and justification for his interference is claimed by reason of his position as a state official. Such official cannot so justify when acting under an unconstitutional enactment of the legislature. So, where the state official, instead of directly interfering with tangible property, is abouj; to commence suits, which have for their object the enforcement of an act which violates the Federal Constitution, to the great and irreparable injury of the complainants, he is seeking the same justification from the authority of the State as in other cases. The sovereignty of the State is, in reality, no more involved in one case than in the other. The State cannot in either case impart to the official immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States. See In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 507.

This supreme authority, which arises from the specific provisions of the. Constitution itself, is nowhere more fully illustrated than- in the series of decisions under the Federal habeas corpus statute (§ 753, Rev. Stat.), in some of which cases persons in vthe custody of state officers for alleged crimes against the State have been taken from that custody and discharged by a Federal court or judge, because the imprisonment was adjudged to be in violation of the Federal Constitution. The right to so discharge has not been doubted by this court, and it has never been supposed there was any suit against the State by reason of serving the writ upon one of the officers of the State in whose custody the person was found. In some of tihe cases the writ has been refused as matter of discretion, but in others it has been granted, while the power has been fully recognized in all. Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241; In re Loney, 134 U. S. 372; In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1; Baker v. Grice, 169 U. S. 284; Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U. S. 276; Minnesota v. Brundage, 180 U. S. 499, 502; Reid v. Jones, 187 U. S. 153; United States v. Lewis, 200 U. S. 1; In re Lincoln, 202 U. S. 178; Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U. S. 179.

It is somewhat difficult to appreciate the distinction which, while admitting that the taking of such a person, from the. custody of the State by virtue of service of the writ on the state officer in whose custody he is found, is not a suit against the State, and yet service of a writ on the Attorney General to prevent his enforcing an unconstitutional enactment of a' state legislature is a suit against the State.

There is nothing in the case before us that ought properly to breed hostility to the customary operation of Federal courts Of justice in cases of this character.

The rule to show cause is discharged and the petition for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari is dismissed.

So ordered.